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Abstract 
A wide range of recent man-made and natural disasters has demonstrated the 
importance of managing disruption risk in global supply chains. This research 
argues that supply chain disruptions are, de facto, unavoidable and consequently all 
complex supply chains can be considered inherently risky. This research focuses on 
a relatively unexplored issue in supply chain risk management, asking and answering 
the question of how companies specifically use time to respond to catastrophic 
events of low probability but high impact.  Linking faster response lead-time with 
reduced impact, the goal is to identify and explore the underlying factors of 
managing disruption risk by answering how companies respond to supply chain 
disruptions.  In reducing total response time by detecting the event, designing 
solutions, and deploying a recovery plan sooner after a disruption, the company can 
reduce the impact of disruption risk.  
The research uses Grounded Theory methodology to extend an emerging 
framework on time-based supply chain risk management. Empirical data is used 
from a range of sources including interviews and corporate publications from the 
events faced by global pharmaceutical manufacturer during a pandemic in 2009. 
The emerging categories of possible factors in response time are further developed 
using data from the events surrounding the worst maritime oil spill in history in 
2010 under the management responsibility of the Exploration and Production 
(Upstream) division of a global energy company and from an industrial accident in 
2005 in the Refining and Marketing division of the same firm.  
The research identifies four categories of factors that companies can focus on to 
reduce response time in the face of catastrophic events of low probability and high 
impact: organisational structure, preparation, partnership and reserve. The research derives 
new insights, presented as four propositions that relate the response time in 
managing supply chain disruption to negative or potentially positive impact. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Research Background 
Supply chain risk is the probability of incurring a loss within the supply chain that is 
related to the logistics activities in companies’ flows of material and information 
(Ritchie & Brindley, 2007).  
Although awareness is increasing among practitioners and researchers, the concepts 
of supply chain vulnerability and its managerial counterpart, supply chain risk 
management (SCRM), are still in their infancy (Christopher et al., 2002). A number 
of researchers suggest that supply chain exposure to risk has increased in recent 
decades due to higher demand, globalisation of markets, market saturation and 
increased competition as well as shorter product life cycles. AMR Research found 
that more than 42% of the surveyed companies managed more than five different 
supply chains in 2006, mainly due to the need to produce multiple products for 
multiple markets. These developments have led to higher exposure to risks in the 
supply chain of global firms (Christopher et al., 2002). Supply chains must adapt to 
these forces to stay competitive but at the same time will thereby increase their 
exposure to different forms of risk (Christopher et al., 2002; Faisal et al, 2006; 
Hallikas et al., 2002; Handfield & Nichols, 1999; Sodhi & Tang, 2009). 
Initiatives in supply chain optimisation – such as minimising stock – can exacerbate 
the likelihood or impact of unanticipated events, for example, sharp increase in 
demand, production or supply-side failure. Moreover, mitigation strategies 
addressing one type of risk can have an adverse affect on another type of risk to the 
supply chain  (Chopra & Sodhi, 2004). This suggests managers must find a balanced 
approach between their strategies for supply chain management and for supply 
chain risk management. 
Failure to manage supply chain risks effectively can have a major impact on an 
organisation (Mitchell, 1995). The negative impact is not only from financial loss 
but also reduction in product quality, delivery delays, damage to property and 
equipment, and loss of reputation among customers, suppliers and the public 
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(Cousins et al., 2004). As Hendricks and Singhal (2003, 2005) documented, not only 
can the failure to manage supply chain risks effectively lead to a sharp drop in an 
organisation’s share price, which can be slow to recover, it can also generate conflict 
amongst the organisation’s stakeholders. 
There are many unexpected and unpredictable disruptions in the last few years that 
highlight the vulnerability of supply chains. Ericsson lost GBP 240 Million in 2000 
due to fire at a supplier’s semiconductor plant in Albuquerque, New Mexico and 
the lack of alternative supply channels. Apple lost a significant number of orders 
following supply interruptions due to an earthquake in Taiwan in 1999. Land Rover 
laid off 1,400 workers after their supplier became insolvent in 2001. The 
longshoremen’s strike in California in 2002, and the outbreak of SARS in 2003, and 
‘triple play’ disaster of earthquake, tsunami and nuclear crisis in northern Japan in 
April 2011 are further examples of events that paralysed supply chain flows. The 
impacts of such disruptions can be catastrophic.  Disruption is inherently difficult 
or impossible to predict, whether due to man-made causes such as terrorism (World 
Trade Center attack in 2011), military action (Kuwait in 1990) or natural events 
such as hurricane (Katrina, destroying New Orleans in 2005) and disease (UK foot 
and mouth disease in 2001 and 2007 and recently the H1N1 Influenza pandemic in 
2009) and have the power to disrupt or cause uncertainty in supply chains (Elliott, 
2005; Peck & Juttner, 2002).  
A disruption to supplies in one country can quickly spread through an entire global 
supply chain (Harland et al., 2003).  There is evidence that economic, political and 
social developments over the past decade appear to be increasing the risk of supply 
chain disruptions as supply chains are getting longer and more complex and are 
involving more partners due to the increase in global sourcing (Hendricks & 
Singhal, 2005). A case in point is the sharp increase in world oil prices as a 
consequence of the disruption of US oil production brought about by hurricane 
Katrina (Elliott, 2005). Supply chain disruption can potentially be very costly, and 
Rice and Caniato (2003) stated that the financial impact of a supply chain disruption 
is difficult to predict.  
The importance of supply chain risk management has been recognised by 
organisations and researchers because of the short-term effects (negative publicity, 
low consumer confidence, loss in market share) and long-term effects (stock prices 
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and equity risk) (Sodhi & Tang, 2009; Hendricks & Singhal, 2005). Seeing risk as an 
important issue in the supply chain, Harland et al. (2004) recommend that supply 
chain risk management should focus on positioning the organisation to try to avoid 
such events and to develop strategies to manage the impact of them should 
avoidance not be possible. If the supply chain risks can be effectively and efficiently 
managed, considerable benefits can accrue not only to companies and their 
shareholders but also to their suppliers and their end customers. 
1.2 The General Problem Area  
The concept of supply chain risk management emerged in the early 1980s. Kraljic 
published one of the first articles in this field entitled ‘Purchasing must become 
supply management’ in 1983 (Paulsson, 2004). As the field supply chain risk 
management is even today still in the development stage, most literature focuses on 
explaining the importance of supply chain risk management, defining what supply 
chain risk is, what are the sources of supply chain risk and how to manage risk.  
Notably, there is no unified theory or framework defined on how organisations can 
manage supply chain disruption risk. In a complex business environment, 
unfavourable surprises and unexpected events are not just an exception but have 
become the norm (Ansoff, 1975; Perrow, 1984). Nevertheless, recent studies have 
revealed a lack of implementation of supply chain risk management (Juttner, 2005; 
Mitroff & Alpaslan, 2003). Moreover, the literature on supply chain risk is quite 
limited due in part to ambiguous taxonomy. Many publications attempt to clarify 
the definition of relevant terms in the area of applied risk management and security 
(Craighead et al., 2007; Harland, Brenchley & Walker, 2003; Ritchie & Brindley, 
2007). 
In the past several years, researchers have developed a number of different models 
to manage supply chain risks (Christopher, 2002; Chopra & Sodhi, 2004; Lee, 2004; 
Sheffi, 2005; and Tang, 2006), using a range of ideas and techniques to identify, 
analyse and mitigate the effects of disruption.  Focus on risk has led to suggest a 
new approach to supply chain strategy which goes beyond, for example, cost 
reduction and time-based competition, to address product characteristics, 
production and distribution strategies, and a partnership approach to suppliers and 
customers (Chopra & Sodhi, 2004; Tang, 2006a).  These strategies can be more 
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effective, and executed with lower negative impact, when deployed using time 
focussed risk management. This also suggests that early warning before an event, or 
the escalation of a disruption, can contribute to a more effective handling of 
catastrophic events.  
1.3 Aim of the Research 
Overall the goal is to contribute to theory building of supply chain risk management 
resulting in a framework and propositions for further study. Using a risk framework 
and the outcome of the research, the aim is to support general theory and 
specifically prescribe an approach to management of risk that explicitly incorporates 
the role of time. This could serve as the basis for further field validation and can 
also be assessed for the impact on theory building in related fields of supply chain 
risk management. 
The specific goal is to understand companies’ response to disruption. I seek to 
analyse, outline and categorise possible factors that underlie response.  These are 
summarised as a set of propositions for further study, which can explore and 
validate specific drivers of event detection and response.  
1.4 Potential Contribution 
The contribution of this study is in providing a deeper understanding of the factors 
that organisations can manage to reduce the impact of disruption risk. By explicitly 
addressing the role of time reducing the impact of disruption, this contributes to the 
development of an integrated framework of supply chain risk management 
incorporating total supply chain cost, time and risk.  
This research also adds to the existing literature on supply chain risk management 
by empirically exploring the ways in which the components of time create value for 
managing supply chain risk based on time-based risk management concept. 
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1.5 Structure of the Report 
Chapter 1 – provides background information regarding supply chain risk 
management in order to set the scene for the study and gives an overview of the 
thesis. 
Chapter 2 – presents an overview of relevant research on risk and risk 
management, business continuity, crisis management, risk and supply chain 
management, time-based management and theoretical approaches behind the 
research. The chapter aims to review the emerging knowledge of supply chain risk 
management and supply chain disruption to identify a research gap to be addressed 
by this study. Finally, the research gap, research questions and emerging conceptual 
framework on time-based risk management (Sodhi & Tang, 2009) are addressed. 
The framework is used to argue that if a firm can shorten its response time by 
deploying a recovery plan soon after a disruption, the firm can reduce the impact of 
the disruption by way of faster recovery. The time-based framework provides the 
structure and a lens with which to organize the data analysis, consistent with the 
methodology described in the next chapter. 
Chapter 3 – provides an overview of the relevant research methodology for this 
study, Grounded Theory, along with perspectives in the literature in its evolution 
and options in application. This methodology is well suited for qualitative data 
analysis based on contemporary events.  In this study, a Straussian approach to 
Grounded Theory is taken, which lends itself to the time-based risk management 
framework as a starting point for data collection and analysis. The methodology 
used can be viewed as abductive, building and validating the initial emerging 
structures derived from the initial study with data taken from subsequent sources. 
The three major data sources used in this study are presented in the following 
chapters along with the initial and revised findings. 
For each event under study here, the causal relationship of decisions taken prior to 
the disruption and the event itself are investigated, with a particular focus on how 
the firms detected and responded to the event. Data is then analysed by coding 
through summarisation, reduced to group similar codes in major categories and 
finally synthesised to a set of propositions on factors underlying disruption 
response. 
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Chapter 4 – provides an introduction and background of the first exploratory case, 
that of a global pharmaceutical company (referred to in this study as PHARMA) 
during the H1N1 Influenza Pandemic in 2009. The novel Influenza strain, H1N1, 
commonly known as swine flu, had fast transmission but unknown mortality at the 
outset, resulting in a dramatic spike in demand for PHARMA’s antiviral and related 
medicines. PHARMA’s handling of the Influenza pandemic declared in April 2009 
is reviewed by an analysis of interviews of key management, company internal and 
public documentation.  
Chapter 5 – provides a detailed analysis of the qualitative data using Grounded 
Theory obtained from PHARMA. Data was taken from interviews, team 
conference calls and meetings, during the event, corporate reports and plans before 
and after the pandemic. Open coding was used to code and group similar actions 
and description of factors that companies should focus on to reduce response time. 
The four potential categories of factors that underlie the firm time-based response 
to handing such an events were discovered: Preparation (warning, stress test, 
modelling, planning and training), Partnership (external communication, 
relationship with competitors, government, agencies and business partners), 
Organisation (teamwork, internal communication, roles and responsibilities and 
learning), and Reserve (employee capacity, production capacity, supplier capacity, 
product design and solution design).   
Chapter 6 – presents the first stage of the constant comparative analysis by looking 
in depth at how the BP Upstream division, its contractual suppliers and various 
government agencies responded to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of 
Mexico in 2010. 
Chapter 7 – describing the background and the analysis from BP Refining and 
Marketing divisions’ handling of a fatal explosion at their Texas City Refinery in 
2005, in which 15 workers were killed and 180 injured, resulting in an extensive 
review of BP and industry operations. 
These two additional disruption events from BP serve to validate the initial 
categories and codes developed in PHARMA. 
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Chapter 8 – presents the confirmed core categories in detail. It discusses how the 
core categories, their properties (sub-categories), and links between categories were 
integrated. It also provides an explanation as to how these four categories affected 
response speed. Finally, it illustrates how these four categories in related with time-
based risk management framework. The findings show that the presence  – or lack 
of – these factors can have an impact on the response speed for the effective 
management of disruption. By giving examples of what actions the companies took 
at each stage shows that these factors can help the company reduce detection time, 
design time, and deploy time. 
Chapter 9 – presents the conclusions of the study and four propositions that relate 
the response time in managing supply chain disruptions to have a negative or 
potentially positive impact. The propositions augment the existing knowledge 
related to response and support hypothesis testing for further research in the field 
of supply chain risk management. This concludes with a perspective of the 
implications of these findings from a theoretical and managerial view, along with 
the limitations of the study and recommendations for future research in the area. 
 
  
Chapter 2 
Literature Review &  
Research Question 
2.1 Risk and Risk Management 
2.1.1 Risk  
The first known theoretical contribution to understanding risk was made by Blaise 
Pascal and Pierre de Fermat, who in the 17th century studied gambling from a 
mathematical perspective (Frosdick, 1997). Development of probability theory 
followed, based substantially on their initial mathematical work (Bernstein, 1996). 
For approximately the next 200 years, risk management continues to be mostly 
applied to gambling.  
The insurance industry was the first to embrace risk management (Moore, 1983), 
which was then followed by a broader use across various industries and corporate 
functions in the mid-20th century (Grose, 1992; Snider, 1991). For example, risk 
management was applied to purchasing by Robinson et al. (1967) and their 
development of the Buy Grid model. More recently, transaction cost economics 
developed by Williamson (1979) highlighted the relationship between transaction 
cost risks and degree of uncertainty in the customer and supplier interaction, as 
increased dependency on a supplier could cause a supplier to act opportunistically 
by increasing prices. According to Moore (1983), risk consists of two basic 
components, namely the range of outcomes and the likelihood distribution of these 
outcomes.  In Williamson’s work, transaction cost economics is closely linked to 
Moore’s definition of risk, exemplified by the supplier/customer relationship where, 
for example, a loosely controlled contractual relationship will have the tendency to 
increase opportunistic behaviour.  
According to Zsidisin (2003), the concept of risk has been the subject of extensive 
studies in numerous business settings, such as managerial decision making (March 
& Shapira, 1987; Yates & Stone, 1992; Shapira 1995), strategy (Ruefli et al., 1999; 
Sitkin & Pablo, 1992), operations (Newman et al., 1993; Pagell & Krause, 1999), 
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accounting (Ash-ton, 1998; Baucus et al., 1993), finance (Ho & Pike, 1992; Chow & 
Denning, 1994) and distribution (Celly & Frazier, 1996).  
Risk is not only about outcomes and likelihood of occurrences, but also about 
choices and behaviour when facing these (Bernstein 1996). The choices made in a 
supplier/ customer relationship and the level of integration can be mutually 
rewarding (Burnes & Dale, 1998; Burnes & New, 1996; Womack et al., 1990) 
however they can also be risky if opportunistic behaviour takes over (Cousins et al., 
2004). Therefore risk – and the choices made when facing risk – comprises the fear 
of losing and the hope of gaining (Moore, 1983). Within organisations and their 
management practices, the negative aspects of risk have however been dominant 
(Hood & Young, 2005; March & Shapira, 1987).  
The Royal Society (1992) defines risk as ‘a combination of the probability, or 
frequency, of occurrence of a defined hazard and the magnitude of the 
consequences of the occurrence’, which is similar to Rowe (1980), Lowrance (1980) 
and Simon et al., (1997) definition that defined risk is a measure of the probability 
of unwanted negative consequence to arise from a specific event.  
Sitkin and Pablo (1992, p.10) reflect this in their generalised definition of risk as 
being ‘the extent to which there is uncertainty about whether potentially significant 
and/or disappointing outcomes of decision will be realized.’  
Most definitions of risk encompass three common elements: (1) the likelihood of 
occurrence of a particular event or outcome; (2) consequences of the particular 
event or outcome occurring; and (3) the exposure or causal pathway leading to the 
event (MacCrimmon & Wehrung, 1986).  
The first element of risk is the likelihood of occurrence, also called probability that 
can be measured in objective or subjective terms. Two schools of thought regarding 
risk likelihood or probability are found in the literature. In one view, risk can be 
treated scientifically as an observable, measurable factor (Lupton, 1999). From an 
objective perspective, risk is tangible and static in its form. It can be evaluated and 
analysed by using statistical methods and tools applied to known quantifiable data 
(Covello & Merkhofer, 1993). Others argue that risk is perceptive, subject to social 
context and interpretation with sensitivities determined by socio-political and 
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historical factors (Bernstein, 1996; Frosdick, 1997; Moore, 1983; Spira & Page, 
2002; Yates & Stone, 1992).  
Yates and Stone (1992:p.5), for example, see the argument that risk must be treated 
as subjective as it involves ‘an interaction between the alternative and the risk taker.’ 
They maintain that the nature of any potential loss, its significance and the 
estimated chance of its occurring, are personal to the individuals concerned, for 
example the result of risk-taking can be perceived as positive by some but negative 
by others. Since the likelihood and consequences are specific to the individuals, 
where each can benefit or lose according to their own context and hence perceive 
risk individually, risk must be subjective. Risk is not, therefore according to Yates 
and Stone, an objective factor in decision making. 
Thomas Bayes, an English clergyman and mathematician, took a similar view. He 
viewed risk as a product of perceptions: ‘probability is a number of expressing a 
state of knowledge or degree of belief that depends on the information, experience 
and theories of the individual who assigns it’ (Covello, 1993: p.209). This 
perspective therefore requires information that is unrelated to the available data. 
When applying an objective view of risk, the evaluation of probability will be 
subject to fitting the real world into mathematical concepts and statistical methods 
(Vesely, 1984). This may result in a somewhat artificial interpretation of the real 
world to be matched with the structure and constraints of mathematical and 
theoretical models. But also the subjective view generates its specific challenges, 
namely that the risk and probability evaluation will be subject to the assumptions of 
the analyst and the interpretation of information. Hence analysts will typically arrive 
at different conclusions to the same information.  
The second element of risk is the consequence of the particular event or outcome, 
which should not simply be regarded as only negative, since ‘the essence of risk 
taking is the potential opportunity to produce positive outcomes’ (Blume, 1971). 
The causal pathway is the third element of risk, which is an understanding of the 
sources, cause and nature of factors that in turn influence the likelihood, nature and 
scale of consequences, whether positive or negative. 
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2.1.2 Risk and Uncertainty 
In 1921, Knight established an important distinction between risk and uncertainty. 
From his book Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, situations displaying risk are those 
where decision-makers are faced with unknown outcomes but with known 
probability distributions before the event. In his view, risks can be anticipated and 
priced in competitive markets; therefore associated profits are competed away. Risk 
is measurable in the sense that estimates can be made of the probabilities of the 
outcome. On the other hand, uncertainty concerns the unforeseeable elements in 
markets, and by definition those elements are not fully priced or factored into a 
firm’s decision. It is not quantifiable and the probabilities of the possible outcome 
are not known. 
Slack and Lewis (2001) describe ‘uncertainty as a key driver of risk but argue that 
managers are able to measure and change their exposure to risk through the 
development of prevention, mitigation and recovery strategies. Whilst these do not 
eliminate uncertainty, they do enable managers to reduce the risks which might arise 
from uncertainty.’ 
Knight (1921) viewed the superior source of profit to be random beyond the 
control of companies however Schoemaker (2002, p.12) argued, ‘uncertainty might 
indeed create opportunities as the firm can be favoured by chance and organisations 
can be designed to profit from uncertainty through superior anticipation, flexible 
strategies, and dynamic monitoring.’ Therefore, in summary risk can be measurable 
and manageable while uncertainty cannot. 
2.1.3 Risk Management 
The International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) defined risk management 
in ISO31000: 2009 as ‘coordinated activities to direct and control an organisation 
with regard to risk.’ A list of risk management definition by numerous authors is 
presented in Table 1.  
Risk management has become a main part of many organisational activities and its 
main aim is to help all other management activities achieve the organisation’s aims 
directly and efficiently (Tchankova, 2002).  
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The actual process of risk management normally begins by assessing two factors: 
first, the likelihood of specific events occurring, and second, the consequences 
should the events actually occur (Cox & Townsend, 1998). Between academics 
there is a general consensus on the phases of the process of managing risk, whereas 
each phase or step sometimes is coined differently. A review of the literature by 
White (1995) suggests that the process of risk assessment in Figure 1 usually 
consists of three stages: (1) risk identification – determining all risk factors that are 
likely to occur on a project (2) risk analysis – understanding the likelihood and 
extent of the most significant risks and (3) risk evaluation – deciding on the most 
appropriate management response for each risk and which party is most 
appropriate to manage each of the risks identified. 
The risk management process in ISO 31000 is illustrated in Figure 2, comprising of 
five key activities: communication and consultation, establishing context, risk 
assessment, risk treatment and monitoring and review (Table 2). 
 
Year Authors Definition 
1989 Dickson (1989) The identification, analysis and control of  those risks, 
which can threaten the assets, or earning capacity of  an 
enterprise. 
1992 The Royal Society The making and implementing of  decisions regarding 
risks and their subsequent implementation, and flows 
from risk estimation and risk evaluation. It focused on 
understanding risks and mitigating the impact of  risks 
by reducing the likelihood of  their occurrence and/or 
the avoidance of  their consequences. To manage risk 
means to avoid, reduce, transfer or share risk.  
1995 The British Standards 
Institution 
The process whereby decisions are made to accept a 
known or assessed risk and/or the implementation of  
actions to reduce the consequences or probability of  
occurrence. 
2000 Fone and Young  
 
A general management function that seeks to assess and 
address risks in the context of  the overall aims of  the 
organisations. 
Table 1: Definition of Risk Management 
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Figure 1: The Process of Risk Assessment 
Source: White (1995) 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The Risk Management Process 
Source: ISO 3100: 2009 
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Key activities Description 
Communication and 
consultation 
Engaging internal and external stakeholders throughout the risk 
management process.  
Establishing context 
 
Setting parameters or boundaries around the organisation’s risk 
appetite and risk management activities. The results of  this context 
are risk management policy, processes, methods and reporting 
processes. 
Risk assessment Overall process of  identifying, analysing and evaluating risks.  
Risk identification is a process of  finding, recognising and describing 
risks. Identification techniques including brainstorming, work 
breakdown analysis, and expert facilitation.  
Risk analysis is a process to comprehend the nature of  risk and to 
determine the level of  risk. It considers possible causes, sources, 
likelihood and consequences to establish the inherent risk.  
Risk evaluation is a process of  comparing the results of  risk analysis 
with risk criteria to determine whether the risk and/or its magnitude 
are acceptable or tolerable.  
Risk treatment Process to modify risk. Risk treatment can involve avoiding the risk by 
deciding not to start or continue with the activity that gives rise to the 
risk, taking or increasing risk in order to pursue an opportunity, 
removing the risk source or changing the likelihood. 
Monitoring and review Process of  continual checking, supervising, critically observing or 
determining the status in order to identify change from the 
performance level required or expected, keeping the risk management 
framework relevant to the changing needs of  the organisation and 
external influences.  
Table 2: The Risk Management Process 
Source: Adapted from ISO 3100:2009 
2.2 Business Continuity  
The disciplines of risk management and business continuity management (BCM) 
share similarities, but there are important differences found in the general 
consensus among practitioners. Whereas risk management has the primary focus on 
assessing and managing known risks, BCM has been developed primarily by 
practitioners to minimise the effects of unanticipated events on the firm’s ability to 
meet customer requirements (Zsidisin et al., 2005).  It is also focussed on keeping 
the business going and mitigating consequences no matter the type of event or risk 
that occurs with a possible negative impact on business activities (Hiles & Barnes, 
2001).  
Business continuity management is defined as  ‘…the development of strategies, 
plans and actions which provide protection or alternative modes of operation for 
those activities or business processes which, if they were to be interrupted, might 
otherwise bring about a seriously damaging or potentially fatal loss to the enterprise 
(Hiles & Barnes, 2001).   
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According to CMI (2002), BCM includes crisis management (the overall process to 
manage an incident), disaster recovery (recovery of critical systems, applications, 
data and networks), business recovery (recovery of critical business processes) and 
contingency planning (recovery from impact external to the organisation).  
There is, as mentioned an overlap between risk management and BCM but the 
definitions are being debated and one group of practitioners argues that risk 
management is a part of BCM whereas another claims the opposite. A third group 
claims that they are indeed distinct from each other. The consensus seems however 
to be that risk management is about responding to specific identified risks, while 
BCM is about responding to unknown risks and events. 
Waters (2007) divided the process in BCM into six main steps: initiate the process 
of BCM; define the requirements of BCM and develop a strategy to achieve them; 
identify the risks and assess their probability and impact; prepare the business 
continuity plan; implement the business continuity plan; monitor and control the 
business continuity plan.  
According to Christopher et al. (2002), the UK government is demanding that BCM 
processes are established across all departments and agencies following the terrorist 
attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. Regulators also place 
demands on industry to establish effective risk management, specifically those risks 
which cannot be eliminated. There is also an acceptance that many of these risks are 
inherent within the supply networks. Accordingly, BCM can be considered as an 
effective tool in assisting in the management of these risks. 
2.3 Crisis Management 
A related field, Crisis Management, is covered by a number of academic authors in 
an extensive body of theory and literature (Elliott & Smith, 1993; Hazarika, 1987; 
Quarantelli, 1998; Reason, 1997; Smith, 1990). 
In the organisational literature, crisis is defined as follows: ‘an organisational crisis is 
a low-probability, high-impact event that threatens the viability of the organisation 
and is characterised by ambiguity of cause, effect, and means of resolution, as well 
as by a belief that decisions must be made swiftly’ (Pearson & Clair, 1998 p.60). 
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The process of crisis management is often seen by some organisations in terms of 
the process of business continuity management (Elliott et al., 2002) and, as such, 
has a focus on the development of contingency plans to cope with a range of ‘crisis’ 
scenarios.  
According to Smith (2005), the term ‘crisis management’ may itself be problematic 
as it could be seen to overemphasise the processes of contingency planning and 
business continuity. However, the ‘crisis’ literature can be seen to encompass work 
that is concerned with the prevention of crises as well as with the contingency 
responses that organisations can make to the threat of such risks. Thus, a definition 
of crisis depends on the context in which it is being used and the researcher’s 
discipline (Preble, 1997).  
Fink (1986, p.15) suggests that planning to avoid a crisis ‘… is the art of removing 
much of the risk and uncertainty to allow you to achieve more control over your 
own destiny’. According to Fink (1986, p.20-28), a crisis consists of four stages: (1) 
Prodromal [forerunning] crisis stage – the early warning stage when the organisation 
gets a first glimpse of the potential of the crisis to come; (2) Acute crisis stage – 
begins once the damage has begun; (3) Chronic crisis stage – begins when the 
organisation tries to recover from the crisis, identify its vulnerabilities and learn 
from the failures and success of its response; and (4) Crisis resolution stage – begins 
when the organisation comes back to normality and resumes full functionality. 
Effective crisis planning aims at identifying the early warning signals for the crisis, 
even if occasionally the prodrome may be oblique and much harder to recognise, or 
is evident but no action is taken (Paraskevas, 2006).    
2.4 Risk and Supply Chain Management 
2.4.1 Supply Chain Management 
It is clearly stated that logistics management is a part of supply chain management 
(SCM) from a definition of logistics modified by the Council of Logistics 
Management (1998) ‘Logistics is that part of the supply chain process that plans, 
implements, and controls the efficient, effective flow and storage of goods, services, 
and related information from the point of origin to the point of consumption in 
order to meet customers’ requirements.’ 
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The concept of supply chain management has been increasingly discussed among 
logistics practitioners and researchers since the mid-1980s (e.g. Houlihan, 1985; 
Jones & Riley, 1985) and lately companies have also started to work according to its 
principles.  The term SCM first appeared in 1982, according to a literature review by 
Cooper et al. (1997). Since the early 1990s, SCM has been distinguished in academic 
studies from logistics management as focus has shifted from inventory reduction in 
the single firm to total network and inter-firm optimisation.  Throughout the 
research literature there are two distinctive views on defining SCM. The first view 
extends the definition of traditional logistics management beyond single enterprise 
boundaries and the original focus on material movement. This view on SCM, found 
in many early logistics management textbooks, emphasises that ‘operational 
effectiveness’ is the key to competitive advantage (Bowersox et al., 1996).  
Swaminathan et al. (1996) defined SCM as managing ‘a network of autonomous or 
semi-autonomous business entities collectively responsible for procurement, 
manufacturing and distribution activities associated with one or more families of 
related products.’ 
On the other hand, the second view on defining SCM is from the wider perspective 
of integrated business processes and strategic management of the complete set of 
activities and organisations and their links, such as communication. This view of 
SCM was suggested by Porter (1985), in which linking different functions could 
create ‘value’. In his view, value is added by improving information and control, 
coordinating related activities, and optimising total costs across multiple activities to 
reduce enterprise transaction costs rather than sub-optimising logistics or other 
functions. In line with Porter, Cooper et al. (1998) note that ‘for companies to 
survive and prosper, they will need to operate their supply chains as extended 
enterprises with relationships which embrace business processes, from material 
extraction to consumption.’  
Reinforcing this definition of SCM, Greis et al. (1997) defined SCM as ‘an 
integrated group of strategically aligned organisations in the supply chain, focused 
on specific market opportunities. This idea of extended enterprise is based on 
mutual benefit which requires co-operation and collaboration among partners.’  
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This evolution in the definition of SCM has two primary drivers, according to 
Cooper et al. (1997):  First is the shift toward process-oriented business 
management in place of the functional view of the organisation. Second, as 
mentioned earlier, is the significant difference in the perception of SCM as having a 
broader management scope than only logistics. 
The second view of SCM definition carries more weight on strategic management 
and marketing perspective than the first view, which makes it widely accepted 
among researchers. According to Christopher (1992), a key characteristic of supply 
chain management is the coordination of activities between these interdependent 
organisations. He defines SCM from the above perspective as ‘the management of 
upstream and downstream relationships with suppliers and customers in order to 
create enhanced value in the final market place at less cost to the supply chain as a 
whole.’ Giunipero et al. (1996) defined SCM thus: ‘in its broadest contest SCM is a 
strategic management tool used to enhance overall customer satisfaction that is 
intended to improve a firm’s competitiveness and profitability.’ By the same token, 
Mentzer et al. (2001) defined SCM as ‘the systemic, strategic coordination of the 
traditional business functions and the tactics across these business functions within 
the supply chain, for the purpose of improving the long-term performance of the 
individual companies and the supply chain as a whole.’  
Given the definitions above, for the purposes of this research, the definition of 
Supply Chain Management by Tang (2005) is as follows: ‘Supply chain management 
is the management of material, information and financial flows through a network 
of organisations (i.e. suppliers, manufacturers, logistics providers, wholesalers, 
distributors, retailers) that aims to produce and deliver products or services for the 
consumers. It includes the coordination and collaboration of processes and 
activities across different functions such as marketing, sales, production, product 
design, procurement, logistics, finance, and information technology within the 
network of organisations’ (Tang, 2005). Figure 3shows the overall picture of supply 
chain flows. 
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Figure 3: Supply Chain Management 
 
According to Lambert and Cooper (2000) and Mentzer et al. (2001), a key 
component for Supply Chain Management is to share both risks and rewards 
between members of the supply chain.  
2.4.2 Supply Chain Risk 
Risky events intrinsically make the global supply chain and logistic network 
vulnerable. In the 1980s, the risk was said to be created by the inter-connected 
material flows, information and funds in the network of firms (Kraljic, 1983; 
Treleven, 1988). It was recently that the phenomenon triggered interest from many 
scholars and practitioners. An increasing amount of literature (e.g., Ritter, Barrett & 
Wilson, 2007; Sheffi, 2005; Zsidisin & Ritchie, 2009) provides case studies relating 
to the events that caused disruption of supply chain, logistics networks, and 
transportation and operations. Also, many publications propose best practices and 
risk management concepts that could help a company create more robust supply 
chains, logistics networks, and transportation operations.    
There are two major factors underlying these increasing interests in the topic. First, 
the risk of unexpected adverse events with which firms must cope is increasing in 
terms of frequency, intensity and diversity (Coleman, 2006; Helferich & Cook, 
2002). The potential for supply chain disruption as well as its magnitude has 
increased (Elkins et al., 2005) as shown in the crises and disasters which happened 
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in the past ten years such as the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in 2001, 
Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the swine flu pandemic in 2009, and the earthquake and 
tsunami in Japan in 2011. These disasters reveal that many supply chain networks 
have a low level of preparedness and therefore force logistics managers to 
reconsider their supply chain security and risk management processes. 
Second, the business model of modern supply chains, logistics networks, and 
transportation operations can increase the impact from unexpected adverse events 
to companies. For example, the logistic service provider industry has changed 
remarkably over the past 15 years. Increasing competition, globalisation of markets, 
and expansion of international trade have put more pressure on individual 
companies to increase collaboration with their supply chain partners. This makes 
supply chains more complex and also increases the level of dependency between 
supply chain entities. As a result, it increases the level of threat in supply chains to 
adverse events that could happen to any entity in supply chains (Kleindorfer & van 
Wassenhove, 2004; Sarathy, 2006). This idea is supported by literature in 
organisational science which states that companies have a greater tendency to be 
affected by accidents and disruptions because of their complex, tightly coupled, and 
technology-oriented processes (Lin et al., 2006).  
Supply chain risk is predominantly used in both the literature on supply disruption 
as well as general concepts of various events, situations, potential threats, or 
uncertainties. Authors from different areas use the term risk to refer to different 
issues when addressing different audiences. Wagner and Bode (2009) commented 
that there is no right or wrong definition; there is just a more or less appropriate 
definition for each specific situation. The definition of risk can generally be 
interpreted in two ways: (1) risk as both danger and opportunity, and (2) risk as 
danger only (Mitchell, 1995).   
The first notion sees risk as variability around the mean of a measure (Arrow, 1965). 
Therefore, there is both downside and upside potential. 
In contrast, the second notion only perceives the downside potential of risk. The 
definitions of risk in most dictionaries will also see risk as having only negative 
consequences. In addition, many empirical studies find that this notion is more 
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consistent with perception as the majority of people tend to perceive solely the 
negative potential of risk (March & Shapira, 1987).  
These two general views on risk have been discussed and applied when authors 
defined the term ‘supply chain risk’. While Juttner, Peck and Christopher (2003) 
defined supply chain risk following the first notion of definition of risk, Harland, 
Brenchley and Walker (2003) defined supply chain risk as associated with the 
chance of undesired consequence such as danger, damage, injury and loss. 
According to the literature in the area, perceiving risk as purely negative is most 
suitable to the business reality. The consequences can be either indirect or direct, 
and can provide major or minor performance objectives (Bode et al., 2007). 
Despite the lack of a generally accepted definition of risks in the supply chain (Baird 
& Thomas, 1990, p.26), March and Shapira (1987) put forward that risk is defined 
as ‘variation in the distribution of possible outcomes, their likelihoods and their 
subjective values’. In the supply chain, the primary driver of risk centres on the 
disruption of the flow of information, materials, products and capital. These flows 
are interdependent and by definition extend beyond the boundaries of a single firm. 
To be effective, any approach to risk management in the supply chain must take 
into consideration the performance of these key management processes in a 
network of organisational entities. This approach acknowledges that objectives may 
not be aligned and therefore risk management should incorporate persuasion, 
negotiation and bargaining and reflect the mutual dependencies within and between 
organisational entities. 
Supply chain risk is the probability of incurring a loss within a supply chain that is 
related to the logistics activities in companies’ flow of material and information 
(Ritchie & Brindley, 2007). Likewise, Zsidisin (2005) defined supply chain risk as 
the potential occurrence of an accident or failure to seize opportunities with 
inbound supply in which the outcome results in a financial loss for the firm. 
2.4.3 Type of Supply Chain Risk 
Many frameworks for supply chain risk are found in the literature. According to 
Tang and Tomlin (2007), supply chain risks are categorised into six types: supply 
risks, process risks, demand risks, intellectual property risks, behavioural risks and 
political/social risks. Chopra and Sodhi (2004) extend this to nine categories of risk:  
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delays, systems, forecast, intellectual property, procurement, receivables, inventory, 
capacity and disruptions. Cousins et al. (2004) have a simpler model, suggesting that 
companies are exposed to two main types of supply chain: ‘technological risk’ – 
over-reliance on a single or limited source of a product, process or technology; and 
‘strategic risk’ – over-reliance on a single or limited number of suppliers.  
Other suggested categories of risk included environmental, demand and supply, 
process and control risks (Mason-Jones & Towill, 1998), and supply market, 
supplier, regulatory and supply strategy risks (Minahan, 2005). Johnson (2001) 
divides supply chain risks into supply risks (e.g. capacity limitations, currency 
fluctuations and supply disruptions) and demand risks (e.g. seasonal imbalance, 
volatility of fads, new products). Merna and Smith (1999) also give an extensive list 
of supply chain risks, which are strategic, natural, political, economic, physical, 
supply, market, transport, products, operations, financial, information, organisation, 
management, planning, human, technical, criminal, safety, environment and local 
permits. 
Christopher et al. (2002) classified risks in supply chains into two different types: 
supply chain risks and external risks. ‘Supply chain risks’ arise from interaction 
between organisations along the chain. Such supply chain risks result from a lack of 
visibility, lack of ownership, chaos, just-in-time practice and inaccurate forecasting. 
On the other hand, ‘external risks’ arise from environmental uncertainties. Such 
risks include disruptions caused by strikes, terrorism and natural catastrophes. Thus, 
external risks are ‘risks to the various links in the supply chains’ (Souter, 2000). 
Although both have independent sources, simultaneous occurrence of both risks 
and the interactions between them intensifies damage to the supply chain.  
Mason-Jones and Towill (1998) refine this model by describing the three categories:  
(1) Internal risks are inherent or arise directly from management decisions, or arise 
from operations within the organisation such as delays and breakdown; (2) Supply 
chain risks that arise from the interactions between members of the supply chain, 
external to the organisation, but within the supply chain, such as risk from suppliers 
or consumers; (3) Risks external to the supply chain that arise from interactions 
with its environment such as natural disaster, legislation pressure groups, wars, etc. 
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Waters (2007) stated that internal risks are generally less dramatic: ‘Internal risks are 
the risks to operations that managers can control while the external risks are outside 
manager control. So managers cannot change the risk, but they can design 
operations that work as efficiently as possible within a risky environment.’ 
2.4.4 Supply Chain Risk Sources 
The sources of supply chain risks are many, as different links of a supply chain are 
exposed to different types of risk. Faisal et al. (2006) pointed out that in ‘a quest to 
become more agile and lean, organisations are becoming more dependent on 
outside support which also adds to the overall risk vulnerability.’  
A study conducted by Cranfield University for the UK government (2002) defined 
supply chain vulnerability as ‘an exposure to serious disturbance, arising from risks 
within the supply chain as well as from risks external to the supply chain.’  
According to Christopher (1992), a number of factors that contribute to supply 
chain vulnerability are due to a focus on efficiency rather than effectiveness, the 
globalisation of supply chains, focussed factories and centralised distribution, the 
trend toward outsourcing, reduction in the supplier base, volatility of demand, lack 
of transparency and control procedures. Supply chains must adapt to these forces to 
stay competitive but at the same time increase their exposure to different forms of 
risk (Sodhi & Tang, 2009).  
This is also supported by Hallikas et al. (2002) and Handfield and Nichols (1999), 
who state that we are living in an era of rapid change in product markets and 
technologies, and increasing customer expectations in terms of better products, 
quicker response time and lower prices.  
The nature of supply chain disruption is diverse because it can occur from both 
inside or outside a supply chain, and its magnitude, attributes, and effect can vary 
greatly. Many scholars have tried to classify supply chain disruption in the form of 
taxonomies/typologies with the objective to distinguish between supply chain 
disruptions from other types of undesirable events in business (e.g., Calvinato, 
2004; Chopra & Sodhi, 2004; Christopher & Peck, 2004; Norrman & Lindroth, 
2004; Svensson, 2000). The categories of supply chain disruption are also called 
supply chain risk sources, as they are known sources and probabilities of supply 
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chain disruptions. Since different risk sources need different risk management 
activities, understanding the categories and nature of supply chain disruption is 
essential. 
There are many classifications of supply chain disruptions proposed by different 
authors. For example, Svensson (2000) classified supply chain risk sources as 
quantitative and qualitative, Juttner (2005) proposed three types – supply, demand, 
and environmental, whereas Manuj and Mentzer (2008) delineated eight types – 
supply, operational, demand, security, macro, policy, competitive, and resource. 
Wagner and Bode (2009) reviewed other authors’ classifications and summarised 
that supply chain risk sources have five categories: demand side; supply side; 
regulatory, legal, and bureaucratic; infrastructure; and catastrophic. This 
classification is generated from an empirical study of industrial firms and logistics 
services across Austria, Switzerland, and Germany (Wagner & Bode, 2010) The first 
two sources focus on risk sources that are internal to supply chain while the later 
three are risk sources that can also be external to supply chain. Various sources of 
supply chain risk are examined as follows: 
Demand Side Risk 
Downstream supply chain operations can cause supply chain disruption. This 
includes disruptions in product distribution to the end-customer caused, for 
example, by  the strike of truck drivers (McKinnon, 2006), as well as the uncertainty  
of customer demand due to poor co-ordination in the supply chain and mismatch 
between a firm’s projection and actual demands of customers. Demand side risk 
can create obsolescence of stock, shortage, and poor customer service due to 
unavailable product. Although addressing demand side risk is said to be an essential 
discipline of supply chain management, it is still present as a major risk source for 
many companies. In 2001, for example, the lack of communication among 
downstream supply chain partners forced Cisco Systems, which is a global 
manufacturer of communications equipment, to write off GBP 1.5 Billion in 
inventory (Spekman & Davis, 2004). 
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Supply Side Risk 
A company should manage the risk of their supplier portfolio in order to minimise 
the risk from disruptions caused by supply side (Kraljic, 1983) especially when a 
company strongly relies on external sources for critical materials. The upstream side 
of a firm’s supply chain can be a major source of supply chain disruption. These 
disruptions can be caused by suppliers, supplier relationships and networks, and 
purchasing activities. Additionally, such risks include production capacity 
constraints on the supply market, supplier business risks, change in technology and 
product design, and quality problems (Zsidisin, Panelli & Upton, 2000).  
Supplier business risks are related to the discontinuity of suppliers that could cause 
the interruption or termination of the buyer–supplier relationship such as suppliers’ 
financial problems, bankruptcy, insolvency, or consequences of supplier default 
(Wagner, Bode & Koziol, 2009). Suppliers’ financial default or a supplier going out 
of business can cause serious problems to a buying firm such as in the case of Land 
Rover whose only supplier of chassis frames for its Discovery model, UPF 
Thompson, unexpectedly went bankrupt in 2001. It cost Land Rover GBP 35 
Million to resume production (Lester, 2002). This type of disruption can also occur 
when the supplier is vertically integrated with a customer firm’s competitors; the 
relationship may be automatically forced to be terminated (Chopra & Sodhi, 2004). 
In addition, when the switching cost for the buying company is high, the 
opportunistic behaviour of suppliers can be a source of supply side risk (Wagner & 
Johnson, 2004; Spekman & Davis, 2004). Finally, poor quality products or services 
of suppliers can also trigger a domino effect on goods or services delivered to the 
end customer (Zsidisin et al., 2000). 
Regulatory, Legal, and Bureaucratic Risk 
The regulatory, legal and bureaucratic risk is the legal enforceability and execution 
of laws, regulations, or policies that have an impact on the supply chain. The 
frequency and degree of changes in these rules can be the source of supply chain 
risk because a sudden change in these rules may lead to the violations of laws, or 
regulations.  
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Although little attention has been paid to supply chain risk from regulatory and 
legal issue, in many countries these factors have significant effect in setting up and 
operating supply chains. Hendricks and Singhal (2003) pointed out that the actions 
of authorities can create severe supply chain disruptions because it can affect the 
firm’s ability to obtain permission to set up or operate a supply chain, as well as 
trade barriers such as embargoes, tariffs, local content constraints, or import/export 
quotas. Wagner and Bode (2008) conducted interviews and found that the major 
risk for inbound logistics in Russia is customs clearance. This is due to changing 
requirements regarding shipping documentation, possible time loss, standstill fees, 
as well as the unpredictable behaviour of customs authorities in Russia. As a result, 
many importing companies are forced to avoid the problem by using expensive 
customs brokers to assist the clearance process. Firms are facing more complex 
supply chains due to environmental legislation in many other countries, leading to 
an increase in supply chain costs. 
Infrastructure Risk 
Infrastructure risk refers to the risk occurring from a firm’s infrastructure 
underlying its supply chain operations. This includes accidents caused by both 
human issue and technical problems related to the area of supply chain security 
such as machine breakdowns, equipment malfunction, disruption of electricity or 
water supply, labour strike, and vandalism (Chopra & Sodhi, 2004; Lee & Wolfe, 
2003; Spekman & Davis, 2004). Firms have become increasingly dependent on 
information technology (IT) as well; therefore, IT-related problems can significantly 
affect supply chain management. These problems include hardware failures or 
software bugs, as well as problems created by human actions such as malicious 
software, or cyber-attacks. In addition, the Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) 
systems, which allow a company’s suppliers and customers to have direct access to 
databases and internal processes, can increase the chance of IT-related threats. 
Catastrophic Risk 
These events include natural disasters, epidemics, terrorist attacks, civil unrest, and 
socio-political instability (Kleindorfer & Saad, 2005; Martha & Subbakrishna, 2002; 
Swaminathan, 2003). Natural disasters such as tsunamis, earthquakes, hurricanes, 
and floods can be a severe threat to transportation systems and production facilities. 
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Due to the globalisation of markets and global-spanning of supply chain operations, 
local disasters have an increasingly indirect global consequence. Since 2001, there 
had been growing interest in the destructive impact from terrorism on companies’ 
supply chains (Rice & Tenney, 2007; Sheffi, 2011) because it affects supply chains 
either directly in causing damage to logistics infrastructure as well as indirectly due 
to, for example, events such as port closures. 
2.4.5 Supply Chain Disruption 
The terms supply chain risk and supply chain disruption are generally used 
interchangeably. However, the definition of the term supply chain disruption has 
not been made explicit in the literature.  Terms such as error, accident, hazard, 
operational failure, operational crisis, and disturbance have been used in the same 
context. Table 3 provides an overview of recent publications discussing supply 
chain disruption. 
The literature on disaster research has spanned many fields such as marketing, 
management, organisational behaviour, psychology, sociology, political science and 
engineering (Pearson & Clair, 1998). As a result, the term organisational crisis and 
its attributive dimensions have various definitions (Hermann, 1963; Kovoor-Misra, 
Clair & Bettenhausen, 2001; Milburn, Schuler & Watman, 1983; Pearson & Clair, 
1998). However, most of the definitions have agreed that organisation disruption 
consists of (1) an unforeseen triggering event, and (2) a consequential situation 
(Bilings, Milburn & Schaalman, 1980; Hermann, 1963; Kovoor-Mistra et al., 2001).   
According to this, supply chain disruption is also said to comprise two components: 
(1) a triggering event which is an unexpected event that appears in the supply chain 
or its environment and causes the consequential situation; (2) a consequential 
situation which is the exceptional event that makes a company unable to pursue 
their normal business operation (Wagner & Bode, 2009).       
What makes a supply chain disruption differ from risk is that a supply chain 
disruption is an obvious situation. Supply chain disruption is more closely related to 
organisational crisis, which needs immediate attention (Reilly, 1987) because the 
impact of the disruption is usually a function of time (Hermann, 1963). It can be 
distinguished by uncertainty of its cause, effect, and means of solution (Pearson & 
Clair, 1998). More importantly, it should be noted that supply chain disruption is 
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said to occur only if the involved actors identify the situation as unusual. Wagner 
and Bode (2009) said that because organisational response is triggered by actors’ 
perceptions, not by fact, this made the nature of supply chain disruption very 
subjective. As a result, it is difficult to distinguish a supply chain disruption’s 
beginning and ending. 
Authors Research Focus 
Applequist, Pekny & 
Reklaitis (2000) 
Develops a metric for evaluating supply chain projects with 
significant risk. The measure quantifies a risk premium used to 
measure return and risk on an investment in comparison with other 
investments. 
Johnson (2001) Enumerates lessons learned from manage supply chain risk in the toy 
industry. Risk mitigation techniques are presented in terms of  
managing demand and managing supply.  
Sheffi (2001) Discusses supply chain investments and re-organisation needed to 
prepare for terror attacks in terms of  the challenges of  dealing with 
the aftermath of  a terror attack and managing supply chains with 
increase uncertainty. 
Mitroff  & Alpasan (2003) Presents recommendations for proactive preparation if  internal 
attacks.  
Rice & Caniato (2003) 
 
Discusses the need for security and resilience in supply-chained ideas 
to develop more secure and resilient supply chains. 
Zsidisin & Ellram (2003) 
 
Considers the influences of  inbound supply chain risk and 
techniques to al within these risks based on the results of  a survey. 
Cavianato (2004) 
 
Focuses on logistics risk in a supply chain and discusses the 
broadening definition of  risk. 
Chopra & Sodhi (2004) Presents a high level categorisation of  supply chain risks and their 
drivers with recommendations to improve risk preparedness. 
Sinha, Whitman & 
Malzhan (2004) 
Develops a methodology to mitigate risk in an aerospace supply 
chain based on a five-step IDEF0 model. 
Zsidisin, Ellram, Carter & 
Cavinato (2004) 
Presents findings of  an empirical study on how purchasing 
organisations assess risk. 
Hallikas, Karvonen, 
Pulkkinen, Virolainen & 
Tuomimen 
Discusses a general risk management process for supplier networks. 
Kleindorfer & Sadd (2005) Develops a conceptual framework for managing supply chain 
disruption risk that includes the tasks of  specification, assessment, 
and mitigation. 
Peck (2005) Presents a framework for understanding supply chain vulnerability 
and a discussion if  the drivers if  vulnerability. 
Sheffi & Rice (2005) 
 
Discusses the stages of  a disruption and provides high-level 
recommendations for improving flexibility in the supply chain.  
Zsidisin, Melnyk & Ragatz 
(2005) 
Discusses the use of  business continuity to manage purchasing and 
supply risk. 
Sodhi (2005) Presents two risk measures (demand-at-risk and inventory-at-risk) 
and two linear programming models to be used together to manage 
demand and inventory risk in consumer electronics supply chain. 
Tomlin (2006) Develop a supply chain model to investigate mitigation and 
contingency strategies and recommends when to use them based on 
firm with a single product and the option of  two suppliers: one that 
is unreliable and the other that is reliable but more expensive.  
 
Craigbead et al. (2007) 
Present propositions that supply chain characteristics - density, 
complexity and node criticality and supply chain mitigation 
capabilities - recovery and warning affected the severity of  supply 
chain disruption.  
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Authors Research Focus 
Sodhi & Tang (2009) Present time-based risk mitigation concept. With this concept could 
enable companies to reduce impact of  supply chain disruption.  
Bode & Wagner (2010) Present a framework for understanding the frequency of  supply 
chain disruptions is a function of  certain supply chain characteristics. 
Table 3: Review of Literature Related to Supply Chain Disruption 
Source: Adapted from Craighead et al. (2007) 
Craighead et al. (2007) explicitly use the term ‘supply chain disruption’ to refer to 
‘unplanned and unanticipated events that disrupt the normal flow of goods within a 
supply chain, exposing the firms within the supply chain to operational and 
financial risks’, (citing Svensson, 2000; Hendriks & Singhal, 2003; Kelindorfer & 
Saad, 2005; Stauffer 2003).  Craighead et al. goes on to discuss two risk mitigation 
capabilities: (1) recovery capability which is defined as the activities in the supply 
chain to restore normal product flow, and (2) warning capability which refers to the 
ability of a supply chain participant to detect a pending or realised disruption and 
disseminate pertinent information about the event to relevant supply chain partners. 
In addition, they state that supply chain design characteristics such as density, 
complexity and node criticality can be expected to be positively related to supply 
chain disruption severity. 
2.4.6 Supply Chain Vulnerability 
The type of supply chain disruption and its magnitude alone are not the only 
determinants of the harm caused by supply chain disruption. The outcome of the 
disruption is also determined by the response capacity, and the susceptibility of 
supply chains is also significantly relevant to the harm and loss caused by supply 
chain disruptions.  
Despite attempts to define and offer approaches to manage supply chain 
vulnerability, the concept is still considered to be unclear and insufficiently 
understood (Juttner et al., 2003; Peck, 2005). Christopher and Peck (2004) defined 
the term as ‘an exposure to serious disturbance’ (p.3). Bernes and Oloruntoba 
(2005) defined vulnerability as ‘a susceptibility or predisposition to …  loss because 
of existing organisational or functional practice or conditions’ (p.519). Svenson 
(2000, 2002) stated that supply chain vulnerability is constructed of atomistic 
vulnerability, which is limited to a part of the supply chain such as a single firm, and 
holistic vulnerability, which covers the entire supply chain. Wagner and Bode’s 
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(2009) definition of vulnerability is quite similar to Bernes and Oloruntoba’s (2005); 
they described vulnerability as ‘a function of certain supply chain characteristics 
which make the focal firm sensitive to disruptions’ (p. 15) and explained that it can 
be, for example, a firm’s mechanism that moderates the consequences of a supply 
chain disruption occurring in a firm. Therefore, supply chain vulnerability can be 
seen as the ability of a firm to absorb the supply chain disruption effects. The 
factors that could increase the degree and impact of supply chain disruption are 
aspects such as dependence on suppliers and clients (Wagner & Bode, 2006), supply 
chain complexity, supply chain density, node criticality (Blackhurst, 
Rungtusanatham & Handfield, 2007), sloppy management (Turner, 1994), eroded 
safety procedures (Reason, 1990), and complex technical systems or organisational 
processes (Perrow, 1984). 
2.4.7 Supply Chain Risk Management 
The concept of supply chain risk management was adapted from general business 
risk management concepts (Khan &Burnes, 2007; McCormack, 2008; Ritchie & 
Brindley, 2007), which aimed to ‘eliminate, reduce, and generally control pure risks’ 
(Waring & Glemdon, 1998:p3). The process of general risk management contains 
(1) risk identification; (2) risk assessment, which includes analysis of the impact and 
probability of the identified risk; (3) risk treatment; and (4) risk monitoring. If the 
amount of remaining risk after the risk management process is in line with a firm’s 
procedure, the level of risk is considered optimal. When applying this concept to a 
supply chain context, the third stage referring to the practice and measure of risk 
treatment has to be made specific to the context of supply chain, therefore it can be 
considered as supply chain risk management (Tang, 2006). 
According to Norrman and Lindroth (2002), ‘supply chain risk management is to 
collaborate with partners in a supply chain, applying risk management process tools 
to deal with risks and uncertainties caused by, or impacting on, logistics related 
activities or resources.’ 
Christopher (2002), defined supply chain risk management (SCRM) as ‘the 
management of supply chain risks through coordination or collaboration among the 
supply chain partners so as to ensure profitability and continuity.’ He pointed out 
the four objectives of supply chain risk management. First, maintain the supply and 
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continuous availability of product. Second, decrease the supply chain’s ability to 
cope with disruptions in the supply of products if necessary. Third, avoid possible 
domino effects throughout the chain. Last, make the supply chain more resilient to 
disruption. 
Management of supply chain risks has over the years seen a myriad of approaches 
with different focus. Most approaches can however be grouped into the two broad 
categories of relationship management (Puto et al., 1985) and strategic/proactive 
purchasing (Smeltzer & Siferd, 1998). These two categories do, to some extent, 
overlap. 
Puto et al. (1985) and Mitchell (1995) identify supplier relationship development as 
an important risk-reducing strategy, which includes loyalty to existing suppliers, the 
characteristics of the buying situation and the buyer’s perception of the 
procurement problem. In addition, Zsidisin et al. (2000) and Zsidisin (2003) also 
support the importance of relationship management by advocating that partnership 
formation; strategic alliances and supplier development and performance systems 
are all activities that reduce risk.  
Approaches Authors 
Purchasing partnerships Ellram (1991a, b) 
Multiple sources of  supply VS single 
sourcing 
Treleven and Schweikhart (1988), Kraljic (1983) and 
Zsidisin (2003) 
Supplier quality/ auditing/ 
certification programmes 
Smeltzer and Siferd (1998), Newman et al. (1993) and 
Zsidisin (2003) 
Supplier improvement programmes Smeltzer and Siferd (1998) 
Closer working relationships with 
suppliers 
Zsidisin et al. (2000), Zsidisin and Ellram (2003) and 
Eisenhardt (1989) 
Communication and early 
involvement of  suppliers in strategic 
decisions 
Krause (1999) 
Buffer Newman et al(1993) 
Strategic alliances Zsidisin et al (2000) 
Risk sharing/ knowledge transfer Eisenhardt (1989), Zsidisin et al. (2000) and Krause (1999) 
Focus on core competence Zsidisin et al (2000) 
Product differentiation Lonsdale (1999) 
Entrepreneurial/ risk taking March and Shapira (1987) and Lonsdale (1999) 
Proactive supply management Smeltzer and Siferd (1998) and Kraljic (1983) 
Table 4: Risk Management Strategy 
Source: Khan &Burnes (2007) 
Eisenhardt (1989) as well as Zsidisin and Ellram (2003) argue that agency theory 
can be applied to reduce supply chain risks, mostly via co-operation with the aim to 
create joint benefits and reduction of conflicts. In that context, improved 
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information sharing, where the aim is to create knowledge, will reduce the risk of 
opportunistic behaviour. 
The category of strategic/proactive purchasing aims at overseeing the whole supply 
chain. This approach is less intimate than the relationship management approach, 
but the scope is also much wider. Monitoring and auditing of supply chain partners 
and their standards is a key activity in reducing risk, according to Smeltzer and 
Siferd (1998) and Newman et al. (1993). Mitchell (1995) and Zsidisin et al. (2000) 
advocate the use of multiple sourcing. Contrasting this view, Lonsdale (1999) 
favours increasing the variety of products rather than choosing multiple sourcing as 
a means of reducing risk.     
As described above, there are different categories and approaches to managing 
supply chain risk. The field has however not matured, which can be seen in the 
broad range of conflicting views. For example, among the most commonly 
accepted risk reduction approaches are single sourcing and building long-term 
partnerships (Treleven & Schweikhart, 1988). On the other hand, single sourcing 
can lead to over-dependence on one supply source and increasing vulnerability to 
opportunism (Zsidisin, 2003; Kraljic, 1983). And the same wide range of views is 
expressed when it comes to the effectiveness of building long-term relationships. 
One group of academics advocate that it does reduce supply chain risk (Zsidisin, 
2003; Eisenhardt, 1989; Ellram, 1991a; Ellram, 1991b), whereas another group 
argues against this approach (Smeltzer & Siferd, 1998; Pilling & Zhang, 1992; 
Lonsdale, 1999). 
Mitchell (1995) sees that one explanation for the lack of maturity in the field is that 
the very different views of supply chain risk management are by nature situational. 
Newman et al. (1993) provide a case in point, which is the use of buffers. In the 
short run the use of buffers can be effective in reducing risk but in the long run risk 
may increase as it is expensive and creates production inefficiencies as well as 
increasing the risk of creating outdate stocks. 
General risk management is a discipline that is fairly developed, especially in the 
financial field. It is however striking that general risk management literature as well 
as the associated tools and techniques have not found their way into how supply 
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chain risk management is being approached (Cousins et al., 2004; Kraljic, 1983; 
Robinson et al., 1967; Williamson, 1975; Williamson, 1979). 
Further development of theoretical and practical supply chain risk management 
appears to be possible, especially if the research agenda focuses on the following 
three areas. First, supply chain risk management should take into account the work 
that has been done within general risk management and in particular within 
financial risk management. Second, supply chain risk management needs to be more 
firmly rooted in understanding how companies actually do manage supply chain risk 
and why they do it in a chosen way. Third, based on research into the two previous 
topics, improved theory and models of supply chain risk management can be 
developed.    
Supply chain management faces the challenge of balancing risk profile and cost 
minimisation. Risk can probably not be completely eliminated but it can in most 
cases be reduced significantly. The risks in the supply chains can often be mitigated 
if companies can understand the variables having an impact on risk management in 
the supply chains. Some of the variables that enable risk mitigation are information 
sharing, aligning incentives, risk sharing and corporate social responsibility (Chopra 
& Sodhi, 2004; Speckman & Davis, 2004; Faisal et al., 2006). 
2.5 Time Based Management and Response 
The importance of time as a competitive parameter has over the last two decades 
made its way into the literature addressing how to compete effectively. Time based 
competition is essentially about compressing time of the important activities of the 
firm, i.e. responding to customer needs, introducing new products faster than 
competitors, reducing time in the production and delivery process, and by doing so 
a significant competitive advantage can be established (Stalk, 1988; Stalk &Hout 
1990; Blackburn, 1991).  
One of the main reasons for the emergence of time-based competition is that 
customers feel increasingly time starved, providing a major opportunity for 
companies that can exploit time as a competitive parameter (Tucker, 1991). In his 
work Tucker viewed time as a major driving force of change. 
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A number of companies are today categorised by competing on time and the 
characteristics are that they employ structurally different methods to manufacturing 
and product innovation and development (Stalk, 1988; Stalk & Hout, 1990; 
Blackburn, 1991), they think of themselves as part of an integrated system of 
suppliers and customers (Stalk & Hout, 1990) and they create more information 
that is also shared more openly and rapidly with important stakeholders. 
The benefits of successful time-based competition are similar to those of most 
other successful competitive strategies, namely increase in productivity, ability to 
command a price premium, ability to gain market share, high customer loyalty and 
the ability and willingness to cannibalise own products (Stalk, 1988; Stalk, 1990; 
Blackburn, 1991; Daniels & Essaides, 1993). 
Time-based competition can be seen as a managerial focal point that guides the 
decisions and directs the company towards time-sensitive customer segments by 
merging principles of traditional strategic schools of thought with flexible and lean 
manufacturing principles.  
The literature on time-based competition in combination with supply chain 
management appears, however, to be very limited and thus provides for a research 
agenda that takes this important aspect into account.  
There are nevertheless scientific models, such as the epidemic model and fire 
model, as well as anecdotal evidence to support a conjecture that the magnitude of 
the problem triggered by the event increases exponentially over time.  
The simple form of epidemic model is the ‘Exponential Model’ by Thomas Robert 
Malthus (1766–1834).  This model can be explained as follows: 
Let I(t) be the number of people infected at time t. In this case, the rate of infection 
can be defined by the differential equation: dI(t)/dt = kI(t), where the parameter 
k>0. This differential equation yields: I(t) = I0e
kt, where I0 is the number of people 
infected at time 0. Therefore, the number of people infected grows exponentially 
overtime.  
A similar model is a fire model called the ‘Elliptical Fire Spread Model’ presented by 
Arora and Boera (2005). They assumed that the area burned is taken to be elliptical 
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in shape with the point of ignition at one of the foci. By assuming that the fire is 
spread linearly over time along a two-dimensional space, they show that the total 
area burned grows as a squared function of time elapsed since the start of the fire. 
Thus, the total area burned grows exponentially over time. 
2.6 Existing Theories 
2.6.1 Normal Accident Theory 
The normal accident theory (NAT) was proposed by Charles Perrow with the 
objective of explaining the reason that makes socio-technical system fail based on 
the analysis of the US nuclear power plant near-disaster (Perrow, 1984). The theory 
suggested that the probability of occurrence and the severity of systems accidents 
are determined by two system characteristics: 
The first characteristic is ‘interactive complexity of the system’: a supply chain is a 
socio-technical system, which Simon (1962) explained is a complex system because 
there are many elements interacting in a non-simple way, making it more difficult to 
manage and control. According to NAT, complexity becomes dangerous when the 
interactions among the components of the system are nonlinear because nonlinear 
interaction leads to unpredictable event sequences. Many small failures can interact 
and produce unexpected, unfamiliar events.  
The second characteristic is ‘tight coupling of the elements in the system’: the 
systems, which contain interrelated components that have time-dependent 
processes, possible substitutions, and minimal slack or buffer, are tightly coupled 
systems (Galbraith, 1973; Perrow, 1984). Although tight coupling systems generally 
have higher efficiency and performance standards, loosely coupled supply chains are 
able to absorb environmental changes, failures, or unexpected system behaviours. 
In tightly coupled systems, a change in one component may trigger a fast and strong 
change in other components in a kind of domino effect. Thus disruptions can 
spread rapidly through the system.    
According to this, a system with high levels of interactive complexity and high 
levels of tight coupling is vulnerable to accidents because when the two 
characteristics are combined, it becomes impossible to predict and protect the ways 
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in which the system could fail. The accidents are hence inevitable; it can be 
concluded that in such systems, accidents are normal.  
NAT stated that supply chains with a high degree of interactive complexity and 
tight coupling have higher frequency of supply chain disruption. However, some 
literature (Hopkins, 1999; Wolf, 2001) argues that the level of tight coupling is 
difficult to subject to empirical test.  
There is no consensus on the definition of supply chain complexity. There are two 
dimensions of supply chain complexity, which are information processing and 
technology (Vachon & Klassen, 2002). Choi and Krause (2006) assumed that supply 
chain complexity has three drivers: (1) the quantity of suppliers, (2) the diversity 
among the suppliers, and (3) the inter-relationships among the suppliers. According 
to literature in organisational design, there are three dimensions of complexity: 
vertical complexity, horizontal complexity and spatial complexity (Daft, 2006). 
These can be applied to the context of supply chain. Vertical complexity can refer 
to the number of tiers in the upstream supply chain. Horizontal complexity refers to 
the number of suppliers. Spatial complexity can refer to the geographical dispersion 
of the supply base (Choi, Dooley & Rungtusanatham, 2001; Choi & Hong, 2002; 
Vachon & Klassen, 2002). It can be summarised that these three dimensions 
amplify the complexity of supply chain and, therefore, increase the uncertainty and 
diminish transparency, which lead to higher exposure to supply chain disruptions 
(Choi & Krause, 2006). 
2.6.2 High Reliability Theory 
Rijpma (2003) pointed out that Perrow’s (1984) NAT can be overly pessimistic in 
concluding that accidents are inevitable in systems with interactive complexity and 
tight coupling. High reliability theory argues that the likelihood of normal accidents 
can be reduced by organisational and structural precautions (Roberts, 1990). The 
theory examines the characteristic of organisations that show strong ability in 
dealing with unexpected events and concludes that although organisations may have 
interactive complexity and tight coupling in the supply chain, they can be successful 
if they possess the characteristics of highly reliable organisations.  
The empirical test of high reliability theory is not very precise nor consistent. For 
example, redundancy was suggested to help organisations buffer the impact of 
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unexpected situations and reduce mistakes (Roberts, 1990). In contrast, redundancy 
was also found to backfire in some critical situations (Sagan, 2004). Another 
recommendation was that the right training should be able to reduce the impact of 
crisis situations. However, other studies argue that training can also diminish 
flexibility, which results in an organisation’s lower ability to respond to crisis 
situations (Price, 1977).  
Therefore, Bode and Wagner (2010) suggested that the focus should be made on 
the characteristics that have been repeatedly accepted to enhance reliability such as 
decentralised decision making (Roberts, Stout & Halpern, 1994). When the supply 
chain is decentralised, the information and decisions regarding the supply chain are 
generated closer to the suppliers, making the organisation able to respond to 
warning signals and disruptions better (Bode & Wagner, 2010). 
2.6.3 Transaction Cost Theory 
In essence deals with the basic question of how to organize economic activity: 
should activities be based within the hierarchy or should activity outcomes be 
obtained through the open market? Coase (1937) explained that transaction costs 
are incurred from activities in the open market and in particular related to cost of 
searching and finding information, bargaining and decision costs and policing and 
enforcement costs. Insights from the transaction cost perspective are suitable for 
making decision about governance and understanding motives of other partners. 
In this study, the goal is to understand the speed of response in Detection, Design, 
and Deployment. Presuming the supply chain transactions cross the firms internal 
(divisional, cross functional) and external boundaries (suppliers, customers, 
logistics), risks may be present and transaction cost theory suggests that such 
differential costs, of whatever nature, could be factored into a model of risk 
response.  
If, for example, events that lead to catastrophic failure are less visible, that is, take 
longer or are more expensive to Detect, then a Transaction Cost theory may suggest 
a different organization boundary will be more robust. At a minimum, greater focus 
on such external relationships will be beneficial; the classic example of Nokia versus 
Ericsson could be studied from this perspective. Both firms outsourced chip 
production of common, key component – typical in an environment of rapid 
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change, tremendous specialization and large investment – to Philips Electronics.  
Nokia proactively sought information on the status of the Philips factory after a 
small but devastating fire; Ericsson relied on the information it was given. Such an 
event within either firm, it could be surmised, would be better communicated and 
result in a different risk  / response pattern.   
Other differences, for example in engineering or management culture, internal 
versus external to the firm can also have an impact on the Design or Deployment 
time in reacting to an event. Transaction Cost theory potentially provides an 
additional dimension to time response. In this study, one could consider this 
dimension as a starting point for exploratory questions or to assure completeness of 
the data, may explicitly identify participants whose role or expertise provide insight 
from across the organizational boundaries. 
2.6.4 Agency Theory 
Agency theory deals with how relationships are organized when it is based on a 
principal-agent type of transaction (Eisenhardt; 1989), and enables control and 
coordination via highlighting the importance of monitoring and creating incentives 
(Child et al., 1998). Especially within knowledge-based economies there is evidence 
of a theory related to increasing returns (Arthur; 1989). Arthur’s main point was 
that “if technological ecologies are the basic unit of strategy in the knowledge-based 
world, players compete by building webs… that amplify positive feedback to the 
base technology”.  
In economics, the principal-agent problem treats the difficulties that arise under 
conditions of incomplete and asymmetric information when a principal hires an 
agent.  There are two problems arising.  The first is the agency problem that occurs 
when (a) the desires or goals of the principal and agent conflict and (b) it is difficult 
or expensive for the principle to verify what the agent is actually doing. The 
problem here is that the principal cannot verify that the agent has behaved 
appropriately. The second is the problem of risk sharing that arises when the 
principal and agent have different attitudes towards risk. The problem here is that 
the principle and the agent may prefer different actions because of the different risk 
preferences (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
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Risks in supply chain become more obvious when viewed using agency theory. For 
example, the supplier (agent) of a critical component make take a less-robust, cost-
minimizing approach to manufacturing in order to win a procurement contract, 
however leaving its customer (principal) disproportionately exposed should a 
manufacturing disruption occur. Information sharing between and agent and 
principle become a key objective of the principle; this can be extended to consider 
the time / risk relationship for supply chain. 
Agency theory may also provide additional insight in the management of disruption 
in the supply chain. Information asymmetry can distort the perception of risk or 
potential consequence of disruption, in particular where asymmetric and non-linear 
financial or other impact is faced by participating firms. For example, where a very 
large, well-funded firm has outsourced a particular task to a much smaller partner, 
collapse of the common supply chain could leave the larger partner liable to greater 
litigation and penalties, even if the smaller firm were contractually and in practise 
the responsible party. Conflicting incentives on production speed versus quality 
may motivate a firm to withhold crucial information if such information is only 
revealed – potentially through catastrophic failure – at a much later stage. 
Counterfeit aircraft components, for example, have been root cause of several air 
disasters, when such components were sold and installed by a subcontractor to the 
airline at high profit long before the accident occurs. In this study, agency theory 
could potentially provide an additional research guide for understanding the 
perception of catastrophic risk and the resulting management systems in terms of 
the time-based framework. This additional dimension requires saturation of 
concepts, which may be visible at a contractual level between firms, however, rather 
than within the management perspective of individual participants, which are the 
focus of data collection here. Agency theory could be applied to test, in future 
research, to the propositions developed in this study. 
2.7 Research Gap 
The literature in supply chain risk has proposed a number of different approaches 
to the management of supply chain risk (Chopra & Sodhi, 2004; Christopher & 
Peck, 2004; Elkins et al., 2005; Lee & Wolfe, 2003; Martha & Subbakrishna, 2002; 
Rice & Caniato, 2003). While Kleindorfer and van Wassenhove (2004) propose that 
supply chain risk management activities comprise supply-demand coordination 
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activities and activities for managing disruption risks, Tang (2006) proposes that the 
management of supply chain risk should focus on four areas: supply management, 
demand management, product management, and information management. Wagner 
and Bode (2009) propose a different approach to supply chain risk management by 
stating that the management should focus on cause-oriented measures (the 
prevention or elimination of supply chain disruption) and effect-oriented measures 
(the attempt to reduce the impacts from supply chain disruptions when they occur).  
Further, certain existing supply chain risk management literature has focused on 
prescribing effective recovery plans for reducing the impact of disruption after an 
event occurs (Christopher, 2002; Chopra & Sodhi, 2004; Lee, 2004; Sheffi, 2005; 
and Tang, 2006).  Sodhi and Tang (2008) argue that these strategies can improve 
recovery if the firm can deploy their strategies during or soon after the event 
occurs.  
Literature in other fields of scientific research has documented the role of time as a 
surrogate measure of the impact of a disruption, for example in the spread of 
disease or forest fire (Richads, 1995; Janssens, 2000; Arora & Boer (2005). 
Specifically, the impact of a natural disruption tends to initially increase 
exponentially with time and then eventually taper off.  
In addition to these natural disruption models, there are hazard analysis reports 
related to supply chain management showing that the magnitude of problems 
associated with many hazards (fire, terrorism, earthquake, etc.) tend to grow super 
linearly over time (Anderson et al., 2002).  
The time-based paradigm was first highlighted explicitly in the supply chain 
management literature in the late 1980s by Stalk (1988) who noted that traditional 
manufacturing focussed on achieving low production cost through the utilisation of 
low-cost labour. Attention then shifted to specialisation and exploiting production 
competency. Time-based competition emerged as the competitive paradigm during 
the 1990s, which mandates a strategy of customer responsiveness and rapid new 
product introduction, along with competitive quality and cost. The essence of time-
based competition involves compressing time in every phase of the product 
creation and delivery cycle. The claim is made that in today’s business, only time-
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based firms will be able to meet such customer demands and respond quickly to 
changing consumers’ needs (Stalk, 1988; Stalk & Hout 1990; Blackburn, 1991).  
As discussed in the literature review, time plays a vital role in logistics and 
operations research. There is much existing time-based literature in traditional 
production/ operations management research such as time-to-market, just-in-time 
manufacturing, product innovation, role time in customer service and satisfaction, 
etc. Yet one issue that remains relatively unexplored is time in risk management 
perspective – namely, how companies leverage time in managing disruption risk. 
Thus, a research gap exists in addressing how time-based risk management can be 
used as a strategy to response supply chain disruption by reducing the impact of 
disruption risk in the supply chain.  
This research therefore is concerned with the external risk that arises from 
disruptions to normal activities. It is also known as ‘disruption risk’, which refers to 
the major disruptions caused by natural and man-made disasters such as 
earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, outbreaks of disease, price rises, strikes, problems 
with trading wars, terrorist attacks or economic disruptions, and financial 
irregularities such as currency evaluation (Sodhi, 2004; Tang, 2005; Kleindorfer & 
Saad, 2005; Waters, 2007).  
The business impact associated with disruption risks is harmful, costly and greater 
than others. This research argues that supply chain disruptions are unavoidable and, 
as a consequence, that all supply chains are inherently risky; accordingly, companies 
should seek to respond faster to a disruption in their supply chain. 
Sodhi, Son and Tang (2012) have argued that the supply chain risk literature has 
understudied response as following: 
Definition gap: there is not enough agreement on the nature of supply chain risk. 
Process gap: between (1) identification (2) assessment (3) mitigation and (4) 
response, there has been proportionally much less attention on response, whether 
to operational risks or to disruptions (catastrophic risks) 
Methodology gap: empirical research in the OM literature is proportionally less 
represented in the literature on supply chain risk 
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Specifically, firms need to identify the factors in the speed of response in order to 
prepare and act faster in the management supply chain disruption. In this research,  
disruption risk is being the potential of an unplanned, internal or external event of 
low probability but high impact that occurs in the supply chain. This unplanned 
event creates sudden, sharp, and significant impact on the ability of supply to meet 
demand, resulting in major disadvantage or potential loss for the firm. 
2.8 Research Question 
As introduced in Chapter 1, this research seeks to fill the gaps in the supply chain 
risk management by conducting an empirical study to explore how global 
companies manage response time to minimise the impact of disruption on the 
supply chain. The primary research question is  
‘What factors underlie companies response to supply chain disruption?’ 
Underlying the theory that greater response speed can reduce the impact of 
disruption, I presume a model where impact increases hyper linearly over time until 
some point where material damage to the firm and its environment has occurred. 
This can include among other things the impact on internal human life and 
resources, systems and supply chain, and financial loss, also external factors such as 
customer defection, reputation, and regulatory and legal action against the firm.  
Motivated by Sodhi & Tang (2009), I considered response as detection, design and 
deployment.  
Therefore, in order to answer the primarily research question, the following aspects 
are considered in each case: 
 How did the company respond to supply chain disruption? 
 How did the company detect and communicate information about the 
disruption and what did the company do to reduce detection time?  
 How did the company design and select possible solutions to address the 
disruption and what did the company do to reduce design time?  
 How did the company deploy their selected solutions? What did the company 
do to reduce the deployment time? 
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2.9 Research Framework 
Supply chain disruption can be costly and damaging to the firm.  Costs can be 
measured in financial metrics such as drop in market capitalisation (Hendricks & 
Singhal, 2003a; Kilgore, 2004), but also in terms of lost reputation, deteriorating 
competitive position, increased or restrictive regulation, loss of internal capacity and 
so forth, with wide-ranging impact across the organisation and its supply chain. 
As stated by Perrow (1984) in his widely referenced work on Normal Accident 
Theory, accidents become inevitable if a system exhibits: (1) interactive complexity 
and (2) tight coupling. Linear interaction leads to a predictable and comprehensible 
sequence of events, while non-linear interactions (interactively complexity) lead to 
unexpected event sequences. Herbert A. Simon (1962) characterised a complex 
system as being ‘made up of a large number of parts that interact in a non-simple 
way’.  From this perspective, supply chains can be viewed as complex and according 
to some theories such as normal accident theory, disruption is inevitable.  
Certain characteristics of the supply chain (density, complexity, node interactivity) 
are stated in some literature to have a positive correlation with the severity of 
supply chain disruption (Craighead et al., 2007). Other definitions of supply chain 
complexity in the literature include Choi and Hong (2002), who consider vertical 
complexity, horizontal complexity, and spatial complexity in terms of parallel, 
sequential span and geographic disperse supply chain stages. Vachon and Klassen 
(2002) looked at complexity in terms of information processing and technology.  
Choi and Krause (2006) illustrate a different approach focussing primarily on supply 
complexity: (1) the number of suppliers, (2) the differentiation among the suppliers, 
and (3) the inter-relationship among the suppliers in the supply base.  
As stated in earlier in section 2.6.1 and section 2.6.2, the proponents of High 
Reliability Theory view Normal Accident Theory as too ‘pessimistic’, and believe 
that appropriate design can reduce or even eliminate system and supply chain 
failure. They state that redundancy of unreliable components, decentralised 
decision-making, ‘culture of reliability’, training, and learning from previous 
accidents can reduce or eliminate failure (Rijpma, 2003; Roberts, 1990; Sagan, 2004; 
Price, 1977). 
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Bode and Wagner (2010) test the complexity proposition that Craighead et al. 
(2007) propose and confirm that the degree of supply chain complexity influences 
the occurrence and magnitude of supply chain disruption. They also find that 
Normal Accident Theory and High Reliability Theory seem to be meaningful 
theories for understanding the causes of supply chain disruption. Faster product 
and technology life cycles, increased use of manufacturing, distribution, and 
logistics partners, greater customer expectation and regulatory complexity are 
resulting in more complex and longer supply network relationships, which make the 
supply chain more complex. In addition, due to the globalisation of markets and 
supply chain operations, local events increasingly have indirect global repercussions. 
Certain types of risks – of human or natural origin – remain difficult if not 
impossible to predict in frequency, magnitude or both; events in Northern Japan 
triggered by an offshore earthquake in 2011 provide ample evidence of local impact 
on global supply chain operations. 
Global supply chains are by nature unavoidably complex and de facto vulnerable to 
disruption. In this research I consider an intersection of probability and impact, and 
leverage a time-based risk management framework (Sodhi & Tang, 2009) to better 
address disruption through faster response. 
At a high level, supply chain risk = probability (of an event) x business Impact (or 
severity) of the event (Brindley, 2004). 
 
Figure 4: Classification of Disruption Risk 
 
Figure 4 shows a straightforward risk matrix measured on two dimensions – ‘the 
impact of risk’ and ‘likelihood of risk occurring’. Probability can be further 
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understood to be low frequency (for example, from the ‘millennium bug’ in 
software systems from two-digit date recording in the transition from the year 1999 
to 2000) and/or low likelihood (natural events, terrorist attack, failure from obscure 
or complex interdependency internal to a system). Impact can be further 
understood in terms of high-impact of known magnitude (for example, due to 72 
hour closing of US airspace in September 1999) or high-impact of unknown 
magnitude (for example, ongoing nuclear crisis in Japan during early 2011). 
Most companies develop plans to protect against recurring, low impact risks in their 
supply chains. Many, however, all but ignore high-impact, low-likelihood risks. For 
instance, a supplier with quality problems represents a common, recurrent 
disruption. Without much effort, the customer can demand improvement or find a 
substitute. In contrast, in regions where earthquakes are rare, preparedness to 
prevent major disruption may be weak or uneven. This research will focus on Box 
D – high impact but low likelihood – where risk management must seek to mitigate 
the losses due to high-impact events in the supply chain. It is also important to 
minimise exposure in general to such events, which is mainly done by designing 
appropriate structures and a robust business/operating model. Such high-impact 
events of high likelihood (Box C) – the drivers for which can be identified – are 
typically addressed in the design of the supply chain. High-impact events with low 
likelihood (Box D) or unknown origin – referred to here as catastrophic events that 
can cause supply chain disruption – cannot be easily avoided due to their 
unpredictable nature and unpredictable locus in the supply chain as well as 
potentially prohibitively high cost of detection and avoidance. 
This research extends a framework on time-based risk management whose premise 
is that faster response to disruption in the supply chain will reduce impact. Figure 5 
illustrates the framework along a time dimension to structure the research. This 
framework for time-based risk management is developed by Sodhi and Tang (2008). 
They state that this approach has been used assessed with ‘anecdotal examples of 
companies rather than detailed case studies’.  I will extend the approach through 
analysis of data from three contemporary events in details in order to study the 
importance of time in established risk management processes. 
In the 3D framework, elapsed time can be divided into three stages, which Sodhi 
and Tang (2008) abbreviate as 3D. The 3D framework divides a company’s 
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response lead-time (R1) into three sequential components – the first component is 
‘Detect’ (D1), which is defined as the time between the moment an event has 
occurred and the time at which the firm recognises the fact that the event has 
occurred. The second component is ‘Design’ (D2), which is defined as the time 
between the detection of an event and the time at which a specific recovery plan is 
designed. The third component is ‘Deploy’ (D3), which corresponds to the time 
between the design of the recovery plan and the time at which the firm has 
deployed the solution. After deployment, the time it takes to effectively restore the 
supply chain operation is denoted the recovery lead-time (R2).  
 
Figure 5: Time Dimensions in Time-Based Risk Management Framework 
Source: Sodhi & Tang (2009) 
According to Sodhi and Tang (2008), faster deployment of a recovery plan via 
shortening the response lead-time R1 can enable a firm to reduce supply chain risk 
significantly. Figure 6 shows the effect when reducing R1; the magnitude of the 
problem caused by the disruption is smaller. It is also plausible that the recovery 
lead-time (R2) is shortened because the recovery plan is deployed sooner. Thus, the 
response lead-time (R1) is essential for managing supply chain disruption. 
Various risk management models ascribe increased vulnerability of a supply chain to 
its characteristics, such as density or interactivity between supply chain nodes. Sodhi 
and Tang (2008) goes further and illustrates interrelationship between risk 
mitigation strategies, where one risk mitigation strategy addressing certain risk types 
can in fact increase vulnerability to another. 
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Figure 6: The Effect of Reducing Response Lead Time 
Source: Sodhi & Tang (2009) 
Adapting a complexity model of supply chain risk (Criaghead et al., 2007) and time-
based risk management framework (Sodhi & Tang, 2008), I illustrate an overall 
framework for this research. The research conceptual framework is provided in 
Figure 7, highlighting elements of analysis in bold. The three elements of response 
time in this framework are assumed to drive increased an impact of supply chain 
disruption. The goal of the research is to understand how companies view and use 
detection time, design time and deploy time in order to respond to supply chain 
disruptions. The identification and characterization of the factors underlying the 
response time from empirical analysis of the real-life cases are the primary 
contribution of this research.  These are indicated as F1, F2, F..., Fn in Figure 7 – 
The research conceptual framework. Table 5 shows definitions used in this research 
to support case analysis. 
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Figure 7: The Research Conceptual Framework 
 
 
Term Definition 
Disruption Risk The potential of  an unplanned, internal or external event of  low 
probability but high impact that occurs in the supply chain. Such an 
unplanned event could create sudden, sharp, and significant impact 
on the ability of  supply to meet demand, resulting in major 
disadvantage or potential loss for the firm. 
Supply Chain Disruption Unplanned events that may occur in the supply chain, which might 
affect the normal or expected flow of  materials and components 
(Adapted from Svensson, 2000; Hendricks & Singhal, 2003; 
Kleindorfer & Saad, 2005; Craighead et al., 2007). 
Response Lead Time The elapsed time between detection of  an event and substantial 
implementation of  an appropriate response (Sodhi & Tang, 2009). 
Detection Time Elapsed time between the occurrence of  an event and the moment a 
firm recognises the occurrence of  – or the initial impact of  – the 
event (Sodhi & Tang, 2009). 
Design Time Duration between detection of  an event and definition of  possible 
solutions, based on existing concepts and methods or new solutions, 
which can restore normal supply chain operations (Adapted from 
Sodhi & Tang, 2009). 
Deploy Time Duration between start and completed implementation of  a selected 
solution that is successful in significantly restoring supply chain 
operations (Sodhi & Tang, 2009). 
Supply chain 
characteristics 
Strategic and operational structure of  the supply chain, including 
strategies for efficiency and speed as well as strategies for risk 
management. (Craighead et al., 2007; Bode & Wagner, 2010). 
Recovery time Total duration between an event and the return of  the supply chain 
to normal and planned flow of  products (Sodhi & Tang, 2009). 
Recovery capabilities Recovery capability or the interactions of  supply chain entities and 
the corresponding coordination of  supply chain resources to return 
the supply chain to a normal and planned level of  product flow 
(Craighead et al., 2007). 
Table 5: Definition Used in the Research 
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Chapter 3 
Methodology 
This study employs classic Grounded Theory methodology (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; 
Glaser, 1978, 1992, 1998, 2001, 2003, 2005; Strauss and Corbin, 1990). As a 
research strategy, Grounded Theory is well suited for exploration and study of 
unstructured natural phenomena through extensive and iterative data collection and 
analysis.   
3.1 Grounded Theory Methodology 
Glaser and Strauss introduced Grounded Theory in their seminal book “The 
Discovery of Grounded Theory”, published in 1967. Their approach to qualitative 
analysis was developed during an observational field study of nurses and hospital 
staff on their work with near-death patients.  Strauss and Corbin (1990, p.24) later 
provided a succinct definition: 
“A qualitative research method that uses a systematised set of procedures to develop 
and inductively derive Grounded Theory about a phenomenon.” 
Strauss & Corbin (1990, p.24) 
Creswell (2002, p.439) further defines Grounded Theory as a “systematic, 
qualitative process used to generate a theory that explains, at a broad conceptual 
level, a process, an action, or interaction above a substantive topic.” 
The objective is to develop an account of a phenomenon that identifies the major 
constructs - in Grounded Theory terms ‘categories’, their relationships, context and 
process, providing a theory of the phenomenon which goes further than just a 
descriptive account (Morse & Richards, 2002; Becker, 1993).  This allows one to  
“organise many ideas from analysis of the data” (Strauss, 1967, p.23). Strauss and 
Corbin (1990, p.24) emphasized the need to develop theory “that was faithful to 
and illuminated the area under study.”   
Theories derived in this approach may also relate to existing theories, and are not 
necessarily developed in isolation. This allows Grounded Theory to be used to 
extend and explore current understanding of the phenomenon. In this study, a 
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time-based risk management framework provides the context and lens through 
which the mechanisms of risk management are to be discovered.   
Strauss (1967, p.22-23) summarised Grounded Theory procedures as the systematic 
analysis of documents, interview notes, or filed notes by continually coding and 
comparing data that produced a “well constructed theory.” Viewed this way, the 
theory is inductively derived from the phenomenon under study.  The data collected 
and analysis are intrinsically linked with the derived theory.  Unlike other scientific 
methods, in which the researcher collects data to test an existing theory, Grounded 
Theory allows the theory to emerge directly from qualitative data.  In this sense, the 
emergent theory is ‘grounded’ in the data. As Strauss and Corbin (1994, p.274) 
noted, “the major difference between this methodology and other approaches to 
qualitative research was its emphasis upon theory development,” and not on the 
descriptive or narrative aspects of qualitative analysis. 
Grounded Theory is structured from three basic elements: concepts, categories and 
propositions. Concepts are the most basic component of Grounded Theory. 
Theory development is based on these units of analysis, not directly from the 
underlying data.  In a definition of concepts used by Corbin and Strauss (1990), 
these are “words that stand for groups or classes of objects, events, and actions that 
share some major common property(ies), though the property(ies) can vary 
dimensionally.” They emphasize the conceptualization of data: 
 “Theories can’t be built with actual incidents or activities as observed or reported; 
that is, from “raw data.” The incidents, events, happenings are taken as, or 
analysed as, potential indicators or phenomena, which are thereby given conceptual 
labels. If a respondent says to the researcher, “Each data I spread my activities over 
the morning, resting between shaving and bathing,” the researcher might label this 
phenomenon as “pacing.” As the researcher encounters other incidents, and when 
after comparison to the first, they appear to resemble the same phenomena, then 
these, too, can be labelled as “pacing,” Only by comparing incidents and naming like 
phenomena with the same term can the theorist accumulate the basic units for 
theory.” 
Corbin and Strauss (1990, p.7) 
Categories – or themes - of related concepts form the second element of Grounded 
Theory. Corbin and Strauss (1990) defined categories as a “higher-level concepts 
under which analysts group lower-level concepts according to shared properties. 
They represent relevant phenomena and enable the analyst to reduce and combine 
data.” Thus:    
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“They (categories) are generated through the same analytic process of making 
comparisons to highlights similarities and differences that is used to produce lower 
level concepts. Categories are the “cornerstones” of developing theory. They provide 
the means by which the theory can be integrated. We can show how the grouping of 
concepts forms categories by continuing with the example presented above. In addition 
to the concept of “pacing,” the analyst might generate the concepts of “self-
medicating,” “resting,” and “watching one’s diet.” While coding, the analyst may 
note that, although these concepts are different in form, they seem to represent 
activities directed toward a similar process: keeping an illness under control. They 
could be grouped under a more abstract heading, the category: “Self Strategies for 
Controlling Illness” 
Corbin and Strauss (1990, p.7) 
Propositions make up the third component of Grounded Theory, which serve to 
express the relationships between a category and its concepts and between 
categories. In the original paper, these where originally referred to as ‘hypotheses’ 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967).  As Whetten (1989, p.42) pointed out, ‘propositions’ 
involve conceptual relationships, whereas ‘hypotheses’ suppose quantifiable 
relationships. Accordingly, the term propositions is chosen here, given the 
conceptual nature of the conceptual relationship which are evident but not be 
directly measurable.  
Concepts, categories and propositions are developed iteratively, as new data is 
incorporated and the emerging theory adapted and refined. Unlike other 
methodologies, Grounded Theory does not engage in the linear testing of an 
existing theory, in contrast, it is:     
“…Inductively derived from the study of the phenomenon it represents. That is, 
discovered, developed, and provisionally verified through systematic data collection 
and analysis of data pertaining to that phenomenon. Therefore, data collection, 
analysis, and theory should stand in reciprocal relationship with each other. One does 
not begin with a theory, and then prove it. Rather, one begins with an area of study 
and what is relevant to that area is allowed to emerge.  
(Strauss and Corbin, 1990, p.23.) 
3.2 Grounded Theory and Qualitative Research 
Grounded Theory has its roots in two philosophical schools of thought, namely 
logical positivism and pragmatism. Influential until the late 1970’s, positivism is 
based on the application of formal logic to underpin an empirical understanding of 
the world, where scientific truths are verifiable claims. Pragmatism (from the Greek 
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‘pragma’ meaning ‘act’ or ‘deed’) describes the process in which theory can be 
extracted from practise and applied back, resulting in ‘intelligent practice’.  
Combining these philosophies, Glaser and Strauss (1967) defined qualitative 
research using techniques such as: “Simultaneous data collection and analysis 
coding, creating categories for data, comparative analysis of data, theory 
development during data collection and analysis, detailed categories, establish 
properties for categories, and identify relationships between categories, theoretical 
sampling to make research more robust and literature review written after data 
analysis instead of drive the research.” 
Using this approach, Grounded Theory, according to Strauss and Corbin (1990, 
p.19), qualitative research can ‘uncover and understand what lies behind 
phenomenon about which little is known’. Their work provided greater 
philosophical credibility to qualitative research, in contrast to methodology relying, 
for example, on quantitative methods such as statistical sampling. Selecting between 
qualitative and quantitative research methods has been stated as one of the most 
challenging decisions for researchers in the early stage of their research, with a 
simple but logical answer to this suggested by Ellarms (1996): ‘it all depends on the 
researcher’s skill and the nature of the research question.’ Grounded Theory is a 
general method of analysis that accepts qualitative, quantitative, and hybrid data 
collection from surveys, experiments, and case studies (Glaser, 1978). 
Since research in logistics and supply chain management is a relatively new 
discipline, there are few well-established research templates in the field. Mentzer et 
al. (1995) also said  ‘there is little to guide logistics research in how to adopt a 
rigorous research process that manifests theory development.’ Therefore, they 
proposed a logistics research framework within the positivist approach, which 
offers a comprehensive perspective on the logistics research process.  
The logistics research framework presented by Mentzer and Kahn is a continuous 
process that integrates three research stages which are: (1) idea generation to 
substantive justification, (2) theory construction to methodology and (3) 
methodology to conclusions and future research.  
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Grant (2001) stated that Mentzer’s logistics research framework (1995) ‘is consistent 
with the nature of positivist and quantitative enquiry that consists of idea 
generation, literature review, hypothesis formulation, data collection and analysis, 
and discussion.’  Thus, it is appropriate when descriptive or causal research is 
undertaken. 
In the period after they created the concept of Grounded Theory, numerous 
publications sought to further investigate the underlying philosophical foundation 
and procedures used in Grounded Theory  (Glaser, 1978, 1992; Glaser and Strauss, 
1968; Straus and Corbin, 1990; Wester and Peters, 2004). Strauss joined with 
Corbin in the 1990s to support use of predetermined categories in Grounded 
Theory and address issues in validity and reliability of theory development.  
While Strauss & Glaser (1967) evidently used logical positivism in the development 
of Grounded Theory, others argued that the assumptions and methods were more 
closely related to hermeneutics (Parker, L.D. and Roffey, B. (1993) and Laws, K. 
and McLeod, R. (2004).  Hermeneutics is the study and theory of interpretation, 
typically applied to areas of social research of written, spoken and non-verbal 
communication in religion, literature and law.  
Babbie (2001) contrasts hermeneutics in social sciences as “interpreting social life 
by mentally taking on the circumstances, views and feelings of the participants”, 
describing Grounded Theory simply as “a term used in reference to the creation of 
theory based on observation more than education”. Strauss and Corbin (1990) 
implicitly acknowledged the hermeneutic and phenomenological foundations of 
Grounded Theory when they stated: 
 “Data collection, analysis and theory stand in reciprocal relationship with one 
another. One does not begin with a theory, and then prove it. Rather, one begins 
with an area of study and what is relevant to that area of study is allowed to 
emerged.” 
Strauss and Corbin (1990, p.23) 
Table 6 show the sets out the key distinctions between logical positivism, 
hermeneutics, and Grounded Theory. 
More recently, Charmaz (2006) argued that Grounded Theory should use an 
interpretivist approach, referring to her method as the ‘constructivist’ Grounded 
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Theory model. Positivist and interpretive work can co-exist, the former seeking to 
understand social relationships, in this case the managerial and operative context of 
risk management, the latter seeking to understand the social mechanisms that 
underpin tailored approaches to risk understanding and risk management in the 
specific cases used for this study. ‘It seeks to describe many perceived realities that 
cannot be known a priori because they are time- and context-specific. Thus, 
research is actually an emergent process. As perceived realities change, the research 
design adapts … the interpretivists conduct research in a natural, changing 
environment’ (Hudson et al., 1988).  Charmaz’ interpretivist approach allows 
Grounded Theory methodology to have greater flexibility, particularly relevant here 
when observation of the PHARMA and events are made as the situations evolve. 
Positivism Hermeneutics Grounded Theory 
Defines the world as 
objects 
Resists objectification Accounts for processes that can 
change the coded ‘meaning’ of  
observed phenomena. 
Objectification seeks 
explanation 
Seeks understanding Seeks understanding based on 
interrelationships between 
conditions, meaning and action 
Objectification seeks 
dissection and reduction 
Seeks respect for the whole Avoids reductionism b using 
conditional matrices and 
transactional systems 
Truth is to be found in 
“agreement” by verification 
“Truth” is revealed 
phenomenological 
“Truth” is approximated by the 
researchers creative engagement 
with systematic, interactive data 
collection, analysis and validation 
process. 
“Meaning” is to be found in 
closed definitions 
“Meaning” is to be found 
through interpretation that 
allows future layers of  
interpretation 
“Meaning” is found through 
interpretation that allows future 
levels and categories of  
interpretation and “explanation” 
Table 6: Positivist, Hermeneutic and Grounded Theory Assumptions 
Source: Parker, L.D. & Roffey, B. (1993) 
To summarize, Grounded Theory methodology has three major design patterns:  
1. Systematic design (Strauss and Corbin, 1998):  In systematic design, 
propositions are developed through a sequence of data collection, coding, 
and the visual representation of categories that group and relate codes. This 
enables construction of a specific set of verifiable set propositions from pre-
existing vantage point based on qualitative data. 
 64 
2. Emerging design (Glaser, 1992): In emerging design, the relationship 
between categories is emphasized and explored by the researcher, with very 
open approach to theory development. 
3. Constructivist approach (Charmaz, 1990, 2000, 2006): The constructivist 
approach emphasizes the meaning and interpretation of data by the 
participants and the researcher, allowing subjective view of events and their 
relationships specific to the situations and data sets under study.  
3.3 Grounded Theory and Abductive Research 
In general, there is a lack of formal discussion on research approaches in logistics 
literature. The central approaches in Western research traditions have been those of 
deduction and induction (Kirkeby, 1990). The deductive research follows a 
conscious direction from a general law to a specific case (Andreewsky and Bourcier, 
2000; Taylor et al., 2002).  
According to Arlbjorn and Halldorsson (2002), deductive research is suitable for 
testing existing theories, not creating new science, whilst the inductive research 
approach moves from a specific case or a collection of observation to general law 
or from fact to theory. Accordingly, inductive research is generally appropriate in 
developing new theories. Figure 8 compares deductive and inductive research 
process. 
C.S. Pierce introduced the concept of abduction as a method of deriving a theory 
from underlying facts and observations (Cunningham, 1998, p.833). Abduction is 
often referred to in the literature with the same meaning as ‘reduction’ (Emery and 
Emery, 1997). As one of main proponents of Pragmatism, his defining work on 
abduction takes a key role in this methodology. Distinct from deduction and 
induction, abduction is focussed on the iterative interpretation of data to derive 
explanations for the observed facts. Abduction applies derived propositions to the 
observed facts ‘tending to make them applicable in any way to other circumstances 
than those under which they are observed’ (Peirce, 1955, p.150), in other words, an 
inference starting with observed facts and linking logically backward to potential 
cause. 
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Figure 8: The Purely Deductive and Inductive Research Process 
Sources: Kovacs and Spens (2005) 
 
According to Cunningham (1998, p.833-4), abduction is the appropriate method for 
making sense of new (or unfamiliar) situations. Abduction is essential to 
development of reasoning, in that ‘all thought would be totally impossible in a 
universe in which abduction was not expectable’ Bateson (2002, p.134), in one view. 
The differences between induction, deduction, and abduction is classically 
illustrated in Table 7 with simple hypothetical example, that of a bag of beans, white 
or black, provided by Shank (1998, p.847): 
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(1) Theoretical framework  
(from prior literature)	
(2) Theoretical conclusions 
(hypotheses H/propositions P 
reached through logic)	
(3) Final conclusions (corroboration/
abandoning theory); acception/
discarding H/P	
(3) Testing of  conclusions	
Purely inductive research process	
(0) Existing theoretical knowledge from 
prior research	
(2) (Final) theoretical conclusions 
(framework)	
(1) Real-life observations	
 Deduction 
Rule [It is true that] All the beans from this bag are white 
Case [We know that] These beans are from this bag 
Result [Certainly, it is true that] These beans are white  
Induction  
Rule [We know that] These beans are from this bag 
Result [We have observed that] These beans are white 
Rule [Probably, then] All the beans from this bag are white  
Abduction  
Result [We have the experience that] The beans are white [but this 
experience lacks any real meaning for us]. 
Rule [The claim that] All the beans from this bag are white [is 
meaningful in this setting]. 
Case [Therefore, it is both plausible and meaningful to hypothesize 
that] These beans are from this bag.   
Table 7: The Method of Deduction, Induction and Abduction 
Source: Shank (1998, p.847) 
3.3.1 Abduction within Grounded Theory Approach 
Within the Grounded Theory approach, the importance of abduction has been 
recognised by Coffey and Atkinson (1996, p.155) stating that ‘abductive reasoning’ 
lies at the heart of ‘grounded theorising.’ Furthermore, they state that: 
 “Our important ideas are not ‘in’ the data, and however hard we work, we will not 
find those ideas simply by scrutinising our data ever more obsessively. We need to 
work at analysis and theorising, and we need to do the intellectual, imaginative work 
of ideas in parallel to the other tasks of data management.” 
Coffey and Atkinson (1996, p.155) 
Thus, abduction is a type of inference that operates bottom up: individual facts are 
collected and connected together in order to develop hypotheses. An observed 
phenomena is the starting point (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996), which at first pass 
suggests the exclusion of formal theory Coffey and Atkinson (1996, p.157) allow for 
formal theory in this approach  
…We can also recognise that theories usefully can be thought of as heuristic tools. In 
other words, we use concepts, theories and ideas constructively and 
creatively…Regularities in data – whether of form or content – must be associated 
with ideas that go beyond those data themselves. 
Coffey and Atkinson (1996, p.157) 
As pointed out earlier, much of the logistics research has a positivist approach and 
has been criticised for lack of focus on theory development (Stock, 1997; Kovacs 
&Spens, 2005). Kovacs and Spens (2005) proposed that an abductive research 
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process (Figure 9) is an appropriate tool to further theory development in business 
logistic research. The abductive approach resonates with the fact that significant 
advances in science typically follow neither a pattern of pure deduction nor of pure 
induction (Kirkeby, 1990; Taylor et al., 2002). 
 
Figure 9: The Abductive Research Process Applied in This Research 
Source: Adapted from Dubois and Gadde (2002) and Kovacs and Spens (2005) 
The abductive approach leads to new insight about existing phenomena by 
examining these from a new perspective. This way of creating knowledge is found 
in logistics research that borrows theories from other scientific fields (Arlbjorn and 
Halldorsson, 2002; Stock, 1997). In addition, abduction works through interpreting 
or re-contextualising individual phenomena within a contextual framework, and 
aims to understand something in a new way, from the perspective of a new 
conceptual framework (Danermark, 2001; Dubois & Gadde, 2002).  
It has been shown that case studies commonly use abductive reasoning (Alvesson & 
Skoldberg, 1994; Dubois & Gadde, 2002). Rather than focusing on generalisations 
and/or their specific manifestations only, the abductive approach is concerned with 
the particularities of specific situations that deviate from the general structure of 
such kinds of situations (Danermark, 2001). As such, it helps to determine which 
aspects of a situation in the case studies are generalisable and which only pertain to 
the specific situation itself.  
Following Hudson (1988), this research on how companies respond to supply chain 
disruption can be seen in a ‘natural and changing environment’, with events 
unfolding during course of the study.  
The abductive research process based on the ideas of Dubois and Gadde (2002) 
and Kovacs and Spens (2005) is appropriate because it leads to simultaneous data 
Theoretical 
part 
 
 
 
 
Empirical 
part	
Prior 
theoretical 
knowledge
- Define 
problem 
Develop 
conceptual 
frame of  
reference 
 
Collect 
empirical 
data 
 
Revise 
framework 
of  reference 
Analyse 
empirical 
data 
Theory 
suggestion -
Develop 
framework, 
hypotheses, 
propositions 
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Then	‘Analyse	empirical	data’	
Then	‘Theory	sugges on	–	develop	framework,	hypotheses,	proposi ons’	
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Application 
of  
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collection, theory development and theory-building elements, precisely the 
approach taken in this study.   
3.3.2 Different Proponents of Grounded Theory Building 
Process 
Grounded Theory is a research method that operates almost in a reverse fashion 
from traditional research. Rather than beginning with a hypothesis, the first step is 
data collection, through variety methods. From the collected data, key points are 
marked with a series of codes extracted from the text. The codes are grouped into 
similar ‘concepts’ in order to make them more workable. From these concepts, 
‘categories’ are formed, which are the basis for the creation of a ‘theory’. This 
process contradicts the traditional model of research, where the researcher chooses 
a theoretical framework, and only then applies this model to the phenomenon to be 
studied (Alan, 2003). 
Table 8 shows the different between two schools of thought – Strauss and Corbin 
(1998) and Glaser (1978) – specifically in data analysis phase. 
 Strauss and Corbin (1990) Glaser (1978) 
Initial coding Open Coding 
Use of  analytic technique 
Substantive coding 
Data dependent 
Intermediate phase Axial coding 
Reduction and clustering of  
categories (paradigm model) 
Continuous with previous phase 
Comparisons, with focus on data, 
become more abstract, categories 
refitted, emerging frameworks. 
Final development Selective coding 
Detailed development of  
categories, selection of  core, 
integration of  categories 
Theoretical 
Refitting and refinement of  
categories which integrate around 
emerging core 
Theory Detailed and dense process 
fully described 
Parsimony, scope and modifiability 
Table 8: Data Analysis: Strauss and Glaser Compared 
Source: Heath and Cowley (2004) 
The Ground Theory steps outline by different authors is illustrated in. In general 
the process of Grounded Theory often starts with researcher decide if a Grounded 
Theory is a best addresses to the research problem, identify a process to study and 
seek and access to the data. Then conduct theoretical sampling and code data by 
using selective coding to develop theory. Once the research has emergent theory 
then they have to validate the theory before writing a Grounded Theory research 
report. 
Technique 1 Technique 2 Technique 3 Technique 4 Technique 5 
Strauss and Corbin (1990) Glaser (1978) Odis E. Simmons (2003) Naresh R.Pandit (1996) Randall and Mello (2011) 
Phase 0: Preparation Phase 0: Preparation Phase 0: Preparation 
Minimising preconceptions. No 
preliminary literature review. General 
research topic, but no predetermined 
research ‘problem’ 
Phase 0: Research design 
Step 1: Review of  technical literature (definition of  
research question, definition of  priori constructs) 
Step 2: Selecting cases (focuses efforts on 
theoretical useful cases not random sampling) 
Phase 0: Research 
problem and opening 
research question 
Phase 1: Data collection  
Collecting data via interviews, 
observations, videos, documents, 
drawings, diaries, memoirs, 
newspapers, biographies, historical 
documents, autobiographies, and 
other sources not listed here. 
Phase 1: Data collection 
Collecting data by intensive 
interviews often combined with 
participant observation. But, any 
type of  data can be used 
including quantitative. 
Phase 1: Data collection 
Collecting data by intensive 
interviews, participant observation or 
from secondary sources. 
Phase 1: Data collection 
Step 3: Developing rigorous data collection 
protocol - create case study database, empty 
multiple data collection methods, qualitative and 
quantitative data) 
Step 4: Entering the field – overlap data collection 
and analysis, flexible and opportunistic data 
collection methods. 
Step 5: Data ordering – arraying events 
chronologically to facilitate easier data analysis. 
Phase 1: Data collection 
initial coding 
Initial pilot interview is 
developed and an archival 
review is conducted 
Phase 2: Data analysis 
 ‘Open coding’ – use of  analytic 
technique 
  
‘Axial coding’ – reduction and 
clustering of  categories (paradigm 
model) 
Final development stage is  
 
‘Selective coding’ – detailed 
development of  categories, selection 
of  core, integration of  categories 
 
Theory stage is detailed and dense 
process fully described 
 
Phase 2: Data analysis 
‘Substantive coding’ –data 
dependent 
 
‘Continuous with previous phase’ 
– comparison, with focus on 
data, become more abstract, 
categories refitted, emerging 
frameworks 
 
‘Theoretical’ – refitting and 
refinement of  categories with 
integrate around emerging core 
 
Theory stage is parsimony, scope 
and modifiability 
Phase 2: Data analysis  
Relating data to ideas, the ideas to 
other ideas. 
 
‘Substantive coding’- Summarising 
empirical substance 
 
‘Open coding ‘- coding for anything 
and everything 
 
‘Selective coding’ – occurring when 
core variable and major dimensions 
and properties have been discovered 
 
‘Theoretical coding’ – 
conceptualizing how the substantive 
codes may relate to each other as 
‘hypotheses’ to be integrated into the 
theory 
Phase 2: Data analysis 
Step 6: Data relating to the first case  
 
‘Open coding’ – develop concepts, categories and 
properties 
 
‘Axial coding’ – develop connections between a 
category and its sub-categories 
 
‘Selective coding’ – all forms of  coding enhance 
internal validity 
 
Step 7: Theoretical sampling – literal and 
theoretical replication across case (go to step 2 
until theoretical saturation) 
  
Step 8: Reaching closure – Theoretical saturation 
when possible 
Phase 2: Initial memos 
raise codes to tentative 
categories 
Phase 3: Memoing 
Writing records of  analysis 
 
Phase 3: Memoing 
Memos are theoretical notes 
about the data and the 
Phase 3: Memoing 
Memos are the theorizing write-up of  
ideas about codes and their 
Phase 3: Literature comparison 
Step 9: Compare emergent theory with extant 
literature 
Phase 3: Data collection 
focused coding 
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conceptual connection between  relationships. Comparisons with conflicting with frameworks to  
Technique 1 Technique 2 Technique 3 Technique 4 Technique 5 
 categories. The memo process 
runs parallel with the coding and 
analysis process to capture the 
research’s emergent ideation of  
substantive and theoretical codes 
and categories. 
 improve construct definitions, and therefore 
internal validity 
Comparisons with similar frameworks to improve 
external validity by establishing the domain to 
which the study’s finding can be generalised 
 
Phase 4: Theoretical sampling 
Data collection based on concepts 
that appear to be relevant to the 
evolving story line 
Phase 4: Theoretical sampling 
Process of  data collection for 
generating theory whereby the 
analyst jointly collects, codes, and 
analyses his data and decides 
what data to collect next and 
where to find them in order to 
develop his theory as it emerges. 
Phase 4: Sorting and theoretical 
outline 
Conceptual sorting of  memos into an 
outline of  the emergent theory, 
showing relationship between 
concepts (not data sorting). 
 
Phase 4: Write up your theory Phase 4: Memos refine 
conceptual categories 
Phase 5: Constant comparison 
Comparing incident with incidents in 
order to classify data is not difficult 
to comprehend. 
Phase 5: Constant comparison 
Comparing incidents applicable 
to each category 
Integrating categories and their 
properties 
Delimiting the theory 
Writing the theory 
Phase 5: Write up your theory  Phase 5: Theoretical 
sampling of  
hypothesized 
relationships 
Phase 6: Theoretical saturation 
The point in analysis when all 
categories are well developed in 
terms of  properties, dimensions, and 
variations. Further data gathering 
and analysis add little new to the 
conceptualization, though variations 
can always be discovered. 
Phase 6: Theoretical 
saturation 
The point where no additional 
data are being found 
 
 Phase 6: Sorting memos, 
Theoretical coding, 
Adopting categories 
Phase 7: Write up your theory Phase 7: Write up your theory  
 Phase 7: Integrating 
memos diagram 
concepts, Saturation 
    Phase 8: Emerge Theory 
   
 Phase 9: Further 
theoretical sampling if  
needed 
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Table 9: Grounded Theory Steps Outlined by Different Authors 
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3.4 Glossary of Grounded Theory 
Grounded Theory has evolved over the last 40 years; below is a short glossary of 
key terms used for this study shown in Table 10. 
Term Definition 
Axial coding Process by which categories are related to subcategories at the level of  
properties and dimensions. This type of  coding consists of  intense 
analysis done around one category a time, in terms of  the Strauss and 
Corbin paradigm items (e.g., coding, actions/interactions, and 
consequences). 
Basic social processes 
(BSP’s) 
One type of  core category, often best visualized when the category 
involved multiple concepts linked together in a larger social process – all 
BSP’s are or involve core variables, but not all core variables are or are 
part of  BSP’s. The primary distinction between the two is that BSP’s are 
processural – they have two or more clear emergent stages in a temporal 
sense. 
Coding paradigm Analytic tool Strauss and Corbin devised to help integrate structure with 
process. When using the paradigm one codes for core phenomena, 
conditions, actions/interactions, and the consequences of  those 
actions/interactions. 
Categories Abstract, higher order concepts under which other concepts can be 
grouped through an underlying shared uniformity. Categories name 
patterns in the data. They have analytic power because they can be used 
to explain and predict behaviour in a phenomenon. 
Categories Abstract, higher order concepts under which other concepts can be 
grouped through an underlying, shared uniformity. Categories name 
patterns in the data. They have analytic power because they can be used 
to explain and predict behaviour in a phenomenon. 
Coding families Sets of  interrelated theoretical codes. For example, the “cultural family” 
includes social norms, social values, social beliefs, and social sentiments. 
Conditions Term used in Grounded Theory to refer to context. Sets of  events that 
create the situations, issues, and problems within which a phenomenon is 
manifest and help explain the behaviour of  individuals or groups. Types 
of  conditions include casual, intervening, and contextual conditions. 
Conceptual ordering Organisation of  data into categories according to their properties and 
dimensions. 
Conditional matrix A diagram used to track or contemplates the various levels of  influence 
on a phenomenon as well as the implications on those levels of  the 
phenomenon. 
Constant comparison Investigation of  similarities and differences across incidents recorded in 
the data. A technique used to generate concepts and their properties 
based on repeated patterns of  behaviour. Comparisons are made within 
and across data sources. 
Core category Central category of  the phenomenon about which the theory is 
concerned. May not necessarily be a category originally sought at the 
beginning of  the research study. Explains the majority of  the behaviour in 
a phenomenon. 
Dimension Range along which properties of  a category vary. Used to provide 
parameters for the purpose of  comparison between categories.  
Formal theory Theory that is developed for a conceptual area of  inquiry at a high level 
of  generality (scope). Formal theory develops through the generalisation 
and modification of  substantive theory as it is applied to different areas 
of  inquiry. 
Process Sequences of  evolving action/interaction taking place over time and that 
are related to changes in structural conditions. 
Properties General or specific characteristics or attributes of  a category, which allow 
a category to e defined and given meaning. 
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Term Definition 
Selective coding To delimit coding to only those variables that relate to the core variable 
that has emerged from the study. The analyst links related and 
subordinate categories to a core category in sufficiently significant way to 
assist in the formulation of  theory. 
Structure Social conditional context in which a phenomenon is located. Social 
structure creates the context for action and interaction, and as such is 
inexorably linked to process. 
Substantive theory Theory that is specific to time and place. May eventually be extended to a 
formal theory if  becomes supported across multiple contexts. 
Theoretical memos Written ideas of  the researcher concerning codes and their inter-
relationships within a phenomenon. 
Theoretical sampling Process of  data where the analyst collects, codes, and analyses data and 
decides what data to collect next and where to find them based entirely 
upon the emergent theory. 
Theoretical saturation Point at which no new information appears to emerge during coding and 
subsequent data collection; i.e., when no new properties, conditions and 
so on can be attributed to a category. 
Theoretical sensitivity Researcher’s knowledge, understanding, and skill, which foster the 
generation of  categories and properties and increase the ability to relate 
them to emergent theoretical codes. 
Table 10: Glossary of Grounded Theory Terms  
Source: Mello and Flint (2009) 
3.5 Case-Based Research and Grounded Theory 
This study uses Grounded Theory methodology with data from three cases. The 
benefits and context in which this methodology can be used in combination with 
case research are discussed below. 
Case-based research has consistently been one of the most powerful research 
methods in operations management, particularly in the development of new theory 
(Voss et al., 2002). Eisenhardt (1989) also argues that case studies are especially 
helpful when building theories or frameworks. 
According to Yin (2003) and Mukherjee et al. (2000), exploratory case study is 
particularly useful when there is uncertainty in the definition of constructs. Since 
the purpose of this research is to describe and learn from current management 
practice and applies the case methodology to actual events in business life, case 
study was an appropriate way to provide data to Grounded Theory methodology 
because ‘a case study is an empirical enquiry that (1) investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real life context, especially when (2) the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident’ (Yin, 2003, p.13).  
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This is confirmed as well by Eisenhardt (1989) who argues that using case data to 
build Grounded Theory has major strengths as follow: 
1. Theory building from case studies is likely to produce novel theory; this is 
so because ‘creative insight often arises from juxtaposition of contradictory 
or paradoxical evidence’ (Eisenhardt, 1989, p.546). The constant 
comparative method of real-world data inevitably reveals conflicts with 
dogmatic, rigid thinking, forcing the researcher to review inherent bias and 
adapt his thinking (p. 546). 
2. The emergent theory ‘is likely to be testable with constructs that can be 
readily measured and hypotheses that can be proven false’ (Eisenhardt, 
1989, p.547). Due to the close connection between theory and data, it is 
more likely that the theory can be tested and expanded by subsequent 
studies. 
3. The ‘resultant theory is likely to be empirically valid’ (Eisenhardt, 1989, 
p.547). Validity is maintained from the start through the constant 
comparison of data with emergent theory. ‘This closeness can lead to an 
intimate sense of things’ that ‘often produce theory which closely mirrors 
reality’ (Eisenhardt, 1989, p.547). 
Stuart et al. (2002) also suggest that case studies are an appropriate research 
methodology to map the field of supply chain management, as they allow 
identification and description of critical variables. Moreover, case studies should not 
be seen as a methodology appropriate only to understand the preliminary stages of 
theory development but also to provide a means of refutation of, or extension to, 
existing concepts because of their observation richness (Stuart et al., 2002). 
Case research and Grounded Theory are consistent in a number of dimensions. 
Data from these studies are obtained from real-world, natural settings; the emergent 
theory is derived from actual managerial practice. The abductive nature of 
Grounded Theory methodology allows exploration of ‘how’ concepts are linked, 
supporting the development of causal relationships. Lastly, these support 
exploration of issues in an area that has not been extensively studied before. As 
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discussed earlier, the role of time in management of catastrophic risk in supply 
chain is minimally covered by existing research.   
Grounded Theory moves beyond descriptive case research toward development of 
theoretic constructs and propositional relationships (Charmaz, 2006). As she points 
out, this analytical method supports investigation of social processes and structure.  
The effectiveness and efficiency therefore depends on the availability and richness 
of data from observing human activity  (Charmaz, 2006).  
When using Grounded Theory methodology with data derived from case research, 
utmost care must be considered to ensure that principle of case study research do 
not distort true emergence for the theory generation (Glaser, 1998, pp.40-2). For 
example, Yin (1994, p.28) states theory development prior to the collection of any 
case study data is an essential step in doing case studies.’ This statement, perfectly 
valid for some case study research, contravenes a key principle of Grounded 
Theory. Therefore, it is advised that when combining case study and Grounded 
Theory, the researcher must clearly specify which methodology is driving the 
investigation. Advancement of a supply chain management theoretical structure 
requires an aggregate approach based upon inductive techniques. Grounded Theory 
provides an inductive method for creating aggregate level theory through in-depth 
investigations within and across organisation (Charmaz, 2006; Glaser, 1992; Glaser 
& Strauss, 1967).   
In addition, supply chain research often involves phenomena with complexity. I 
believe that grounded theory approach is an appropriate choice of methodology for 
this study because it makes the findings more robust and possibly makes it easier to 
detect similarities and differences.  
Grounded Theory also emphasises gaining deep insights into social phenomena that 
are problematic for the people involved. Though deep immersion in the daily 
worlds of supply chain managers and gaining access to their thoughts, feeling and 
behaviours as they go and about solving the problems they encounter, researchers 
can gain insights into social aspects of supply chain management that other 
methodologies are less likely to tap into. Such insights are imperative in furthering 
our understanding of supply chain management phenomena and in developing 
useful theories (Randall, Wesley and Mello John E., 2006). 
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It is helpful to consider what Grounded Theory is and what it is not (Table 11)  
 
What Grounded Theory is … What Grounded Theory is NOT … 
 Constant comparison & theoretical sampling 
- Collection of data and analysis go hand-in-
hand 
- What data to collect next depends on the 
theory constructed thus far 
 Study of inter-subjective experience 
- More suited to efforts to understand how 
actors construct meaning out of inter-
subjective experience (Suddaby, 2006) 
 ‘Everything is data’ 
 Theory testing with a case study 
 Theory building with ‘raw data’ 
 An excuse to avoid reading up on the extant 
literature 
 A study of the actors’ “inner lives” 
 Content analysis through word counts 
 A formulaic approaches to data (or to data 
gathering) 
 A descriptive account 
Table 11: What Grounded Theory Is and What It Is Not 
 
3.6 Step-by-Step Guide to Grounded Theory in this 
Research 
Previously I have shown the differing approaches in theory building presented by 
several researchers. In this study, I have chosen the process based on Strauss and 
Corbin (1990), specifically in the data analysis phase employing an abductive 
approach.  
All the interpretations of Grounded Theory methodology, the Strauss and Corbin 
(1990) approach was chosen for several reasons:  
1. The focus of this study is on managerial decision-making. As stated by 
Lehmann, the Straussian approach is more effective for studies of 
individuals than research involving organisations, political systems, or 
technical issues (Lehmann, 2001a, p.9).  
2. Strauss permits the notion of initiating the study with a general idea or 
framework of concepts in place, e.g. the 3D framework, while Glaser 
believes that an ‘empty mind’ should be the starting point to avoid bias and 
prejudice which might mask potential concepts and categories. 
3. The approach Strauss takes can used structured questioning, leading to a 
more focus emergence and development of propositions; Glaser’s approach 
presumes that theory should emerge entirely from the study. 
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Differences between the two approaches of Strauss and of Glaser are summarized 
below in Table 12. 
GLASERIAN STRAUSSIAN 
Beginning with general wonderment (an empty 
mind) 
Having a general idea of  where to begin 
Emerging theory, with neutral questions Forcing the theory, with structured questions 
Development of  a conceptual theory Conceptual description (description of  
situations) 
Theoretical sensitivity (the ability to perceive 
variables and relationships) comes from 
immersion in the data 
Theoretical sensitivity comes from methods and 
tools 
The theory is grounded in the data The theory is interpreted by an observer 
The credibility of  the theory, or verification, is 
derived from its grounding in the data 
The credibility of  the theory comes from the 
rigour of  the method 
A basic social process should be identified Basic social processes need not be identified 
The researcher is passive, exhibiting disciplined 
restraint 
The researcher is active 
Data reveals the theory Data is structured to reveal the theory 
Coding is less rigorous, a constant comparison 
of  incident to incident, with neutral questions 
and categories and properties evolving. Take care 
not to ‘over-conceptualise’, identify key points.  
Coding is more rigorous and defined by 
technique. The nature of  making comparisons 
varies with the coding technique. Labels are 
carefully crafted at the time. Codes are derived 
from ‘micro-analysis, which consists of  analysis 
data word-by-word’. 
Two coding phases or types, simple (fracture the 
data then conceptually group it) and substantive 
(open or selective, to produce categories and 
properties) 
Three type of  coding, open (identifying, naming, 
categorising and describing phenomena), axial 
(the process of  relating codes to each other) and 
selective (choosing a core category and relating 
other categories to that) 
Regarded by some as the only ‘true’ Grounded 
Theory method 
Regarded by some as a form of  qualitative data 
analysis (QDA) 
Table 12: The Difference between the Glaserian and Straussian Approaches to Grounded 
Theory 
Onion (2006) 
Table 13 depicts this Grounded Theory process, emphasizing the constant 
comparison process which considers and compares the multiple concepts articulate 
by study participants to those concepts derived from theoretical memos, memos 
recorded during analysis, documents, and relevant literature and online sources. I 
selected three cases for study to seek theoretical similarities and differences in order 
to develop the higher order concepts, which explain behaviours and response  
(Gephart 2004; Glaser 1978). 
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Four analytic (and not strictly sequential) phases of Grounded Theory building were 
identified in this study: research design, data collection, data ordering, data analysis, 
literature comparison and write up. Within these phases, ten procedures or steps 
were followed. These phases and steps were evaluated against four research quality 
criteria: construct validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability.  
Briefly, construct validity is enhanced by establishing clearly specified operation 
procedures. Internal validity is enhanced by establishing causal relationships 
whereby certain conditions are shown to lead to other conditions, as distinguished 
from spurious relationships. In this sense, internal validity addresses the credibility 
or “truth value” of the study’s findings. External validity requires establishing clearly 
the domain to which to study’s findings can be generalised. Here, reference is made 
to analytic and not statistical generalisation and requires generalising a particular set 
of findings to some broader theory and not broader population. Finally, reliability 
requires demonstrating that the operations of a study – such as data collection 
procedures – can be – repeated with the same result. 
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Table 13: The Process of Building Grounded Theory in This Study 
 
   Description Output 
P
h
a
se
 1
 
R
es
ea
rc
h
 d
es
ig
n
 
Step 1 Preparation Minimizing preconceptions and preliminary 
literature review, define general research topic 
but no predetermined research problem. 
General 
research 
problem & 
opening 
research 
questions 
Step 2 Case selection Selecting the case – theoretical selection, not 
random sampling. 
Case(s) 
P
h
a
se
 2
 
D
at
a 
co
lle
ct
io
n
 a
n
d
 d
at
a 
o
rd
er
in
g 
Step 3 Develop 
rigorous data 
collection 
protocol 
Deviating real-life observation, interview, 
lecture, seminar, expert group meeting, 
newspaper, article, internet, mail, field notes or 
note taking. 
 
Step 4 Entering the 
field 
Overlap data collection and analysis to speeds 
analysis and reveals helpful adjustments to data 
collection. 
 
Step 5 Data ordering Arraying events chronologically to facilitate 
easier data analysis. 
 
P
h
a
se
 3
 
D
at
a 
an
al
ys
is
 
Step 6 Analysis data 
Open coding 
Axial coding 
 
Selective coding 
 
Memoing 
Analysis data relating to the first case by coding 
Develop concepts, categories and properties 
Develop connections between a category and its 
subcategories 
Integrate categories to build theoretical 
framework. All forms of  coding enhance 
internal validity. 
Theorizing write-up of  ideas about codes and 
their relationships. 
 
Emerging core 
categories  
Properties,  
Sub-categories  
 
Step 7 Theoretical 
Sampling 
Deciding what data to collect next and where to 
find that data in order to develop the theory as 
it emerges. Literal and theoretical replication 
across cases - keep going back to step 2, this 
process continues until no new properties or 
dimension are emerging. 
 
Step 8 Constant 
comparison 
Comparing incident with incidents for 
similarities and differences in order to classify 
data is not difficult to comprehend. 
 
Step 9 Theoretical 
Saturation 
Reaching closure when further data gathering 
and analysis add little new to the 
conceptualization. 
Saturated core 
categories 
 
Step 10 Theoretical 
sorting memos 
 
Theoretical 
coding 
Conceptual sorting of  memos into an outline 
of  the emergent theory, showing relationship 
between concepts. 
Defining hypotheses or proposition, suggesting 
new theory in final conclusion 
Hypothesis, 
proposition –  
 
Emergent 
Theory  
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Step 11 Integrating the 
literature 
Compare emergent theory with extent literature 
(comparisons with conflicting/similar 
frameworks). 
 
Step 12 Validation your 
theory 
Checking whether your new theory fit, 
relevance, workability and modifiability. 
 
Step 13 Write up your 
theory 
Writing research report  
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PHASE 1: Research Design 
Step 1 – Preparation 
The first step is in designing the research program, defining the overarching 
methodology and scope of study. Easterby and Smith define research design as: 
 “…The overall configuration of a piece of research: what kind of evidence is 
gathered from where, and how such evidence is interpreted in order to provide good 
answers to the basic research questions(s).” 
Easterby – Smith et al. (1990, p.21) 
Definition of the basic research question, as stated in the introduction to this study, 
is the first step in Grounded Theory. The scope must be narrow enough to provide 
focus and feasibility; the scope must be broad enough to allow flexibility as the 
study evolves and support discovery of unanticipated concepts.  Existing   supply 
chain risk management literature, however limited, provides an initial structure and 
scope (as per Charmaz, 2006; Glaser, 1992; Glaser 1998). For this perspective, the 
literature focuses, but does not constrain, or presuppose, the direction of the 
investigation. Here, I am using 3-D time framework developed by Sodhi and Tang 
(2008) to focus the research design.  
Step 2 – Case Selection 
After basic research questions have been generated and the research is scoped and 
focused, the second step is in case selection and identification of the starting case. 
Cases (the principal units of data in this research) were selected to fulfil 
requirements of theoretical sampling: 
The process of data collecting for generating theory whereby the analyst jointly collects, 
codes, and analyses his data and decides what data to collect next and where to find 
them, in order to develop his theory as it emerges.  
Glaser and Strauss (1967, p.45) 
Accordingly,  
Unlike the sampling done in quantitative investigations, theoretical sampling cannot 
be planned before embarking on a Grounded Theory study. The specific sampling 
decisions evolve during the research process itself.  
Strauss and Corbin (1990, p.192) 
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Yin (1994) suggested three principles of data collection that can help deal with the 
problems of establishing the construct validity and reliability of the case study 
evidence. These principles are (1) use of multiple sources of evidence (evidence 
from two or more sources, but converging on the same set of facts or findings); (2) 
creation a case study database (a formal assembly of evidence distinct from the final 
case study report), along the lines of the Straussian approach; and (3) maintain a 
chain of evidence in order to increase the reliability of the information in a case 
study (explicit links between the questions asked, the data collected, and the 
conclusions drawn).  Grounded Theory is consistent with these principles.  
The context for my investigation is PHARMA’s handling of the H1N1 Influenza 
pandemic declared on 11 June 2009, with analysis of first-hand interviews of key 
management, company internal documents and publically available news and 
additional documentation from key players. The novel Influenza strain, H1N1, 
commonly known as swine flu, had fast transmission but unknown mortality at the 
outset, resulting in a dramatic spike in demand for PHARMA’s antiviral and related 
medicines.  
PHASE 2: Data Collection and Data Ordering 
Step 3 – Develop Rigorous Data Collection Protocol 
In this step, a data collection protocol is developed employing multiple data 
collection methods to establish the cases database. In Grounded Theory 
methodology, both of qualitative and quantitative data can be used. Data can come 
from (1) collecting observations of the area directly from the events under study (2) 
accessing public or private records of various types (e.g. news report, survey, 
government or organisation document, online sources, etc. (3) interviewing 
individuals or participating in group discussion, face to face or remotely (e.g. 
telephone, text chat) or asynchronously such as with email (Glaser, 1964 and 
Glaser, 2008). 
For the PHARMA case, selected as the primary case, data was gathered through 
company visits from 2009 to 2010. Triangulation was used to ensure research 
reliability by obtaining the same piece of information from different sources: semi-
structured interviews, internal documents, direct observation (McCutcheon and 
Meredith, 1993) and media. A semi-structured interview tool was developed to 
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collect data on the three above-mentioned dimensions. No fixed vocabulary was 
used to ask questions, assuring that the conversation developed at its own pace 
(Sutton and Callahan, 1987).  I followed Yin’s (1994) and Eisenhardt’s (1989) 
suggestion of executing the case study by conducting interviews, face to face or via 
telephone, with key informants from different divisions along the PHARMA supply 
chain.  
To ensure broad dimensionality in the data as suggested by Glaser and Strauss, 
1967; Glaser, 1992, 1978; Charmaz, 2006), I engaged line managers, employees, 
supervisors and executives at multiple levels in the supply chain, while also cutting 
across functionally by interviewing R&D and manufacturing management 
At this step, an initial pilot interview is typically developed, and an archival review is 
conducted to ensure the target participants represent a sufficiently rich with the 
phenomena under study. 
Step 4 – Entering the Field 
The step initiating field research include preparation work such as selecting and 
appropriate company sites and groups to interview, identifying participants and 
obtaining access to key documents, contacting participants and gaining their 
consent. 
I used the interview protocol as show in Table 14 to conduct semi-structured 
telephone interviews with high-level site directors, sending them the planned 
interview questions in advance. The first goal of each interview was to understand 
their perception on supply chain risk and supply chain disruptions. The questions 
also explored their view on whether the company was aware of vulnerabilities in the 
supply chain and how they leveraged time in their management of supply chain 
disruptions. 
I then conducted semi-structured face-to-face interviews with senior supply chain 
managers and executives. This used the time-based risk management framework 
(Sodhi & Tang, 2009) to understand how PHARMA and its executives viewed and 
used time to respond to the H1N1 Influenza pandemic. The interview questions 
submitted to the executives are shown also in Table 14. 
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Apart from face-to-face and interview, data was collected from direct observation, 
participant-observation (meeting and conference calls) and archival records and 
documentation both from internal sources (presentations, reports) and external 
sources (internet, news, press released). The data source, data collection methods 
and data content of PHARMA are summarised in Table 15. 
 
Aspects Questions 
Supply chain design  What are general design principles of  the global supply chain of  the 
company? 
Risk management 
strategy 
 What risk mitigation policies and strategies are in place today? 
o What governance has been established to:  
o Manage update of  disruption catalogue (risk map) 
o Review contingency plans 
o Monitor occurrence of  disruptions, and finally 
o Initiate and carry out contingency plans? 
 How are contingency plans being tested and how often?  
  Can you describe any previous significant disruptions to the supply 
chain that the company experienced? 
 What internal disruptions have PHARMA experienced and what 
were the lessons learned?  
Current event  How did the company become aware, and in retrospect were there 
any warning signs? How does the firm prepare for this type of  risk? 
 How is the occurrence of  a disruption detected and communicated 
to initiate contingency plans?  
 What was the initial impact of  the current event? 
 What contingency plans does PHARMA have to manage major 
supply chain disruptions for the Hematol product line?  
 Who is responsible for the plan and execution?  
 What changes in the products, supply chain or other approach did 
the company consider to respond to the event? 
 What was the role of  time in determining the response of  the 
supply chain disruption? 
 How quickly could the actions enable the company to meet the 
supply chain objectives? 
Time-Based Risk 
Management 
 Does company explicitly set time targets or metrics for measuring 
response speed in handling the pandemic? 
 What was the role of  time in managing the response? 
 Does company think that by shortening detection time, solution 
design lead-time and solution deployment time it can reduce supply 
chain impact or gain greater advantage? 
Learning from the event  What went well in responding to the event? What could have been 
done better? 
Table 14: Final Interview Protocol 
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PHARMA   
Data Source Data Collection Methods Data Content 
Key 
Informants 
Semi-structured telephone and face-to-
face interviews with:  
 Manufacturing and Supply BCP 
lead 
 Division BCP Lead(s) 
 Environment, Health and Safety 
Head 
 Process Owner 
 Primary Procurement Manager 
 Manufacturing Strategy 
Manager(s) 
 Project Manager(s) 
 Primary Logistics Manager(s) 
 Site Logistics Head(s) 
 Site Production Head(s) 
 Site Head(s) 
 R&D Manufacturing Manager (s) 
 
Telephone Interview 
 Perceived probability and impact of  
potentially severe disruption. 
 Preparation and testing of  business 
continuity plans. 
 Decision making process during a 
disruption. 
 Experience from previous supply 
chain events. 
 
Face to Face Interview 
 Steps taken to organise and initiate 
first response. 
 Mechanisms used to accelerate 
creation, evaluation and deployment 
of  possible solutions. 
 Strategies to communicate and 
coordinate the status of  the situation 
and the organisational response. 
 Lessons learned and incorporated in 
risk management strategies after the 
event with regard to reaction speed. 
 
Archival 
Records 
Presentations by:  
 Chief  Executive Officer 
 Value Stream Leader, 
Manufacturing and Supply 
Pandemic Lead 
 Manufacturing and Supply BCP 
lead 
 Manufacturing Strategy 
Manager(s) 
 Project Manager(s) 
 Site Logistics Head(s) 
 Global Quality Assurance(s) 
 
 Global procurement process and 
strategy 
 Risk management process 
 H1N1 Influenza pandemic executive 
review 
 
Table 15: Data Sources, Data Collection Methods and Data Contents from PHARMA 
 
Step 5 – Data Ordering 
The fifth step involves data ordering. Yin (1989, p.119) suggested to array events 
chronologically to facilitate analysis, an obvious dimension for this study on time 
response time: 
“The arraying of events into a chronology permits the investigator to determine causal 
events over time, because the basic sequence of a cause and its effect cannot be 
temporally inverted. However, unlike the more general time-series approaches, the 
chronology is likely to cover many different types of variables and not to be limited to 
a single independent or dependent variable”  
Yin (1989, p.119) 
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In this study, a timeline was created to visualise the sequence of events and the 
response to these events. 
PHASE 3: Data Analysis 
Step 6 – Initial Data Analysis 
Coding and Categorising Data 
After data was collected and collated, an initial categorization was made to identify 
common concepts. Three sequential types of coding are used in the Straussian 
approach to Grounded Theory, namely open coding, axial coding and selective 
coding, where the output of one is the input to the next in a non-iterative fashion. 
This research process is summarised in Figure 10 with a definition of each step in 
the process and how this is implemented in the study.  
Open Coding 
The first step, open coding, is the initial analysis stage that deals with identification, 
naming, labelling, description and categorization of phenomena suggested by the 
data.  Glaser (1978) coined the term by characterizing the process as ‘running the 
data open’, meaning the extraction of categories and properties from the underlying 
data.  The output of labelling and categorization are concepts, forming the basic 
element used in Grounded Theory. 
Open coding is implemented by memoing, in which notes are recorded of the 
interpretation of the data.  Basic questions are asked on key attributes, such as 
where, how, who, when. This forms the initial stage of constant comparative 
analysis.  Specific data is compared with the partial or complete data set, to express 
similarities and differences for purposes of categorization and labelling (Glaser, 
1992; Glaser Strauss, 1967).  
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Figure 10: Data Analysis Process in This Research 
 
In this step, data is coded in multiple ways (Glaser 1978), from smaller elements – 
word-by-word – or larger elements, such as complete narratives.  Patterns can 
hereby emerge without bias, unrestricted by preconceived ideas and critically, 
‘grounding’ the patterns directly in the underlying data.  
As the open coding process continues, codes are grouped into categories and 
subcategories (Glaser 1992). The categories group codes and concepts with similar 
properties. The researcher may begin to identify a major concept that underlies all 
observation, and propose this as a core category. A core category encompasses the 
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variations of data across the complete study, and can be used to explain the 
behaviour and actions of participants.  
Open coding therefore provides the overall theme, core categories and 
subcategories in which the coded data can be structured.  This is used for further 
data collection or ‘theoretical sampling’, which is used to make the structure more 
robust.  In this study, interview text was labelled and used to guide subsequent data 
collection and interviews. Approximately 200 codes were identified through open 
coding. Some codes are more descriptive in nature, and in other instances repetitive; 
these would be collapsed into a subcategory after additional theoretical sampling. 
Table 16 shows an example of developing categories from concepts in this study. 
By grouping concepts into categories, the number of elements needed to express 
the structure of analysis can be made more manageable.  In this case, Box 1 
provides an overview of how concepts were integrated into higher-level categories. 
For example, various concepts could be identified as supporting the create integrated 
response team, whereas other could be identified as supporting the category of establish 
frequent communication with supply chain partners.  
Category Concepts 
Preparation Alarm, Delay, Information, Modelling, Monitoring, Notification, Scenario 
Planning, Testing, Training, Validation 
Partnership Agencies, Communication, Competition, Expertise, Government, Industry 
Corporation, Partners, Press, Publicity 
Organisation Communication frequency, Education, Experience, Learning, Roles, 
Responsibilities, Structure, Team 
Table 16: An Example of Developing Categories 
 
Axial Coding  
In the next stage, axial coding is used to structure the categories and sub-categories 
along one or more properties and dimensions to make the relationships between 
the codes explicit and provider greater coherence to the initial analysis (Strauss and 
Corbin (1990, 1998; Strauss, 1987).  
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Box 1: Examples of open coding generated from PHARMA case 
 
“No one organisation or country, or ground, can meet the pandemic challenge alone. All 
partners…must work together to put in place a robust and effective global response”. 
My initial coding for this excerpt was coordination with international agencies. This excerpt later 
recorded as establish frequent communication with supply chain partners. (a code that emerged as a sub-core 
category in my emergent theory. In this case, establish frequent communication emerged as a 
property of creates integrated response team. 
 
Another excerpt, “We are talking to them about a range of issues, trying to understand exactly 
what this new virus is, exactly how the WHO and CDC believe this may develop so we can 
response to their need more quickly and efficiently.” Initial coding was coordination with international 
agencies; later re-coded as establish frequent communication with supply chain partners. 
 
Another example from data collection in PHARMA and open coding was, “We created an online 
electronic database for information sharing. These include risk management plans and our strategic 
plan”. Initial coding for this except was Establish online team room for document sharing which also later 
re-coded as Create integrated response team. 
 
A further example, “…during the first three months of the pandemic, we were held on a daily basis 
meeting with site directors and supply chain managers…” Initial coding was create frequent 
communication with site directors; later re-coded as create integrated response team. 
 
Strauss (1987, p.64) sees axial coding as building “a dense texture of relationship 
around the ‘axis’ of a category.”  This would be typically support identification of a 
major category, as the variation in the data and therefore codes can be expressed 
along a dimension in axial coding. Creswell states the objective to be sorting, 
synthesis and organizing the potentially large amount of data, allowing the codes to 
be ‘reassembled’ in new ways.  Links between categories and their subcategories and 
relationships among them become visible (Strauss and Corbin, 1998).  By re-
integrating the concepts which emerged from open coding, axial coding can begin 
to provide answers such as ‘who, where, when, why, what impact, etc.’ They 
suggested using scientific terms to make the links between categories more visible, 
emphasizing causal relationships as part of an overall framework.  This has the 
following elements: (1) “causal conditions” – the context in which the phenomena 
was observed, and events leading up to the phenomena (2) “actions / interactions” 
– the way that participants responded to events or reacted to problems and (3) 
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“consequences” – the intentional or unintentional outcome or impact of the actions 
taken.  Strauss and Corbin document the conditions for (1) with questions such as 
“why, where, for what reason, when” etc. (2) Action/interactions are answered by 
knowing who and how something was done.  Lastly (3) Consequences are 
determined by answering questions of ‘what happens or what impact’.  
Looking back at their original study in 1967 which looked at how nurses dealt with 
near death patients, axial coding showed that the main concept under study was 
‘pain’, the causal condition was ‘arthritis’, the ‘action’ was ‘taking drugs’, and the 
consequence was ‘pain relief’.  
Table 17 illustrates the conditions, actions and consequence of several examples in 
this study, showing the link between categories and subcategories and illustrating 
how these are related.  
For example, A, B, C, D and E are the outcome from the open coding stage, each 
dealing with how communication can affect response time after supply chain 
disruption. The examples A, B, C, D relate to external communication, therefore 
they fall into the core category of ‘partnership’. While E also deals with 
communication for same objective, it falls into ‘organisation’ category as an internal 
issue. 
Selective Coding 
In the next stage, output from axial coding is used for selective coding; where the 
core categories representing the main phenomena under study are explicitly 
identified and other (sub-) categories are placed in relation to create an integrated 
theoretical scheme.   
The focus is usually on a limited number of categories, which seem to best 
encapsulate the major aspects of the phenomena under study.  Once the core 
category(ies) has been identified, it is used to guide incremental data collection and 
further theoretical sampling (Glaser 1978). Similar to open coding, selective coding 
uses a process of constant comparison, considering the (dis)-similarities of new data 
to existing categories and properties of categories.  
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In contrast, however, to open coding which uses substantive codes (i.e. original data 
such as quotes or statements from the participants in their own words and 
language), selective coding uses analytical and abstract codes leading to conceptual 
labels for categories. (Glaser 1978). 
Example(s) A B C D E 
Pattern 
recognition 
Coordination Coordination Coordination Coordination Coordination 
The 
phenomenon 
of  interest 
Communication Communication Communication Communication Communication 
The causal 
conditions 
Need to 
understand 
and control 
external 
suppliers 
Government 
plays major role 
in policy and 
demand 
Public and press 
have a vital role 
in responding to 
crisis 
Internal 
agencies need? 
Organisation 
want desire for 
business 
The action 
strategy 
Establish 
direct line of  
communicatio
n with external 
suppliers 
Proactive contact 
with governments 
to anticipate 
orders and 
allocate stock 
proportional to 
need 
Increase 
frequency of  press 
and public 
communications 
Coordination 
with 
international 
agencies e.g. 
CDC and 
WHO 
Modify 
organisation 
hierarchy to 
shorten lines of  
communication 
The 
consequence 
Improved 
speed and 
reduce risk, 
reduce deploy 
response time 
Improved 
understand of  
order, reduce 
design and 
deploy response 
time 
Lower risk, 
reduce design 
and deploy 
response time 
Improved 
understanding 
of  external 
parties, reduce 
detection, 
deploy and 
deploy 
response time 
Reduced design 
response time 
and deploy 
response time. 
The sub-core 
category 
Establish 
frequent 
communicatio
ns with supply 
chain partners 
Establish 
frequent 
communications 
with supply 
chain partners 
Establish 
frequent 
communications 
with supply 
chain partners 
Establish 
frequent 
communication
s with supply 
chain partners 
Shorten lines 
of  
communication
s within the 
organisation  
The core 
category 
Partnership Partnership Partnership Partnership Organisation 
Table 17: An Example of Basic Form of Generic Relationship of Axial Coding in This Study 
 
Selecting coding allows filtering and codification of the data, which are likely to be 
most relevant to the emerging concepts. Only selective data is needed, for example 
specific sections of an interview transcript needed to explore existing codes.   
Interview questions and data collection techniques can be continuously refined to 
focus on the objective of theoretical saturation of the existing conceptual structure.  
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Memoing 
One of the important stages in ascribing meaning to the coding is a technique 
referred to as memoing, central to the coding process: ‘the theorising write-up of 
ideas about codes and their relationship as they strike the analyst while coding’ 
(Glaser, 1978, p.83). Glaser emphasized that the memoing process is essential in 
Grounded Theory: 
“The writing of theoretical memos is the core stage in the process of generating 
Grounded Theory. If the researcher skip this stage by going directly to sorting or 
writing up, after coding, she is not doing Grounded Theory”. 
Glaser (1978, p.83) 
As a theoretical framework begins to emerge in axial coding and reinforced in 
selective coding, memos are used to document hypothesized relationships between 
concepts, and provide evidence for how these relationships were developed by 
Charmaz (2006). 
The basic goal of memoing is “to develop ideas with complete conceptual freedom” 
(Holton, 2007), without restriction, hence produced throughout the coding process 
and development of the ultimate theoretical framework.  During process of 
comparison and conceptualisation, memos document the theoretical foundation 
relating codes to underlying data (Glaser, 1978; Urquhar, 2001). Memos provide 
intellectual freedom, flexibility, and enhance creativity in developing the overall 
framework. Stated by Holton, they are also a key to further data collection, coding, 
and analysis in selective coding (Holton, 2007). Box 3 shows a few examples of 
theoretical memos from this study. 
Step 7 – Theoretical Sampling 
In theoretical sample, the emerging theory is used as a guide on where and how to 
collect and coding additional data.  Holton (2007) recommends: 
The decisions concerning initial collection of data, further collection cannot be planned 
in advance of the emerging theory. Instead the researcher can only discover where next 
to collect data by first coding the initial data and then looking for comparison groups 
by which to saturate the emerging codes and their properties. By identifying emerging 
gaps in the theory, the researcher will be guided as where and how to collect the next 
sources of data. 
Holton (2007) 
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As categories emerge from data in PHARMA case, I then chose to sample data 
from BP Deepwater Horizon and BP Texas Refinery cases, which could strengthen 
my emerging theory in defining the properties of the categories, and revalidate the 
relationship of core categories and sub-categories derived from initial analysis. The 
data sources of these two cases were determined in step 2.  
Step 8 – Constant Comparison 
Constant comparison is an analytic process of comparing different pieces of data 
for similarities and differences against a growing set of abstracted data. This process 
is essential for testing emerging concepts but also addressing the risk of bias from 
the researchers inherent starting perspective and limitations in conceptualization. 
The process evolves from the initial coding of interviews and data, to hypothesizing 
a relationship based upon one set of interviews or data from other sources), and 
then testing those relationships interpretation of follow-on data collection 
(Charmaz, 2006; Glaser and Strauss, 1967).  
This emphasizes consistency and relevance of concepts derived from multiple data 
sources. Considering the commonality and variance between these three cases (e.g. 
global firms but different industries), this is of importance to assure stability of the 
emerging theory in further study. Constant comparison also helps enrich the 
properties and scope of the emerging categories. 
In this study, this process continues from open coding to selective coding. The 
initial coding, which I had from the first case - PHARMA, leads to new interviews. 
During this process, my conceptual categories are refined. Constant comparison 
continued until the core and related categories were sufficiently saturated and 
further coding and constant comparison produced no meaningful further concepts. 
  
 93 
Box 3: Examples of memos 
During this study I have written over hundreds memos capturing the conceptual and methodological 
development of my theory. These memos ranged in length from a few lines to a page. In early 
memos I may record my hypotheses that ‘preparation’ and ‘organisation’ were categories and have 
closed relations. While another memo might question if “integrated response team” belong in 
partnership or organisation category. Another memo might query if organisation thinks time is 
important factor in general and can it lead to the better way in their mitigation plan? The following 
offers a few samples of memos written in conjunction with the category, Preparation. 
Memo 1: Because of organisation optimisation in PHARMA (‘Agile’ programme), people who were 
explicitly named as a role in the pandemic response team are no longer in the same position. 
PHARMA resolved this problem afterward by defining a generic role of participation in the response 
structure.  This was incorporated in revised and updated roles and responsibilities and document in a 
RACI diagram. 
Memo 2: From an interview with a PHARMA logistic manager, the pandemic event seems to be 
more than ever in the public eye and daily reports of pandemic death as headlines across the world. 
Memo 3: After re-reading fieldnotes from interviews with a plant manager, PHARMA has put 
additional reserves in place. Within a few weeks, they are able to secure all the ingredients, sourcing 
globally and immediately ramping up production. This reminds me of the contrast between Nokia 
and Ericsson in their response to the event of a fire at a Philips semiconductor factory. Ericsson 
decided to let the delay take its course, while the Nokia supply chain manager monitored the 
situation closely and immediately implemented contingency plans (securing components used to 
make chips for mobile phone from other suppliers) which resulted in more effective response. 
Memo 4: The first call that was made by the site director in BP was the first action by BP to 
instructor second in command to inform the Washington BP base lobbyist of the event. It is parallel 
to PHARMA proactive establish direct communication with government and international agencies 
such as WHO in the same topic. It stands in contrast to the public perception that BP was hiding 
information in the early days of the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill disaster. 
 
Step 9 – Theoretical Saturation 
After the repeated visit and interviews at PHARMA, the marginal improvement to 
the theoretical framework was small. As found Martin and Turner (1986, p.149), 
they said, “by the time three of four sets of data have been analysed, the majority of 
useful concepts will have been discovered”. 
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Step 10 – Theoretical Sorting Memos and Theoretical Coding 
Theoretical Sorting Memos 
Theoretical sorting of memos is a key to formulating the theory for presentation or 
writing (Glaser, 1992). Glaser said it starts to put the data previously analysed 
during open coding into a theoretical framework. During the sorting process 
connections are made between categories and properties. For example, memos 
concerning condition affecting the phenomenon can be sorted together to help 
bring to surface similarity in incidents (or consequences) based on comparable 
condition.  
Theoretical Coding 
Theoretical coding occurs when core categories have become saturated. Theoretical 
codes conceptualised the interrelation of substantive codes by generating 
hypotheses to be integrated into theory. Theoretical coded emerged from open 
coding and theoretical memos.  The results 
Theoretical sorting of memos is a key to formulating the theory for presentation or 
writing (Glaser, 1992). Glaser said it starts to put the data previously analysed 
during open coding into a theoretical framework. During the sorting process 
connections are made between categories and properties. For example, memos 
concerning condition affecting the phenomenon can be sorted together to help 
bring to surface similarity in incidents (or consequences) based on comparable 
condition.  
Theoretical codes conceptualised the interrelation of substantive codes by 
generating hypotheses to be integrated into theory. Theoretical coded emerged 
from open coding and theoretical memos.  
In this study, having achieved theoretical saturation of my core concept and related 
categories, I proceeded to review, hand sort, and integrate those memos related to 
the core, its properties, and related categories. As I began to sort (read) memos and 
look for relationship between the various concepts, theoretical codes began to 
emerge. I formalised and systematised the findings into propositions that explained 
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what factors underlie response times. The emergent theory, which is the outcome 
of this study, will be explained in detail in Chapter 7– findings of the research. 
PHASE 4: Literature comparison and write up 
Step 11 – Literature comparison 
The eleventh step is to compare the emerged theory with the existing literature and 
assess similarities and differences with a view on how such arise. Eisenhardt (1989, 
p.545) states: 
“Overall, trying the emergent theory to existing literature enhances the internal 
validity, generalizability, and theoretical level of the theory building from case study 
research…because the findings often rest on a very limited number of cases.” 
Eisenhardt (1989, p.545) 
As discussed earlier, literature on risk management in supply chain is relatively 
limited in scope and depth. Nevertheless, reading the relevant literature increases 
sensitivity to concepts – at the same time keeping in mind the ‘open approach’, 
which seeks to avoid bias. 
For example, in my study, the literature review which are relevant to the main 
category and the emerging theory such as supply chain disruption, supply chain risk 
management, time-based management, supply chain partnership raised the 
theoretical level and help to improved construct definition, as suggested by 
Eisenhardt (1989).  
Step 12 – Validation the theory 
From the nature of the Grounded Theory process, validity is essentially inherent 
but validation can check whether the new theory has ‘fit’, ‘relevance’, ‘workability’ 
and ‘modifiability’.   
By fit, an evaluation is made on how well the concepts represent the observed 
phenomena, as outcome to rigorous application of constant comparison of multiple 
events contributing to the representation of a concept. 
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By relevance, a view is formed on how meaningful the concepts are to participants 
or to the cohort they represent. Certainly, the concepts identified here can be 
readily tested in further work against other industries – there is no scarcity of cases 
of supply chain disruption.   
By workability, the applicability of concepts across a range of scenarios is 
understood. As the inputs are phenomena from real-world situations, which express 
considerable variability, the workability of theory and concept structure is critical to 
make the work meaningful. 
With modifiability, the theory can be extended and adapted when new insight is 
generated through comparison with further data. This validation in the study is 
explained more in the closing chapter – ‘Conclusion.’ - of the study. 
To validate my constructs (categories) and the relationships I looked at two 
disruption at BP the oil company. The disruption at BP Upstream, which 
experienced a catastrophic oil containment event in 2010, was selected. After a 
sequence of design changes by BP and missed warnings by its contracting partners, 
the Deepwater Horizon drilling platform lost control of the 15,000-foot deep 
exploration well at Macondo Prospect in the Gulf of Mexico. An eruption of oil 
and gas on the rig exploded, killing 11 and destroying the platform, starting a three-
month effort to cap the well and the largest oil spill in American waters. Estimates 
of damage climbed exponentially; BP faced possible collapse, a lengthy moratorium 
on offshore drilling shutdown the industry and penalties of GBP 20 Billion where 
filed against BP and its partners.  
The second disruption is from the BP company was selected, exploring the 
background, cause and response to an explosion at its Texas City refinery in which 
15 workers were killed and 180 injured, resulting in an extensive review of BP and 
refining industry operations. BP has paid out more than GBP 1.2 Billion in 
compensation by late 2010.   
For the BP Deepwater Horizon and BP Texas City cases, data were collected from 
secondary sources, as access to direct interviews was constrained by ongoing 
investigations and litigation. Data was collected from official government sources as 
well as from print news media, company reports and on the Internet. Data and 
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reports used here are from the US government (National Commission report to the 
President, Department of Energy, Department of Justice, and the Department of 
the Interior) and BP internal and public reports. Data included sworn testimony by 
direct participants in the events from formal and judicial investigations; these are in 
the public record. The data source, data collection methods and data content of BP 
are explained in Table 18. 
The three disruptions are shown in Table 19 and the similarities and differences of 
these three cases are shown in Table 20 in order to underpin the relevance of the 
cases to the research objectives. 
Step 13 – Writing the report 
Writing of the report is the concluding step of the process.  The key objective is to 
make the relationships explicit and clear, where relevant through graphical 
representation of the core categories, subcategories and contributing foundation of 
codes and observations. 
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BP Deepwater Horizon  
Data Source & Collection Methods Data Content 
Reported by 
 BP – Internal BP Investigation 
 National Commission on the BP 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill and 
offshore drilling 
 President, Global Business Lines and 
Chief  Health, Safety and Environmental 
Officer Halliburton 
 The Joint United States Coast Guard/ 
The Bureau of  Ocean Energy 
Management 
 Energy Policy Research Foundation 
 U.S. Department of  Homeland Security, 
United States Coast Guard 
 Congress of  the United States 
 Det Norske Veritas (DNV) 
From the company and external investigation 
reports. 
 Industry and organisational background 
contributing to the event. 
 Factual sequence and likely root cause of  
the disruption. 
 Assessment of  initial and ongoing response 
including corrective and preventative steps 
taken by the company. 
 Perspective on environmental and external 
impact. 
 Audio transcripts 
 
From company and external websites. 
 Perceived cause and impact of  the 
disruption, as experienced during the event. 
 External perception of  liability and 
consequences to the firm. 
 
BP Texas City  
Data Source & Collection Methods Data Content 
Reported by 
 BP – Internal BP Investigation 
 U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard 
Investigation Board 
 Environmental Protection Agency 
 U.S. Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration 
 Texas Commission on Environmental 
Quality 
 The BP U.S. Refineries Independent 
Safety Review Panel 
 
 
From the company and external investigation 
reports. 
 Industry and organisational background 
contributing to the event. 
 Factual sequence and likely root cause of  
the disruption. 
 Assessment of  initial and ongoing response 
including corrective and preventative steps 
taken by the company. 
 Perspective on environmental and external 
impact. 
From company and external websites. 
 Perceived cause and impact of  the 
disruption, as experienced during the event. 
 External perception of  liability and 
consequences for the firm. 
 
Table 18: Data Sources, Data Collection Methods and Data Contents from BP
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Case PHARMA Response to 2009 H1N1 Pandemic BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, 2010 BP Texas City Refinery Fire, 2005 
Notification of  
the event 
 On 24 April 2009, the WHO announced an outbreak of  
H1N1 virus in Mexico and the United States. 
 On 25 April 2009, the WHO called the flu pandemic 
problem “a public health emergency of  international 
concern.” 
 On 11 June 2009, the WHO declared the first global 
Influenza pandemic in 41 years. 
 On 10 August 2010, The WHO declared pandemic is 
over. The world has now entered the “post pandemic 
period”. 
 On 20 April 2010, an explosion on the 
BP-leased Deepwater Horizon Gulf  of  
Mexico platform exploded. 
 On 23 April 2005, several explosions 
and a fire occurred during start up of  
the isomerization unit at the BP in 
Texas City. The explosions occurred 
when a distillation tower flooded with 
hydrocarbons and was over 
pressurized, causing a geyser-like 
release from the “blowdown drum” 
vent stack. 
Impact of  event  WHO reported laboratory confirmed cases of  pandemic 
Influenza H1N1 2009, including over 18036 deaths. 
 CDC estimated an average of  57 million people have 
been infected with H1N1 and an average 257,000 cases 
resulted in hospitalizations. 
 Pandemic Influenza risk triggers other across the 
company e.g. regulatory controls, sales and market 
regulations, global political and economic conditions etc. 
 Effect on several supply chains (Nicole, Hematol, 
consumer products, antibiotic etc.) 
 Potential loss of  revenue, reputation, R&D investment 
(GBP 3.2 Billion) and market position. 
 11 workers were killed and many 
injured. 
 4.9 million barrels of  spilled in the Gulf. 
 Moratorium on drilling in the Gulf  for 
six months and extensive new 
regulations. 
 BP fines estimated at USD 20 – 40 
Billion. 
 
 15 Workers were killed and 180 other 
were injured.  
 Impacted on the World oil market - 
world oil prices jumped to USD 61 a 
barrel on the day after an explosion, 
raised concerns about energy supplies 
toward the end of  2005. 
 BP refineries were investigated and BP 
was fined numerous times by OSHA. 
 BP has paid out more than GBP 1.3 
Billion in compensation. 
 
Description of  
the risks 
 Lack of  stock availability to meet demand in the market. 
 Unable to produce business or medically critical products. 
 Loss of  life; absentee on worker. 
 Strike in France & Shut down of  the plant Mexico 
 Reputation risk. 
 Largest accidental marine oil spill in the 
history of  the petroleum industry. 
 Environmental. 
 Loss of  life. 
 Loss of  reputation risk. 
 Fines. 
 Litigation. 
 Right to drill. 
 Government contracts (e.g. Pentagon) 
 As the third largest refinery in the US, 
disruption risk can have effect on the 
global oil supply petroleum.  
 Loss of  life. 
 Fines. 
 Litigation. 
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Table 19: A Fact Sheet of Three Disruptions
Case PHARMA Response to 2009 H1N1 Pandemic BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, 2010 BP Texas City Refinery Fire, 2005 
Examples of  
Action taken/ 
insights 
solution 
 Ramp up production to 24/7. 
 Recruiting contingency workers. 
 Redesign supply chain – shifting manufacturing capacity. 
 Develop production extension. 
 Accelerate approval process for existing products. 
 Accelerate vaccine development. 
 Simplify packaging for easier in high volume production. 
 Setup Central command / incident 
management team. 
 Modelling of  impact. 
 Develop and attempt portfolio of  well-
control solutions like top kill, 
containment dome, and relief  well. 
 Develop and attempt oil recovery and 
oil spill techniques. 
 Create spill-response company with 
competitors. 
 Create organization analysis (Fatal 
accident investigation report) 
 Engineering and plant analysis. 
 Simulation and modeling of  impact. 
 Culture and safety review. 
 
Parties Involved  Suppliers & distributors. 
 Primary, secondary and third party manufacturing. 
 Government & International authorities.  
 Press and public communication. 
 Consumers/patients. 
 Transocean – drilling rig operator. 
 Halliburton – cement contractor. 
 Federal, state and local governments. 
 The Bureau of  Energy (BOEMRE) 
 Coast Guard. 
 Industry partners and competitors. 
 Environmental Protection Agency. 
 U.S. Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration. 
 Texas Commission on Environmental 
Quality, Internal BP investigation. 
 Texas City citizens. 
 Plant workers and management. 
Issues 
encountered 
 Establish framework or pandemic management 
organization. 
 Preparedness plan in place but not in use – out of  date, 
lack of  clarify role & responsibilities. 
 Problems in line of  communications. 
 Highly variable and uncertain demand. 
 Missed early warning signs. 
 Long delay between detection and 
countermeasures. 
 Poor simulation modeling resulted in 
massive over investment of  certain oil 
spill remedies. 
 No process and procedures in place for 
handling Deepwater oil spills.  
 Many parties involved in legal issues. 
 Missed early warning signs. 
 Not learning from past events. 
 Documents are is out of  date since 
merger of  BP with Amoco. 
 Policies are ignored / plant layout is 
unsafe. 
 Failed alarms. 
 No effective notification system. 
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 Description 
Similarities  Challenges in distinguishing disruptive events from normal events. 
 Organisational ‘apathy’ regarding potentially disruptive risks. 
 Communications barriers during and after event. 
 Initial ‘chaos’ during first phase as awareness of  the event builds. 
 Surge in widespread demand for information. 
 Exponential acceleration of  impact when business-as-usual control 
mechanisms failed to isolate the disruption (‘shape’) 
 Balance between general fear of  greater impact and need to manage 
perception of  the event (control panic).  
 Global supply chains and organisation. 
 Multi-player / multi-geography 
 Complex supply chain / systems. 
 Significant impact to the organisation locally and globally. 
 Potential of  catastrophic impact outside the organisation / industry. 
 Fast response required. 
 Long-term recovery cycle. 
 Aspect of  government regulation and reputation risk.  
 Political interests during later phases of  the disruption and in long-term 
‘learning’ process. 
Differences  Speed and absolute duration of  the event. 
 Scale of  the permanent impact after the event. 
 Upside and downside opportunity. 
 Scale of  potential impact on human lives (15 killed, 180 injured in BP 
approximately 18,000 swine flu deaths, 11 people killed in BP oil spill -  
Table 20: Similarities and Differences of Three Disruptions
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Chapter 4 
PHARMA H1N1 Influenza Pandemic 
4.1 Introduction 
Influenza and other pandemics are infrequent but can have a dramatic impact on 
health for a large population. In previous generations, millions died in multiple 
waves of Influenza outbreaks in a relatively short period. Although most humans 
and animals suffer only mild symptoms, some variants are highly contagious or, 
such as the recent avian flu, deadly. 
Uncertainty about the deadliness and spread of illness makes it difficult to predict 
the impact of an epidemic or pandemic, and with infrequent occurrences, planning 
for such a global outbreak is a challenging exercise. 
A major pharmaceutical firm such as PHARMA (one of top five pharmaceutical 
companies in the world in term of revenue) must act quickly to protect its supply 
chain. A local or widespread outbreak can disrupt production and logistics for 
critical medicines relied upon by specific groups of patients, and obviously hamper 
the broader response for the production of Influenza medicines. 
Fast and convenient travel in recent times has accelerated the spread of Influenza 
between countries and continents;; however, better modelling, science and 
communication present an opportunity to detect earlier, coordinate more effectively 
and respond faster. PHARMA plays a key role in minimising the humanitarian 
impact of such occurrences, at the same time there is a potential upside revenue 
opportunity that can reward years of investment in antiviral medicines. 
Even so, there is always the risk of over-reacting to potential outbreaks, as seemed 
evident during the 'false alarm' epidemic in 1973 in the US, which led to 
unprecedented government involvement in vaccinating a large percentage of the 
population, despite only a handful of deaths early in that outbreak. Managing the 
critical supply, sales and political relationships is challenging when governments are 
regulators and influencers as well as important customers. According to Wolfgang 
Wodarg, head of health at the Council of Europe, the makers of flu drugs and 
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vaccines influenced the decision of the World Health Organisation (WHO) to 
declare a pandemic. Talking after the 2009 swine flu pandemic, Wodarg said, “This 
led to the pharmaceutical firms ensuring 'enormous gains', while countries, 
including the UK, 'squandered' their meagre health budgets, with millions being 
vaccinated against a relatively mild disease1.”  
In this chapter explained how PHARMA deal with unexpected/adverse events and 
the risk of disruption to PHARMA supply chain. It focuses on PHARMA’s 
approach to supply chain risk management, in particular, discussing in depth, its 
planning and preparation for flu pandemic, the production of Nicole Influenza 
treatment, vaccine and the significant investment in PHARMA.  
4.2 Company Overview 
PHARMA is one of the world’s leading research-based pharmaceutical and 
healthcare companies, and is “committed to improving the quality of human life by 
enabling people to do more, feel better and live longer”. With a firm foundation in 
science, PHARMA discovers, manufactures and distributes vaccines, prescription 
medicines and consumer health products. Headquartered in the UK, PHARMA 
employs over 100,000 people in 117 countries and the pharmaceutical group 
includes 108 plants located in 41 different countries. 
In 2000 two leading pharmaceutical companies merged to form PHARMA. After 
mergers and acquisitions PHARMA had a 7% share of the global pharmaceutical 
market, accounted for 26% of all vaccines sales and 17% of all anti-infective2.  
According to PHARMA released 2009 annual reports, PHARMA was the fourth 
largest pharmaceutical company worldwide by revenue with sales of GBP 28.4 
Billion. Of that, sales in the care and pharmaceutical business were GBP 23.7 
Billion (of which vaccines sales were GBP 3.7 Billion) and consumer healthcare 
sales were GBP 4.7 Billion.  
 
                                                 
 
1  Macrae, F. (2010) 
2  Oxfam (2001) 
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PHARMA Products 
PHARMA is known as a leader in respiratory central nervous system, AIDS/HIV 
and anti-infective research. The company's products are divided into three main 
areas: prescription medication, vaccines and consumer healthcare. 
1. Prescription Medication (GBP 27.3 Billion) 
The bulk of PHARMA’s revenues come from the sale of prescription medications. 
PHARMA has medications in many different therapeutic categories, including 
cardiovascular, respiratory and the central nervous system. Some of its most 
important prescription products are: 
 Hematol/Enatol (GBP 5 Billion):  This product is a long-acting bronchodilator, 
meaning it opens up a patient's air passage through an anti-inflammatory taken 
through an inhaler. Hematol/Enatol is approved to treat asthma and chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease. In 2004, it was estimated that approximately 20 
million Americans (between 5 and 10%) have asthma. There is clearly a large 
market for treatments. Although there are no indications that the number of 
cases of asthma is growing, there has been no marked decrease either. 
Hematol/Enatol is the highest selling respiratory product worldwide; it is a main 
driver for the strong growth in PHARMA’s revenue. 
 Seria (GBP 771 Million): This product is metabolic product for the treatment of 
diabetes. It is used to level insulin levels and is effective at mitigating type II 
diabetes.  
 Antivirals (GBP 4.2 Billion): PHARMA’s antivirals treatments include an Herpes 
treatment, HIV treatment, and Nicole Influenza treatment. In 2009, the total 
antiviral sales grew by 12%. 
2. Vaccines (GBP 3.7 Billion) 
PHARMA is dominant in the vaccine market, supplying approximately one-quarter 
of all vaccines worldwide. Its vaccines are used to immunise a wide range of 
ailments including hepatitis (hepatitis A and hepatitis B), meningitis, Influenza and 
various childhood illnesses. 
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3. Consumer Healthcare (GBP 4.7 Billion) 
PHARMA's consumer healthcare products include over-the-counter medications, 
nutritional supplements and oral care products. Some of the major products include 
a well-known toothpaste brand, toothpaste specifically for sensitive teeth, gastro-
intestinal ailments and products to help users quit smoking. The portfolio includes a 
well-known product in a line of glucose energy and sports drinks of which sales 
rose 7 % to GBP382 Million in 2009. 
PHARMA Supply Chain 
The Manufacturing and Supply Chain (MSC) is responsible for PHARMA’s supply 
chain quality, performance and customer service. MSC supports the commercial 
ambitions of PHARMA by delivering quality medicines and consumer products to 
patients and customers around the world. More than 29,000 people work in MSC 
across PHARMA in a network of 77 sites in 33 countries. 
The scale of manufacturing in PHARMA is large, with the manufacture of over 
four billion packs per year in 28,000 different presentations including tablets, 
creams and ointments, inhalers, injections, liquids and sterile solutions supplied to 
more than 150 markets. As stated in the PHARMA annual report 2009, MSC spent 
over GBP 3.7 Billion on production in 2009. 
PHARMA's supply chain is complex with over 75,000 suppliers worldwide. These 
range from major strategic relationships with suppliers that manufacture active 
pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs), intermediates, raw materials and packaging for 
PHARMA medicines through to local contracts for goods or services such as office 
equipment, cleaning and security. According to the 2008 annual report, PHARMA 
operates a procurement operation that spends over GBP 2 Billion annually with 
external suppliers. Importantly, PHARMA takes specific steps to protect its supply 
chain from disruption, as reviewed below. 
PHARMA Risk Management 
PHARMA is committed to having an effective risk management process across all 
business units. This enables management to operate a risk-based approach to 
establishing internal control systems to effectively mitigate or control significant 
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risks. PHARMA's risk management approach can be categorised into two levels: 
corporate level and business unit level. 
Corporate Level 
According to PHARMA's Corporate and Social Responsibility Report 2009, an 
internal control framework ( Figure 11) integrates ethics and compliance with the 
day-to-day management of the group. This framework supports line management in 
the identification and mitigation of significant risks, among which are potential 
compliance failures. 
The framework includes the Risk Oversight and Compliance Council (ROCC), as 
well as sector and other business unit risk management and compliance boards. The 
ROCC is chaired by PHARMA’s corporate compliance officer and it includes 
several corporate executive team (CET) members and heads of department with 
internal control risk management, assurance, audit, and compliance responsibilities. 
The ROCC reports to the audit committee of the PHARMA Board and the CEO, 
and will also report to the CET. The reporting line to the audit committee provides 
a mechanism for the executive management if irregularities are identified. 
PHARMA's Risk Management and Legal Compliance Policy further clarify the roles 
and responsibilities of people in the company's internal control framework. CET 
members are formally responsible for establishing an appropriate risk management 
structure within their business units to identify and mitigate significant risks. 
PHARMA continues to improve its risk management process. The ROCC meets 
regularly to review and assess significant risks and mitigation plans, providing an 
oversight of internal controls to ensure compliance with applicable laws, regulations 
and internal PHARMA policies. 
“Each business unit must review significant risks at least once a year and include 
identifying operational risks, legal compliance risks and risks to the achievement of 
strategic goals and objectives. This ensures that significant risks connected with 
changes in management direction and the external environment is identified. Business 
units are corporate functions are required to present annually to the ROCC and 
Audit and Risk Committee detailing risk management and compliance approach, 
provide a balanced assessment of the status of internal controls over key risks, and 
highlight any significant compliance issues." 
PHARMA Corporate Responsibilities Report (2010) 
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Table 21 shows the most significant risks facing PHARMA are listed below based 
on the annual CET risk workshop in 2009. 
Business Unit Level (Manufacture and Supply Chain Level) 
Risk management is an essential component of PHARMA's system of internal 
control and governance and is regarded as good management practice throughout 
its business. PHARMA states a need for a systematic, standardised and effective 
approach to risk management to ensure that responsibilities for managing risks are 
clearly stated, understood and accepted as well as to ensure that the business 
objectives are achieved. This can also establish appropriate mechanisms for 
communication, reporting and the escalation of risk. 
PHARMA’s basic approach to supply chain risk management is a five-step process 
(Figure 12). The risk management process includes risk identification, risk 
assessment, risk analysis, risk treatment and risk monitoring. 
Significant risks facing PHARMA 
1. Risk that R&D will not deliver commercially successful products. 
2. Patent infringement litigation. 
3. Potential changes in intellectual property laws and regulations. 
4. Weakness of  intellectual property protection in certain countries. 
5. Risk of  substantial adverse outcome of  litigation and government investigations. 
6. Product liability litigation. 
7. Anti-trust litigation. 
8. Sales and market regulations. 
9. Third party competition. 
10. Governmental and payer controls. 
11. Regulatory controls. 
12. Risk of  interruption of  product supply. 
13. Risk of  concentration of  sales to wholesalers. 
14. Global political and economic conditions. 
15. Taxation and treasury. 
16. Pandemic Influenza. 
17. Environmental liabilities. 
18. Accounting standards. 
19. Failure of  third party providers. 
20. Protection of  electronic information and asserts. 
21. Alliances and acquisitions. 
22. Attraction and retention. 
Table 21: Significant Risk Facing PHARMA 
Source: PHARMA Corporate Responsibility Report (2009) 
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 Figure 11: PHARMA Risk Management and Compliance Framework 
Source: PHARMA corporate responsibility report, 2009 
 
 
 
Figure 12: PHARMA's Basic Approach to Supply Chain Risk Management  
Source: PHARMA 
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MSC defines the risk management requirements regarding identifying, accessing, 
prioritising, mitigating, monitoring and communicating risks. MSC and global 
functions must incorporate the process steps, decisions and approval points shown 
in the risk management process map in (Figure 13). 
I. Define the risk management organisation for the risk assessment area. 
The activities and areas in which this risk management process operates in MSC 
is known as the risk assessment area and defined by senior executive 
management.  
II. Identify, record and prioritise scored risks 
The risk identification processes consider past and present events in addition to 
potential future events or changes that could occur within the risk assessment 
area. Initially, PHARMA identifies and analyses its supply chain risks by 
mapping the supply chain, looking at suppliers as well as products and services. 
PHARMA distinguishes between five levels of the probability of an event 
occurring Table 22. 
III. Design, confirm and approve risk mitigation plan 
At this stage, the approved mitigation plan must be included in the risk register 
as well as mitigated consequence (score), mitigated likelihood (score), mitigated 
index value and escalation. A risk register or risk analysis that is used for 
identifying, analysing and managing risk contains are shown in Table 23. The 
risk score is calculated by multiplying the impact by the likelihood: I (impact) x 
L (likelihood) = R (risk score) 
PHARMA categorises overall risk score and recommends response in four 
levels (Figure 14). 
 Ensure mitigation and contingency remain valid (score 1–2). 
 Consider further mitigation or contingency (score 3–4). 
 Increase mitigation or strengthen contingency (score 6–10). 
 Increase mitigation and strengthen contingency (score 12–16). 
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IV. Implement, monitor and complete risk mitigation plans. 
At this stage, a mitigation plan owner starts the implementation of the risk 
mitigation plan and defines the key milestones for the measurement of the 
delivery of the plan to be monitored in the risk register. However, the risk 
owner determines the appropriate frequency for the review of the risk 
mitigation plan based on the severity of the risk and timing of key milestones. 
 
V. Governance and maintain 
There is a defined process for reporting, communicating and escalating risks 
including the communication of the plan's progress for review and approval. At 
the end of this stage, the risk register must be maintained and reviewed by the 
risk team annually. 
 
Figure 13: Process Map 
Source: PHARMA 
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Category Product Quality and Compliance Environment, Health and Safety Business 
 Patients and customer 
Company and shareholder 
Regulators 
Injuries or illness potential 
Environmental impact 
 
Cost 
Supply 
Reputation 
 
Likelihood Score 1-Rare 2 - Unlikely 3-Possibly 4-Likely 5-Almost 
certain 
Frequency: How often 
might/ does it happen? 
Once in 50 years Every 5-10 years Every 1-5 years One or more 
times per year 
Significant 
number of  times 
per year 
 
Impact Score 1-Insignificant 2-Minor 3- Moderate 4- Major 5- Catastrophic 
Table 22: Five by Five Matrix - Likelihood and Impact Scoring 
Source: PHARMA 
Risk Register 
1. A description of  risk. 
2. A consequence if  this event actually occurs. 
3. A probability of  its occurrence (score). 
4. An impact (score) 
5. Raw risk score (score). 
6. Mitigation plan (how to reduce the probability of  an event occurring). 
7. Contingency plan (action to be taken to reduce impact should it occur). 
8. Mitigated likelihood score (a score of  probability after mitigation). 
9. Mitigated consequence score (a score of  supply chain impact after contingency). 
10. Mitigated index value (new overall risk score). 
11. Risk team owner. 
12. Escalation. 
Table 23: A Range of Content for Risk Register 
Source: PHARMA 
 
Figure 14: Risk Analysis Matrix Before and After Mitigation and Contingency Plan 
Source: PHARMA 
 112 
Manufacturing Site Business Contingency Plan 
Business continuity plans (BCPs) at PHARMA are part of a formal planning 
process to identify the potential impact of significant unplanned adverse events on 
critical business processes and assets and to formulate viable strategies and plans to 
minimise the impact on business continuity for the organisation following a 
significant business interruption. 
BCP focus on developing contingency and recovery plans that minimise the impact 
of an event, rather than the threats and causes of the event. The BCP in Figure 15 is 
a balanced, ongoing, coordinated programme of strategies, plans and procedures 
that provide the ability to manage and ensure the ready availability of enterprise-
wide critical resources in response to disaster or unplanned interruptions.  
 
Figure 15: Business Continuity Planning Model 
Source: PHARMA 
Business Unit – must ensure that BCPs exist for all critical processes. 
Continuity Planning – a subset of continuity planning that ensures that an adequate 
recovery strategy is in place to restore minimum essential service and systems in the 
event of a significant disruption. 
SLA (1) – Service Level Agreements (SLA) or contracts should be developed and 
agreed between the business and the unit that confirms, in measurable terms, the 
recovery service that the unit will provide to ensure critical processes remain 
uninterrupted in the event of a disaster. 
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SLA (2) - must be established to ensure adequate recovery capabilities for service 
that are operated by IT internal or external service providers. 
IT and other services providers – a service level agreement or contract developed to 
confirm, in measurable terms, the recovery services that will be provided to ensure 
critical applications and services remain uninterrupted in the event of a disaster.  
Annual Reviews – continuity plans are reviewed annually to ensure they are kept 
up-to-date and accurate. 
Periodic Live Testing and joint live testing - performed on continuity plan to ensure 
that the plans will work in the event of a disaster. 
Logistics Pandemic Business Continuity Plan 
The logistics pandemic business continuity plan is based, in part, on the WHO 
national preparedness plan. It defines the roles and activities of MSC and the supply 
chain pandemic management team, which will be formed in the event of an 
Influenza pandemic being declared. In addition, it states the responsibilities and 
describes the methods and sequence for performing the Influenza pandemic 
logistics process.  
This process document forms a central part of the overall MSC activities as outlined 
in the formal MSC preparedness plan. It aims to ensure that, in the event of a 
pandemic, medically critical products from PHARMA will continue to be supplied, 
defined business critical products will continue to be supplied, the number and 
duration of stock-outs and the impact on sales will be minimised and manufacturing 
site BCPs are aligned to this process plan. In addition, its aim is to mitigate the 
negative effects of the pandemic and maintain business operation as efficiently as 
possible. 
4.3 Background of the H1N1 2009 Influenza Pandemic 
History of the Influenza Pandemic 
It is generally agreed that three pandemics of Influenza occurred in the 20th 
century: in 1918, 1957 and 1968. The latter two pandemics together are thought to 
have caused between one million and four million deaths. They were in the era of 
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modern virology and as such have been the most thoroughly studied. All three have 
been informally identified by their presumed sites of origin as Spanish, Asian and 
Hong Kong Influenza, respectively. They are now known to represent three 
different antigenic subtypes of the Influenza A virus: H1N1, H2N2, and H3N2, 
respectively.  
The 'Spanish flu' outbreak in 1918 is thought to have infected up to one-third of the 
world's population and caused 20 to 50 million deaths from 1918 to 1919. It 
occurred in three waves, beginning with a first spring wave in 1918 that was mild, a 
severe second wave quickly followed by a milder third wave in early 1919. This 
pandemic is estimated to have had an overall case fatality rate of approximately 2% 
of infected persons. 
Not classified as true pandemics are three notable epidemics: (1) a 'Pseudo-
pandemic' in 1947 with low death rates, (2) an epidemic in 1977 that was a 
pandemic in children and (3) an abortive epidemic of swine flu in 1976 that was 
feared to have pandemic potential. Major Influenza epidemics show no predictable 
periodicity and all differ from one another in impact. 
Current theory suggests that the basic genetic structure that varies according to 
origin (e.g. strains of aviary or porcine origin) will evolve through mutation and 
genetic reassortment in mild forms (antigenic 'drift') or significant forms (antigenic 
'shift'). The latter was presumed to typically be followed by a pandemic, because the 
population at large was effectively not immunised as they might have been from 
previous mild transmissions of similar Influenza strains. 
History of the Avian Flu 
Influenza A virus subtype H5N1, or simply H5N1, is a subtype of the Influenza A 
virus that can cause illness in humans and many other animal species. In birds this 
virus can cause a wide spectrum of manifestations, ranging from mild illness to 
rapidly fatal disease. Avian Influenza A virus strains are classified as low pathogenic 
(associated with mild disease) and highly pathogenic (HPAI; associated with severe 
illness and high mortality). A bird-adapted strain of H5N1, called HPAI A, was 
cause of H5N1 flu, commonly known as avian Influenza or bird flu. 
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Avian Influenza A (H5N1) first came to attention worldwide in 1997, following a 
massive outbreak in poultry flocks in Hong Kong. Another brief outbreak occurred 
in February 2003 in Asia, Africa, the Pacific, Europe and the Near East. Limited 
person-to-person transmission kept this bird flu strain from causing a pandemic, 
although experts continued to closely monitor bird flu cases. 
Avian Influenza viruses do not usually infect humans; however, several instances of 
human infections and outbreaks of avian Influenza have been reported since 1997. 
In 2003, Influenza A (H7N7) infections occurred among persons who handled 
affected poultry and their families in the Netherlands during an outbreak of avian 
flu among poultry. More than 80 cases of H7N7 illness were reported with 
symptoms ranging from eye infections (conjunctivitis) to severe respiratory disease 
(pneumonia). One patient, a veterinarian who had visited an H7N7 flu-affected 
farm, subsequently died. 
Although there was evidence of limited person-to-person spread of infection, 
sustained human-to-human transmission did not occur in the previous outbreaks of 
avian Influenza. It is believed that most cases of avian Influenza infection in 
humans resulted from contact with infected poultry or contaminated surfaces. 
According to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Avian Influenza 
Disease Emergency Situation Update in 2008, H5N1 pathogenicity was continuing 
to gradually rise in endemic areas but the avian Influenza disease situation in farmed 
birds was being held in check by vaccination. Eleven outbreaks of H5N1 were 
reported worldwide in June 2008 in five countries (China, Egypt, Indonesia, 
Pakistan and Vietnam) compared with 65 outbreaks in June 2006 and 55 in June 
2007. The "global HPAI situation can be said to have improved markedly in the 
first half of 2008 but cases of HPAI are still underestimated and underreported in 
many countries because of limitations in country disease surveillance systems3."  
On December 21 2009, the WHO confirmed 447 human cases, which resulted in 
263 deaths. 
                                                 
 
3  Food and Agriculture Organisation (2010) 
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Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) was first reported in Asia in February 
2003, causing severe respiratory illnesses in 8,098 people worldwide. Before the 
SARS outbreak was contained in July 2003, 774 people died. However, avian 
Influenza and SARS are entirely different disease entities caused by completely 
different viruses, although some of the symptoms are the same. 
The 2009 H1N1 Influenza Pandemic 
In April 2009, a novel Influenza virus strain began to spread around the world. The 
WHO referred to the virus as Influenza A (H1N1), whereas the CDC and other 
Administration officials referred to it as 2009 H1N1 flu. Public reports referred to 
the virus as 'swine flu', which reflected the dominant genetic makeup of the 
unknown disease. Throughout this report, this event will be referred to as the 
‘H1N1 pandemic’ is a highly contagious acute respiratory disease of pigs, caused by 
one of several swine Influenza A viruses. Morbidity tends to be high and mortality 
low (1–4%). The virus is spread among pigs by aerosols, direct and indirect contact, 
and asymptomatic carrier pigs (e.g. animals that do not appear to be infected). 
Outbreaks in pigs occur year round, with an increased incidence in the autumn and 
winter in temperate zones. Many countries routinely vaccinate swine populations 
against swine Influenza. 
The WHO formally investigated and explained how the disease emerged: pigs can 
be infected by avian (bird), human, and swine (pig) Influenza (flu) viruses. When flu 
viruses from different species infect pigs simultaneously, the viruses can reassort 
(swap genes) and new viruses that are a mix of swine, human or avian flu viruses 
can emerge. This type of reassortment has already happened in pigs; avian and 
human genes have been circulating among swine in the United States since 1998. 
This type of reassortment can also occur in humans. The currently circulating 
Influenza A (H1N1) virus is such a reassortment, composed of genes of swine, 
avian and human origin. This particular combination had not been seen in humans 
or in swine. The origin of this reassortment, and when and where it happened, is 
not known. This virus is now being transmitted from human to human in a 
sustained manner.  
Swine Influenza viruses are most commonly of the H1N1 subtype, but other 
subtypes are also circulating in pigs (e.g., H1N2, H3N1, H3N2). Pigs can also be 
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infected with avian Influenza viruses and human seasonal Influenza viruses as well 
as swine Influenza viruses. The H3N2 swine virus was thought to have been 
originally introduced into pigs by humans. Pigs can be infected with more than one 
virus type at a time, which can allow the genes from these viruses to mix.  
According to the US Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the first 
large-scale outbreak was registered in Mexico in late March 2009, resulting in an 
effective shutdown of Mexico City. Although the illness caused was typically mild 
and similar to common seasonal flu, patients with underlying health issues were at 
risk and the global spread during June triggered a major response by governments 
and pharmaceutical companies. 
Although many illnesses are successfully and predictably treated by modern 
medicines, rapidly communicable diseases can overwhelm the medical profession 
and exhaust the availability of an affordable remedy. Historical and recent examples 
are many and severe, of both highly contagious diseases such as the bubonic plague 
or tuberculosis as well as the broader category of infectious diseases such as HIV. 
This study examines the response of a major pharmaceutical in the face of the 
global outbreak of H1N1 Influenza virus, where the eventual outcome was 
unknown at the time that major investments in and strategic decisions about its 
supply chain had to be made. 
In June 2009, H1N1 reached pandemic levels. The WHO declared a pandemic on 
11 June 2009, which was the first flu pandemic in 40 years. On the day of the 
announcement, 74 countries and territories had reported laboratory confirmed 
infections. Official reports stated that there had been nearly 30,000 cases globally 
and 141 deaths, with figures rising daily. 
As of June 22 2009, the WHO confirmed more than 50,000 human cases of H1N1 
in more than 80 countries and territories, including 231 deaths (Figure 6). It is 
important to note that more people than officially reported may have contracted 
H1N1; the number of cases shown in the WHO report reflected only cases 
confirmed by laboratory testing and reported to the WHO by foreign health 
authorities. By this date, most countries had since confirmed infections from the 
new virus. 
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The virus strain does not seem to be as lethal as was H5N1 avian Influenza, which 
re-emerged in 2005, but it is slightly more lethal than seasonal flu. Although the 
virus has been characterised as a pandemic, researchers could not initially predict 
how virulent the virus would ultimately become. The FAO, the World Organization 
for Animal Health (OIE) and the WHO agreed that there was a risk of contracting 
the virus from consuming well-cooked pork or pork products. The WHO asserted 
that imposing travel restrictions would minimally affect the spread of the virus, but 
would be highly disruptive to the global community. Nevertheless, local authorities 
shutdown Mexico City for five days and imposed wide-ranging restrictions over 
weeks in an attempt to slow the spread of the H1N1 virus. 
The globalisation of the pharmaceutical industry has had an impact beyond the core 
corporate aim of managing profitability; in an industry where investment costs in 
research are huge and few drugs reach ‘blockbuster’ profitability status. Other 
aspects such as public policy, public perception, intellectual property rights and 
competition can affect efficient supply chain operations for the pharmaceutical 
industry. After the pandemic declaration by the WHO, PHARMA experienced a 
sudden increase in demand for its Nicole product, one of just two commonly 
available treatments in the market along with a competitors product, referred to 
here as Abaco. PHARMA is the only company licensed to make Nicole; however, it 
was increasingly feared during the first stages of the swine flu pandemic that the 
higher end of demand estimates for Nicole might not be met. 
Therefore, in this study, I look at the role of time on PHARMA's response to the 
2009 Influenza pandemic and the impact it had on a range of risk management and 
supply chain management policies. As one of the largest global pharmaceutical 
development and manufacturing firms, PHARMA has a particularly important role 
in addressing the health challenges posed by viral pandemics. Like other 
pharmaceuticals, PHARMA's sourcing and manufacturing strategy is global and 
complex, with a broad range of commodity and high-value products including life-
critical medicines. Selling in markets and to governments worldwide, PHARMA is 
exposed to demand-side fluctuation and influence that make forecasting and stock 
allocation a complex process. 
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Available Treatments and Vaccines for 2009 H1N1 Influenza 
According to the WHO, most people who have contracted H1N1 have experienced 
Influenza-like symptoms, such as a sore throat, cough, runny nose, fever, malaise, 
headache and joint/muscle pain, and recovered without antiviral treatment. Drugs 
provided to H1N1 patients may reduce the symptoms and duration of illness, just 
as they do for seasonal Influenza. They also may contribute to preventing severe 
disease and death. The strain of H1N1 circulating the globe was a new virus, and 
only a small number of people with the infection have been treated for it with 
antiviral drugs. 
The strain of H1N1 is treatable with two antiviral drugs, Osolia (brand name Abaco 
marketed by PHARMA’s competitor and Xtazo (brand name Nicole) marketed by 
PHARMA. The WHO has maintained a global stockpile of approximately five 
million adult treatment courses of Abaco, which were donated by manufacturers 
and sponsoring governments. This stockpile was initiated after the onset of H5N1 
bird flu outbreaks. The WHO had already distributed some of the treatments 
through its regional offices and distributed another three million treatment courses 
from its stockpile to developing countries in the first months of the pandemic. 
At the beginning of the H1N1 outbreak, there was no available vaccine against the 
current strain of H1N1, although the CDC, the WHO and others were working on 
developing one. Scientific evidence, although incomplete, suggested that the then 
available seasonal Influenza vaccines would offer no protection against H1N1. The 
WHO and CDC prepared vaccine candidate viruses and estimated that once the 
strain had been modified, it would take between five and six months to mass 
produce a vaccine against H1N1. Once a vaccine had been developed, the WHO 
estimated that one to two billion vaccine doses could be produced annually. Five 
major pharmaceutical companies have since developed these flu vaccines. One of 
these companies announced that it would donate 100 million doses to the WHO 
for distribution to poor countries in need. PHARMA also reportedly planned to 
donate 50 million doses to the WHO. 
Nicole Dry Powder Inhaler 
Nicole inhalation powder contains the active pharmaceutical ingredient called 
Xtazo, which is a type of medicine called a neuraminidase inhibitor. It is used to 
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treat and prevent infection with the Influenza virus. Nicole is marketed by 
PHARMA competes with Abaco which is a product contains the API called Osolia 
from ISSA. 
PHARMA has adapted two technologies for delivering the Nicole drug. The first 
technology uses a dry powder inhaler with the Nicole inhalation powder packed in 
blisters on a circular foil disk.  From a patient perspective, the multi-dose format is 
convenient but more expensive to manufacture. The second technology is capsule-
based, in which the drug is delivered in a single application form using a capsule to 
be inserted by the patient in the inhaler device.  
Nicole can minimise the impact of the virus when taken by the patient within 72 
hours of exposure. Nicole is an alternative treatment from Abaco; however, using 
an inhaler for treatment is less convenient compared with Abaco, which is taken in 
tablet form. Nicole is also understood to be more expensive to manufacture than 
Abaco.  
Most countries have built stockpiles of antiviral medication consisting of 
approximately 80% of Abaco and 20% of Nicole. Both products have advantages 
and disadvantages.  
According to the WHO, Abaco was working against the strains of the new H1N1 
flu but some health experts expressed concerns that it might be less effective than 
Nicole was, since there had been widespread reports in the past year of resistance to 
Abaco by seasonal flu. The swine Influenza A (H1N1) viruses that had been 
detected in humans in the US and Mexico in 2009 were also resistant to 
Amantadine and Rimantadine.  
Clinical tests had confirmed that 2009 H1N1 pandemic virus were sensitive to 
inhibitors of neuraminidase such as Abaco and Nicole. As said by CDC, Nicole was 
the preferred medication for all circulating subtypes of the Influenza virus at that 
time. As a result Nicole has typically been used to diversify and add to government 
stockpiles of Osolia (Abaco).  
Following the outbreak, PHARMA contacted governments around the world to 
ascertain demand for Nicole and put in place a series of measures to raise 
production levels. PHARMA expected to be able to increase its annual production 
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capacity of Nicole to 190 million treatment courses by the end of 2009. This new 
capacity is three times more than PHARMA’s previous maximum capacity of 60 
million treatment courses. 
 
Figure 16: Number of Laboratory Confirmed Cases as of 22 June 2009 
Source: World Health Organisation (2009) 
4.4 Companies and Parties Involved 
A range of national and international agencies are involved the response to a 
possible pandemic. 
World Health Organisation (WHO) 
The World Health Organisation is the directing and coordinating authority for 
health within the United Nations system. It is responsible for providing leadership 
on global health matters, shaping the health research agenda, setting norms and 
standards, articulating evidence-based policy options, providing technical support to 
countries and monitoring and assessing health trends. The headquarters of WHO is 
located in Geneva, Switzerland. 
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WHO Pandemic Phases 
The phases of pandemic alert (Figure 17) are defined and managed by the World 
Health Organisation. They were first developed in 1999. It is applicable globally and 
provides a framework to aid countries in pandemic preparedness and response 
planning. The use of a six-phased approach has been developed to facilitate 
incorporation of new recommendations into existing national plans.  
To facilitate planning at national and global levels, Phases 1 to 3 correlate with 
preparedness, including capacity development and response planning activities; 
Phases 4 to 6 clearly signal the need for response and mitigation effects and have 
been grouped to include common action points.  
In addition, the time after the first pandemic wave has been elaborated into post 
peak and post pandemic periods. When making a change to the global phase, WHO 
considers all available information to assess if the criteria for a new phase have been 
met.  
In May 2009, there was vigorous debate about whether WHO should maintain its 
pandemic Influenza phase system, which reflects the spread of the virus and 
transmission patterns rather than the severity. Some argued that WHO should 
develop an alert system that is based on severity. Supporters of this idea asserted 
that the public might not understand that widespread death may not occur at the 
highest pandemic phase level. Critics of the systems, including some European 
leaders, warned that if WHO raised the pandemic threat level to Phase 6, panic 
might ensue and considerable economic and social disruptions may occur. Other 
health experts maintained that cases of sustained human-to-human transmission of 
H1N1 at that time in Japan justified raising the pandemic threat level to Phase 6.  
On 11 June 2009, WHO raised the 2009 pandemic phase level from Phase 5 to 
Phase 6. When announcing her decision, WHO Director General Margaret Chan 
underscored that the shift did not reflect a change in severity. WHO also released a 
pandemic Influenza preparedness and response guide that was updated and 
replaced its 2005 guide. Among other changes, the update “retained the six-phase 
structure, but regrouped and redefined the phases to more accurately reflect 
pandemic risk and the epidemiological situation based upon observable 
 123 
phenomena4.”  The update also outlined steps governments should take in planning 
and preparing for an epidemic (Table 24). 
 
Figure 17: WHO Pandemic Influenza Phases 
Source: WHO pandemic preparedness and response plan (2009) 
By their nature, Influenza viruses circulate continuously among animals, especially 
birds. Even though such viruses might theoretically develop into pandemic viruses, 
by definition, in Phase one no viruses circulating among animals have been reported 
to cause infections in humans. 
Phase two, an animal Influenza virus circulating among domesticated or wild 
animals is known to have caused infection in humans, and is therefore considered a 
potential pandemic threat. 
Phase three, an animal or human-animal Influenza reassortant virus has caused 
sporadic cases or small clusters of disease in people, but has not resulted in human-
to-human transmission sufficient to sustain community-level outbreaks. Limited 
human-to-human transmission may occur under some circumstances, for example, 
when there is close contact between an infected person and an unprotected 
caregiver. However, limited transmission under such restricted circumstances does 
                                                 
 
4  Salaam-Blyther, T. (2009) 
PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PHASES	
TIME	
Phases 1 – 3 	
Phase 4	
Phases 5-6/ 
Pandemic	
Post Peak	
Post 
Pandemic	
Predominantly 
animal 
infections; few 
human 
infections	
Sustained 
human to 
human 
transmission	
Widespread 
human 
infection	
Possibility of  
recurrent 
events	
Disease 
activity at 
seasonal 
levels	
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not indicate that the virus has gained the level of transmissibility among humans 
necessary to cause a pandemic. 
Phase four is characterised by verified human-to-human transmission of an animal 
or human-animal Influenza reassortant virus able to cause “community-level 
outbreaks.” The ability to cause sustained disease outbreaks in a community marks a 
significant upwards shift in the risk for a pandemic. Any country that suspects or 
has verified such an event is asked to urgently consult with WHO so that the 
situation can be jointly assessed and a decision made by the affected country if 
implementation of a rapid pandemic containment operation is warranted. Phase 
four indicates a significant increase in risk of a pandemic but does not necessarily 
mean that a pandemic is a forgone conclusion. 
Phase five is characterised by human-to-human spread of the virus into at least two 
countries in one WHO region. While most countries will not be affected at this 
stage, the declaration of Phase 5 is a strong signal that a pandemic is imminent and 
that the time to finalise the organisation, communication, and implementation of 
the planned mitigation measures is short. 
Phase six, the pandemic phase, is characterised by community level outbreaks in at 
least one other country in a different WHO region in addition to the criteria defined 
in Phase five. Designation of this phase indicates that a global pandemic is under 
way.
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Table 24: WHO Pandemic Influenza Phase Descriptions and Actions in Each Phase  
Source: WHO pandemic Influenza preparedness and response, guidance document (2009) 
Phase Estimated 
probability of  
pandemic 
Description Main Actions 
in Affected 
Countries 
Main Action in Not-Yet 
Affected Countries 
Phase 1 Uncertain No animal Influenza virus 
circulating among animals 
has been reported to cause 
infection in humans. 
Producing, implementing, exercising, and 
harmonizing national response plans with 
national emergency preparedness and 
response plans. 
Phase 2 Uncertain An animal Influenza virus 
circulating among 
domesticated or wild animals 
is known to have caused 
infection in humans and is 
therefore considered a 
specific potential pandemic 
treat. 
Producing, implementing, exercising, and 
harmonizing national response plans with 
national emergency preparedness and 
response plans. 
Phase 3 Uncertain An animal or human-animal 
Influenza reassortant virus 
has caused sporadic causes 
or small clusters of  disease 
in people, but has not 
resulted in human-to-human 
transmission sufficient to 
sustain community-level 
outbreaks. 
Producing, implementing, exercising, and 
harmonizing national response plans with 
national emergency preparedness and 
response plans. 
Phase 4 Medium to 
high 
Human-to-human 
transmission of  an animal or 
human-animal Influenza 
reassortant virus able to 
sustain community-level 
outbreaks has been verified. 
Rapid 
containment 
Readiness for pandemic 
response 
Phase 5 High to 
certain 
The same identified virus has 
caused sustained community 
level outbreaks in two or 
more countries in one WHO 
region. 
Pandemic 
response: Each 
country to 
implement 
actions as called 
for in their 
national plans. 
Readiness for imminent 
response 
Phase 6 Pandemic in 
progress 
In addition to the criteria 
defined in Phase 5, the same 
virus has caused sustained 
community level outbreaks 
in at least one other country 
in another WHO region. 
Pandemic 
response: Each 
country to 
implement 
actions as called 
for in their 
national plans. 
Readiness for imminent 
response 
Post-
peak 
period 
 Levels of  pandemic 
Influenza in most countries 
with adequate surveillance 
have dropped below peak 
levels. 
Evaluation of  
response; 
response; 
recovery; 
preparation for 
possible second 
wave. 
Readiness for imminent 
response 
Possible 
new wave 
 Levels of  pandemic 
Influenza activity in most 
countries with adequate 
surveillance rising again. 
Response Readiness for imminent 
response 
Post-
pandemic 
period 
 Levels of  Influenza activity 
have returned to the levels 
seen for seasonal Influenza 
in most countries with 
adequate surveillance. 
Evaluation of  
response; 
revision of  
plans; 
Readiness for imminent 
response 
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During the post-peak period, pandemic disease levels in most countries with 
adequate surveillance will have dropped below peak observed levels. The post-peak 
period signifies that pandemic activity appears to be decreasing; however, it is 
uncertain if additional waves will occur and countries will need to be prepared for a 
second wave. 
Previous pandemics have been characterised by waves of activity spread over 
months. Once the level of disease activity drops, a critical communications task of 
WHO will be to balance this information with the possibility of another wave. 
Pandemic waves can be separated by months and an immediate “at-ease” signal 
may be premature. 
In the post-pandemic period, Influenza disease activity will have returned to levels 
normally seen for seasonal Influenza. It is expected that the pandemic virus will 
behave as a seasonal Influenza A virus. At this stage, WHO advises that surveillance 
be maintained and pandemic preparedness and response plans are updated 
accordingly. An intensive phase of recovery and evaluation may be required. 
The Role of National Pandemic Preparedness Plan 
The WHO has developed a range of recommendations for responding to the threat 
of a pandemic. The strategic actions are designed to reduce likelihood of infection, 
enable early warning systems, contain or delay spread at the source of the outbreak, 
and reduce mortality, social and economic disruption. The guidelines are revised 
periodically and the last update was issued in late 2008.   
Many countries have adopted and tailored the recommendations for creating their 
national pandemic preparedness plans.  These typically include measures such as the 
stockpiling of antivirals and pre-pandemic vaccines to be used immediately when a 
pandemic is declared.  Governments also have implemented Advanced Purchase 
Agreements (APAs) with local and global pharmaceuticals for acquiring the 
vaccines specific to the pandemic Influenza strain once they become available.  
Additional stockpiles of related medicines and medical supplies have been 
implemented, for example for antibiotics and personal protective equipment. Actual 
deployment of the preparedness plans, however, and varies widely across countries, 
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according a recent report by the UN System Influenza Coordinator and World 
Bank issued in 20085. 
Centres for Diseases Control and Prevention (CDC) 
The CDC is an agency of the United States within the Department of Health and 
Human Services. Its focus is on health promotion, prevention and preparedness to 
address infectious diseases, injuries, workplace hazards, disabilities and health 
threats.  The agency works with local, state and international governments to 
provide a system of health surveillance and monitoring, with personnel stationed 
throughout the United States and in more than 25 countries. The CDC maintains 
detailed health statistics and has in depth data and experience on the epidemics and 
pandemics that affected the US during the last 100 years. 
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
The FDA is an agency with the Federal Department of Health and Human Services. 
The mission of the FDA is to protect public health by assuring the efficacy, safety 
and security of human and veterinary drugs, biological products, medical devices, 
also the food supply, cosmetics and materials with radioactive properties. The 
agency is the primary regulatory body controlling the manufacturing, marketing and 
distribution of tobacco products. 
The FDA also seeks to improve public health through fostering industry innovation 
that can make food and medicines safer, more effective, and more affordable. It 
also provides science-based information the public on medicines and nutrition to 
improve health. 
The World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) 
The OIE is an international intergovernmental organisation founded in 1924 with 
headquarters in Paris, France. It represents a total of 178 Member Countries and 
Territories and acts as the primary intergovernmental organization responsible for 
improving animal health.  
 
                                                 
 
5  PHARMA (2009), Pandemic Preparedness, Global Public Policy Issues, March 2009. 
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The Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nation (FAO) 
The FAO is a specialised agency of the United Nations that leads international 
efforts to combat hunger. It provides a forum for developed and developing 
countries to formulate and debate policy and negotiate agreements on improving 
agriculture, forestry and fisheries practices. Avian Influenza and other infectious 
diseases form a significant part of the FAO agenda. 
U.S. Agencies for International Development (USAID) 
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is the United 
States federal government agency primarily responsible for administering civilian 
foreign aid. Its history is based on the Marshall Program after World War II and the 
Truman Administration’s Point Four program.  The agency itself was created by 
executive order of President John F. Kennedy to implement development assistance 
programs in the areas authorized by the Congress in the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961. An independent federal agency, USAID receives overall foreign policy 
guidance from the United States Secretary of State and seeks to "extend a helping 
hand to those people overseas struggling to make a better life, recover from a 
disaster or striving to live in a free and democratic country6." It operates in Sub-
Saharan Africa; Asia and the Near East, Latin America and the Caribbean, Europe 
and Eurasia.  
US Federal Government First Response to H1N1 Influenza Pandemic 
On 1 May 2009, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) 
established the Pandemic Influenza Response Management Team – composed of 
its Bureaus of Global Health and Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian 
Assistance – to coordinate the US humanitarian response to the H1N1 outbreak. 
As of 18 May 2009, the US had provided more than USD 16 Million to assist 
countries responding to H1N1 outbreaks. Primarily the CDC and USAID 
conducted global responses by US agencies to H1N1, although the US Department 
of Defence also provided some support to global aid. The CDC sent experts to 
Latin America and the Caribbean to help countries there strengthen laboratory 
                                                 
 
6  USAID, Available from http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/ 
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capacity and train health experts. The US Department of Health and Human 
Service sent 400,000 treatment courses to Mexico, accounting for less than 1% of 
the total American stockpile. 
Investments made by the US and other stakeholders to prepare for a possible 
Influenza pandemic and to monitor the spread of other infectious diseases were 
applied to the most recent global response to H1N1. Although health experts have 
made considerable gains against the disease, questions remained. Some health 
experts were concerned that poorer countries would not have the capacity to 
sufficiently monitor and respond to H1N1. Others warned that H1N1 transmission 
might accelerate in winter. Questions remained about whether the disease could 
change or undergo reassortant, particularly in countries simultaneously contending 
with H5N1 bird flu cases (such as Egypt, Vietnam and Indonesia). The deadly 
nature of bird flu could be catastrophic when combined with a strain supporting 
faster transmission. 
As of late June 2009, with the exception of the UK and Australia, all human deaths 
from H1N1 had occurred in the Americas. Approximately 87% of all deaths 
occurred in Mexico (49%) and the US (38%). 
The Health Protection Agency (HPA) 
The HPA plays a leading role in providing an integrated approach to protecting 
health in the United Kingdom, in particular against infectious diseases and 
preventing harm and reducing impact when hazards involving chemicals, poison or 
radiation occur.  
4.5 Timeline of the Disruption 
On 21 April 2009, the CDC reported that two children in California had recovered 
from a unique Influenza strain, which contained gene segments from swine flu 
viruses. The children had not been in contact with pigs. Two days later, the CDC 
reported five more H1N1 cases, three in California and two in Texas. 
On 23 April 2009,human cases of the new swine flu Influenza A H1N1 virus were 
officially confirmed in Mexico and the US. Officials issued orders to close schools 
in Mexico City and begin a process of limiting public crowds. The CDC held its 
first media briefing on H1N1 swine flu. 
 130 
On 24 April 2009, the WHO announced an outbreak of H1N1 virus in Mexico and 
the US. Mexico’s health ministry announced that a new strain of Influenza was 
affecting the country, with just over 1,000 suspected cases. The Mexican 
government also announced that it was closing schools and cancelling public 
gatherings such as sporting events and concerts in Mexico City and surrounding 
states until 6 May 2009. For example, football fans were forced to watch televised 
games from the Aztec Stadium, which normally houses more than 105,000 
spectators. 
On 27 April 2009, the WHO raised its alert level to Phase 4.It announced that 
health officials in Canada and Spain had reported human cases with no deaths. The 
first two confirmed UK cases of pandemic Influenza were reported in a couple who 
had returned to Scotland from Mexico. In the UK, ministers met for the first time 
under the chairmanship of the then Secretary of State for Health. 
On 29 April 2009, the WHO announced it was raising its alert level from phase 4 to 
5. The first case in England - a schoolchild in Devon, was announced. The child’s 
school was the first to be closed. Gordon Brown, the Prime Minister, announced to 
the House of Commons that the stockpile of antivirals would be increased from 
33.5 million to 50 million (covering 80% of the population). 
On 11 June 2009, the WHO Director raised the pandemic alert level from Phase 5 
to the highest level 6. This triggered advanced purchase agreements for vaccines, 
which were in place between a number of governments and global and local 
pharmaceutical firms. Dr. Chan characterised the virus as 'moderately severe', 
although she warned the virus could become increasing virulent at anytime. Dr. 
Chan emphasised that the shift reflected the spread of the disease rather than a 
change in virulence. 
As of 22 June 2009, the WHO confirmed more than 50,000 human cases of H1N1 
in more than 80 countries and territories, including 231 deaths. On 15 September 
2009, FDA approved H1N1 vaccines developed by major pharmaceutical 
companies. 
On 10 August 2010, WHO declared pandemic to be over and the world had 
entered the “post-pandemic period”. 
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A full timeline of the H1N1 2009 Influenza pandemic is shown in Table 25. 
Date The 2009 H1N1 Pandemic  
2005  PHARMA Corporate Executive Team (CET) approves a global pandemic policy and plans 
to address threat of  Influenza. 
2005-2009  PHARMA countries site/ functions develop individual pandemic preparedness plans 
addressing local needs and issues. 
2006  PHARMA granted license to China to manufacture and sell Xtazo (API of  Nicole) in 
China, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam and all least developing countries (LDCs) 
March 2009  First reports of  a novel flu virus in Mexico 
28 March 2009  Earliest onset date of  swine flu reaching the United States, according to the CDC. 
21 April 2009  CDC reported that two children in California had recovered from a unique Influenza 
strain, which contained gene segments from swine flu viruses. The children had not 
contact with pigs. Two days later, CDC reported five more H1N1 cases, three in California 
and two in Texas. 
23 April 2009  CDC holds its first media briefing on H1N1 swine flu. 
 Human cases of  new swine flu Influenza A H1N1 virus were officially confirmed in Mexico and 
the United States. Officials issue orders to close school in Mexico City, beginning a process of  
limiting public crowds. Three major soccer games around Mexico City close stadium gates to all 
fans the weekend of  25-26 April 2009, with games broadcast on television. Stadium closures 
continue through 2-3 May 2009. 
24 April 2009 
 
* This study 
defined this point 
of  time as ‘the 
event’ in analysis. 
 The World Health Organisation (WHO) announced an outbreak of  H1N1 virus in Mexico 
and the USA. 
 PHARMA acknowledged swine flu cases that occurred in Mexico. 
 Mexico’s Health Ministry announced that a new strain of  Influenza was affecting the country, with 
just over 1,000 suspected cases. The Mexican government also announced that it was closing 
schools and cancelling public gatherings such as sporting events and concerts in Mexico City and 
surrounding states through 6 May 2009, which was subsequently to all schools throughout the 
country.  
25 April 2009  Director of  WHO -Dr. Margaret Chan calls the flu problem “a public health emergency of  
international concern” 
 PHARMA set up ‘Emergency Supply Chain Planning Nicole Ramp Up Plan Meeting’ 
with objective to ensure the supply chain is operating at maximum capacity. 
26 April 2009  Health authorities step up vigilance measures around the world. 
 PHARMA, Value Stream Leader appointed by President of  Manufacture and Supply 
Chain (MSC) to be a head of  Manufacturing and Supply Lead in responding to 2009 H1N1 
outbreak. 
27 April 2009  The WHO level to 4 having confirmed human-to-human transmission able to cause 
'community-level outbreaks'. "Phase 4 indicates a significant increase in risk of  a pandemic but 
does not necessarily mean that a pandemic is a forgone conclusion," says the organization. 
 PHARMA created Pandemic Management Organisation Chart 
 PHARMA increased frequency of  the ‘MSC Executive Team Meeting’ to provide 
governance and guidance, now daily 
 PHARMA setup ‘Crisis Management Team Meeting’ to bring the various workstations 
together to gain overview of  pandemic. 
 PHARMA increased frequency of  the ‘Corporate Executive Team Meeting’, now daily. 
 Canada reports six cases of  swine flu and Spain reports one. In the United States 40 people have 
flu confirmed. In Mexico 26 cases are confirmed, with 7 deaths resulting. Estimates for the true 
number of  deaths hover around 80. 
 First three cases are confirmed in Europe. 
 In UK, the first two confirmed UK cases of  pandemic Influenza were reported in a couple that 
had returned to Scotland from Mexico. Ministers met for the first time in the UK’s Civil 
Contingencies Committee (CCC), under the chairmanship of  the then Secretary of  State for 
Health. 
 At that stage the information emerging from Mexico was worrying: there had been a total of  149 
deaths from 878 reported cases (of  which only 18 deaths were as yet confirmed to be H1N1). The 
UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) advised against all but essential travel to Mexico. 
28 April 2009  PHARMA Pandemic Rationing Team was set up. 
 PHARMA distribute antiviral medicines to Mexico. 
 The first cases in the Middle East. 
 Seven countries are now reporting cases of  H1N1 swine flu: the United States, Mexico, Canada, 
New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Israel and Spain. 
29 April 2009  The WHO raise pandemic lever alert to Phase 5, “a strong signal that a pandemic is 
imminent”.  
 First swine-flu death outside Mexico reported as a baby dies in Texas. The WHO confirmed seven 
more cases in Canada; bring the total number to 13 cases. 
  
 Gordon Brown, the Prime Minister of  United Kingdom announced to the House of  Commons 
that the stockpile of  antivirals would be increased from 33.5 million to 50 million (covering 80% 
of  the UK populations). 
 The first case in England was announced. The child’s school in Devon became the fist school 
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to be closed. 
30 April 2009  CEO of  PHARMA gave the first speech to employees about H1N1 Outbreak. 
 PHARMA start to ramp up Nicole production. “We already restarted manufacturing this week, 
and it will grow every week over the next few weeks and months.” 
 WHO adopts the term “Influenza A (H1N1)” after veterinary experts point out that the virus is 
not occurring among pigs. 
 There had been 91 confirmed cases in the USA, with one confirmed death, while in Mexico there 
were 730 suspected cases, 26 confirmed cases and 7 deaths. At this point the virus appeared to be 
mild and self-limiting outside Mexico; the outbreak seemed likely to be less severe overall than the 
1918-19 pandemic, although it had the potential to be worse than the pandemics of  1958 and 
1968.  
 In UK, ministers decided that there was no need, at that point, to advise the public against 
attending mass gatherings, to restrict domestic transport or to recommend mass closures of  
schools. Individual schools would take decisions in consultation with the Health Protection 
Agency (HPA) and the health protection services in devolved countries. Proposals to extend the 
sickness certification period to 14 days during a pandemic in order to reduce the strain on GPs 
were agreed in principle, but it was decided that there was no need to implement them at the 
current time. 
 The H1N1 information campaign was rolled out on television, radio and in print media, with a 
booklet in preparation for household delivery. The Swine Flu Information Line was put into 
operation in United Kingdom. 
 Austria, Switzerland and the Netherlands join the countries with confirmed cases. The agency also 
announces it would refer to the virus not as swine flu but as Influenza A (H1N1). 
1 May 2009  The European regulators approved PHARMA antiviral facemask that the company had 
developed over the last two years. 
 As of  this morning, 331 cases of  H1N1 have been reported in 11 countries. According to the 
worst outbreaks are still in Mexico (156 cases and nine deaths) and the United States  (109 cases 
and one death). 
 Started to conduct semi-structured face-to-face interviews with senior supply chain 
managers and executives. 
2 May 2009  The virus makes its appearance in Asia. 
 China (Hong Kong special administrative region), Costa Rica, Denmark, France, and the Republic 
of  Korea join the list. Total cases reported to the WHO are now at 658 in 16 countries. 
 Canadian authorities announce that H1N1 has been detected in a swineherd in Alberta. The pigs 
likely caught the virus from a Canadian who had recently visited Mexico, making this the first 
known case of  human-to-animal transmission. 
3 May 2009  Ireland and Italy each report one case. 898 cases are now reported. 
4 May 2009  Colombia joins the club. There are now 985 cases in 20 countries. Mexico is up to 25 deaths, but 
officials there say the disease seems to be on the decline. 
5 May 2009  Mexico's H1N1 shutdown should begin to ease, with restaurants and cafes set to reopen. 
 The latest say the virus has now spread to 21 countries. Mexico has reported 590 cases and 25 
deaths while the United States has reported 286 cases and one death. 
 However, the Texas Department of  State Health Services has confirmed a second person has died 
in the United States. The DSHS says a woman with "chronic underlying health 
 conditions" died earlier this week. 
 The following countries have reported cases but no deaths: Austria, Canada, China (Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region), Costa Rica, Colombia, Denmark, El Salvador, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Republic of  Korea, Spain, Switzerland 
and the United Kingdom. 
 MSC Pandemic Organisation Chart was created in order to explain which product line should be 
covered during the outbreak of  H1N1. 
6 May 2009  WHO swine flu cases in Sweden and Guatemala. 
7 May 2009  Worldwide-confirmed cases are reported to be 2,371. 
8 May 2009  Brazil reports four cases, bringing the number of  affected countries to 25. Deaths now stand at 44 
worldwide, with 2,500 confirmed cases. Most newly reported cases in new areas, the WHO says, 
come from travellers returning from affected areas.   
 The CDC reports that hospitalization rates in the US are coming down, to 3.5%, as testing 
expands to include milder cases. 
 The Harvard School of  Public Health releases a poll in which 83% of  Americans polled say they 
are satisfied with the waypublic health officials have managed the outbreak. Still, 48% of  parents 
with children in school think they or a family member will come down with H1N1 in the next year. 
11 May 2009  The WHO has swine flu deaths in Canada and Costa Rica, bringing the total number of  countries 
where fatalities have occurred to four. 
 Mexico has reported 48 deaths and the United States three. Worldwide, 30 countries have officially 
reported 4694 cases. 
 A modelling study in Science suggests that the virus spreads at a rate comparable to that of  
previous Influenza pandemics. 
12 May 2009  The CDC that it is seeing some severe complications in cases of  H1N1 in pregnant women, 
including one death in the US. 
13 May 2009  As of  this morning, 33 countries have reported 5,728 cases of  H1N1 to the WHO. 
18 May 2009  The day it that 8,829 H1N1 cases have been reported in 40 countries, the WHO has cautioned 
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against complacency. 
 “This virus may have given us a grace period, but we do not know how long this grace period will 
last, “WHO director general “No once can say whether this is just the calm before the storm.” 
 However, the pandemic alert level is still at five today, one level below a full pandemic. 
20 May 2009  WHO says that H1N1 has officially contaminated 10,243 in 41 countries and killed 80 people 
worldwide. 
22 May 2009  Australia raises its alert level to 'Contain', even as the Mexican government relaxes its restrictions 
in Mexico City. 
27 May 2009  A New England Journal of  Medical article, in response to suggestions that the WHO evaluate its 
criteria for moving to Phase 6 and declaring a pandemic, that "the global extent of  a pandemic 
should be described objectively and should be just one factor in decisions about how to respond." 
31 May 2009  PHARMA  received approval of  Nicole Capsule Inhaler  
1 June 2009  The FDA has approved PHARMA antiviral facemask for use in the United States.  
 June opens with 17,410 cases reported in 62 countries, including newbie’s like the Bahamas and 
Estonia. The death toll in Mexico stands at 97. 
 In the US there are or have been cases in all 50 states, including 17 deaths, according to the 
CDC.MedImmune, a biotechnology firm in Gaithersburg, Maryland, wins a USD 90 million 
contract from the federal government to begin developing a live attenuated vaccine for H1N1. 
2 June 2009  The WHO says it is closer to moving its pandemic alert status to Phase 6, which would 
denote official global pandemic status. 
3 June 2009  H1N1 has reached Africa. The WHO has a case in Egypt. Cases in Australia stand at 501, the 
largest number outside of  the Americas. 
 A report Euro surveillance estimates a reproduction number for the virus – the average number of  
secondary cases generated by a single primary case – of  2.3 in Japan, higher than estimates from 
elsewhere. 
 The CDC’s Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report suggests that the outbreak in Mexico may have 
peaked in the late April. 
8 June 2009  The WHO adds a death in the Dominican Republic to its list, bringing the number of  countries 
that have reported deaths to six. 
9 June 2009  The WHO reports that Inuit communities in Canada may be particularly hard-hit. It continues to 
face questions as to why a full-blown pandemic has not been declared. 
11 June 2009  Pandemic is declared! WHO Director – General Margaret Chan raised the pandemic alert level 
from Phrase 5 to Phase 6, which is the highest level. The world is a full-blown Influenza pandemic 
for the first time in 41 years. This triggered the advance-purchase agreements for vaccine. Dr. 
Chan characterised the virus as ‘moderately severe’, though she warned the virus could become 
increasing virulent at anytime. Dr. Chan emphasised that the shift reflected the spread of  the 
disease but not signal a change in virulence. 
14 June 2009  The first swine flu death in Europe has been reported. A woman in Scotland who died with H1N1 
had "underlying health conditions", according to the Scottish government. This is the first death 
outside the American continent.   
19 June 2009  South Africa confirms its first case of  swine flu - officially marking the disease's spread into sub-
Saharan Africa. 
22 June 2009  Chinese state news source Xinhua reports tests have begun on the first H1N1 vaccine developed 
in the country. 
24 June 2009  Argentinian authorities report that a pig at a pig farm in Buenos Aires province has tested positive 
for the novel H1N1 strain, making it only the second known swine infection outside of  Canada. 
29 June 2009  Denmark reports the first case of  resistance to Abaco, considered to be the most effective 
treatment for the flu by the WHO. The virus continues to spread throughout the world with 
11,000 new cases in three days. 
2 July 2009  Japan’s health ministry reports that it too has detected a case of  Abaco resistant H1N1. 
 The UK moves its swine flu response from ‘containment’ to ‘treatment’. ‘Our national focus 
should be on treating the increasing numbers affected by swine flu,” says health minister Andy 
Burnham. 
8 July 2009  WHO says the three incidences of  drug resistant H1N1 to date are "sporadic cases" of  resistance. 
"At this time, there is no evidence to indicate the development of  widespread antiviral resistance 
among pandemic H1N1 viruses." 
16 July 2009  WHO changes reporting requirements for H1N1 and abandons issuing global tables with numbers 
of  confirmed cases for all countries. 
 It notes that the increasing number of  cases "is making it extremely difficult, if  not impossible, for 
countries to try and confirm them through laboratory testing". 
17 July 2009  The WHO says that the swine flu pandemic is moving around the globe at an “unprecedented” 
speed. 
22 July 2009  PHARMA distributed antiviral medicines to all UK employees. 
 PHARMA confirmed that it had contracts in place to supply 195 million doses of  its 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 adjuvanted Influenza vaccine and had a variety of  agreements in 
place with the US Government to supply pandemic products worth USD 250 million.  Since 
that date, nine government contracts have been signed for a further 96 million doses of  the 
vaccine.  This now brings the total number of  doses ordered for PHARMA’s adjuvanted vaccine to 
291 million.  
 Two Australian companies say they have started human trials of  their swine flu vaccines. 
28 July 2009  The death of  a 22-year-old university student in South Africa marks the first death in sub-Saharan 
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Africa. Confirmation of  H1N1 as the cause comes 3 August.  
29 July 2009  Researchers from the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention warn that pregnant women 
"might be at increased risk for complications from pandemic H1N1"  
31 July 2009  PHARMA had executive after action review meeting 
3 August 2009  India confirms first death from H1N1, the victim being a 14-year old girl in the city of  Pune. 
14 August 2009  PHARMA commenced the clinical development programme for its adjuvanted pandemic 
vaccines. 
21 August 2009  Healthy victims of  swine flu should not routinely be given antiviral drugs, the World Health 
Organization. 
 The total UK death is 60. 
10 September 
2009 
 Two papers published in the New England Journal of  Medicine show two new vaccines against H1N1 
are likely to be effective after just one dose. 
 "The obvious advantage of  a one-dose schedule is that, in the current time of  vaccine scarcity, it 
doubles the number of  people who may be vaccinated with a fixed amount of  vaccine," writes 
Kathleen Neuzil, of  PATH, in an accompanying editorial. "On the basis of  these data, it would be 
appropriate to begin vaccination with the use of  one dose of  the usual antigen content." 
15 September2009  FDA approves four H1N1 vaccines, from major pharmaceutical companies. 
25 September 
2009 
 European Committee for Medicinal Production for Human Use (CHMP) has issued a 
positive opinion and recommends approval of  PHARMA’s candidate pandemic 
adjuvanted vaccine. 
30 September 
2009 
 Australia begins mass H1N1 vaccinations. 
1 October 2009  The four health ministers in the United Kingdom heard that the PHARMA vaccine had 
been licensed for those over six months and for pregnant women. Ministers agreed to 
double existing ECMO capacity in line with broader policy on critical care capacity.  
8 October 2009  The JCVI reconfirmed its previous advice of  7 August concerning the priority groups for 
vaccination. Once all those in the priority groups had been offered vaccination, it should be 
offered to the healthy population. The JCVI advised that a single dose of  (the PHARMA H1N1 
adjuvant vaccine) should generally be sufficient for those aged 10 and above, although two doses 
would be required for the immunocompromised and those below 10 years would require two half-
doses of  vaccine. While PHARMA’s rivals vaccines required two doses for treatment in all groups.  
18 October 2009  This week Mongolia, Rwanda, and Sao Tome and Principe issue first reports of  H1N1 and 
Iceland, Sudan, and Trinidad and Tobago reported their first deaths. 
21 October 2009  In UK, vaccination program begins: front-line healthcare workers and their patients who fall into 
at-risk categories. 
25 October 2009  This week: vaccinations get underway in many European countries. 
29 October 2009  The total UK deaths are 137. 
30 October 2009  Strategic Advisory Group of  Experts (SAGE) on Immunization issues vaccination advice to the 
WHO, including use of  a single dose of  vaccine in adults and adolescents and use of  any licensed 
vaccine for pregnant women.  
 27 October 2009: Russian media reports the country's first H1N1 deaths. 
 PHARMA distributed the first vaccine to their employees; PHARMA biological and MSC 
staffs only. 
1 November 20 09  WHO reports that more than 199 countries and overseas territories have laboratory confirmed 
cases of  H1N1, with over 6,000-recorded deaths. 
10 November 
2009 
 US FDA approved PHARMA’s pandemic H1N1 adjuvanted vaccine. 
 PHARMA announced to donate 50 million doses of  its adjuvanted pandemic H1N1 
Influenza to WHO for distributing to developing countries. 
19 November 
2009 
 China says it has dispatched monitoring teams to 12 regions after a high profile doctor suggested 
some cases of  H1N1 might be being deliberately not reported. 
 After around 65 million people have been vaccinated, the WHO says H1N1 vaccines appear to 
have an "excellent safety profile". None of  the deaths investigated in those vaccinated have found 
a direct link to vaccination. 
23 November 
2009 
 PHARMA H1N1 vaccines have been distributed to countries globally for use in 
government-initiated vaccine programmed. 
8 December 09  A review in the BMJ warns that there is insufficient evidence for or against using neuraminidase 
inhibitors (Nicole and Abaco) for preventing Influenza complications. An accompanying editorial 
says, "The review and a linked investigation undertaken jointly by the BMJ and Channel 4 News 
cast doubt not only on the effectiveness and safety of  Osolia (API of  Abaco) but on the system by 
which drugs are evaluated, regulated, and promoted." 
27 December2009  The WHO says over than 208 countries, territories and communities have reported H1N1 cases, 
including "at least" 12,220 deaths. 
2 January 2010  China's ministry of  health confirms there have been 659 deaths from H1N1 in the country as of  2 
January. A spokesman warns of  "the danger of  an explosion of  outbreaks in some places". 
14 January 2010  The four health ministers agreed to suspend deliveries of  the PHARMA H1N1 adjuvanted 
vaccine from 16 January and to enter into negotiations with the supplier over terminating 
the contract. A variety of  options were considered for managing the pandemic flu vaccine 
stockpile, including donating or selling vaccines to pharmacies, private companies or other 
countries.  
26 January 2010  The WHO defends itself  against allegations it overhyped the dangers of  H1N1 under pressure 
from vaccine manufacturers at a hearing of  the Council of  Europe's health committee. 
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 "Let me state clearly for the record. The Influenza pandemic policies and responses recommended 
and taken by WHO were not improperly influenced by the pharmaceutical industry," says Keiji 
Fukuda. 
18 March 2010  342 deaths in England related to H1N1 had been recorded 69 in Scotland, 28 in Wales and 18 in 
Northern Ireland, giving a UK total of  457. 
1 April 2010  Antiviral medicines were no longer available from national stockpile, and antiviral collection points 
in England were closed. The Swine Flu Information Line also closed, and treatment of  people 
with flu-like symptom returned to business as usual, with people advised to contact their GP. 
10 August2010  The WHO declared pandemic is over. The world has now entered the “post-pandemic 
period”. 
11 April 2011  PHARMA welcomes key agreement coordinated by the WHO on a framework to support 
global preparedness for a future Influenza pandemic. 
  Table 25: Timeline of the 2009 H1N1 Pandemic 
Source: Adapted from PHARMA report 
UK and the H1N1 Influenza pandemic 
The virus reached the UK in April 2009.The first cases were confirmed on 27 April 
2009 in passengers returning from Mexico. As mentioned above, the government 
began closing schools after the first case of person-to-person transmission within 
the UK was announced on 1 May 2009. The first death attributed to H1N1 in the 
UK occurred in Scotland (reported on 14 June 2009). 
The UK had been preparing for Influenza pandemic for some time. The possibility 
of the emergence of an avian virus such as H5N1 was of particular concern and 
provided a reason for the UK government to stockpile antiviral medicine. 
The arrangements of the UK’s current central government crisis management had 
been in place since 2002 and had been tested in various crises and exercises. The 
pre-pandemic planning, set out in Pandemic Flu: A National Framework for 
Responding to an Influenza Pandemic, ensured that many decisions had already 
been made in principle prior to the pandemic and that key personnel had the 
opportunity to work together. The Department of Health and the Cabinet Office 
jointly published this plan in November 2007 and it formed the basis for the 2009 
pandemic response. 
On 29 April 2009, the Prime Minister announced to the House of Commons that 
the stockpile of antivirals would be increased from 33.5 million to 50 million 
(covering 80% of the population). 
After a slow start, the virus spread rapidly in the UK during July 2009, with new 
cases peaking at 110,000 in the last week of that month, according to the Health 
Protection Agency's modelling estimate, but declining sharply in the first week of 
 136 
August 2009. Cases fell progressively down to 3,000 in the first week of September 
2009, and then began to rise again. The decline in cases during the summer had 
been predicted, but a large surge was expected in the autumn to coincide with the 
normal flu season. New cases rose to 84,000 for October, well below the summer's 
peak and then declined during November. 
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Chapter 4 
Findings: PHARMA Response 
during the H1N1 Influenza 
Pandemic 
This chapter examines the response of a major pharmaceutical in the face of the 
global outbreak of H1N1 Influenza virus, where the eventual outcome was 
unknown and major investments and strategic decisions about its supply chain had 
to be made. The challenges faced by PHARMA are discussed including financial 
and product pricing issues. PHARMA’s response is outlined, structured along the 
dimension of the 3D time-based framework.  
The initial coding and categorization is of the PHARMA data is then presented, 
from open, axial and selective coding stages of analysis. The process of constant 
comparison was employed to confirm preliminary categories. The goal was first to 
compare selected data to each other to gauge similarity and dissimilarity, and to then 
compare additionally to potential categories, assessing whether the data was 
consistent or inconsistent with the initial coding structure consisting of 
approximately 110 codes. 
Theoretical saturation of the core categories and related concepts was done through 
new interviews and questions to the original participants. Through a process of 
theoretical sorting, memos from the data were related and integrated to the 
emerging structure. Theoretical codes, and patterns relating the codes and the 
factors of the company response in dealing with disruption, are described. 
Finally, the four preliminary core categories and 18 subcategories of response time 
are described, which will be validated with the BP disruptions as is described in the 
subsequent chapters. 
Table 26 below illustrates application of Grounded Theory methodology in this 
study 
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Phase  Description This study Output 
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 Step 1 Preparation Preliminary literature review: Time-Based Management and Response - Time 
Based Risk Management Framework (Sodhi & Tang, 2009). 
General research problem – What factors underlie 
companies’ time response to supply chain 
disruption? 
 
Step 2 Case selection Selected PHARMA for a study of  their response to H1N1 Pandemic. Chose 
two disruptions from BP to validate the finding from PHARMA. 
 
1. PHARMA 
2. BP Deepwater Horizon 
3. BP Texas City 
P
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 2
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Step 3 Develop rigorous 
data collection 
protocol 
Data gathering from: semi-structured telephone and face-to-face interviews, 
direct observation, participant-observation (meeting and conference calls), 
archival records and documentation from internal (report, presentation) and 
external sources (news, press). 
 
Interview guides and inventory of  available data 
sources. 
Step 4 Entering the field Data gathering through company visit. Interviews with senior supply chain 
managers and executives. 
Transcripts and data. 
Step 5 Data ordering Arraying events and information chronologically to facilitate easier data 
analysis. 
 
Collated data. 
P
h
a
se
 3
 
D
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a 
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Step 6 Analysis data 
Open coding 
 
Axial coding 
 
Selective coding 
 
Memoing 
 
 
Developed concepts from PHARMA data through coding. Preliminary core 
categories were established. 
Relationship between categories and subcategories were developed. 
Core categories were integrated to build theoretical framework. 
Write-up of  ideas about codes and their relationships; this is an on going 
process from data analysis through completion of  the study.  
 
Approximately 110 codes, 18 subcategories and 
preliminary 4 core categories were established. 
 
 
 
Memos. 
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Table 26: Application of Grounded Theory Methodology in This Study 
Phase  Description This study Output 
P
h
a
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 3
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a 
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Step 7 Theoretical 
Sampling 
Determine where to find additional data to develop the emergent theory. Re-
interview original participants and complete additional interviews until no 
new properties or aspects could be identified.  
Defined scope and saturation of  categories. 
Step 8 Constant 
comparison 
Compare new to previous interviews and compare events to other sources of  
information for similarities and differences. 
 
 
Step 9 Theoretical 
Saturation 
Saturation is reach when further data gathering and analysis from PHARMA 
added little to the conceptualisation. 
Saturated core categories 
1. Preparation 
2. Partnership 
3. Organisation 
4. Reserve 
 
Step 10 Theoretical sorting 
memos 
 
Theoretical coding 
Memos, which have been written since data analysis phase, were sorted 
theoretically and four propositions are derived from the findings. 
Four propositions and Emergent Theory  
 
P
h
a
se
 4
 
L
it
er
at
u
re
 c
o
m
p
ar
is
o
n
  
an
d
 w
ri
te
 u
p
 
Step 11 Integrating the 
literature 
Compare emergent theory with extant literature (comparisons with 
conflicting or similar frameworks) 
 
 
Step 12 Validation of  theory Validation the emergent theory using two disruptions from BP: Deepwater 
Horizon Oil Spill and BP Texas Refinery Explosion. Iteration back to step 2 
for data collection and data analysis to check theoretical fit, relevance, 
workability and modifiability. 
 
Confirmed core categories – Factors underlying 
response time. 
Step 13 Write up of  theory Writing research report. This document. 
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5.1 The Disruption 
Prior to the 2009 Influenza outbreak, the World Health Organization evaluated the 
growing probability that a major flu pandemic could be approaching. The previous 
pandemic occurred in 1968. WHO Director Margaret Chan assessed that Influenza 
pandemic to be a unique type of event7.  It is “impossible to anticipate when the 
next pandemic might occur or how severe its consequences might be…on average, 
three pandemics per century have been documented since the 16thcentrury, 
occurring at intervals of 10-50 years8." The World Bank estimated that a new flu 
pandemic could kill more than 70 million worldwide with worst-case fatalities up to 
260 million (Osterholm, 2005)9. For every death, many more would suffer from 
mild or severe symptoms. The direct and indirect effect on the population could 
trigger a major recession of the global economy costing more than USD 3 Trillion. 
Lower global domestic productivity would drop by 4.8 percent, a result of lower 
tourism, transportation and retail sales as well lower productivity and employee 
absenteeism 10 . In this context, PHARMA's response played a crucial role in 
reducing the impact of a possible pandemic. 
Pandemics are by nature unpredictable but also unavoidable.  Transmission rates 
and virulence of the Influenza strains vary greatly, from the widespread seasonal flu 
to the historical Spanish flu in 1918 that killed over 50 million people. Hence 
declaration of a pandemic put PHARMA in a challenging situation: not only was its 
production of medically and business critical drugs potentially at risk, but the world 
would be watching closely how such a market-leading (and profitable) corporation 
met the exploding demands for antiviral medicines. 
Based on PHARMA Corporate Executive Team workshop in 2009, Influenza 
pandemic was thought to be one of the most significant risks facing PHARMA 
(Table 2). On its five-by-five risk matrix, PHARMA scored the likelihood of a 
pandemic as ‘2’ two – ‘unlikely to happen’ (every 5-10 years) and impact of it as ‘5’ 
five – catastrophic. PHARMA uses a conservative approach, selecting a higher 
                                                 
 
7  Margaret Chan, DG WHO address to the Pacific Health Summit, Seattle, Washington, 13 June 2007 
8  In-Pharma (2006) 
9  Osterholm, M.T. (2005)   
10 Burins et al, (2008)  
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matrix input where the best estimate falls into a range overlapping two possibilities. 
Multiplying the two inputs on the PHARMA risk scale gave a total score of ten, 
which put the recommended response at level three – increase mitigation or 
strengthen the contingency plans.  
The manufacturing and supply BCP leader concurred: the company is not able to 
reduce the likelihood of a pandemic and must focus on reducing the impact of the 
event through its contingency plans. 
“So the mitigation plan can’t reduce the frequency of the event ... But by designing 
the supply chain, we can reduce the impact. And we can probably reduce that impact 
from a catastrophic event to a moderate event. The contingency plan introduces how 
we set our supply chains up to be flexible, how we had business continuity plans for 
every other site, .how we issue antivirals to staff. These were all our contingency plans 
to reduce that effect from catastrophic. And the whole pandemic crisis management 
was a way of controlling that event.” 
Manufacturing and Supply BCP Lead 
An Influenza pandemic could trigger risks across of PHARMA internally as well as 
externally. Mitigating one risk can end up exacerbating another risk in some 
business area (Chopra and Sodhi, 2004):  
“The pandemic triggered all those risks. Risk that R&D will not deliver a 
commercially successful product - this involved our new product in capsule inhaler 
device, weakness of intellectual property protection in certain countries which was 
challenge in the emerging market, sales and market regulations, regulatory controls, 
risk of interruption of product supply and global political and economics conditions.” 
Manufacturing and Supply BCP Lead 
Given the evolving situation, the first challenge was to understand what factors 
drove WHO to declare a pandemic so quickly, or more importantly, what that 
meant in actual opportunity, risk and required decision making for swift response.  
Swine-flu impact on world health was catastrophic in the worst-case scenarios; at 
the same time, early scientific review hinted at a milder form of Influenza. Potential 
evolution of the strain during the next flu season, as well as possible resistance to 
PHARMAs antiviral treatments, meant vigilance was required and supply chain 
response had to be managed under considerable uncertainty. 
PHARMA had immediate supply challenges as the company had recently stopped 
API production and was reducing secondary packaging as the rate of commercial 
orders was dropping in the first quarter 2009. Demand rose dramatically after April 
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27th as governments reviewed their preparedness plans and placed forecasted 
abnormal demand on the two suppliers of H1N1 antivirals.  
“With sudden increased demand from many countries, there was clearly not enough 
product available. Annual demand typically means 60 million treatment doses, and 
PHARMA had only three million devices on hand since we have stopped 
production. Within a day, the government asked for an immediate additional 32 
million additional doses, which we would normally take six months of production.” 
Manufacturing Strategy Manager 
Allocation of limited stock was as much a political process as commercial – 
governments and press can create reputation risk irrespective of the ethical 
commitments PHARMA fulfils. 
Expansion of capacity required evaluation of a broad portfolio of techniques: 
expanding too soon created investment risk, with millions of Pounds of cost taken 
on to prepare for rapid ramp-up in production. Expanding too late meant missing 
commercial opportunity but also put lives – tens of thousands of lives – at risk. 
Expanding production too broadly using internal capacity created production risk 
on other critical drugs; external expansion through licensing could create 
downstream intellectual property and marketing challenges in growth markets.  
Underlying these challenging supply circumstances, there are pressures on 
compliance and quality standards. PHARMA has a well-established quality 
management system, high compliance standards and culture. These standards are 
fundamental to the PHARMA culture and maintained throughout the supply chain 
expansion.  
Apart from production sites, PHARMA faced challenges in terms of assuring 
continuity of the internal organization and external suppliers. Protection of 
employees – medically and in terms of ability to adapt to changing requirements and 
be able to continue to work – was critical.  Clarity of communication and decision-
making was also important, as PHARMA has to respond to this situation quickly. 
As well as restarting and expanding Nicole supply capability, PHARMA had to look 
at other business critical products, e.g. large revenue generating products. 
PHARMA must consider its business objectives, along with supporting global 
humanitarian response. PHARMA also needed to closely look at assuring 
production and distribution of 32 medically critical products. These were defined as 
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products that are critical to patient survival that are made uniquely by PHARMA: it 
could be fatal if the product was not available and PHARMA must assure that 
sufficient stock is locally available. 
For example, Hematol is a business critical product: it generates significant revenue 
to PHARMA. 
 “Not only do we need to restart, maximise and expand Nicole production and 
develop and manufacture the Vaccine but this must be achieved not at the expense of 
other business critical and medically critical products to protect the lives of millions of 
patients who rely on these products and protect the ongoing financial security of the 
company.” 
Manufacturing and Supply BCP Lead 
PHARMA culture is risk averse, having built capacity, triple sourcing and resilience 
into its Nicole Supply Chain as part of supply chain risk mitigation. The company 
also sees itself as excellent in responding to crisis situations in the view of the 
Manufacturing and Supply BCP: 
“As well as our approach to risk management we thrive on reacting to crisis 
situations. This is where our values of empowerment and collaboration come to the 
fore and the whole organisation aligns itself to support the challenge.” 
  Manufacturing and Supply BCP 
Financial Challenge 
PHARMA invested substantially in R&D in preparing for Influenza pandemic and 
in this 2009 pandemic, PHARMA publically committed itself to support the 
governments and international authorities.  
These risks and challenges in facing the H1N1 Influenza presented PHARMA with 
a unique opportunity; today PHARMA sees itself better positioned to react far 
more quickly in the likely, but unpredictable, even of the next pandemic.  
Financial risk in the pharmaceutical industry is significant in terms of both the long-
term investment required and the possible failure to capture revenue or market 
share from events such as the Influenza pandemic. 
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“The company has spent USD 2.5 Billion over the last seven years preparing for 
this situation. PHARMA has been planning for a pandemic for three-and-a-half 
years and has spent more than GBP 1 Billion to ensure its factories could crank up 
production at short notice.” 
CEO of PHARMA 
This investment in the Nicole supply chain and R&D must be matched by an 
appropriate return, which in turn can have an impact on prioritisation and pricing. 
PHARMA sales are publicly reported with and without pandemic products. In the 
first six months, PHARMA's global revenue grew by only 1% without this category; 
however, it was boosted 6% (GBP 14.4 Billion) in the April–June quarter between 
2009 and 2010. The majority of this sales increase in Q1 was because of Nicole and 
the H1N1 vaccine. 
PHARMA is a commercial organisation, however, it must also respect perceived 
ethical constraints; as a global pharmaceutical company, public trust is essential and 
production decisions are based on factors in addition to profitability. Investment 
policy in Influenza-related medicines can affect large populations as well as small 
numbers of patients needing critical, immediate care, such as in intravenous 
formulations: “ We committed significant money and resources into developing an 
intravenous (IV) dose form,  but we'll only sell 5000 doses. We'll save the lives of 
5000 people and we won't make any money on it. But if you were desperately in 
hospital ….So this will save people from dying.”  
According to a BMJ article in 2010 (340L 2385), the CEO of PHARMA denied 
accusations that the company profiteered during the swine flu crisis. Last year, 
PHARMA made a pre-tax profit of more than GBP 8.5 Billion. 
Pricing Challenge 
PHARMA manufactures a portfolio of antiviral medicines and related medical 
supplies. As such, its pricing policy extends across the portfolio. Pricing policy on 
preventative vaccines developed after the start of the outbreak attracted particular 
attention. In an interview on the BBC’s World Have Your Say programme on 26 
April 2010, the CEO denied that the company had "charged the whole world" for a 
vaccine that may not have been necessary. 
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"PHARMA charged a very reasonable price for the swine flu vaccination, the same 
price we charge for regular seasonal flu. We did not charge a special crisis price." 
Manufacture Strategy Managers 
Nevertheless, the revenue opportunity presented by the pandemic response was 
significant. According to the Guardian newspaper on 10 January 2010, the swine flu 
boosted PHARMA's revenues by GBP 1 Billion. CEO stated that the “company 
has worked hard to come up with a vaccine and that it would be foolish to deny 
that events like these aren’t good for business.” 
CEO of PHARMA said that the company had been there when it was needed by 
governments around the world to help them cover their risks of swine flu and the 
products that PHARMA had supplied will help with future crises. 
"More importantly, the medicines and vaccinations that we have manufactured and 
sold are able to be held in stockpiles. For example, the Nicole flu treatment has a 
shelf life of seven years so governments now have that in stock for future use, and 
even our vaccine has a technology which will allow at least a piece of that vaccine to 
be used against other potential flu strains in the future." 
CEO of PHARMA 
Among others, PHARMA used two mechanisms to manage both commitments to 
customers and supply chain capacity, namely price and stock allocation. Early in the 
response to the crisis, when Nicole orders exceeded stock by a factor of 20, a 
mechanism for prioritisation was developed for stock allocation. Nicole pricing 
policy also has political visibility: accordingly, richer countries were charged higher 
prices than were poorer countries. Reports of individual consumer pricing showed 
the same differential mechanism existed within certain markets. 
5.2 Overview of PHARMA Response 
In dealing with H1N1 pandemic, PHARMA faced the interdependence of a wide 
range of issues: production, supply chain constraints, commercial objectives, 
licensing, external supplier, product design but also politics and speculation on the 
spread and severity of the pandemic itself. Underlying these issues is the need for 
speed in response – all aspects were changing quickly and were unpredictable; 
PHARMA had to respond quickly to changing conditions to contain the risk, to 
serve an urgent and unmet patient need and to capture the revenue opportunity. 
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Following Sodhi & Tang (2009), I consider the respond in terms of  
 D1 – Detection of the event 
 D2 – Design of a solution, and  
 D3 – Deployment of the solution in response.  
 
D1 - Detection of the Event 
In the late March 2009, Mexico began to register cases of a stronger than normal 
Influenza virus in Mexico City. On 21 April 2009, the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC) also reported that two cases of febrile respiratory illness in 
children in southern California had been caused by infection with genetically similar 
swine Influenza A (H1N1) virus. The viruses contained a unique combination of 
gene segments that had not been reported previously among swine or human 
Influenza viruses in the United States or elsewhere. 
The outbreak became visible to PHARMA on 24 April 2009 after being reported on 
various newswires and the WHO officially announced the outbreak of H1N1 virus 
in Mexico and the USA.  
PHARMA was able detect the event and had their first steps in place in a short time 
after the event occurred. Two elements which helped PHARMA detect the event 
early were first, having a good monitoring system and second, by regularly 
conducting preparedness and stress testing.  
D2 – Design of a Solution 
PHARMA took immediately action to respond to the declaration of the outbreak 
by the WHO. Numbers of step has been implemented to organise its internal and 
external responses to the outbreak and eventual pandemic. At the outset, the flu 
outbreak was seen to have a potentially dramatic impact on the ability of PHARMA 
to manufacture critical medicines as well as strong reason to ramp up the 
production and distribution of antivirals. 
The first initial steps that PHARMA design to respond to the event are: increase the 
frequency of senior executive governance meetings, assess the existing pandemic 
preparedness plan, establish an integrated response team and create a new 
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organization chart to reflect emergency roles and responsibilities. This enabled 
PHARMA to then quickly move toward design and assessment of appropriate 
supply chain response in antivirals and related medicines. 
The next step in PHARMA's response addressed the challenges of rapid supply 
chain for the antivirals and related medical supplies that help treat the symptoms of 
an existing infection. This is the focus of the PHARMA case study in this paper. 
Once the H1N1 strain was identified and isolated, PHARMA was able to adapt its 
Influenza-related portfolio of preventative vaccines and vaccine production 
technology. Research by government, industry and academic continues to pursue 
development of vaccines that can fit a broader range of Influenza strains and can be 
put more rapidly into production. 
At the first indication of a new Influenza strain, PHARMA executives quickly took 
action to prepare for a possible pandemic. Such events were seen as rare but quite 
possible, even probable over time. The potential impact was entirely uncertain in 
both the speed with which it spread and its mortality. Preparedness plans, which the 
company had in place, were based upon WHO guidance about the spread and 
mortality of the pandemic. Events proved to be very different from this original 
guidance. The first reported cases were severe and the upper estimates of scientific 
community and popular press on mortality called for urgent action. Press reports 
predicted tens of thousands of deaths in the UK alone during the summer of 2009.  
Given the uncertainty, PHARMA prepared its organization to better make and 
execute informed decisions, adding scientific know-how and other disciplines to a 
purpose-built Pandemic response team. The activation of previously prepared 
pandemic response plans required an update of communications as well as role and 
responsibilities, given the organizational and staffing changes from recent fine-
tuning of regular supply chain operations. Daily monitoring by PHARMA 
executives and supply chain managers allowed decision making to closely track the 
evolving pandemic storyline. Frequent communication with employees and internal 
sites across the globe as well as government agencies and the press allowed 
PHARMA to maintain the confidence of its workforce and the public that were 
both hungry for information on what was an essentially unpredictable situation. 
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With governance for crisis response in place, PHARMA could begin to address the 
sudden flood of requests for antivirals from governments around the world. Key 
medicines were in limited production and stockpiles of antivirals were a fraction of 
what was requested. A proportional response was developed to best allocate 
existing stock and new production, reflecting the urgency based on growing case 
information and input from health and other governmental organizations. A fair, 
tiered pricing structure was developed as well to reflect the ability of a country to 
afford the necessary medicines. PHARMA was, in the words of one supply chain 
executive, ‘not a charity’, but ‘would never say ‘no’ where lives were at stake’. 
PHARMA produces a wide portfolio of critical medicines and other drugs; 
employee health and labour availability was at risk and could affect not only the 
pandemic response but overall supply chain performance. Plans were made for 
absentee rates that could exceed 50%. Accordingly, PHARMA took steps to assure 
management was focussed in country and that employees had access to antivirals as 
soon as was deemed necessary.  
PHARMA had to consider a broad range of existing and new techniques for 
meeting the sudden demand, and preparing for a much higher requirement should a 
second pandemic wave hit in the Northern Hemisphere autumn flu season.  
Primary capacity was shifted and expanded in a balanced manner from other large-
volume, critical drugs across multiple production sites to reduce the secondary risks 
from the dramatic spike in antiviral production. Moving to round-the-clock 
production was possible with external, temporary staff taking on less-skilled steps 
and carefully allocating internal skills. With additional key supplies and materials put 
in place, PHARMA could move to dramatically higher monthly production in just 
12 weeks from the sudden declaration of the pandemic.    
“After the outbreak in April, we are beginning to receive orders from governments 
again, and we will start engaging with those governments on what the supply and 
delivery schedules can look like for Nicole…A tremendous amount of work is being 
done on Nicole in terms of ramping up our short-term production capability, and the 
MSC has worked ceaselessly in the last week on this issue.” 
Demand Operation Manager 
Additional options were explored to accelerate ramp up and maximise production 
including postponement of country-specific product packaging configuration, 
 149 
essentially a ‘vanilla pack’ that was easier to produce and ship globally. By shifting 
production between sites, moving to round-the-clock shifts, and various other 
supply chain improvements, production of Nicole could be increased from a 
maximum annual capacity of 60 million doses to 90 million. Government approval 
of a new, simpler dose delivery format – already designed and ready for 
manufacture – was accelerated by having pandemic contingency plans in place in 
agreement with key health authorities. Voluntary licensing for manufacturing in 
China allowed PHARMA to expand the global supply capability with a single dose 
delivery device to meet a predicted increase in demand from emerging market 
countries where there was a potentially huge patient base.  With the new delivery 
format, PHARMA could attain a 300% increase for a total capacity of 190 million 
doses. PHARMA was able to quickly bring additional pandemic healthcare supplies 
such as an antiviral mask to limit the spread of the infection and meet the increased 
demand of other medicines triggered by Influenza cases. 
PHARMA was able to assure rapid response at all stages of a pandemic, able to 
deploy antivirals and ‘pre-pandemic’ vaccines that can be deployed early before a 
fully matched, new vaccine becomes available.  The new Influenza strain was shown 
to have some resistance to competitors’ drugs, increasing the opportunity to 
PHARMA and reinforcing its potentially critical role in the pandemic if the strain 
evolved further resistance. Its response had to reflect changing insight and evolving 
government policy in major markets: 
"Pandemics by their nature are unpredictable and we recognise that governments’ 
needs are changing. We are committed to finding solutions for governments changing 
their immunisation programmes and to fulfilling recent new orders."   
 CEO of PHARMA 
Ultimately the mortality was lower and while the Influenza strain sadly claimed the 
lives of more than 45,000 worldwide – and continued to be responsible for deaths 
each week, PHARMA was able to rapidly meet the overall demand for antivirals 
and later for flu vaccines. What was, in fact, a real crisis facing its supply chain, was 
at the same time a unique opportunity to tailor and expanding existing strategies 
and decision making structures in the likely but unpredictable event of future 
pandemics. It was finally “Good for PHARMA”, contributing to its profit and 
reputation as a leading global manufacturer. 
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D3 – Deployment of the Solution 
PHARMA had a number of production solutions in place but not yet activated. 
After the event occurred, PHARMA was able to update, tailor and quickly 
implement pre-existing plans, shortening design lead-time and assuring faster 
deployment. In the following discussion, the preparation is reviewed relative to its 
impact on deployment lead-time. 
The timeline of the pandemic response is shown in Figure 18. In this study, the date 
24 April 2009 is defined as ‘the disruption event’ for purpose of analysis. (See also 
the detailed of the event in Table 25 in Chapter 4.) 
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Timeline of PHARMA Response to the H1N1 2009 Pandemic 
 
 152 
 
Figure 18: Timeline of PHARMA Response to the 2009 H1N1 Pandemic
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5.3 Coding and Categorisation of PHARMA Data 
This section reports on the analysis of the data collected from interviews, internal 
documents, direct observation and media in PHARMA case using the Grounded 
Theory method. It illustrates on how PHARMA solved the challenges mentioned in 
section 4.6 in detail by leveraging contingency plans and enhancing the company’s 
performance by its response. Analysis was performed a systematic and iterative 
approach with constant comparison of data, as described in Methodology (Chapter 
3).  
In addition to the process of coding, interviews were recorded and summarised. 
Those interviews, which could be taped, were transcribed verbatim. For interviews 
in which the recording device was not allowed, interview notes and memos were 
written from memory. In conjunction with a constant comparative method of data 
analysis in keeping with Grounded Theory method, the process of constant 
comparative analysis was continually rechecked and memos were written 
throughout the research to assist with theory development. 
Dissimilar data was not discarded as it was significant in the analysis and was used 
where similar and dissimilar data appeared as separate codes within categories. Later 
in the study this data was also used to identify properties of categories and links 
between sub-categories and core categories.  
During analysis of the second and subsequent interviews, the data was constantly 
compared with the prior interviews to highlight the similarities and difference 
response to the events and areas of interest.  Similar data is grouped together to 
form codes. Codes were grouped into analytic concept or categories according to 
Charmaz (2006). Though the analytic questions, based on the time-based response 
framework, provided some initial ideas for categories, these ideas were not imposed 
on the data. The categorisation of codes required careful consideration and proved 
to be conceptually complex. Ideas were interconnected with people’s statement and 
documents, frequently, had multiple meaning that could be categorised in a range of 
ways.  
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Using the 3-D Framework by Sodhi & Tang (2009): D1- detection of the pandemic 
by PHARMA, D2 – design and evaluation of possible supply chain and D3 – 
solution deployment across the organisation, helped to locate and determine the 
relevance and importance of the study, provided direction for theory development 
and connected the study to disciplinary practice. Of course, the real-world response 
does not fall into simple linear progression – solution design, for example, typically 
encompass development of a portfolio of possible initiatives, which overlap in 
deployment.  
The following section is a discussion of codes I created from PHARMA data 
(Figure 19). The analysis looks at the steps the company, took as well 
recommendations made after the event, where significant lack of capability or 
action is believed to have hindered the company in its response. Approximately 110 
codes were identified and revised in the PHARMA setting. Codes were identified as 
the words, concepts and phrases with similar intent. The codes are enumerated 
below along with selected underlying source data. At this point, some codes overlap 
in some aspects, as certain concepts can be coded in multiple ways. Eighteen 
subcategories were developed as follow:  
1. Warning 2. Stress test 
3. Modeling 4. Planning 
5. Training 6. External communication 
7. Relationship with competitors 8. Relationship with governments and 
agencies 
9. Relationship with business partners 10. Teamwork 
11. Internal communication 12. Roles and responsibilities 
13. Learning 14. Employee capacity 
15. Production capacity 16. Supplier capacity 
17. Product design 18. Solution design 
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Figure 19A-D shows an overview of codes, sub-categories and potential four core 
categories following completion of the analysis of PHARMA data. Subcategories of 
the core categories represent tailored approaches taken by the firm, that is, the are 
the action patterns that express the implementation of activities to address a specific 
risk management strategy. For example, sub categories of ‘reserve’ are: assure 
management and employee capacity, increase production capacity, develop product or solution 
extensions, acquire additional suppliers, increase flexibility, and increase inventory. Axial coding 
indicates a relationship between the sub-categories, for example in time sequence, 
prioritization, and interdependency. 
 
 
 
Figure 19: An Overview of the Codes, Sub-Categories and Potential Core Categories 
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Figure 19A: A Structure of the Category "PREPARATION" and Its Sub-Categories and 
Codes 
 
 
Figure 19B: A Structure of the Category "PARTNERSHIP" and Its Sub-Categories and 
Codes 
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Figure 19C: A Structure of the Category "ORGANISATION" and Its Sub-Categories and 
Codes 
 
Figure 19D: A Structure of the Category "RESERVE" and Its Sub-Categories and Codes 
 
  
 158 
Warning - Develop advanced warning system 
Example: Assign staff to monitor the information and process flow 
Codes: Information, Monitoring, Notification, Speed and Timing 
PHARMA monitors production of its key suppliers as well as its own inventory at 
the manufacturing sites. The company has dedicated staffs that monitor the 
information flow (demand forecasts, production schedule, inventory level, quality) 
and process flow constantly; thus, when the Influenza outbreak occurred, 
management was able to get a clear overview immediately and design solutions 
accordingly. The monitoring system helps PHARMA reduce detection time D1 and 
reduce design lead-time D2. 
Prior to the start of the event, PHARMA had put in place and tested several aspects 
of its response to a pandemic. Potential issues due to rationing of stock were 
identified and policies were put in place. Testing was performed on the procedures; 
however, the dependencies made this an apparently complex process. 
“We have written procedures on how we would ration in the event of a pandemic. 
We potentially have to run rationing across many products not just Nicole as 
potentially our global production capability across 72 sites and all our products could 
have been compromised if staff were absent through contracting the disease. The 
timescales, impact and scenarios were very complicated and it proved impossible to 
test all scenarios. A selection of probable scenarios were chosen and tested.” 
Manufacturing and Supply BCP 
What was not anticipated, however, was the speed with which measures would have 
to be implemented. Virulence and transmission rates of viruses such as H1N1 tend 
to follow certain patterns and timings. In this case, the unknown impact of the virus 
led the WHO to escalate the issue in a very short period: “The WHO guidance was 
saying it was going to take four to six weeks (to move from Phase 4 to 5); in fact it 
went in 24 hours." 
The speed of this response by the WHO put PHARMA in unchartered territory, in 
particular initiating a global response when the initial outbreak was still confined to 
Mexico: “Phase 5, in our old flu pandemic procedures, meant we would issue 
antivirals to all staff in all locations across the world. We would put in measures to 
limit social risks, we would stop travel, we would activate all these plans to move 
stock from all these sites, from Singapore to our secondary sites, and then to move 
stocks from our sites into the market to try to push material down the supply chain. 
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And of course, we don't really need to do this, because we only have an outbreak in 
Mexico.” 
Stress Test - Conduct stress testing 
Example: Pandemic stress testing annually (July) 
Codes: Testing, Validation and Verification 
According to the PHARMA pandemic preparedness plan, the company also creates 
and rehearses different scenarios for pandemic events once each year around July. 
As, the H1N1 pandemic broke out before the scheduled test in 2009, the previous 
‘pandemic stress test’ was run nearly one year before events unfolded. 
Modelling - Develop scenario plan and modelling capacity 
Example: Modelling the second wave of pandemic to estimate demand of antiviral 
medicines. 
Codes: Modelling, Prediction, Scenario planning, Simulation and Valuation 
PHARMA had developed a planning scenario in order to estimate the demand of 
medicines and how to ramp up production in order to handle the second wave of 
Influenza cases, which as predicted to occur during October 2009 at the onset of 
the winter flu season in the northern hemisphere. 
Planning - Leverage site pandemic preparedness plan 
Example: Assessment and update site pandemic preparedness plan 
Codes: Documentation, Plan and Procedures 
PHARMA has a site Pandemic Preparedness Plan to protect the health and safety 
of site personnel, protect site assets and preserve its ability to provide essential 
medicines to the market in case a pandemic occurs. MSC develops a common site 
Pandemic Preparedness Plan that is for adapted for each site. These plans include 
the Business Continuity Plan, Plant Manager Emergency Response Plan and Site 
Crisis Management Plan. 
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The Pandemic Preparedness Plan is arranged in sections corresponding to the 
WHO pandemic alert system. It describes in detail the tasks to be performed at 
each site. At each stage of the incident, this plan is used by site directors and the 
Crisis Management Team (CMT) to establish, review and execute procedures to 
manage the impact of flu pandemic on the workforce. It also describes actions, 
triggers and communications within and between the sites, the regional CMT and 
PHARMA Corporate functions in the WHO Phases 3, Phase 4, Phase 5 and Phase 
6 of a pandemic. The pandemic preparedness plan has been prepared in line with 
PHARMA's global principles. 
Although PHARMA had these existing plans in place, some documents were found 
to be out-of date, having been written between 2006 and 2008. Key persons 
identified in the plans were no longer responsible for the tasks addressed therein, 
due in part to changes that are typical for large organizations. . The generic 
preparedness plan, which was to be deployed in the event of a major event, was last 
updated in 2008. Thus, PHARMA’s first solution design task was to update and 
refine the pandemic preparedness plan: 
“We activated all our business continuity plans and our pandemic preparedness plan 
for the entire organisation across the world. There was a gap between the documented 
procedures and what staff members were actually doing. The preparedness documents 
were from 2006; Sites used them as a basis for their initial response at the end of 
April . An instruction was sent to all site directors to update their plans based on a 
best practice example within 2 weeks of the outbreak.” 
Director of Supply Chain Planning 
The new pandemic preparedness plan was issued to the manufacturing sites across 
the world. The roles and responsibilities in the plan were tightened up, listing the 
contact details by job role and title instead of name to assure clear ownership of 
responsibility irrespective of staff changes.  
Having a base line Pandemic Preparedness Plan in place accelerated PHARMA’s 
response to the event in design and deployment process. 
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Training - Implement training 
Example: Assure skill availability for managing risk by training 
Codes: Education, Skills and Training 
PHARMA assure skill availability for managing risk by implementing training of 
management staff and sufficient skill for replacement to maintain understanding 
how to manage risk in case there is an absence of experienced staff.  
 “For key roles in the CMT and key positions in the supply chains, BCP and 
Pandemic preparedness plans now require deputies to be identified and trained in 
case in any future event key staff contract the disease and are absent from work." 
Manufacturing and Supply BCP Lead 
External communication – Establish frequent communications 
Example: Create frequent communication with governments, agencies and business 
partners. 
Codes: Communication, Communication frequency, Direct contact, Information, Real-time, 
Reputation and Trust 
PHARMA increase frequency of press and public communication when there was 
the outbreak. This is in order to keep the public inform what they are doing and 
show that company has aware of the issue and need to response to the public need 
to save people life as soon as possible. In addition, this is to get real-time 
information so that the company can response to the event better.  
“Information flow is crucial. We need real-time information with all parties that 
involved in this pandemic is really important to respond better.” 
Manufacturing Strategy Manager 
Example: Increase frequency of press and public communication 
Codes Communication, Communication frequency, Compliance, Press, Publicity, Relationship and 
Review 
Public perception is also important in the highly visible response to a possible 
pandemic. Governments drive the sale of the majority of Influenza medicine 
directly through tenders or indirectly through medical advisory bodies such as the 
CDC and participate in the funding of research. 
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The pharmaceutical industry plays a crucial role in the health and well being of the 
global population; pharmaceutical firms typically attract the direct scrutiny of the 
press. For PHARMA, the press and public communication are seen to have an 
important role and the company could not delay its response, as it would give the 
company negative image.  
“Our mission statement is built around improving the quality of human life. Given 
the importance of our brand in the market, we operate and communicate with press 
to maintain our strong reputation.” 
Manufacturing Strategy Manager 
Relationship – Establish relationship with governments, agencies and supply 
chain partners. 
Example: Coordinate with governments, agencies and business partners 
Codes: Agencies (local and international), Cooperation, Compliance, Expertise, Government, 
Industry, Press, Publicity, Relationship and Review 
In the event of pandemic, establishing relationship with partners such as 
governments and international agencies is critical: 
“No one organisation or country, or group, can meet the pandemic challenge alone. 
All partners – multilateral organisations such as UN, developed countries, 
developing countries, public-private partnerships and industry – must work together 
to put in place a robust and effective global response.” 
Global Public Policy Issue PHARMA’s Position (2009) 
To respond to the Influenza outbreak efficiently, PHARMA closely monitored the 
situation and proactively contacted relevant organisations and health authorities 
around the world – including the WHO, the CDC and the Department of Health 
and Human Service in the US and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and 
Control – to gain a better understanding of the support and response needed. 
Frequent communications and direct line of communication with its partners 
benefits PHARMA in terms improving forecasting accuracy: 
“We are talking to them about a range of issues, trying to understand exactly what 
this new virus is, exactly how the WHO and CDC believe this may develop so we 
can response to their need more quickly and efficiently.” 
CEO of PHARMA 
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In term of its relationship with governments, PHARMA had been working to 
supply antivirals for use in a pandemic situation since the global spread of avian 
Influenza (H5N1) in 2003.PHARMAwas committed to supporting governments 
worldwide. This commitment included addressing the needs of developing 
countries and their concerns about timely and affordable access to medical 
interventions. 
According to PHARMA's annual report 2008, sales Nicole fell 80% reflecting fewer 
government orders for pre-pandemic stockpiling. PHARMA stopped receiving 
orders for Nicole three months before the start of the pandemic. No production 
was planned for 2009. 
“With no additional orders from governments, PHARMA had stopped Nicole 
production some three months before the start of the pandemic. No production was 
planned for 2009. At that time, PHARMA's commercial position was that no 
additional production would be planned without firm orders from governments.”  
Manufacturing Strategy Manager 
Once PHARMA acknowledged the outbreak, the company has contacted 
governments around the world to ascertain demand for Nicole, including those 
countries most affected by the virus, such as Mexico and the United States. 
Proactive contact with government helps PHARMA in managing the limited 
existing stocks of Nicole and anticipating demand of Nicole to determine 
appropriate solutions to raise Nicole production levels. 
“PHARMA established contact with local governments via the country managers to 
confirm the timing and estimate of required capacity and priority. Pandemics by their 
nature are unpredictable and we recognise that governments’ needs change. We are 
committed to finding solutions for governments changing their immunisation 
programmes and to fulfilling recent new orders.” 
CEO of PHARMA 
Example: Proactive contact with governments to anticipate orders and allocate 
stock proportional to need 
Codes: Allocation, coordination, government, proactive, stock 
When the outbreak occurred, PHARMA faced an immediate challenge in allocation 
of existing stock. At that time PHARMA has only 6 million treatment packs 
available. The company prioritised orders to governments and was working with 
them closely to determine the best mechanisms for distribution of this antiviral 
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treatment through either public or commercial routes as well as to allocate stock 
proportional to the need of the governments. 
Political pressure was a factor in the initial response. For example, a PHARMA 
senior vice president demanded 200,000 packs of Nicole for country ‘C’ – ISSA 
(PHARMA’s competitor) had apparently promised to deliver an equivalent number 
of doses of Abaco. The government insisted they needed the full amount 
immediately. However, country ‘C’ was not considered by PHARMA to be a 
priority destination for several reasons. First, it did not have an Influenza outbreak. 
Second, they had not placed a firm order for which they would have to take 
delivery; in other words, if PHARMA produced a Nicole package, they would have 
to commit to payment. Four hours after the demand was made, country ‘C’ 
cancelled its order.  
By the end of April, it was clear that the impact of the H1N1 outbreak affect the 
organisation across a range of areas, including organisation and communication, 
finance and product development.  
Regarding to stock allocation in coordination with government, it became urgent 
for PHARMA to understand the commercial priority in terms of who would be 
allocated product, and country managers were asked to talk to their governments to 
understand the potential demand. By the second week of the outbreak, PHARMA 
created a map of outbreak areas and determined the priority of locations to be 
supplied with Nicole.  
PHARMA needed absolute clarity from the commercial team on who was to be 
supplied based on the medical need. Therefore, the rationing team had to develop 
clear guidelines. The rationing process was refined during the pandemic response to 
meet ethical and corporate objectives. As stated by director of supply chain 
planning, a hierarchy of priorities was defined as follow:  
First: countries with a confirmed outbreak, which had deaths and had placed a firm 
order such as Mexico. Second: confirmed outbreak, no deaths, but countries that 
wanted to place a firm order such as Paraguay. Third: confirmed outbreak, no 
deaths, but hadn't placed firm orders. Fourth: no outbreak, no deaths, but firm 
orders. And fifth: no outbreak, no deaths, and no firm order. 
Director of Supply Chain Planning 
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For example, after the WHO rapidly increased the level of alert, without a definitive 
assessment of the pathology of H1N1, PHARMA evaluated and initiated a 
'proportional response' that sought to more appropriately balance perceived with 
actual risks. By developing a system of fair, proportional response, PHARMA could 
accelerate delivery of medicines to populations with the most urgent need. The 
approach was developed as one of the first solutions to meet rapidly increasing 
demand, and serves as a template for general response during a pandemic. 
Example: Establish relationship with experts in the industry 
Codes: Expertise, Industry and Relationship 
PHARMA also coordinated with experts by bringing scientists and doctors onto the 
team to advise on the WHO guidelines for pandemic alert levels and interpret the 
various other sources of information. This was seen as a turning point for MSC in 
its initial handling of a potential crisis for PHARMA. 
Teamwork – Create integrated response team 
Example: Create frequent communication with site directors 
Codes: Communication, Cross functional, Frequency, Leadership and Meeting 
Once PHARMA acknowledge the event, three responses were set up with the MSC 
executive and the central executive teams the following days. The first was to run an 
emergency supply chain planning meeting for Nicole. This meeting was previously 
run monthly but a meeting was held immediately to provide an accurate assessment 
of our stockpiles of API, raw materials and intermediates and finished goods, 
ongoing production and commercial commitments. The second response is MSC 
executive meeting, which aims to provide governance and guidance in the supply 
chain. The frequency of this meeting was increased from monthly to weekly then to 
daily as the situation became clearer. The third response was to establish a crisis 
management team comprised of key operational staff across the PHARMA 
business with the aim to provide overall governance and guidance focus on three 
areas: (1) finding solutions to meet the order for 32 million doses of Nicole; (2) 
putting into action initiatives across the supply chain to protect the business; and (3) 
determining how the company could move from its existing capacity of Nicole to a 
production dose capacity a factor of three times per annum greater in the event of 
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pandemic. This much higher estimate was considered possible during the second 
wave of Influenza cases, which could come during October 2009 at the onset of the 
winter flu season in the northern hemisphere. 
PHARMA created a frequency communication with site directors. During the first 
three months of the event, these meetings were held on a daily basis. There was 
clear delegation and empowerment of the Crisis Management team allowing faster 
and more responsive decision making during the design phase to ramp up and 
expand production.  
In addition to the responses in the MSC the whole of the PHARMA business 
responded including daily meetings of the CET attended by the CEO of PHARMA 
Communication to all employees in every country was a key objective from the 
CET in order to communicate the response and changes in a very dynamic and 
evolving situation. 
“I am absolutely committed to ensuring that we communicate with the organisation 
as we develop the response. This may mean that you get a daily update from the 
CET on the decision and direction we are taking. It may also mean that we have to 
change the direction that we set on one day very soon afterwards because this is a fast 
moving situation and I ask for your understanding in that situation if it occurs.” 
CEO of PHARMA 
Example: Establish integrated response team called ‘Crisis Management Team’ 
Codes: Team 
In order to reduce design and deploy time, PHARMA also created integrated 
response team called MSC Crisis Management Team (CMT). The President of the 
MSC appointed the value stream leader as manufacturing and supply pandemic lead 
to bring together the disciplines across supply chain needed to identify possible 
solutions to respond to the event. PHARMA’s existing pandemic procedures were 
reviewed immediately after the event. They found the existing response plans were 
a good basis, but needed to be expanded to cover all products, not just antivirals. 
Example: Crate pandemic management organisation chart 
Codes: Cross-functional, hierarchy and structure 
Apart from create CMT, based on the identified gaps PHARMA also created a new 
Manufacture and Supply Chain (MSC) pandemic management organisation chart 
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(Figure 20) this organisation chart was used as a core organisation setup during the 
response to help MSC executives communicate and understand which product lines 
could be affected. The pandemic organisation chart provides clarity of roles and 
responsibilities through out the distributed supply chain organization. 
As part of this CMT, a sub team was set up to address the potential impact of the 
Influenza on multiple supply chains, initially thought to be unrelated. Continuity of 
the supply of critical medicines was vital to patients as well as to PHARMA’s 
corporate mission.  
 
Figure 20: Manufacturing and Supply Chain (MSC) Pandemic Management Organisation 
Chart 
Source: PHARMA 
Moreover, a pandemic creates additional demand for a broad range of medical and 
health-related products. Asthma patients, for example, are more susceptible to 
Influenza infection. PHARMA had to consider additional areas such as respiratory, 
antibiotics (demand for antibiotics was also predicted to increase because of 
weakness in the body caused by the Influenza virus can trigger secondary bacterial 
infections), consumer health (antiviral facemask), business-critical products and 
external supply in which demand would increase in the face of a pandemic. 
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The newly created sub team reported to MSC pandemic management team who 
reported, in turn, on a daily basis to the MSC executive team during the outbreak. 
Example: Established online team room for document sharing and set up a war 
room at headquarter 
Codes: Communication, Team room and War room 
PHARMA established a control room for the purpose of agreeing strategy and 
directing global operations during the pandemic to develop and execute a crisis 
response plan. The room was conveniently located at its global headquarters where 
members of the crisis management team and MSC pandemic management team had 
easily access. To aid in the process, valuable visual information such as budget and 
timetables, demand forecasts, production plans and project information are 
available as charts in the control room. 
PHARMA also created an online electronic database for information such as risk 
management plans, strategic plan, BCP, etc. With uninterrupted access, this helped 
managers worldwide to get the documents faster for implementation and 
deployment.  The focus of the document sharing was on project management in 
deployment, and had proven useful during the solution design phase as well.  
Internal communication – Shorten lines of communication within the 
organisation 
Example: Modify organisation hierarchy to shorten lines of communication 
Communication, Frequency, Hierarchy and Structure 
Communications emerged as a key issue in the response to the pandemic. In the 
words of one executive: 
“There was an initial problem with lines of communication. An immediate lesson 
was that greater communication was required to give the sites better guidance, and 
therefore a communication team was established.”  
Manufacturing Strategy Manager 
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Another executive added: 
“Normal lines of Communication were used initially during the response but these 
proved inadequate and not responsive enough. Amended communication channels 
were put in place aligned to the role responsibilities during the response phases. 
Manufacturing and Supply BCP Lead 
Consistency of communication was vital. Under normal conditions, PHARMA had 
both formal and informal channels of communication that existed side-by-side. 
Additional management teams were put in place without – in retrospect – having 
been aligned to handle appropriately the scope and route of communications. 
Inconsistent communication resulted in considerable 'noise'. 
One executive explained,  
“When PHARMA gets in a situation like this, PHARMA changed the formal 
network. They put in bodies that would communicate on the pandemic, bypassing 
some of the normal communication channels. So, that created a lot of noise, because 
we are expecting those channels to communicate, but we're getting those channels 
communicating. So if you run a site, instead of getting information from one channel, 
you have four.” 
Director of Supply Chain Planning 
Figure 21 shows communication lines during the response of H1N1 outbreak. It 
illustrated that the sites were getting different messages from a number of different 
sources; Employee Health Management (HRM) executives, the Incident 
Management Team (about many topics, including personnel issues, the distribution 
of antivirals and the stages and levels of the pandemic and reactions.), the Senior 
Vice President (SVP) (about the pandemic response e.g. moving stock) and from 
the Crisis Management Team (CMT). 
This structure prevented PHARMA from being able to communicate effectively; 
accordingly, restructuring the communications channel was a key design objective. 
PHAMA shorten the line of communication by proposed that the CMT would be 
responsible for communicating all issues during the pandemic (Figure 22). 
Ownership and authority were also under pressure. For example, management staff 
outside the MSC and not based in the United Kingdom, who believed they held risk 
management responsibility, had remained peripheral to the activities of the 
response, yet later pushed to be part of the executive review process. 
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Figure 21: Communication Lines during the Initial Response of H1N1 Outbreak 
 
 
Figure 22: Revised Communication Lines During the H1N1 Outbreak 
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Roles and Responsibilities – Clarity of roles and responsibilities 
Example: Revised and updated roles and responsibilities as formally documented in 
RACI diagram.  
Codes: Hierarchy, Responsibility, Role and Structure 
To clarify individual/departmental roles and responsibilities, PHARMA revised and 
updated their logistics pandemic BCP, site pandemic preparedness plan and ‘RACI’ 
diagram.  
RACI diagram captures four roles, specifically for Responsible (those participants, 
management or employees, internal or external, who are to do actually assigned 
tasks), Accountable (those ultimately will be held accountable for the completion of 
the tasks), Consult (whose input or opinions should be sought) and Inform (those 
that should be kept up-to-date on progress and status of the work).  
RACI is a technique for identifying functional areas, key activities, and decision 
points where confusion may exist. This approach enables PHARMA management 
team to actively participate in the process of systematically describing, decisions that 
have to be made, activities that must be implemented, and to clarify the 
responsibilities in relation to those activities and decisions. By formally identifying 
accountabilities, the pandemic management team south to improve 
communications across MSC.  
Learning - Establish learning from past events and during the events 
Example: Learning from past epidemics  
Codes: Experience, Knowledge, Learning from the past, Learning during the event and Skills 
Prior to the H1N1 Pandemic, events such as the H5N1 Avian Flu provided insight 
into the evolution and transmission of Influenza strains. However, this affected 
primarily animals (birds in this case), with relatively few incidents of human fatality. 
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“We have learnt from previous outbreaks, although bird flu was less severe than this 
and confined for the most part to aviary death. But since then we have been focussing 
on developing our antiviral medicines…the thing with bird flu, and it was less severe, 
in that it was killing birds. In some areas there were problems, where there was very 
close proximity between people and birds such as in China. But the transmission 
from birds to humans isn't so easy. Swine flu is different. Transmission from pigs to 
humans has happened and of course transmission from humans to humans.   
Site Logistics Head 
With additional experience from the H1N1 response, it could respond significantly 
faster: what used to take weeks now takes just days to deploy.  
“We have learned a lot, we are in a much better state of response now in case that 
ever happened again.  We understand our vulnerability and we can respond faster . . 
.I have the feeling we responded better than most companies. We certainly responded 
increasing our supply chain capacity very well. No one would produce that portfolio. 
We didn't have that product six months ago, we didn't have a vaccine, we didn't 
have Nicole capsule inhaler, we didn't have an IV product. That development has 
been unprecedented.  
Director of Supply Chain Planning 
Production capacity – Increase capacity  
Example: Ramp up production to increase capacity of Nicole 
Codes: Capacity, Inventory, Product and Stock 
In the event of a major pandemic, PHARMA would invest heavily in increasing 
supply chain capacity to help governments and other customer organisations. 
Significant investments would need to be made internally for antiviral drugs such as 
Nicole but also for an H1N1 vaccine and potentially external suppliers who could 
help PHARMA meet demand. 
Before discussing how PHARMA increase antiviral capacity to meet up demand 
during pandemic, I would like two explain a structure of two important supply 
chains: Nicole and Hematol. Table 27 below shows PHARMA manufacturing sites 
and locations. 
Manufacturing Site Location 
Site A United Kingdom 
Site B United Kingdom (Scotland) 
Site C France 
Site D United States 
Site E Australia 
Site F Singapore 
Table 27: PHARMA Manufacturing Sites and Locations 
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 Hematol Supply Chain 
Hematol is one of PHARMA’s biggest revenue-generating products. It contains two 
active ingredients, Fancrose and Salmora. Two primary sites manufacture the APIs 
for Fancrose and Salmora. The APIs are micronised at PHARMA in France (Site C) 
and the United Kingdom (Site A) and secondary dry powder inhaler product is 
manufactured and packed at sites in United Kingdom (Site A), United States (Site 
D) and France (Site C). 
 Nicole Supply Chain 
Nicole is a medicine for the treatment of Influenza and for reducing the chance of 
getting flu in community and household settings. It belongs to a group of medicines 
called neuraminidase inhibitors. These medications attack the Influenza virus and 
prevent it from spreading through the body. Nicole treats the cause of Influenza at 
its source, rather than simply masking the symptoms. Nicole is delivered via 
inhalation using a dry powder inhaler, a PHARMA proprietary device for delivering 
medicines. 
The API of Nicole is called Xtazo. There are three suppliers of raw material 
intermediates to primary site in United Kingdom (Site B): a PHARMA internal 
supplier in United Kingdom along with the third-party supplier sites in Italy and 
Belgium.  
Figure 23 illustrates the Nicole supply chain. The primary manufacturing site is 
responsible for the production of the API contained within the medications. This 
normally involves either chemical synthesis and separation stages to build up the 
complex molecules involved, or fermentation and product recovery and purification 
in the case of biochemical process. In the Nicole supply chain, this process happens 
at PHARMA's manufacturing site in the United Kingdom (Site B). 
The secondary manufacturing site is responsible for taking the API produced at the 
primary site and micronising and adding 'excipient' (pharmacologically inert) 
material along with further processing, quality control and packaging to produce the 
finished dry powder inhaler products. 
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For Nicole secondary production, the API is micronised at secondary site in France 
(Site C). The product is then blended, filled, assembled and packed at secondary 
sites in France (Site C), Australia (Site E) and United States (Site D). 
PHARMA stated in its corporate commitment to make flu pandemic medicines 
affordable and broadly available and further mentions its production capacity as a 
key part of its corporate responsibility. The company championed ethical values and 
doing the right things for society. Presenting the critical role of its supply chain 
vital, the CEO stated that:  
 “We need stay focused on the main job, which is to ensure that important 
PHARMA medicines continue to be developed, manufactured and distributed to 
patients who need them. They will need them more than ever in the event of further 
healthcare crisis.” 
CEO of PHARMA 
 
 
Figure 23: Nicole Supply Chain 
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The challenge to the MSC team was to design a solution to go from zero 
production to maximum production and then expand production by a further 50% 
in as short a time as possible. The main question that was raised was summarised by 
one interviewee: 
“How quickly we could move from other duties back onto Nicole, how we then had 
to start the filling operation, then there is an assembly operation, then a packing 
operation…time was our constraint and we knew that we had to design a solution 
as soon as possible.” 
Site Production Head 
Example: Leverage production load balancing by reducing load of production on 
some sites while increase production of Nicole site 
Codes: Capacity, Inventory, Labour reallocation, Product and Stock 
PHARMA correctly predicted an increase in demand for medication to treat 
respiratory ailments such as Hematol. The PHARMA Project manager explained: 
“People who have asthma are likely to be more easily affected by the Influenza 
virus. A viral chest infection can trigger an asthma attack. These people are more 
vulnerable and hence more likely to take asthma medicine, driving up the demand 
for Hematol.” 
There were two main reasons why PHARMA was concerned about the impact on 
demand for this product. First, Hematol is a medically critical product, which means 
its availability can mean life or death for some or all of its users. An impact on the 
supply of this product could result in the loss of company reputation and/or 
customer loyalty. Second, Hematol is one the company's main products, which 
generates GBP 4Billion per year. Any reduction in the production could have a 
significant financial impact. 
When the pandemic was declared, employees working on Hematol manufacturing 
at Site D (United States) were needed for Nicole production. Production output of 
Hematol was scaled back at site D and global demand was sustained by taking up 
the capacity shortfall at Site B, which did not make Nicole. This load balancing 
flexibility was designed in when the supply chains for Nicole and Hematol were 
configured.  Site B was asked to produce five million disks of Hematol a month, 
which was considerably more than they had ever produced. Six months before the 
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pandemic; Site B had moved from 24 hour /7 days-per-week shifts to 24/5 shifts, 
and now they were going back to 24/7. 
To increase the capacity of the Nicole dry powder inhaler device, PHARMA had to 
reallocate the capacity of Hematol production in each manufacturing site. Decisions 
were made for each site to: 
 Maximise Hematol production at Site B (United Kingdom). 
 Maximise Nicole production at Site E (Australia) 
 Maximise Hematol and Nicole production at Site D (United States). 
 
Maximise Hematol and Nicole production at Site C (France). Although Nicole and 
Hematol do not share the same supply chain, they share some common resources 
as mentioned earlier. Therefore they were able to divert resources (e.g. labour 
resources), which is one of PHARMA’s risk mitigation strategies. Figure 24 shows 
how PHARMA used production load balancing to both maximize production of 
Nicole and assure multi-site production of both Nicole and Hematol.  
 
Figure 24: Production Load Balancing Strategy 
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Production capacity – Financial investment and R&D  
Example: Multi-billion dollar investments in R&D, manufacturing capacity, and also 
short-term tactics to increase production capacity. 
Codes: Budget, Capacity, Financial investment, Product, Product extension and R&D 
PHARMA has been conducting R&D of vaccines since 1997 to enable 
governments to protect their populations in the event of an outbreak. More than 
GBP 2 Billion has been invested in developing technologies to respond to an 
Influenza pandemic by increasing capacity at its vaccine and antiviral manufacturing 
sites. Supply chain investment during the past three-and-a-half years to 2009 was 
more than GBP 1 Billion and aimed to improve production response at short 
notice. “We don’t know how big this deal is going to be, but no one can say we 
aren’t ready,” claimed CEO of PHARMA at the outbreak of the H1N1 flu. 
Significant tactical investments for Nicole production were made during the initial 
response without any assurance of a return, “The sums of money we were investing 
were huge; we made a decision to put over GBP 100 Million to expand capacity, 
not knowing if we would recover our costs.” Investments in R&D as well as 
manufacturing were considerable, measuring in the billions of dollars (1988,1989), 
with an estimated 60% of the total manufacturing costs for the Influenza vaccine 
fixed (HHS, 1998).  
Employee capacity – Assure employee capacity 
Example: Recruiting contingency workers to cover peak period and move to 24/7 
shifts for greater production in existing site (Nicole) 
Codes: Capacity, Employee, Employee readiness and Labour reallocation 
PHARMA also putting extra shifts on, recruited temporary external staff, also 
transfer of experienced production labour who previously made Hematol in Site C 
and Site D, and maximizing Hematol production in Site A. 
“Although Site A does not produce Nicole at all, but All staff responded urgently 
knowing that by making more Hematol they were helping maximise Nicole as 
well.” 
Site Production Head 
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“This is a part of our supply chain integrity, in that we have multiple plants to do 
this, multiple plants to do that. But obviously, we don’t have people just waiting 
around manufacture if we don’t have demand. So as we went lost orders for Nicole a 
year ago, we released our staffs, we mothballed those facilities -we wouldn’t keep that 
cost . . . now the demand is peak, so we have to get the lines running, we would have 
to re-recruit temporary worker to build the capacity, but at the same time we have to 
have experienced workers who know the production operation well.” 
Manufacturing and Supply BCP Lead 
Supply chains that can share resources, such as experienced and temporary external 
labour and facilities helped PHARMA rapidly ramp up capacity of Nicole quicker 
but also sustained the production of Hematol. To solve this, PHARMA using 
production load-balancing strategy to cascade production, reducing impact on the 
Hematol supply chain. 
“It allows you to deploy quicker for Nicole but also impacts production of Hematol 
because they share the same common resources such as warehouse and labour. That’s 
why they need load balancing to cascade the impact from one to other.” 
Manufacturing and Supply BCP Lead 
Employee capacity – Assure management capacity 
Example: Distribute H1N1 antiviral medicine to employee and lockdown managers 
in country and restrict travel 
Codes: Capacity, Employee readiness, Protection and Safety 
After PHARMA acknowledged the outbreak, the CEO of PHARMA instructed all 
country managers to physically stay in their countries so that they could better focus 
on local business unit issues and assure their supply and distribution chains would 
run effectively. All non-essential travel to Mexico was halted. The CEO guidance to 
employee was ‘to remain calm and carry on’ with their work to make sure patients 
would continue to have access to critical medicines.  
The protection of PHARMA employees was an important objective in the initial 
stages of the response. In the face of the infection, employee health was protected 
by distributing the company’s own H1N1 antiviral medicine to employees according 
to Employee Health and Preparedness Plan. The key objective of this plan is to 
collate information required by the centre to assure the antiviral storage, allocation 
and delivery of pre-pandemic and pandemic vaccines for employees.  
  
 179 
Product design – Develop product extension 
Example: Having easier-to-manufacture Nicole capsule inhaler product design in 
place and ready to produce 
Codes: Capacity, Product, Product extension and R&D 
PHARMA achieved new capacity by increasing production levels of Nicole dry 
powder inhaler from 60 million treatment courses to 90 million and building new 
capacity to produce 100 million treatment courses a year of Nicole capsule inhaler.  
Another stream of increasing the capacity of Nicole was through alternative dose 
forms for antivirals. A few years prior to the swine flu pandemic, PHARMA 
developed a capsule inhaler device. This delivery format was slightly more difficult 
to use from a patient perspective. The patient has to load the device with every 
capsule, and then breathe in the medicine for dose delivery: 
 “The advantage of the Nicole capsule inhaler form is that PHARMA 
manufacturing has capsule capability at six of the PHARMA sites. So, the project 
team was formed to develop this product and to look at how we will carry out 
emergency registration with regulatory governmental authority and then spend the 
money for industrial analysis to validate so that we can have 100 million Nicole 
capsule inhaler capacity in place in about five months time; as it is predicted that the 
second wave will come in around October 2009.” 
Manufacturing Strategy Manager 
By having new dose delivery mechanism, such as the Nicole capsule inhal)er, 
developed before the outbreak helped PHARMA save design lead time and ramp 
up production much faster. Figure 25 shows capacity of Nicole production in 
percentage. 
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Figure 25: Published, Improved & Upside Weekly Nicole Output 
 
Example: Accelerate approval process for new product such as Nicole capsule 
inhaler and antiviral masks 
Codes: Capacity, Product, Product extension, R&D and Time 
Nicole capsule inhaler format had been approved to manufacture but not for sale in 
the market yet. PHARMA had submitted the Nicole capsule inhaler device to the 
regulatory authorities several years ago, and the company had gotten certain 
approvals. At the time, PHARMA decided to discontinue the regulatory 
submissions due to the lack of demand in the market and patient preference for the 
more convenient, multi-dose delivery format (the dry powder inhaler). 
To meet rapidly growing production targets, the capsule-based format required 
regulatory approval. PHARMA accelerated deploy lead-time through fast-track 
approval of the product via the Swedish regulator on behalf of European regulatory 
bodies. This product was granted temporary approval for sale only in pandemic 
situations. This helped PHARMA respond quickly, especially important in 
anticipation of major second i 
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Influenza wave in the Northern Hemisphere, which could begin in October - 
December 2009. 
Normally the fast track scheme can take approximately six months. Some products 
take two to three years to review, for example, due to extensive and complex 
clinical trial data. As this product had proven clinical results and the same active 
ingredients as the previously approved Nicole dry powder inhaler; the regulatory 
authorities also understood the urgency: 
“In the pandemic, we had to go back, dig out all the regulatory information on the 
Nicole capsule and resubmit our application. We then had to fast-track it through 
the regulatory bodies . . . normally, at the regulatory authorities, their fast track 
scheme is six months but they understood the urgency of this and the world is in a 
potential pandemic. They were reviewing and approving this quicker. Also we try to 
point out that this is the same product with Nicole dry powder inhaler, just in a new 
single dose device. The regulatory authorities understood the situation and accelerated 
their response without compromising their standards. So all we had to do is show 
that we could administer it therapeutically...” 
Manufacturing and Supply BCP Lead 
The availability of existing product definition greatly shortens the deploy lead-time 
for new solutions. PHARMA hoped to profit from its existing disposable respirator, 
a specially fitted type of facemask, which has an antiviral coating. The company was 
able to accelerate government approval for a related antiviral facemask adapted for 
the H1N1 virus 
“ ... The antiviral facemask has been approved for use in Europe and certain 
international markets and last month was approved for occupational use in the 
United States by the FDA…"  
CEO of PHARMA 
Supplier capacity – Acquire additional suppliers 
Example: Granting a production licence to a Chinese manufacture 
Codes: Capacity, Product, Product licensing and Intellectual property 
Another way to increase capacity of Nicole was through licensing production. 
PHARMA committed to engage in voluntary license discussions with other 
companies willing to manufacture and supply a Nicole product for use in 
developing countries. Other companies would not be able to make Nicole in dry 
powder inhaler format because the delivery device is relatively complicated, but they 
could more readily adopt the capsule inhaler format. 
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Two years ago, PHARMA had given a voluntary license to a Chinese company to 
manufacture flu drug. The company in China has the right to manufacture and sell 
Xtazo in China, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam and all least developed countries 
(LDCs). 
“PHARMA is doing everything we can to prepare for a global Influenza pandemic 
including expanding production of Nicole and developing a pandemic vaccine . . . 
this agreement with Chinese company is intended to expand available suppliers of 
Xtazo in areas of the word that may be on the front line of a possible Influenza 
pandemic.”i 
President of the company's pharmaceutical operations 
Three main reasons that Nicole capsule inhaler is a ‘good fit’ for granting license 
are: easy to manufacture, leverage the existing drug approval documentation made 
several years earlier, and it was suitable for licensing to third-party from an 
intellectual property perspective.  
Having a pre-existing licensing arrangement with Chinese manufacture shortened 
the search and implementation for external. It was seen as a good solution to 
responding for handling increase demand since China given the high volume 
needed for such a large population.   
“There are a number of companies that we would give voluntary license to make this 
product. However, they would not be able to make dry powder inhaler because that is 
a complicated device that needs sophisticated manufacturing and technical expertise  . 
. . Instead they could make Nicole capsule because that uses a relatively simple 
technology available to pharmaceutical manufacturers globally. And that meant we 
could grant Nicole capsule inhaler license into countries such as China.” 
Manufacturing and Supply BCP Lead 
PHARMA also needed to control the quality of external suppliers to match that of 
its internal manufacturing capacity so that all applicable quality, safety and efficacy 
standards are maintained.  
 “PHARMA also investigated the company who had been doing development work 
on this product and within those companies at the end of the day we want to 
investigate giving a license to them so they can produce these products to satisfy 
demand volume… Governments can issue compulsory licences to other companies but 
these licences would require significant technical assistance in order to manufacture 
the product and scale up within the demanding timelines of the pandemic. In 
addition key raw materials for manufacturing and packaging of Nicole are in short 
supply due to the PHARMA expansion and the suppliers are constrained due to 
the unprecedented demand.” 
Manufacturing and Supply BCP Lead 
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Supplier capacity – Increase raw material and inventory 
Example: Increase raw material by securing all available active pharmaceutical 
ingredients (API) from the suppliers  
Codes: Capacity, Inventory, Outsourcing, Sourcing and Stock 
PHARMA identified a series of additional projects to increase capacity. First, 
PHARMA had to increase the capacity of suppliers; second, it had to increase the 
capacity of its secondary factories and then the production capacity of the APIs. 
This meant buying more materials, which implied an immediate (and risky) initial 
financial outlay. PHARMA purchased raw materials and components to produce a 
significant volume over the period of several months.  
“We are also beginning to increase our bulk raw material manufacturing plans for 
Nicole to assure we have enough raw bulk material in the future.” 
Manufacturing Strategy Manager 
Example: Increase strategic stock of micronised ingredients  
Codes: Capacity, Ingredient, and Stock 
For shared equipment with finite capacity, such as the microniser, PHARMA’s 
supply risk mitigation strategy is to build strategic stock and hold high levels of 
micronised material. With micronized material in warehouse, PHARMA can start 
manufacturing the product quicker, albeit at a potentially higher work-in-process 
relative to competitors.  
“We had built a lot of strategic capacity in micronising. We hold high levels of 
micronised materials in our supply chain as part of the manufacturing strategy for 
common products.” 
 Manufacturing and Supply BCP Lead 
Solution design – Increase flexibility 
Example: Implement generic packaging (vanilla pack) instead of market specific 
packaging and using multi-language labelling 
Codes: Flexibility, Label and Packaging 
Additional options were explored including postponement or delaying the last stage 
of country-specific product packaging configuration, ‘vanilla pack’ or ‘generic pack’  
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A straightforward simplification of the packaging of Nicole would help speed-up 
production, using a supply chain method referred to as ‘postponement’. In this 
approach, customer- or market-specific configuration is delayed, to better pool 
supply chain capacity in production and distribution.  
There two types of packaging. A ‘market specific’ pack is uniquely labelled with in 
languages specific to country an order and containing country-specific regulatory 
information. Approval of packaging – even details on graphics, logos and text, 
forms a key part of the regulatory review. The other called ‘generic pack’ or ‘vanilla 
pack’ is typically labelled in multiple languages such as English, French and Spanish. 
In the event of pandemic, local language and regulatory information on the 
medicine could be limited to a locally produced insert. 
“Having vanilla pack wouldn't increase our capacity, but it would allow us to chop 
and change to make as much as possible and ship as much as possible.  Initially 
there was some resistance from countries wanting their own pack but once the global 
benefits of flexibility were understood and regulators approved the generic pack the 
market specific requests decreased” 
Manufacturing Strategy Manager 
In the urgency to receive product, governments initially accepted the ‘vanilla pack’ 
but later insisted on country-specific packaging, reflecting the sensitivities of public 
consumers and need to confidence during the widely publicized pandemic. 
 “For example, PHARMA had product that was packaged for Japan and Japan 
then cancelled the order; at the same time one of the outbreaks was in another 
country. This country wanted the product within two weeks; PHARMA said we 
could supply the product to you but only in Japanese packaging (market specific 
label). The country accepted the Japanese order only for four weeks later to reverse 
their decision and request a market specific pack.”.  
Manufacturing Strategy Manager 
The same approach was used for the Nicole capsule inhaler; PHARMA used multi-
language labelling instead of country-specific labels in order to maximise production 
during the pandemic outbreak. 
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Example: Sharing common resources 
Codes: Flexibility, Manufacturing, Resources and Warehouse 
The Nicole and Hematol supply chains are unique. These are two different supply 
chains – they are co-dependent on certain resources such as the microniser 
machine; others machine such as filling and packaging equipment is separate. 
However, they do share he same machine, labour, resources, quality assurance and 
warehouse etc. Resource sharing enhances supply chain flexibility in adapting for 
redesign (new) supply chain design during pandemic and be able to deploy 
manufacture production faster. 
5.4 Response Time and Preliminary Core Categories 
After an initial period of confusion in the aftermath of the sudden pandemic 
declaration, the actions initiated across a broad range of areas were ultimately 
effective in PHARMA’s response. Communication and decision-making – aided by 
daily and weekly review meetings – meant a number of tasks could be quickly 
delegated to the sites and country management. 
“No formal targets exist for response time, but there is a general expectation that all 
Corporate Incident management teams, CMT and BCP teams would be established 
and operating within 24 hours after the WHO communicated the event.”  
Manufacturing and Supply BCP Lead 
The rapid spread of the virus suggested that the protection of employees was 
critical in many locations; the distribution of antivirals to staff was prepared in 
advance of the eventual rollout. 
The expected seasonal evolution of the pandemic set the urgency and timing of 
various options to respond. In the Northern Hemisphere, flu infection rates peak 
typically in January, with the earliest onset in October; such a possible second wave 
was feared to be far worse, as in it was in previous pandemics, than what actually 
occurred. 
PHARMA responded rapidly to the outbreak, successfully leveraging plans and 
investments in antivirals accumulated during the previous decade. Out-of-date 
documents, changes in staffing and somewhat chaotic communication were quickly 
rectified and brought under the control of a single pandemic response team: 
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"Flexibility, visibility of supply chain and a clear plan are essential to the smooth 
running of a response to an emergency." 
Site Production Head 
Decreasing the cycle time in decision-making assisted PHARMA in adjusting its 
solution strategy as product demand evolved: 
"PHARMA prides itself on it's ability to respond in a crisis and "changing the 
clock speed" is a phrase common in these circumstances This means monthly business 
processes are then run weekly, weekly processes run daily and daily activities run 
hourly and staff are dedicated to the response and their day jobs suspended or 
delegated in order to shorten this response time." 
Manufacturing and Supply BCP Lead 
Immediate demands for medicines from a limited stock were addressed through a 
rationing system and this helped provide a proportionate response to changing 
requirements. The rapid increase in the production of antivirals and related 
products was possible through new formulation and packaging, with the eventual 
formulation and accelerated production of a set of targeted vaccines. 
Target production capacity was achieved for specific products, e.g. Nicole powder 
formulation, the Nicole capsule inhaler formulation and importantly for the H1N1 
vaccine, over a period of several months with full capacity reached by the end of 
2009. 
“Time plays a key role to ensure more product is made and distributed and more 
patients are treated. In the pandemic response, Nicole production was restarted and 
output doubled within 6 months, new dose forms where developed, approved by 
regulators, supply chains and suppliers extended, a vaccine was available in an 
unprecedented timescale in 6 months.” 
Manufacturing and Supply BCP Lead 
These solutions were each effectively incremental changes to existing mechanisms, 
feasible and sufficient as none of the worst-case scenarios materialised (e.g. closure 
of multiple active ingredient production facilities or long-term closure of regional 
transport). A formal review of the steps taken at the end of the first wave, e.g. July 
2009, was supplemented by monthly tracking of further corrective and preventative 
actions to assure a greater level of preparedness going forward. 
By August 2010, the WHO observed that new cases of swine flu followed a more 
typical seasonal flu pattern and with declining numbers of new cases and declared 
the pandemic to be over. In 2011, people were still catching the H1N1 swine flu in 
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the UK, although it was at the lowest level since the virus first appeared it is current 
form. The WHO estimates that there have been at least 16,813 deaths from swine 
flu around the world – 457 in the UK. Since the outbreak in Mexico, estimates 
varied widely and initial worst-case scenarios envisioned significant health and 
economic impacts on large populations globally. 
PHARMA’s fast response is also seen to have improved its competitive position:  
“We have learned a lot, we are in a much better state of response now in case that 
ever happened again.  We understand our vulnerability and we can respond faster . . 
.I have the feeling we responded better than most companies. To increase capacity by 
50% then up to 300%, develop and approve new dose forms, develop a vaccine took 
the efforts of thousands of people in this organisation.”  
Manufacturing and Supply BCP Lead 
Table 28 shows examples of actions that PHARMA took in responding to the 
H1N1 pandemic and affected of those actions on detection time (D1), design lead-
time (D2) and deploy lead-time (D3). 
Tailored approaches Examples of PHARMA Response to  
H1N1 Pandemic 
D1 D2 D3 
Develop advanced warning 
system 
 Assigned staff  to monitor the 
information and process flow. 
   
Conduct stress testing  Pandemic stress testing each year (July).    
Develop scenario plan and 
modelling capability  
 Modelling the second wave of pandemic 
to estimate demand of medicines. 
   
Leverage preparedness plan   Assessment and update site pandemic 
preparedness plan. 
   
Implement training  Assure skill availability for managing 
risk. 
   
Establish frequent 
communications with supply 
chain partners 
 Coordination with international 
agencies e.g. CDC and WHO. 
 Proactive contact with governments to 
anticipate orders and allocate stock 
proportional to need. 
 Increase frequency of press and public 
communications. 
 Establish direct line of communication 
with external suppliers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 




 
 



 

Create integrated response 
team 
 Create pandemic management 
organisation chart. 
 Established integrated response team 
called “Crisis Management Team”. 
 Create frequent communication with 
site directors. 
 Set up a War room at headquarters. 
 Established online team room for 
document sharing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 




 
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Table 28: A Summary of the Findings from PHARMA in Relation to Response Time 
 
The search for a core category or categories begins from the outset with data 
collection. Codes and then categories emerge and are compared. The objective of 
the research using Grounded Theory is to generate theory “that accounts for the 
patterns of behaviour which is relevant and problematic for those involved’ (Glaser, 
1978. P.93). In order to achieve this goal, the researcher must discover the core 
Tailored approaches Examples of PHARMA Response to  
H1N1 Pandemic 
D1 D2 D3
Shorten lines of 
communications within the 
organisation 
 Modify organisation hierarchy to 
shorten lines of communication.  
 
 
 
 
Clarify roles and 
responsibilities 
 Revised logistics pandemic BCP and site 
pandemic preparedness plan. 
 Revised and updated roles and 
responsibilities as formally documented 
in RACI diagram. 
 



 
 
Establish learning from past 
events and during the events 
 Learning from past epidemics (e.g. 
H5N1 Avian Flu). 
   
Assure management and 
employee capacity 
 Distribute H1N1 antiviral medicines to 
employees. 
 Lockdown managers in-country and 
restrict travel to at-risk areas (Mexico). 
 Recruiting contingency workers to 
cover peak period and move to 24/7 
shifts for greater production capacity in 
existing sites (Nicole). 
  

 


 
Increase capacity  Reallocate labour resources to increase 
capacity of Nicole. 
 Leverage production load balancing by 
reducing load of production on some 
sites while increase production on main 
sites. 
 
 
 
 


 
Develop product or solution 
extensions 
 Having easier-to-manufacture Nicole 
capsule inhaler product design in place 
and ready to produce. 
 Accelerate approval process for new 
products e.g. Nicole capsule inhaler and 
antiviral masks. 
 


 
 
 
 
Acquire additional suppliers  Granting a production licence to a 
Chinese manufacturer. 
   
Increase flexibility  Using generic pack (vanilla pack) instead 
of market specific packaging. 
 Shift shared Hematol manufacturing 
capacity to Nicole. Shared same 
machine, labour, resources, warehouse, 
quality insurance etc. 
 


 
 


 
 
Increase inventory  Increase raw material by securing all 
available active pharmaceutical 
ingredients (API) from the suppliers. 
 Increase strategic stock of micronised 
ingredients. 
  


 
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categories and delimit the investigation around it. This categorization is the crucial 
point for the theory; sub categories relate to it, and it accounts for most of the 
variation in pattern and behaviour. The core category or categories  ‘have the prime 
function of integration the theory and rendering the theory dense and saturated as 
the relationships increase’ (Glaser, 1978, p.93). 
According to Glaser (1978, p.95-97) research is looking for core category(ies) that 
explains the main concern or problem for the participants. He identifies the main 
criteria for core category selection as follows, where core category(ies) should: 
 Central to as many other categories as possible, accounting for the majority 
of observed behaviours. 
 Found throughout the data as a recurring concept, becoming more central 
to related categories through evolution of the research. 
 Require more data than others to become saturated; that is, encompasses a 
broader range of data relative to other (sub) categories.  Saturation “occurs 
when the data yields no new information for a category.” (Glaser, 1978, 
p.95-97) 
 Should have visible and meaningful links to other categories. 
 Have validity and relevance to observed behaviours throughout the study. 
Alternate core category(ies) should be sought if only a limited duration of 
the study can be interpreted using the potential core category(ies) should be 
flexible and broad enough to encompass the emerging relationships 
between categories as they develop. 
 The core category should also be a part of the problem itself. Therefore the 
core category should, in part, explain itself and its own variations. 
 Should be a central part of the area under study, explaining its own role and 
encompassing variations on the concepts it represents. 
In this study, the core pattern was managing supply chain risk by reducing response 
time, in which the firm undertook a series of activities to address risk in meeting 
supply chain demands in the event of low probability and high impact disruption.  
This chapter provided a detailed description of how open coding was used to 
constantly compare and analyse data from the PHAMA case. It explored the codes, 
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subcategories and preliminary categories that emerged from the interview data and 
other sources. The codes explained how PHARMA leverages time in responding to 
the pandemic. As a result of analysis of the data, four preliminary categories were 
identified. These four distinct but interrelated core categories in responding to 
disruption are: 
1. Preparation 
2. Partnership 
3. Organisation 
4. Reserve 
 
Figure 26: Finding thus Far from PHARMA Case 
 
At this stage, it is too early in the analysis to confirm these categories. Further 
sampling and continued constant comparison of additional data is required to 
achieve theoretical saturation of this construct. The findings so far provide a 
preliminary answer to identification and initial characterization of the factors as was 
set out above (Figure 26). 
Further coding from additional cases reveal more detailed characteristics of the 
identified subcategories after the PHARMA case. Additional subcategories are 
discovered in the incremental data, for example, in the BP Deepwater Horizon 
event. Cooperation with competitors, for example, was shown as a critical 
approach, which was not evident in the strategy taken by PHARMA. 
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Chapter 6 
Validation with Disruption at  
BP Deepwater Horizon 
The following chapter expands on the preliminary categories that were outlined in 
Chapter 5. This will be achieved by analysis of additional qualitative data collected 
through secondary sources of two additional cases. Through constant comparison 
with data from BP Deepwater Horizon and BP Texas City events, this process will 
assist in validating if the four categories are core to understanding the time-based 
response framework. Theoretical sampling and further coding will enable the 
properties of the preliminary categories and subcategories as well as the links 
between them to be identified, as presented in Chapter 8 - Findings. 
The BP events came under intense public scrutiny for a number of reasons, most 
obviously due to the dramatic impact of the explosions that killed scores of 
workers. The immediate and long-term environmental damage drew government 
criticism; in turn politicians themselves were under fire for their lack of 
responsiveness and ultimately held responsible  for creating the underlying 
conditions in industry which could allow such events to occur. Litigation followed, 
as can be expected for a major disruption involving firms along a global supply 
chain operating in the United States. This put a large amount of testimony into the 
public record. Delivered under oath, this verbatim material provides a rich source 
of data. The events, background and consequences were extensively documented 
through various government and industry investigations, along with the reports 
from BP itself.  
It is not the aim to repeat this material nor to assess culpability, though a clear focus 
in the available material seeks to assign blame. Through Ground Theory 
methodology, the handling of these events serve to strengthen and detail the 
concepts emerging from PHARMA, where additional concepts extend the core 
categories and additional codes provider greater depth and applicability. A short 
summary on the background of the Deepwater Horizon disaster is provided below. 
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6.1 Company Overview 
BP is a major international oil and gas company headquartered in London, United 
Kingdom. The company was founded in 1909 as the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, 
later Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and was predominantly focussed on exploration 
and production in various countries in the Middle East. The AIOC became the 
British Petroleum Company in 1954, and expanded worldwide with investments in 
Alaska and the North Sea. 
Extensive nationalization of assets in Iran and Libya and elsewhere during the 
1970s forced the company to seek new sources of energy, often through 
cooperation with competitors like Shell and acquisitions of Amoco and Arco in the 
United States in 1988.   
In 2001, the company was renamed BP plc. to reflect its total energy strategy 
('Beyond Petroleum') and global operations, remaining headquartered in London.  
Today BP plc. is one of the world's largest energy companies, with extensive 
downstream distribution to retail customers and businesses across the globe. The 
BP Upstream division holds more than 500 lease blocks in the Gulf of Mexico and 
is the largest producer of oil and gas in the Gulf of Mexico. 
6.2 Background of BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill 
On the morning of Tuesday, April 20, working in calm waters in the Gulf of 
Mexico, engineers were confident of finally completing a challenging, much delayed 
exploration well in the Mississippi Canyon, Block 252.  The area was dubbed 
Macondo, after the ill-fated town in Gabriel García Márquez book “One Hundred 
Years of Solitude”.  BP plc planned on drilling the first well in 100 days11. 
Though a leader in exploration, BP had little experience in the specific rock 
formation under Block 252 but was optimistic about finding significant 
hydrocarbon reserves at the Macondo Prospect. Looking to save time and expense 
for eventual production, offshore engineers at BP designed the exploration well to 
make it 'production ready'. 
                                                 
 
11 OSC - Oil Spill Commission (2011c) 
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The crew was working to securing the bottom of the well with specially formulated 
cement which would allow the massive Deepwater Horizon exploration rig to 
'temporarily abandon' the location. Normal exploitation could be continued at a 
later date with a cheaper rig, and allowing Deepwater Horizon to being work at new 
locations in the Gulf.  
At 5:45 AM on the 20th of April, a cementing engineer from Halliburton Company, 
subcontracting to BP, sent e-mail from the rig to his colleagues in Houston a few 
hundred miles away.  Despite some initial concerns, the work looked done: “We 
have completed the job and it went well.12”  
Deep water drilling – more than 1000 feet below the sea level in current (2011) 
terms – is a complex endeavour, operating at the edge of engineering experience 
with extreme pressures, high temperatures and in remote waters. Maintaining the 
delicate hydrostatic balance of oil and gas pressure below with a column of heavy 
drilling 'mud' requires geology, experience, engineering and coordination.  
Conditions at sea level in the Gulf can change dramatically during the hurricane 
season; in fact, the Macondo well was started by an earlier Transocean drilling ship, 
Marianas, that had to be towed back for repairs after Hurricane Ida some five 
months earlier.  The Deepwater Horizon had already suffered a stuck drill pipe at 
Macondo at more than 12,000 foot depth on March 8 when the fragile stone 
formation collapsed, forcing a design revision and drilling around the abandoned 
lower segment of the original bore hole13. By mid-April, the well was already six 
weeks late, with original projections of USD 96 million expected to overrun by 
USD 58 million14. 
Deepwater Horizon was one of the most sophisticated drill ships in the Gulf of 
Mexico, built in at a cost of USD 350 Million and operated by the largest offshore 
drilling fleet company, Transocean. The rig was on a long-term lease to BP with 
daily services fees of some  USD 1 Million15.  The safety record of Deepwater Horizon 
was generally good, with no major health and safety incidents in seven years. Two 
senior BP executives - company men drilling parlance - and two Transocean senior 
                                                 
 
12  OSC - Oil Spill Commission (2011a)   
13  BP. 2010c. Deepwater horizon accident investigation report 
14  OSC - Oil Spill Commission (2011a) 
15  OSC - Oil Spill Commission (2011c) 
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managers – arrived on the rig that morning in April 20, 2010 for a one-day 
'management visibility tour' and would congratulate the team on seven years of 
drilling with no major incidents16.  
Preparing the well for temporary abandonment, the drill team was testing the 
integrity of the 15,000 feet deep well, coordinating with specialist firms such as 
Halliburton and visiting BP engineers. The design of the well, formulations of 
concrete and mud, and techniques for securing it were specific to the geologic 
'formation' and intense, specific conditions found during drilling.  The engineers 
had to resolving differences of opinion in the approach, and were reviewing 
conflicting results from the various 'negative pressure' and 'positive pressure' tests.  
At 21.30 PM that night, a massive geyser of sea water and drilling mud erupted and 
began to rain down on the rig and onto nearby support ship, covering the deck in 
the thick mucous-like synthetic drilling compound. Moments later, a hiss of highly 
compressed gas was audible. Loss of well control or ‘blow-out’ is one of the 
primary risks in drilling on sea or land, and extremely fast response is needed to 
avoid disaster.  The drill pusher and mudrakers working on the drilling floor 
scrambled to take action.  
At 21.41 PM, the rig shook with the first of several massive explosions. 11 crew 
members were killed in the blast. Most of the able and injured crew could escape by 
lifeboat – or jumping directly seventy feet into the oily and burning Gulf waters 
below. Some 27 hours later, the rig sank to the sea floor 5000 feet under the 
surface. 
Over the next 92 days, BP would attempt a range of techniques to stop the flow of 
oil into the Gulf – originally thought to be minimal then 5000 barrels per day, 
ultimately known to be 10 times greater. The resulting oil spill reached hundreds of 
miles of coastline and covered vast surface and subsurface area. BP and its 
subcontractors faced billion-dollar litigation, on top of the USD 11.8 Billion that BP 
has already paid out by the end of 2010.  
                                                 
 
16  OSC - Oil Spill Commission (2011a) 
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This was the beginning of the most expensive and damaging oil spills in American 
waters to date with more than 4.9 million barrels discharged into the Gulf waters. 
The public and industry scrutiny on this catastrophe was unparalleled, with impact 
beyond the critical energy supply chain that powers the American and international 
economy. In this case we look at the context and likely causes of the event, with a 
focus on how BP and its partners sought to accelerate their response to the crisis. 
The United States was estimated to consume more than 18 million barrels of oil per 
day during 2011. The energy supply chain is critical to the national and global 
economy. To secure current and future hydrocarbon supplies, private industry has 
moved to new frontiers, drilling offshore to extreme depths and employing new 
techniques to extract energy sources from the ground. The wells in the Macondo 
Prospect are among the deepest, starting at 5000 feet below sea level and going 
some 13,400 feet into Miocene geologic layer that traps extensive oil reserves in the 
waves of salt and clay below much of the Gulf of Mexico.  
The network of companies serving the Gulf of Mexico is complex, with many 
contracting parties for specialized services in marine geophysical surveying, offshore 
engineering and construction, transportation, diving and mobile drilling17. Due the 
exceptionally high cost of exploration and development, leading firms often shared 
costs of drilling, production and transportation 18 . According to a National 
Petroleum Council study, “This 'buy versus build' strategy resulted in a significant 
reduction in the number of skilled people within operating companies who 
understood development and deployment19”. 
Time pressure in this industry is considerable:  “Project profitability depended on 
how soon production could be brought online. Drilling vessels were contracted on 
day-rates, increasing time pressures. Production processes were highly 
interdependent: delay on one place could cause delays elsewhere.20”  
  
                                                 
 
17  OSC - Oil Spill Commission (2011a)   
18  OSC - Oil Spill Commission (2011a) 
19  OSC - Oil Spill Commission (2011a) 
20  OSC - Oil Spill Commission (2011a)  
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In 1985, an Office of Technology Assessment study of the Arctic and Deepwater 
oil drilling identified “a need for new approaches to preventing work-related injuries 
and fatalities in coping with new hazards in the hostile Arctic and Deepwater 
frontiers.”  It also presciently warned of the glaring deficiencies in safety oversight 
offshore, observing, “there is no regulatory requirement for the submission of 
integrated safety plans which address technical, managerial and other aspects of 
offshore safety operations21”.  
The offshore drilling business is expensive and dangerous. Since 2001, the Gulf of 
Mexico workforce – 35,000 people, working on 90 big drilling rigs and 3500 
production platforms – had suffered 1,550 injuries, 60 deaths, and 948 fires and 
explosions22. Nevertheless, oil production in the Gulf is a vital part of the economy 
and considered generally safe for the environment; as stated by President Obama 
on 2 April 2010 on a speech in North Carolina, three weeks before the disaster, 
“Oil rigs today generally don't cause spills23”.   
Macondo Prospect, Mississippi Canyon Block 252 
The Gulf of Mexico accounts for 90% of offshore drilling in the U.S. by volume 
and contributes approximately one third of all U.S. oil production.  BP acquired the 
lease for Block 252 in 2008, and was approved by MMS to drill the first of two 
wells on May 29, 200924.  
The well was started ('spudded') by Marianas on 6 October 2009. After reaching a 
well bore depth of 9,090 feet, the rig was badly damaged by Hurricane Ida and had 
work had to be re-started by Deepwater Horizon in February 201025.  
During drilling, the team faced seven 'lost returns' events, in which the pressure 
from drilling fluid fractures the surrounding formation and the fluid flows into the 
rock. While this is not unusual, the events were frequent and at varying depths, 
prompting BP engineers in Houston to halt the drilling at 18,630 feet – 
                                                 
 
21  OSC - Oil Spill Commission (2011a) 
22  OSC - Oil Spill Commission (2011a)   
23  The Whitehouse (2010) 
24  OSC - Oil Spill Commission (2011c)   
25  OSC - Oil Spill Commission (2011c)   
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approximately 1,400 feet short of the original target. Because of the fragile state of 
the well, additional tests and precautions are required. 
“John Guide explained after the incident that losing returns ‘was the No. 1 risk.’ 
He and the other BP engineers worried that if their cementing procedure placed too 
much pressure on the geologic formation below, it might trigger another lost-returns 
event similar to the one on April 9.”  
 
BP had to choose a well abandonment procedure that would balance the risk of 
'lost returns' due to the fragile formation with possibility of losing well control.  
To prepare a well for cementing, a mechanism known as the 'float valve' is 
introduced at the bottom segment ('the reamer shoe'). This has a pressure-sensitive 
mechanical device which changes from a two-way valve – allowing flow down and 
up through the pipe – to a one-way system. This conversion helps prevent mud 
from contaminating the cement. 
The drill team had difficulty converting the valve (reversing its direction), and in 
multiple attempts, increased pump pressure on the ninth attempt to 3,142 psi – four 
times the design specification. There was the possibility that conversion did not 
occur due to obstruction of the very bottom of the well, the tip of the reamer shoe. 
To test that the obstruction, perhaps cuttings or debris, was pushed out, and the 
float collar converted, the crew would have needed to run at least 6 barrels of mud 
per minute and observe the comparable return; they did not run this test. Another 
possibility was that the high pressure forced the ball through the float tube, leaving 
it in place and leaving a bi-directional path through the float collar. If so, this could 
cause contamination of the cement.  
The process for temporary abandonment typically requires setting of a cement plug 
some distance down into the well and a lock-down sleeve at the seafloor, allowing 
the BOP and riser to be removed.  After several iterations through the well design, 
BP engineering planned to put the concrete plug at 3000 feet below the mudline. 
1. Run the drill pipe into the well to 8,376 feet, 3300 feet below the mudline. 
2. Displace the mud in the well with 3300 feet of seawater, pushing the mud 
into the riser above the BOP. 
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3. Perform a negative pressure test; to assure the concrete plug at the 
bottom could hold the hydrocarbon under pressure without substantial 
downward pressure from drilling mud 
4. Displace the mud in the riser with seawater. 
5. Set a cement plug at 8,376 feet. 
6. Set a lockdown sleeve. 
This phase would leave only the cement at the bottom reamer shoe to stop 
hydrocarbon flow up into well; the BOP could act as backup only if someone on 
the rig activated it early enough should the cement fail.  This could require 
significant reaction speed from the operating crew, at the same time they were 
working with the complex mud displacement process from the riser. 
This procedure allowed BP to set lock-down sleeve last, but required the upper 
cement barrier to be significantly deeper than was typical. Preferring to set cement 
in seawater, this left 8,376 feet of mud displace with much lighter seawater before 
any secondary barrier was in place. The procedure was developed at the last minute 
without performing any risk analysis.  BP had changed the procedure a number of 
times in the two weeks prior to these final steps.  
The plan on the 12 April did not include a negative pressure test, and had the 
cement plug set at 6,000 feet below sea level.   On 14 April, BP sent a revised plan 
to MMS for approval, which included a negative pressure test, but required setting 
the cement plug in drilling mud before seawater displacement. On 15 April, BP 
changed the plan again, deciding to perform the negative pressure test before 
setting the cement plug.   On April 16, BP sent the plan to MMS, which was 
approved in less than 90 minutes26.   
The plan changed one more time, on the day of the blowout. BP sent the Macondo 
team on the rig a revised plan, different to the one approved by MMS. In this final 
plan, the negative pressure test would be combined with displacement of mud in 
the riser with seawater27.  
                                                 
 
26  OSC - Oil Spill Commission (2011c)   
27  OSC - Oil Spill Commission (2011c)   
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Explosion and Oil Spill 
Along with 11 deaths that occurred within minutes of the blast, 54 workers on the 
Deepwater Horizon were injured – some critically. Powerless after the first explosion, 
which destroyed its engine rooms, the burning rig drifted 1600 meters, listing 
heavily, before sinking to the seafloor 27 hours after the initial explosion. 
By then an estimated 1500 meters of the riser connecting the rig to the wellhead lay 
crumpled on the sea floor. An oil slick from the initial destruction of the rig was 
visible for kilometres, but first impressions from the surface led the Coast guard 
and BP to assume that the well had been sealed during the emergency:“No oil 
leaking into the Gulf.” 
This would soon prove not be the case:“Coast Guard officials on Saturday 
estimated that as much as 1,000 barrels of oil is escaping each day from the well 
head on the ocean floor.” 
On April 28th, Coast Guard Adm. Mary E. Landry quoted a scientist from the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration who had concluded that oil is 
leaking at the rate of 5,000 barrels a day, not 1,000 as had been estimated.  “It 
appears to have been calculated using a method that is specifically not 
recommended for major oil spills.”   
On April 30th, the WSJ reported that “Ian MacDonald, professor of oceanography 
at Florida State University who specializes in tracking ocean oil seeps from satellite 
imagery” had concluded the “oil spill could be leaking at a rate of 25,000 barrels a 
day, five times the government’s current estimate”.  
On May 4th, Doug Suttles, an executive with BP Plc on Wednesday said the well 
could gush at 60,000 barrels per day if all the equipment on the sea floor restricting 
the current flow were removed during certain repair procedures. 
“If the existing Blow-Out Preventer (BOP) and all the equipment were removed, it 
could get up to that rate.” 
 
Oil Spill Commission, 2010b: Congestions al testimony 
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By May 14th, the amount of oil spilling into the Gulf of Mexico may be at least 10 
times the size of official estimates, according to an exclusive analysis conducted for 
NPR.  
BP has said repeatedly “that there is no reliable way to measure the oil spill in the 
Gulf of Mexico by looking at the oil gushing out of the pipe.”  
Steven Wereley, an associate professor of mechanical engineering at Purdue 
University, analysed videotape of the seafloor gusher using a technique called 
particle image velocimetry. A computer program tracks particles and calculates how 
fast they are moving. Wereley put the BP video of the gusher into his computer. He 
made a few simple calculations and came up with an astonishing value for the rate 
of the oil spill: 70,000 barrels a day — much higher than the official estimate of 
5,000 barrels a day.  
On 14th May, BP spokeswoman Rebecca Bernhard said the company is standing by 
the 5,000-barrel figure. “We look at the fact that it’s coming out of the riser (pipe) 
in several ways. We look at it from satellite imagery, over flight observations and 
on-the-water observations.” 
Carol Browner, director of the White House Office of Energy and Climate Change 
Policy noted that BP had a “vested financial interest” in downplaying the size of the 
leak, speaking to CBS news on “Face the Nation” that BP “ . . . will ultimately pay a 
fine based on those rates . . .” 
Representative Ed Markey of Massachusetts, head of the House Energy and 
Environment subcommittee, agreed that the company “had a stake in low-balling 
the number right from the very beginning.” 
Noting that BP has consistently provided information that proved to be wrong, 
Markey said he had “no confidence whatsoever in BP.” 
“The public needs to know the answers to very basic questions: How much oil is 
leaking into the Gulf and how much oil can be expected to end up on our shores 
and our ocean environment?” Markey said in a letter to BP. “I am concerned that 
an underestimation of the flow may be impeding the ability to solve the leak and 
handle management of the disaster.”  
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Retrospective estimates of the oil leak from the first day of the disaster stand at 
approximately 62,000 barrels, slowing to 54,000 barrels per day by the time the well 
was finally capped. This figure is an order of magnitude higher than the original 
estimates, for a total spill of some 4.9 million barrels, making it by far the worst 
open sea oil spill in US waters. 
6.3 Companies and Parties Involved 
Transocean 
Transocean is one of the leading offshore drilling companies.   It owned some of 
the most capable drilling rigs in the industry, setting records for offshore drilling 
depth. 
According to BP's Patrick O'Bryan, the Deepwater Horizon was “the best performing 
rig that we had in our fleet and in the Gulf of Mexico and I believe it was one of the 
top performing rigs in all the BP floater fleets from the standpoint of safety and 
drilling performance28”.  While there were several thousand hours of outstanding 
maintenance issues to be scheduled29, the rig was seen as a workhorse capable of 
handling some of the most complex operations.  
Halliburton 
Halliburton is one of the world’s largest oil field services providers and owns 
several other oil field services companies, including Baroid and Sperry Drilling. 
Halliburton designed and pumped the cement for all of the casing strings in the 
Macondo well. 
The Minerals Management Service (MMS) 
The Minerals Management Service (renamed on 18 June 2010 to the Bureau of 
Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement, or Bureau of Ocean 
Energy (BOE)) 
                                                 
 
28  OSC - Oil Spill Commission (2011a)   
29  OSC - Oil Spill Commission (2011a)   
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The Department of the Interior’s (DOI), Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, 
Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE), is the federal agency responsible for 
overseeing the safe and environmentally responsible development of energy and 
mineral resources on the Outer Continental Shelf. 
The Bureau is led by a Director appointed by the DOI Secretary. The Director is 
supported by senior executives who manage national programs, policy, and budget 
in Washington, DC (headquarters) and three regional directors responsible for 
management and program implementation. 
The BOEMRE’s Offshore Energy & Minerals Management (OEMM) offices 
contend with all aspects of offshore federal leasing and renewable energy projects.  
The OEMM's work includes the preparation and administration of regular offshore 
oil and gas lease sales. Additionally, BOEMRE is responsible for conducting 
supporting research and documentation leading up to each lease sale.  
The OCS is a significant source of oil and gas for the Nation’s energy supply. The 
approximately 43 million leased OCS acres generally accounts for about 15 percent 
of America’s domestic natural gas production and about 27 percent of America’s 
domestic oil production. The BOEMRE’s oversight and regulatory framework 
ensure production and drilling are done in an environmentally responsible manner, 
and done safely. 
In addition to BP, Transocean and Halliburton, a number of other subcontractors 
to BP and individuals were “parties of interest”, and participated in further 
investigation and eventual litigation. These companies included: Cameron 
(equipment manufacturer of the BOP), M I Swaco (subcontractor to Halliburton), 
Anadarko Petroleum, MOEX USA Corp. 
6.4 Timeline of the Disruption 
The timeline of the pandemic response is shown in  
Figure 27. In this study, the date 20 April 2009 at 19:55 is defined as ‘the event’ for 
purposes of analysis because at this point in time the lost of well control became 
inevitable. (See also the detailed of timeline according to BP Deepwater Horizon 
Accident Investigation Report in Appendix 3.) 
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Timeline of BP Response to Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill 
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Figure 27: Timeline of BP Response to Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
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6.5 Handling of Disruption by BP 
BP committed itself to sharing the lessons learned within the energy industry and 
the wider community. It created an internal investigation team, led by BP’s head of 
safety and operations, immediately after the explosion inviting the expertise of more 
than 50 technical and other specialists. 
The findings below are based publically available reports and testimony under oath 
from the internal investigation from BP and the various agencies:  
 The Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation, a combined effort of the US Coast 
Guard Marine Board of Inquiry and the US Department of Interior, Bureau of 
Offshore Energy Management Regulation and Enforcement. 
 The National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and 
Offshore Drilling, also known as the Presidential Commission. This 
commission was created by President Obama on 22 May 2010 as an 
independent, non-partisan entity to thorough investigate and assess the causes, 
responsibilities, immediate and long-term response. 
 The National Academy of Engineering. 
 The US Chemical Safety Board. 
 The US Congress. 
 The US Department of Justice. 
 The US Securities and Exchange Commission. 
 The US Coast Guard.  
6.5.1 Assessment of Causes 
From a geological perspective, each well is unique. The structure of the rock 
formation, depth and pressure of the layers containing hydrocarbons, compositions 
of those reserves and of course the drilling location make each drilling operation a 
unique process.  Well blow-outs, in which the drilling or production platform loses 
control over well pressure, present a major risk and while difficult to predict, are 
typically preceded by early warning signs. The most obvious objective of the team is 
to understand the conditions, engineer accordingly and closely monitor conditions.  
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Once the event occurs, pressure can rise explosively as the gas and oil travel 
upward. Fast response is critical to ‘shut-in’ the well or diverts the hydrocarbons 
away from any ignition sources, equipment and workers. Seconds and minutes 
count: the tremendous volume of gas can quickly engulf a large area; the explosion 
that ripped through the Deepwater Horizon killed the drill team instantly but also 
destroyed equipment that was could have helped re-seal the well. Designing the 
safety mechanisms for surviving such a blast is a major challenge. 
Once the rig was essentially abandoned and lost, the race against time began to 
permanently ‘kill’ the well. Oil was leaking at an unknown rate – five kilometers 
down – from multiple locations. Getting consistent information was difficult at 
those depths, information that the public and government demanded. The public 
and government lost confidence in BP’s ability to handle the crisis as estimates on 
the rate of oil spill increased. Threat of extensive government sanctions against BP 
created shareholder concern as well. BP Upstream and its partners struggled to 
adapt known mechanisms for well-control to the harsh deepwater conditions. The 
only permanent, but not entirely reliable solution, would be drilling a relief well – in 
fact, two well, should one fail. Shorter-term engineering efforts were attempted and 
failed. Worst-case scenarios were reviewed in the Unified Command’s various 
technical teams; public and academic input – solicited by BP – went to extreme 
measures, even use of nuclear explosion to seal the well. 
As the oil spread was carried by currents, it threatened the coast areas and marine 
life. Oil recovery and spill control mechanisms were put in place – though little new 
technical advancement had been made since recovery efforts 20 years earlier. 
Political pressure on coastal protection triggered investment – and hence financial 
compensation due from BP – on measure that proved ineffective. 
Legal and criminal investigation was immediately initiated; placing restrictions on 
the way information could be retrieved and published. BP faces on-going litigation, 
which could dramatically increase its exposure. The impact of the event will be felt 
by BP and the environment long after the oil stopped flowing into the Gulf of 
Mexico. 
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6.5.2 Overview of BP Response 
Within a week of the explosion, BP embarked on what would become a massive 
effort to generate containment options, either by adapting shallow-water technology 
to the Deepwater environment, or by designing entirely new devices.   
Even after the blowout during efforts to contain the spill BP continued to 
demonstrate overconfidence:  “The government saw its pushback as essential 
because BP would not, on its own, consider the full range of possibilities. 
According to one senior government official, before the increased supervision, BP 
‘hoped for the best, planned for the best, expected the best.’” 
“Though willing to fund and carry out the response, BP had no available, tested 
technique to stop a Deepwater blowout other than the months-long process of drilling 
a relief well.”  
Oil Spill Commission, 2010b: Congestions al testimony  
BP's response plan revealed how ill-equipped the firm was in dealing with such a 
crisis. BP had named Peter Lutz as a wildlife expert on whom it would rely; he had 
died several years before BP submitted its plan to the MMS. BP listed seals and 
walruses as two species of concern in case of an oil spill in the Gulf; these species 
never see Gulf waters. And a link in the plan that purported to go to the Marine 
Spill Response Corporation website actually led to a Japanese entertainment site.    
The response has required the development of extensive systems, procedures and 
organizational capabilities to adapt to changing and unique conditions. As the 
Deepwater Horizon spill continued despite efforts at the wellhead, the response 
effort progressed, expanded, and took on not just new tasks and directions but new 
personnel and resources. As a result, from source to shore, existing systems were 
evolved and expanded and new ones developed to advance workflow, improve 
coordination, focus efforts and manage risks. The adoption of these systems will 
ensure the ability to respond more rapidly at scale with a clear direction as to 
personnel, resource and organizational needs. 
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Early-Warning Signs 
The original well at Macondo was started by the Transocean Marianas, but halted due 
to damage from Hurricane Ivan.  This highlighted the challenging environments 
and importantly set the schedule back by many weeks, creating significant time 
pressure on BP management and the subcontracting support companies. 
Transocean chose a 'condition based' inspection and maintenance schedule, in 
contrast to Inspection status of the BOP. Cameron specified that the BOP should 
be disassembled and inspected every 3 to 5 years; this was not implemented by 
Transocean or BP. 
Lost drill. The well collapsed at 12000 feet, and had to be drilled again 
circumventing the collapsed well section. While this is not uncommon, the fragile 
nature of the formation was demonstrated and merits additional precaution. 
Disagreement in the drill team and BP on well design, in particular on use of 
centralizers30. 
Several changes to well design which were very rapidly approved by clearly 
overburdened MME engineering in the New Orleans South office31.  
Excessive pressure (x4) to convert the flow valves. The manufacturer states that the 
maximum pressure was 260 psi to convert the valves (e.g. change the reversal of 
flow, so that cement could flow and would not be pushed back into the drill pipe). 
The metering indicated x4 times greater after several attempts – engineers 
interpreted the data 'optimistically' assuming a 'bladder effect' (reserved pressure) 
could cause the anomaly.  
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Halliburton cement formulation. In testing during April 2010, cement engineers 
found it very difficult to create a nitrogen gas-rich mix that would set at the 
pressures and time required. No information to this effect was passed to the rig. 
Later tests by Chevron after the accident with comparable materials showed the 
cement formulation was generally unstable.  
Negative pressure test left inconclusive results. The drill team used the kill-line 
pressure to indicate the cement was sealed properly against high well pressure.  
Increasing pressure in the well after negative pressure testing was concluded. The 
rig crew was busy with replacing some 8300 feet of drilling mud with seawater to set 
a high-level cement plug. The returned mud was assessed to detect hydrocarbon 
('sheen test'); no oil was visible at that moment.    This was a 'kick indicator’; 
showing that the well had been comprised and gas or oil was entering the well bore. 
A driller, assistant driller, or mudlogger watching the Sperry-Sun monitors screen 
could have seen it.   
At 21.40 PM, Mud erupted on to the rig in a geyser, raining down on the drilling 
platform and the nearby support ship32. Sometime between 21.40 and 21.43 PM, 
mud overflowed onto the rig floor, shot up to the top of the derrick, and poured 
down onto the main deck33.   
Gas could be heard rushing out of the well with the mud in a high-pitched hiss for 
some minutes.  Gas alarms were turned off in the drilling area, and only went off 
when gas was detected in a very wide area covering the rig, seconds before the first 
explosion. 
Conclusions of BP and External Investigations 
With recovery and analysis of the BOP, and extensive simulation and analysis, the 
technical sequence Macondo blow-out and oil spill is essentially complete. A 
sequence of management and operational decisions, along with failure of multiple 
technical elements prevented the crew of avoiding the disaster at multiple instances.  
                                                 
 
32  OSC - Oil Spill Commission (2011c)   
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The National Commission’s report to the President quoted the Board that 
investigated the loss of the Columbia space shuttle, “Complex systems almost 
always fail in complex ways.”  
BP's investigation emphasized the complexity of the environment:“The team did 
not identify any single action or inaction that caused this accident. Rather, a 
complex and interlinked series of mechanical failures, human judgements, 
engineering design, operational implementation and team interfaces came together 
to allow the initiation and escalation of the accident. Multiple companies, work 
teams and circumstances were involved over time34.” 
Nevertheless, the Commission’s report found that the accident was caused by “the 
cumulative risk that resulted from these decisions and actions   was both 
unreasonably large and avoidable 35 ” and “could have been prevented 36 ”.  
Specifically, the commission concludes “BP’s fundamental mistake was its 
failure…to exercise special caution (and, accordingly, to direct its contractors to be 
especially vigilant) before relying on the primary cement as a barrier to hydrocarbon 
flow37.” 
Response to the spill was also hampered by years of underinvestment. “Investments 
in safety, containment, and response equipment and practices failed to keep pace 
with the rapid move into Deepwater drilling38.”   
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Additional findings from BP investigation are:  
Well Design 
 BP’s decision to choose a well design consisting of a long string production 
casing instead of a liner led to a higher risk of cement failure. 
 BP installed only six centralizers on the production casing instead of the 
recommended 21 centralizers. Furthermore, BP neglected to inform 
Halliburton of the number of centralizers installed. 
 BP replaced 3,300 feet of heavy drilling mud with lighter seawater and this 
put unnecessary stress on the cement job. 
Risk assessment 
 BP made multiple changes to the temporary abandonment procedures in 
the weeks prior to the blow out but the changes did not go through any sort 
of formal risk assessment or review process. 
Monitoring 
 When the BP and Transocean staff on the rig noted an anomalous pressure 
reading while attempting to convert float valves they concluded that the 
pressure gauge they had been relying on was broken. “BP’s team appears 
not to have seriously examined why it had to apply over four times the 750 
psi design pressure to convert the float valves.” 
 In the minutes prior to the blowout the Transocean crew failed to notice an 
increase in pressure in the well—they failed to recognize that a natural gas 
kick was occurring until it was too late and the blowout was uncontrollable. 
 The Commission cites a lack of automated alarms in the displays used to 
monitor well pressures as a contributing factor. 
Training 
Failure of the Deepwater Horizon’s Blow-out Preventer, possibly due to poor 
maintenance, was a major contributing factor in the blowout. 
Training of key engineering and rig personnel was inadequate. 
Communication  
There was a lack of communication within BP - for instance between offshore and 
onshore staff and poor communication between BP and its contractors. 
Information was compartmentalized and not fully shared. 
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6.5.3 Coding and Categorisation of Data from BP Deepwater 
Horizon  
Warning – Develop advance warning system 
Examples:  
 Manage distractions during well pressure monitoring (which inhibited early 
detection). 
 Implement gas detection systems for early warning (drill floor level alarm was 
turned off). 
 Provide shift change information from night to day shift (missing on the 
morning of event) 
 Assure usability (Driller's display screen was difficult to interpret; pressure 
anomaly went unnoticed). 
 Provide on-shore real time monitoring facility. 
Codes: monitoring, training, roles, preparation, warning, real-time and remote 
 
The Deepwater Horizon had a number of alarm systems installed, including one to 
alert the crew to presence of potentially explosive gas. The alarms on the rig floor 
had both visual and sound indicators. However, according to Mike Williams, some 
were turned off (inhibited, in his words) “the explanation I got was that they did 
not want people woke up at 3:00 o'clock in the morning due to false alarms” 
referring to instruction from the Offshore Installation Manager. Had the alarm 
system been active in key areas, the Emergency Disconnect Sequence would have 
shutdown the equipment at risk, and alerted the crew to presence of gas in 
dangerous areas. 
Andrea Fleytas was the Transocean DPO on duty in charge of the alarm panel at 
the time of the blowout. After feeling a first jolt and noticing multiple combustible 
gas alarms sounding throughout the rig, she did not immediately hit the general 
alarm. At the time, she received a call from the engine control room asking what 
was going on but did not instruct them to shut down the engines despite the 
multiple combustible gas alarms sounding throughout the rest of the rig.  Fleytas 
said in her testimony, when asked why she hesitated “It was a lot to take in. There 
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was a lot going on.” Fleytas said that Transocean provided no formal training or 
simulations on how to respond to combustible gas alarms.  
Decision 
Was There A 
Less Risky 
Alternative 
Available? 
Less Time 
Than 
Alternative? 
Decision Maker 
Not waiting for more centralisers of  
preferred design 
Yes Saved Time BP on shore 
Not waiting for foam stability test 
results and/or redesigning slurry 
Yes Saved Time  
Not running cement evaluation log Yes Saved Time BP on shore 
Using spacer made from combined 
lost circulation materials to avoid 
disposal issues 
Yes Saved Time BP on shore 
Displacing mud from riser before 
setting surface cement plug 
Yes Unclear BP on shore 
Setting surface cement plug 3,000 
feet below mud line in seawater 
Yes Unclear 
BP on shore 
(Approved by MMS) 
Not installing additional physical 
barriers during temporary 
abandonment procedure 
Yes Saved Time BP on shore 
Not performing further well integrity 
diagnostics in light of  troubling and 
unexplained negative pressure test 
results 
Yes Saved Time 
BP (and perhaps 
Transocean) on Rig 
By passing pits and conducting other 
simultaneous operators during 
displacement 
Yes Saved Time 
Transocean (and 
perhaps BP) on Rig 
Table 29: Examples of Decisions that Increased Risk at Macondo while Potentially Saving 
Time 
Source: OSC-Oil Spill Comission (2010c) 
Stress testing – Conduct stress test 
Examples 
 Testing prior to deployment of equipment (e.g. BOP was not tested). 
 Testing for stability (Positive and negative pressure tests of well integrity). 
 Verification of inputs (Incorrectly interpreted cement testing during formulation 
by Halliburton) 
Codes: testing, modelling and verification 
BP contracted a number of tests to be performed by Halliburton, the contractor 
responsible for cement formulation and pumping, and the Transocean crew that 
would run a set of positive and negative pressure test. 
To prevent oil and gas from escaping an exploration or abandoned well, and assure 
stability of product wells, cement is used to reinforce the well.  Specially formulated 
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cement slurry is used according to the characteristics of the well such as pressure, 
temperature, depth and surrounding fluids. 
Cement slurry requires testing on shore prior to use. Because the pressure and 
temperature at the bottom of a well can significantly alter the strength and curing 
rate of a given cement mix - and because storing cement on a rig can alter its 
chemical composition over time - companies like Halliburton normally fly cement 
samples from the rig back to a laboratory shortly before pumping a job to make 
sure the cement will work under the conditions in the well. The laboratory conducts 
a number of tests to evaluate the slurry’s viscosity and flow characteristics, the rate 
at which it will cure, and its eventual compressive strength.  
On February 10, soon after the Deepwater Horizon began work on the well, 
Halliburton laboratory personnel ran a series of pilot tests on the cement blend 
stored on the Deepwater Horizon that Halliburton planned to use at Macondo.    
Halliburton sent the laboratory report to BP on March 8 as an attachment to an e-
mail in which he discussed his recommended plan for cementing an earlier 
Macondo casing string.  
According to the Commission, experienced cement engineers would immediately 
see that the February foam slurry design was unstable. Halliburton did not 
comment on the evidence of the cement slurry’s instability, and there is no evidence 
that BP examined the foam stability data in the report at all.  It appears that 
Halliburton never reported the results of the earlier February test to BP. 
Halliburton conducted another round of tests in mid-April, just before pumping the 
final cement job. By then, the BP team had given Halliburton more accurate 
information about the temperatures and pressures at the bottom of the Macondo 
well, and Halliburton had progressed further with its cementing plan. Using this 
information, the laboratory personnel conducted several tests, including a foam 
stability test, starting on approximately April 13. The first test Halliburton 
conducted showed once again that the cement slurry would be unstable.   The 
Commission does not believe that Halliburton ever reported this information to 
BP. Instead, it appears that Halliburton personnel subsequently ran a second foam 
stability test, this time doubling the pre-test conditioning time to three hours. 
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Negative Pressure test 
“The negative-pressure test was accepted although well integrity had not been 
established. The Transocean rig crew and BP well site leaders reached the incorrect 
view that the test was successful and that well integrity had been established. ”  . 
Not all agreed, including Whelan Weeler, an experienced drilling engineer badly in 
injured in the blow-out. “Wheeler was “convinced that something wasn’t right,” 
recalled Christopher Pleasant, a subsea supervisor. Wheeler couldn’t believe the 
explanations he was hearing. But his shift was up.  
Failure to run final tests 
During the rig's daily 19.30 operations conference call to BP in Houston, engineer 
Morel discussed the good news that the final cement job at the bottom of the 
Macondo well was successful.  To ensure the job did not have any problems, a 
three-man Schumberger team was scheduled to fly out to the rig later that day, able 
to perform a suite of tests to examine the well's new bottom cement seal. According 
to the BP team's plan, if the cementing went smoothly, as it had, they could skip 
Schlumberger's cement evaluation, saving time and the USD 128,000 fee.  
Blow Out Preventer (BOP) 
Through a review of rig audit findings and maintenance records, the investigation 
team found indications of potential weaknesses in the testing regime and 
maintenance management system for the BOP. In fact, the Commission identified 
many areas where BP saved time or money by avoiding test procedures. 
Training – Implement training 
Examples 
 Educate staff on failure modes (Blow out prevention school for key engineers). 
 Provide online information resources (Online electronic bulletins and document 
databases). 
Codes: training, learning, communication and teamroom 
 
Influx of high-pressure oil and gas was not recognized until hydrocarbons were in 
the riser, connecting the well with the rig. With the negative-pressure test having 
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been accepted, the well was returned to an overbalanced condition, preventing 
further influx into the wellbore. Later, as part of normal operations to temporarily 
abandon the well, heavy drilling mud was again replaced with seawater, under 
balancing the well. Over time, this allowed hydrocarbons to flow up through the 
production casing and passed the BOP. Indications of influx with an increase in 
drill pipe pressure are discernable in real-time data from approximately 40 minutes 
before the rig crew took action to control the well. The rig crew’s first apparent well 
control actions occurred after hydrocarbons were rapidly flowing to the surface. 
The rig crew did not recognize the influx and did not act to control the well until 
hydrocarbons had passed through the BOP and into the riser.   
Well control response actions failed to regain control of the well. The first well 
control actions were to close the BOP and diverter, routing the fluids exiting the 
riser to the Deepwater Horizon mud gas separator (MGS) system rather than to the 
overboard diverter line. If fluids had been diverted overboard, rather than to the 
MGS, there may have been more time to respond, and the consequences of the 
accident may have been reduced.   The float collar used in the cementing process 
did not initially operate as intended and required 9 attempts with higher than usual 
pressures to function properly. Moreover, the float test performed after cementing 
may not have been definitive, leading to concern that there may have been 
contamination of the cement due to density differences between the cement and the 
drilling mud. 
Teamwork – Create integrated response team 
Examples 
 Establish integrated response team (BP and related parties setup a response 
team known as the ‘Unified Command”). 
 Establish investigation team (BP set up an internal investigation team). 
Codes: investigation, cross-functional, learning, war-room and communication 
 
BP created an integrated response team called ‘Unified Command’. This command 
structure was established to manage the response to the disaster. It subsumed the 
spill's "responsible party" (in this case, BP) with federal and state officials in a single 
organization. The Coast Guard established its Unified Area Command - 
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headquarters for the regional spill response—on April 23 in Robert, Louisiana, later 
moving it to New Orleans. 
Learning – Learning from previous events 
Examples 
 Investigate root cause. 
 Establish forums to accumulate and manage learning. 
Codes: investigation, learning, root cause, external, industry, expert, litigation and criminal 
A number of formal bodies were established or involved in capturing the lessons 
learned from the event, with documentation in the public domain including:  
 National Commission on BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Offshore Drilling. 
 Chief Counsel's Report. 
 Coast Guard ISPR and BOEMRE Joint Investigation 
 DNV BPO Report on key equipment 
 Department of Justice Investigation on potential criminal liability. 
These investigations provided input to investigation of potential criminal liability. 
Upon reading the BP internal report, Richard Sears, the Commission’s Chief 
Scientific and Engineering Advisor, commented “it appeared that for BP the 
accident happened at 9:49 p.m., on April 20; whereas in some ways, the blowout 
began in early 2009 when they initially designed the well.” 
As the largest of the off-shore exploration and drilling companies, both BP and 
Transocean had access to a wealth of experience – successes and challenges – from 
which to learn. Nevertheless, previous events had occurred and while investigation 
was performed, the lessons were not necessarily made sufficiently visible to 
otherwise trained personnel on the Deepwater Horizon. 
For example, a set of incidents occurred at the Grangemouth Complex, Scotland, 
one of Europe’s largest refineries that process a significant percentage of North Sea 
oil.  Three separate incidents – Power failure on 29th May, a steam rupture on the 7th 
of June, and fire in a Catalytic Cracker Unit on 10th June 2000 did not cause loss of 
life, but highlighted important lessons and resulted in BP being fined some GBP 
1M. The report highlights that “BP Group and Complex Management did not 
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detect and intervene early enough on deteriorating performance” as stated in the 
Grangemouth executive report. 
More broadly, it stated “Major accident hazards should be actively managed to 
allow control and reduction of risks. Control of major accident hazards requires a 
specific focus on process safety management over and above conventional safety 
management.”  
Also in the North Sea, the BP Forties Alpha production platform was flooded with 
methane when a gas line ruptured.  Unlike the calm conditions that contributed to 
gas formation on the Horizon, wind moved gas from the Forties Alpha and no 
ignition source was present.  BP admitted breaking the law by allowing pipes to 
corrode on the Forties Alpha and paid a USD 290,000 fine.”   
Other platforms were not as lucky. Occidental Petroleum's Piper Alpha exploded 
and sank, with 167 fatalities. Common contributing factors included inadequate 
safety assurance, worker training, and evacuation procedures. Poor communication 
and confusion about lines of authority amplified the death toll in at least two of the 
accidents.   
The Commission also cited Transocean’s failure to communicate lessons from an 
earlier near-blowout in the North Sea some months earlier.  The crew of the 
Deepwater Horizon was not aware of this event nor the safety lessons gained from 
it.  On December 23, 2009, gas entered the riser while the North Sea rig was 
displacing a well with seawater during a completion operation. Following similar 
procedures to the Deepwater Horizon team, the crew had already run a negative 
pressure test on the lone static barrier between the pay zone and the rig and deemed 
it successful. The tested barrier failed during displacement. Hydrocarbons flowed 
into the well, and mud spewed from the rig floor. Unlike at Macondo, the crew was 
able to shut in the well before a blowout occurred but not until nearly one metric 
ton of oil-based mud had spilled into the ocean. The incident cost Transocean 11 
days of additional work and more than GBP 5 Million.  
The Macondo Prospect was referred to as the “well from hell”, as stated by Natalie 
Roshto in congressional testimony, due to similarities to a unsuccessful, ultimately 
abandoned well known as Devil's Tower that share many characteristics. Ms. 
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Roshto was quoting her husband Shane Roshto, an experienced toolpusher who 
died during the explosion. Shane Roshto told her "Mother nature just doesn't want 
to be drilled here39" some weeks before the accident occurred. The BP drilling 
engineer responsible for the well design echoed that sentiment, sending an email on 
14 April “this has been   nightmare well which has everyone all over the place.40” 
External communication – Establish frequent communications with partners 
Examples 
 Improve communication with key suppliers (e.g. Halliburton communication of 
cement test results was incomplete). 
 Increase frequency of press and public communications-daily press briefings. 
 Use Real-time video camera feed (‘spillcam)’. 
 Participate in formal testimony (Congressional hearings after the event.) 
 Create new one-to-many networking systems (Radio relay network for 
thousands of ships and team to coordinate response) 
 Invite external experts (academic, industry) to assist in design. 
Codes: communication, partner, frequency, testing, verification, public, press, frequency, real-time, 
video, investigation, coordination, expert and industry 
 
Halliburton, the cementing contractor, advised BP to install numerous devices to 
make sure the pipe was cantered in the well before pumping cement, according to 
Halliburton documents, provided to congressional investigators and seen by the 
Journal. Otherwise, the cement might develop small channels that gas could 
squeeze through. 
Relationship with Competitors – Established relationship with competitors 
Examples 
 Outsource tasks before or after event (Chevron for cement testing). 
 Add capacity from competitors (Shell help BP adding capacity by provides ships 
for clean up). 
                                                 
 
39  Oil Spill News (2010) 
40  Keim (2010) 
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 Create industry group to increase capacity, reserve and experience (Marine Well 
Company formed after event to facilitate recovery and reduce cost of reserve). 
Codes: competitor, capacity, industry and reserve 
The Vessels of Opportunity program was a way for BP to provide some income to 
local residents outside of a formal claims process. Through the program, BP 
employed private vessels to conduct response efforts such as skimming, booming, 
and transporting supplies. Vessels of opportunity made between USD 1,200 and 
USD 3,000 per day, depending on the size of the boat. Individual crewmembers 
made USD 200 for an eight-hour day. 
In response, the State of Louisiana began its own program, as did several local 
governments. The Unified Command struggled to coordinate this floating militia of 
independent vessels and to give them useful response tasks. Having hundreds of 
vessels look for oil did not contribute significantly to the response, because aircraft 
were more effective at spotting oil. Placing boom requires skill and training, and 
responders differed in their judgements of how much the vessels contributed. 
Marine Well Containment Co. is a new organisation; it was formed after the 
Deepwater Horizon even in 2010 by some of the largest firms operating in the Gulf 
of Mexico including ExxonMobil, Chevron, ConocoPhillips, Shell and eventually 
BP.  The not-for-profit organization is tasked with bringing together expertise and 
systems for addressing a range of blowout and spill scenarios.  The initial 
investment to construct new subsea and modular process equipment is expected to 
be approximately USD 1 Billion, in a large part based on the techniques developed 
during the Macondo disaster. 
Employee capacity - Assure management and employee capacity 
Examples 
 Protect staff (Rig was quickly abandoned to avoid further casualty) 
 Leverage staff for immediate response (Rig personnel who survived the blast 
were pressed into fire-fighting duty). 
 Assure safety of all employees (Search for survivors for about 27 hours). 
Codes: capacity, employee, reserve 
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Production capacity – Increase capacity by improving recovery capacity 
Examples 
 Add recovery capacity (Extend recovery and oil burning with additional support 
ships and rigs). 
 Source new type of capacity (Hire and re-purpose fishing vessels unable to 
operate, solving capacity and political pressures through commercial partnership 
with those affected by the spill). 
 Replicate core production capacity (Employ Transocean rigs for drilling relief 
wells) 
 Source capacity widely (Leasing of clean-up from across the industry world-
wide, e.g. Q4000 ship). 
Codes: capacity, sourcing, flexibility 
 
Product design – Develop new products by implement most robust solution 
Examples 
 Implement solution with highest assurance to succeed (Initiate Relief well 
drilling as soon as feasible). 
Codes: speed, risk 
 
Increase flexibility – Improve operational scope of scare equipment 
Examples 
 Redesign equipment for faster deployment across different use-cases (more 
flexible rig and seafloor equipment to reduce points of failure and costly re-
tooling). 
Codes: design, flexibility, speed 
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6.5.4 Response Time at BP Deepwater Horizon 
D1 - Detection of the Event 
According to an extensive set of interviews by BP internal investigation, the 
national commission and in congressional hearing after the event and the 
monitoring data accumulated offshore, there were numerous signs prior to the well-
blow out when BP and its partners could have anticipated the event and initiated 
mitigation action. 
While earlier detection may not have enabled the team to avoid loss of well control 
– maintenance and testing of equipment did not assure all preventative systems 
were working – faster reaction could have enabled more appropriate steps. 
D2 – Design of a Solution 
BP was in the process of reorganizing its management structure at the time of the 
blowout to clarify reporting relationships for engineers. The reorganization 
complicated the task of identifying the precise lines of authority and areas of 
responsibility, both at the time of and in the months leading up to the blowout. In 
addition, because of the reorganization, many of the managers overseeing the 
Macondo team had only a few months of experience in their respective positions at 
the time of the blowout. 
Internal Organisation  
At the beginning of April, BP conducted a major reorganization of its exploration 
business unit, including the BP Macondo team, creating separate reporting 
structures for engineering and operations. The reorganization also led to questions 
about authority and accountability.   
In March, for example, operations to control the well after a kick led to 
disagreements between BP’s managers on the Macondo team. BP engineering team 
leader David Sims wrote BP well team leader John Guide: “We cannot fight about 
every decision.... I will hand this well over to you in the morning and then you will 
be able to do whatever you want.”   
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Internal and External Expertise 
BP did not always use its internal technical experts effectively. “Yeah, well no one 
told us what the actual decision was, so we thought y‘all were going with the 
liner....” BP is now developing standards on how to consult internal experts and 
hiring more cementing experts.   
Every stage of the exploration and production cycle in hydrocarbon energy industry 
involves a significant number of parties, who in turn will often source individual 
engineers and workers on a contracting basis. 
In addition to sharing real time information to the BP Houston centre, a number of 
other mechanisms were used to communicate between teams including email. 
D3 – Deployment of the Solution 
According to the Rand Corporation, “Remedies must be designed and tested to 
work under the actual operating conditions. This is the biggest lesson from the 
Deepwater Horizon spill. All of the remedies fielded during the first 40 days of the 
spill were not effective because they had not been tested or proven to work in 
deepwater drilling conditions.” 
In managing the oil spill, following the failure of the top kill, BP engineers turned 
away from attempting to shut the well in, for fear that instability in the well could 
lead to an "underground blowout," with oil and gas flowing into the ocean from 
many points on the sea floor. This would make containment nearly impossible, at 
least until the completion of a relief well. Thus, in the aftermath of the top kill, BP 
and the government focused on trying to collect the oil, with the relief wells still 
providing the most likely avenue for killing the well altogether. 
It became increasingly clear in the weeks after the explosion that neither BP, its 
industry partners nor the government had the experience and resources to quickly 
deal with an oil spill on the scale of the Macondo disaster. 
The Commission identified three gaps in the government’s existing response 
capacity: (1) the failure to plan effectively for a large-scale, difficult-to-contain spill 
in the deepwater environment or potentially in the Arctic; (2) the difficulty of 
coordinating with state and local government officials to deliver an effective 
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response; and (3) a lack of information and understanding concerning the efficacy 
of specific response measures, such as dispersants and berms.  
BP had a team ready to proceed with new collection tools almost immediately. On 
May 29, the company and the government announced that BP would attempt to cut 
off the portion of the riser still attached to the top of the BOP and install a 
collection device - the "top hat" - which would then be connected via a new riser to 
the Discoverer Enterprise above. By June 8, the Discoverer Enterprise was collecting 
nearly 15,000 barrels of oil per day. 
BP also developed a system to bring oil and gas to the surface through the choke 
line on the BOP. BP outfitted the Q4000, a vessel involved in the top-kill effort, 
with collection equipment, including oil and gas burner imported from France. 
After it became operational on June 16, the Q4000 system was able to process and 
burn up to 10,000 barrels of oil per day. 
On occasion, BP was overly optimistic about the percentage of the oil it could 
remove or collect, with officials saying that the approach would allow for the 
collection of the "vast majority" of oil. But when the Q4000 came online in mid-
June, the two vessels' joint capacity of 25,000 barrels per day was still insufficient. 
Not all mechanisms proved effective, and some were used primarily for political 
reasons. 
Financial and Legal Impact 
The oil spill may prove to be one of the costliest industrial accidents ever.   
A USD 20 Billion fund known as the Gulf Coast Claims Facility, was created by BP 
under the direction of the US Federal Government to cover costs related to 
environmental damage, personal injury, clean-up and lost earnings by affected Gulf 
Coast businesses. By the end of 2010, the fund had paid out USD 2.7 Billion to 
address nearly 168,000 claims. 
In the weeks following the blow-out, BP's share price dropped from USD 60.57 to 
a low of USD 27.02 on 25 June 2010, wiping 100 Billon from its market 
capitalisation (NYSE). The share price recovered to USD 47.41 (10 March 2011), 
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with downstream prices reaching historic highs as political turbulence disrupted 
activities in oil-producing countries in the Middle East. 
BP faces, in the view of some experts, 20 years of litigation. The US Federal 
government is suing for USD 21 Billion in fines, and has consolidated all criminal 
investigations under the Deepwater Horizon Task Force. Citigroup estimated at 
that time that an additional USD 6 Billion in lawsuits could be filed.   
In 2011, BP plc. announced it would be selling substantial refinery capacity (Texas 
City, Carson City), for an anticipated USD 5 Billion, to help offset expected pay-out 
from the disaster. Table 30 shows a summary of finding from BP Deepwater 
Horizon in related to the 3-D framework. 
Tailored approaches Examples from BP Response to Deepwater Horizon 
Oil Spill 
D1 D2 D3 
Develop advanced 
warning system 
 Well pressure monitoring: distractions while working 
prevented early detection.  
 Gas detection systems for early warning (example: drill 
floor level was alarm was turned off) 
 Lack of  shift change information from night to day 
shift. 
 Driller’s display screen (Sperry-Sun) difficult to 
interpret, e.g. (pressure anomaly unnoticed) 
 No on-shore real-time monitoring facility. 
 

 

 
  
Conduct stress testing  Engineering tests prior to deployment of  equipment 
(example: BOP was not tested). 
 Positive-pressure tests of  well integrity. 
 Negative-pressure test of  well integrity. 
 Cement testing during formulation by Halliburton. 
 
 
 
 
 




 
 
Develop scenario plan 
and modelling 
capability  
 Model of gas flow and explosion on the rig. 
 Cement model software at Halliburton 
 Independent testing of cement formulation by Chevron 
and CSI. 
 OLGA software well-flow modelling. 
 Simultaneous Operations using storyboarding to 
coordinate operations after the event. 
 Oil spill modelling after the event. 
 Forensic study of BOP after it was retrieved from the 
sea floor (flow modelling, finite element modelling). 

 
 
 
 













 
 
Leverage preparedness 
plan  
 Blow-out procedures during well completion. 
 Rig abandonment procedures. 
 
 
 
Implement training  Blow out prevention school for key engineers 
 Online electronic bulletins and document databases. 
   
 
Establish frequent 
communications with 
supply chain partners 
 Improve communication with key suppliers: e.g. 
Halliburton communication of cement test results was 
incomplete. 
 Increased frequency of press and public 
communications-daily press briefings. 
 Real-time video camera feed (‘spillcam)’. 
 Congressional hearings after the event. 
 Radio relay network for thousands of ships and team to 
coordinate response. 
 Invite external experts (academic, industry) to assist in 
design. 
 






 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Table 30: A Summary of Finding from BP Deepwater Horizon 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tailored approaches Examples from BP Response to Deepwater Horizon 
Oil Spill 
D1 D2 D3
Establish relationship 
with competitors 
 Outsourcing key tasks (Halliburton, Chevron, etc.) 
before and after event. 
 Shell help BP adding capacity by provides ships for 
clean up. 
 Marine Well Company formed after event to facilitate 
recovery and reduce cost of reserve. 
   

 
Create integrated 
response team 
 BP internal investigation team. 
 Established integrated response team called “Unified 
Command”. 
  
 

 
 
Establish learning 
from past events and 
during the events 
 BP investigation team on root-cause and possible 
mitigation. 
 National Commission on BP Deepwater Horizon Oil 
Spill Offshore Drilling 
 Chief Counsel’s Report 
 Coast Guard ISPR and BOEMRE Joint Investigation 
 DNV BPO Report on key equipment. 
 Department of Justice Investigation on potential 
criminal liability. 
  





 
Assure management 
and employee capacity 
 Rig was abandoned relatively quickly to avoid further 
casualty. 
 Leverage rig personnel in immediate fire-fighting 
operations. 
 Extensively staffed 27 hours search for survivors. 
   

 
Increase capacity  Oil recovery and burning facilities put in place to 
reduce impact of spill. 
 Hire wide group of existing fishing vessels to assist in 
recovery (‘Vessels of Opportunity’) 
  
 
Develop product or 
solution extensions 
 Initiate Relief Well drilling immediately. 
 Develop new design solutions in place (Top Hat, Oil 
Boom, Artificial Barrier, Top Kill, Skimmers, Junk 
Shot, BOP activation) 
  
 


 
Acquire additional 
suppliers 
 Relief well drilling using capacity from Transocean. 
 Leasing of clean-up equipment from across the 
industry. 
  
 
Increase flexibility  Design of rigs for multiple operations (exploration, 
drilling, production on both gas and oil) 
   
Increase inventory  Deploy remotely operated vehicle (ROV) with more 
flexible tooling 
   
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Chapter 7 
Validation with Disruption at  
BP Texas City 
7.1 Company Overview 
BP Products North America Inc. is part of BP plc with headquarters in London, 
England. In 2005, it was the third largest energy company and fourth largest 
company by revenue of any kind. The Texas City refinery, where the explosion 
occurred, was BP's largest oil refinery with thirty process units spread over 1,200 
acres and 1,600 permanent employees.  There were approximately 800 additional 
contractor staffs are on site for significant turnaround work at the time of the 
incident. Prior to 1999, Amoco owned the refinery. BP merged with Amoco in 
1999 for GBP 67 Billion and BP subsequently took over operation of the plant. It 
was the largest corporate acquisition ever41.  
The plant processes over 430,000 barrels of crude oil a day and produce about 11 
million gallons of gasoline a day.  The refinery also produces jet fuels, diesel fuels 
and chemical feedstocks. It is one of five BP refineries in North America, produces 
30 percent of BP's North American gas supply and 3 percent of the U.S. supply 
(2005) 42 .  About 31,000 people live within a three-mile radius of the refinery, 
according to Census data. 
The refinery ranks as the eighth largest polluter in the state of Texas (disregarding 
March 23, 2005 explosion). It released 5.1 million pounds of pollutants in 2002, 
according to the latest data, including some chemicals that are known carcinogens 
and cause other serious health effects.  
Texas City is also the site of the worst industrial accident in U.S. history. In 1947, a 
fire aboard a ship at the Texas City docks triggered a massive explosion that killed 
576 people and left fires burning in the city for days. 
                                                 
 
41 CBS (2007) 
42 OSHA (2005) 
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7.2 Background of BP Texas City Refinery Explosion 
At 13.20 PM on March 23, 2005, a series of explosions occurred at the BP Texas 
City refinery during the restarting of a hydrocarbon isomerization unit. Fifteen BP 
employees and contractors were killed and 180 others were injured. Many of the 
victims were in or around work trailers located near an atmospheric vent stack, in 
violation of safety regulations. The explosions occurred when a distillation tower 
flooded with hydrocarbons and was over pressurized, causing a geyser-like release 
from the vent stack. The event triggered an extensive review of management and 
operational practices in BP and the refining industry. 
7.3 Companies and Parties Involved 
After the shock of the explosion, the site was secured and four agencies team were 
established to immediately determine the causes of the explosion on 24 March 
2005. An overview of the investigations is presented below. 
United States Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) 
The U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, also known as the 
Chemical Safety Board or CSB, is a U.S. federal agency charged with investigating 
industrial chemical accidents. Headquartered in Washington, DC, the agency's 
board members are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The 
CSB conducts root cause investigations of chemical accidents at fixed industrial 
facilities, looking into all possible causes of chemical accidents, ranging from 
equipment failure to safety management.  
The scope of the investigation 
The board conducted the broadest investigation of the plant explosion, initially 
estimated to take at least a year. It was not restricted just to determining BP 
compliance with state or federal regulations. It interviewed witnesses and employees 
independently of other federal agencies. "We look at the whole issue of 
management systems, root causes, and we come up with recommendations," said 
chemical safety board member John Bresland. The board held one public meeting 
halfway through the investigation, and another at the conclusion. The Board does 
not assess fines, but can recommend them to other federal agencies.  
 231 
Conduct of the investigation 
Investigators from the CSB arrived at the facility on the morning of March 24, 
2005. During the investigation, the CSB reviewed over 30,000 documents; 
conducted 370 interviews; tested instruments; and assessed damage to equipment 
and structures in the refinery and surrounding community. Electronic data from the 
computerized control system and process information from five years of previous 
startups were also examined. The CSB investigation team was supplemented by 
experts in blast damage assessment, vapour cloud modelling, pressure relief system 
design, distillation process dynamics, instrument control and reliability, and human 
factors.  
The results of the agency’s investigation 
Two years after the tragedy in BP’s Texas plant, on March 20th, 2007, the CSB 
published its Final Investigation Report consisting of incident overview, analysis of 
safety system deficiencies in unit startups, incident investigation system deficiencies, 
other safety system problems and also analysis of BP’s safety culture, description of 
root and contributing causes of BP’s safety problems and recommendations for 
future improvement..  
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is an agency of the federal 
government of the United States charged with protecting human health and with 
safeguarding the natural environment: air, water, and land. The EPA began 
operation on December 2, 1970, established by President Richard Nixon.  
The scope of the investigation 
The EPA was charged with determining whether the explosion or fire released 
hazardous material into the environment. The agency began air monitoring at the 
plant and up to four miles away in surrounding communities, and one-half mile 
downwind of the site. No dangerous chemicals were detected..  
United States Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) 
The United States Occupational Safety and Health Administration is the agency of 
the United States Department of Labor.  
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The OSHA mission is to assure the safety and health of America's workers by 
setting and enforcing workplace standards. Most American workers come under 
OSHA jurisdiction. Investigators first secure the scene of a chemical plant accident, 
interview employees and management and then look at the operation of the plant 
and maintenance of equipment prior to the accident. By law, the team has up to six 
months to complete its investigation.  
The results of the agency’s investigation 
On September 22nd 2005 OSHA and BP reached the agreement following OSHA’s 
investigation of the accident. Under terms of the settlement, BP Marketing agreed 
to:  
 Pay USD 21,361,500 in penalties and abate all hazards for which it was cited. 
 Complete a review of the ISOM unit to determine how it can be operated safely 
and alert OSHA if and when a decision is made to start up the unit in the 
future; retain a firm with expertise in process safety management (PSM), 
including pressure relief systems, safety instrumented systems, human factor 
analysis and performing process safety audits, to conduct a refinery-wide 
comprehensive audit and analysis of the company's PSM systems. 
 Hire an expert to assess and report on communication within and between 
management, supervisors, and authorized employee representatives and non-
management employees and the impact of the communication on 
implementation of safety practices and procedures. 
 Submit to OSHA and BP Products' authorized employee representative, every 
six months for three years, logs of occupational injuries and illnesses ("OSHA 
300 Logs") and all incident reports related to PSM issues. 
 
Notify the OSHA area office of any incident or injury at the Texas City facility that 
results in an employee losing one or more workdays during the same three-year 
period.  
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Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) 
Texas Commission on Environmental Quality or TCEQ is the state's 
environmental control agency, operates the most extensive pollution-monitoring 
network in the country. It works with the federal EPA to measure whether harmful 
agents were released by the accident. A spokesman for the state agency said that 
their monitoring has not detected any dangerous emissions. Runoff from the water 
and foam used to fight the fire was contained within the facility and did not enter 
the storm drains, said spokesman Terry Clauson. The agency also inspected for 
compliance with permits at the time of the explosion.  
The results of the agency’s investigation 
The 2005 annual average benzene concentrations reported near the Texas City Ball 
Park site (1.06 ppbv), and BP-sponsored site (2.70 ppbv) are above the long-term, 
health-based ESL of 1 ppbv. The comparison of the 2005 and 2004 annual average 
concentrations indicated an increase at both sites, with an approximate 35% 
increase at the BP-sponsored site. An evaluation of source identification near the 
BP-sponsored site was performed using the hourly autoGC data from the BP-
sponsored site (see attachment 4.) indicates that higher benzene concentrations 
were associated with winds blowing from the south. The 2005 annual averages 
reported near both the BP-sponsored site and the Texas City Ball Park site were 
attributed to frequent episodes of elevated benzene concentrations stemming from 
an onsite explosion on March 21st, 2005 and a power outage due to Hurricane Rita 
on October 3, 2005.  
BP Internal Investigation 
A BP group executive was assigned to lead the initial investigation and another 
three individual from outside of the Refining business were formed to the team. 
They took over the evidences gathering on March 26, 2005. 
The preliminary investigation was performed over five weeks at the BP Texas City. 
The investigation included the broadest evidences collection, visiting the incident 
site, reviewing whole documents, interview the witnesses, tested instruments and 
assessed damage on equipment and structures of refinery and surrounding 
community. Photographs were taken as supporting documents on the investigation. 
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Electronic data from computerized control system and process information from 
five years of previous start-ups were also examined. Chemical analysis and trial also 
taken place and collected as part of the investigation. 
All preliminary evidences gathered have been shared with four agencies team for 
further investigation. The main outstanding work of publication of the report was 
from: 
 Various process samples analysis. 
 Process instrument and equipment testing, such as relief valves. 
 Internal inspection of the Raffinate Splitter and Blowdown Drum and Stack. 
 Process and explosion modelling. 
 
7.4 Timeline of the Disruption 
A summary timeline of BP response to refinery explosion in Texas is shown in 
Figure 28. Timeline of BP Response to the Refinery Explosion in Texas City. In 
this study, the date 23 March 2005 is defined as ‘the event’ for purposes of analysis. 
A full timeline of BP refinery explosion is shown in Table 31. (See also Appendix 5) 
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Date Time Events 
21 February 2005 
 Raffinate splitter section of  the ISOM unit is shut down; the 12-hour consecutive day 
shift schedule begins. 
26 February2005 
 Operators try to open/close the pressure control (3-pound) valve from the control 
board; valve is unresponsive. 
10 March 05 
 A revised work order to replace leaking isolation valves is added to the list of  
turnaround work so that the level transmitter can be fixed.  
22 March 2005 
 Operators again try to open/close the 3-pound valve from the control board, but 
valve is unresponsive.  
Supervisor A tells instrument technicians to stop checking the critical alarms because 
the unit is starting up and there is not enough time to complete the checks. 
23 March 2005 
2.15 AM The Night Lead Operator begins filling the tower with raffinate feed from the satellite 
control room. 
3.09 AM 
* This study 
defined this 
point of  time 
as ‘the event’ 
in analysis. 
The tower high level alarm sounds when the level in the tower reaches 7.6 ft in the 
tower (72% on the transmitter). 
The redundant high level alarm switch does not sound when the tower level reaches 
7.9 ft (78% on transmitter). 
The Night Lead Operator fills the tower, stopping when the transmitter reads 99%, 
which should have been 8.95 ft (2.7 m) in the tower, but is actually 13.3 ft (4 m). 
5.00 AM The Night Lead Operator leaves the refinery a little over an hour before his scheduled 
shift leave time. 
6.06 AM The Day Board Operator arrives at the refinery. 
6.23 AM The Night Board Operator leaves the refinery.  
7.15 AM Supervisor A arrives for his shift. 
9.27 AM Operators open 8-inch NPS chain valve to remove nitrogen; the pressure in the tower 
drops to near 0 psig (0 kPa). 
A verbal miscommunication occurs between operations personnel regarding feed-
routing instructions. 
9.40 AM The Day Board Operator opens the tower level control valve to 70% output for 3 
minutes, then closes the valve.  
9.51 AM Start-up of  the raffinate unit recommences and the tower begins receiving more feed 
from the ARU. 
The Day Board Operator observes a 97% transmitter reading (which should have 
been an 8.85 ft, or 2.7 m, tower level) when he starts circulation. 
9.55 AM Two burners are lit in the raffinate furnace. 
10.47 AM Supervisor A leaves the refinery due to a family emergency; no supervisor or 
technically trained personnel replaces him. 
11.16 AM Two additional burners in the furnace are lit; the level transmitter reads 93%, which 
should have been a tower level of  8.65 ft (2.6 m); but is actually 67 ft. (20 m).  
11.50 AM Fuel to the furnace is increased; the actual tower level is 98 ft, but the transmitter 
reads 88% (8.4 ft.; 2.6 m). 
12.41 PM The tower's pressure rises to 33 psig (228 kPa); operators reduce pressure by opening 
the 8-inch NPS chain valve. 
12.42 PM. Fuel gas to the furnace is reduced; the actual tower level is 140 ft (43 m), but 
transmitter reads 80% (8 ft; 2.4 m). 
12.42 PM The Day Board Operator opens the tower level control valve to 15% output, then 
tries several times to increase output over the next 15 min.  
12.45 PM Approximately 25 people attend a safety meeting in the main control room until 
~13.10 PM.  
12.59 PM Heavy raffinate flow out of  the unit finally begins.  
13.02 PM Heavy raffinate flow out of  the tower matches the flow of  raffinate into the unit.  
13.04 PM The actual level in the tower is 158 ft (48 m) but transmitter reading has declined to 
78% (a level of  7.9 ft; 2.4 m). 
13.11 PM Supervisor A and Lead Operator talk; Supervisor suggests opening a bypass valve to 
relieve tower pressure. 
13.14 PM Hydrocarbon flows out of  the tower into overhead piping; tower pressure spikes to 
63 psig (434 kPa); all three-relief  valves open. 
The Board Operator begins troubleshooting the pressure spike; he notices the drum 
alarm had not sounded, so he resumes moves to reduce pressure believing there is a 
residual buildup of  non-combustibles in the tower.  
13.15 PM Fuel gas to the furnace is reduced. 
13.16 PM The Board Operator fully opens the heavy raffinate level control valve.  
13.17 PM The overhead reflux pump is started by outside operators.  
13.19.59 
PM 
The Day Lead Operator shuts off  fuel gas to the furnace from the satellite control 
room.  
13.20.04  
PM 
Vapour cloud ignites and explodes.  
Table 31: Timeline of BP Refinery Explosion in Texas City 
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Timeline of BP Response to the Refinery Explosion in Texas City 
 
Figure 28: Timeline of BP Response to the Refinery Explosion in Texas City 
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7.5 Handling of Disruption by BP 
7.5.1 Assessment of Causes 
Recovery from the Texas City disaster presented BP with significant challenges on a 
number of levels and on a range of time scales.  
Its first response was focussed on assuring the safety of employees and contractors, 
and to contain the fires that continued to burn at the plant. The immediate loss of 
life was tragic but limited, with the last body recovered the same day under rubble 
and the majority of injured treated. The Texas City facility was large and only 
partially closed.    
Notably, the first phone call by the on-site management after the event was made to 
a BP lobbyist in Washington, even before the site manager and the local executive 
team were notified. Clearly, reputation risk was triggered by the event, in the 
context of previous BP environmental and safety issues. 
Process safety was also of immediate concern. The facilities were in an unknown 
condition with an unknown volume of hydrocarbon discharged into the sewers and 
atmosphere. Immediately, all non-essential personnel were restricted, and changes 
were implemented to address the close proximity of trailers and meeting rooms to 
process equipment.  
BP faced litigation from the environmental damage and loss of life.  BP was already 
one of the largest polluters in Texas, and the event would increase by many factors 
the volume of toxic chemicals in the air over the nearby population. It was essential 
to secure all paper and electronic records and information that would be needed for 
internal and external investigation. 
BP had to understand not only the mechanics of the event but also the cultural, 
policy and business factors that made the event possible. Four factors were 
identified in the Internal BP investigation report – ‘Fatal accident investigation 
report’ which was finished on 9 December 2009: 
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 Loss of containment. 
 Raffinate Splitter Start-up Procedures and application of knowledge and skills. 
 Control of Work and Trailer Siting. 
 Design and Engineering of the Blowdown stack. 
 
The failure to take emergency action resulted in loss of containment of 
hydrocarbons, leading to the explosion. The inappropriate siting of work trailers 
close to the blowdown stack put hundreds of employees and contractors at grave 
risk. Had a warning been sounded, more could have escaped serious harm. Well-
understood system design and engineering would have reduced the risks of such an 
event occurring, had recommended changes been implemented. 
Longer term, BP faced a challenge in changing its management culture and policies, 
not only to avoid such events, but also to respond faster when catastrophic failure 
occurs. 
7.5.2 Overview of BP Response 
BP launched and completed the internal investigation that cooperated with other 
agencies that carried out their own investigations. As stated in the BP’s statement 
on CSB’s final investigation report, BP produced to CSB over 6,300,000 pages of 
documents and made over 300 witnesses available for CSB interviews. More 
importantly, BP created an Independent Panel, to assess process safety management 
and safety culture (proper operation of equipment and handling of hazardous 
materials) at BP’s US refineries. The Independent Panel undertook investigations, 
and issued their report in January 2007. According to Panel’s findings, BP gained 
false confidence in its safety culture before the blast as the result of effort put in 
providing personal safety (meaning preventing workers’ falls or slips). This finding 
is stated as opposed to CSB’s conclusion that the safety lapses had been clearly 
linked to the budget costs in the 1999. 
In the June 2007 BP, prompted by the Panel, appointed an independent monitor 
whose task is to oversee safety improvements. For this position, Duane Wilson, a 
retired vice president of refining, marketing, supply and transportation for 
ConocoPhillips was chosen. 
 239 
BP also reached an agreement with OSHA. Under terms of the settlement BP 
agreed to fulfil six requirements (among them: to pay more than USD 21 Million in 
penalties, complete a review of the ISOM unit, retain a firm with expertise in PSM, 
hire an expert to assess and report on communication within and between 
management, supervisors, and authorized employee representatives and non-
management employees and the impact of the communication on implementation 
of safety practices and procedures, submit to OSHA and BP Products' authorized 
employee representative, every six months for three years, logs of occupational 
injuries and illnesses, notify the OSHA area office of any incident or injury at the 
Texas City facility that results in an employee losing one or more workdays during 
the same three-year period43. 
7.5.3 Coding and Categorisation of Data from BP Texas City 
Warning – Early warning before the event 
Examples 
 Assure function of alarm system (High-level alarm sounded two minutes late 
when much higher liquid level was received). 
 Visually inspect equipment  (Broken physical sight equipment was present). 
 Alert worker population  (No general alarm sounded, instead radio reports and 
shouting to notify workers in the area). 
 Testing of alarms, which had not been done as required by standard operating 
procedures. 
Code: timing, warning, alarm, training, maintenance, monitoring, communication, verification, 
testing 
 
Before the explosion and the fire in March 23, 2005, BP had long history of safety 
incidents, as follows, with 23 workers were killed in the 30 years prior to the ISOM 
event.  
In March 2004 there was a blast and fire at a BP refinery in Texas City, about 35 
miles southeast of Houston. That explosion forced the evacuation of the plant for 
                                                 
 
43  OSHA (2005) 
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several hours, but no one was injured. The Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration fined the refinery USD 63,000 in that blast after finding what it 
called serious safety violations, including problems with the emergency shutdown 
system and employee training. OSHA also fined the refinery this month for safety 
violations after two employees were burned to death by superheated water in 
September. 
In August 2000, a fire erupted in a cooker unit at the plant, then known as BP 
Amoco oil refinery. About 20 workers escaped without injury.  
The fire caused extensive damage to a unit used to make dry by products of the 
gasoline refining process and turn them into coke — a hard, coal-like substance 
sold and used for fuel in industrial furnaces.  
In 1992, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration cited BP predecessor 
Amoco Oil Co. for using equipment, including a splitter — the same type of 
machinery at the centre of the current investigation — in a manner "that allowed 
toxic gases to vent to the atmosphere ... thus exposing employees to flammable or 
toxic gases." The four-month investigation was part of a broader initiative launched 
by OSHA after a string of fires at industrial facilities44. 
In 1993, Amoco Oil Co. agreed to pay USD 20 million in damages to the family of 
a worker who died after an April 1992 explosion at the Texas City plant.  
In July 1995, an explosion rocked the Texas City facility. No one was seriously 
injured though at least 105 people were taken to local hospitals with breathing 
problems and burning eyes. The incident happened after oil began leaking from a 
catalytic cracker, which produces gasoline components from oil. 
 
  
                                                 
 
44 Houston Chronicle (2005) 
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Modelling – Develop scenario plan and modelling capability 
Examples 
 Model key process lows (Gas flow modelling). 
 Perform major risk analysis (Major accident risk analysis performed in 2003, 
however using limited scope and only generic industry data). 
Codes: modelling, analysis and learning 
 
Other types of testing either failed or were not implemented.  Simulation for 
training on disaster management was not available to the process operators. In its 
place, so-called ‘gun drills’ – verbal discussions of hazardous operations – were 
inconsistently used; either technique was recommended in 2001 but not in evidence 
in 2003 and 2004. 
Other types of systems testing was postponed or eliminated. The level indicators, 
for example, were not calibrated for the typical or extreme liquid temperature 
conditions: when the splitter was full and at the high temperature (300 degrees), it 
would read 78% - it should have been adjusted or training provided to indicate 
100%.  The datasheet, which would have been used for calibration, was more than 
30 years old and never updated. Physical sight glass, which would normally allow 
visual inspection of fluid levels, were too dirty for use and could not be removed 
until leaking valves were repaired. These levels were important for calibration of 
other instruments and alarms.  The same leaks prevented testing of the alarms that 
failed.  Finally, the blowdown drum high level alarm which failed to sound was 
found to have material wear and would not have sounded – giving crucial 2 minutes 
to evacuate the area.  The test procedures used by BP were simpler than those 
recommended by the manufacturer, and would not have revealed the malfunction 
(Goettsche, 2005). 
Process, knowledge, mechanical and systems testing of the production environment 
could have contributed to avoidance or earlier detection of the incident. Focus on 
reducing employee fatality and injuries from previous accidents contributed to a 
false sense of improvement in the robustness of the site; reduction in training and 
testing budgets left a significant risk of catastrophic failure. 
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Internal communication – Shorten lines of communication 
Example: BP created a new communication structure for safety related issues. 
Codes: communication and safety 
 
Lack of communication contributed directly to the accident and delayed awareness 
of the growing risk. Specifically, operations personnel on the 23rd of March failed to 
communicate firstly, the required routing of products from the raffinate splitter and 
secondly, the degree to which the splitter was filled. Normally this information is 
conveyed from management and supervisors and between operations shifts during 
hand-over. With the lack of emphasis on communications by BP management, this 
critical information was not recorded in any logbook or passed on when the day 
shift arrived. The need for clearly defined roles and responsibilities regarding 
communications is cited by the CSB, in particular during time so of sensitive 
operations and changes of personnel. 
Often near misses and early warning signs foreshadow serious accidents, as noted 
by the CCPS in its ‘Guidelines for Investigating Chemical Process Incidents (1992). 
Further, the CSB report cites James Reason on the organizational causes of 
accidents, who states that effective safety culture, relies on the organization being 
informed (Reason, 1997).  BP Texas City had many incidents that went unrecorded 
and unreported – site risk management, issued before the March explosion, was 
that “the site was not reporting all incidents in fear of consequences.”  
Extensive organization changes after the Amoco merger, and continued re-
organization since, had a negative impact on the vertical communications within the 
BP group. Important findings on safety, for example, were not communicated to 
executives.  BP's outgoing refining chief testified in a deposition in 2006 that he 
first learned of serious safety concerns at the company's Texas City refinery in 
March 2005, after the event. 
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Modelling – Develop scenario planning 
Example: Provide business planning on major risks 
Codes: business planning, risk, disruption, forecasting 
Manzoni also was shown a January 2005 business plan that stated among key risks, 
Texas City "kills someone in the next 12-18 months." Manzoni said part of business 
planning was to articulate risks. "It is not a prediction. It is a planning 
mechanism45". 
Employee capacity – Increase employee capacity 
Examples 
 Increase employee shifts to 12 hours. 
 Manage safety of employees (in this case, reduced physical safety buffer by 
placing personnel close to production equipment). 
Codes: capacity, distraction, layout, labour reallocation 
 
Ever stricter profitability targets reduced investment in physical plant and staff over 
the years. This also led to inadvertent reduction of safety zones, e.g. the siting of 
trailers close to high-volume hydrocarbon production. Similarly, lax control of the 
work environment led to overloaded staff – ‘stepped up’ employees and contractors 
took on multiple roles without additional training. Shifts ran 12 hours on a regular 
basis during the shut-down and start-up phase around the time of the accident, 
leading to employee fatigue. In the control room, where numerous visual 
distractions were evident and phone calls took place during monitoring, operators 
could not easily detect anomalies nor react quickly. Recommendations were based 
by the CSB to improve this labour ‘reserve’ – running staff until failure was no 
more safe than running equipment to failure, as was the BP practise. 
  
                                                 
 
45 Houston Chronicle (2007)  
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Relationship with governments 
Example: Management of relationship with regulatory bodies (EPA, OSHA) 
Codes: government, regulation, relationship 
BP has been in the radar of various agencies on environmental and employee 
protection.  As mentioned earlier, the very first management action at Texas City 
was a phone call to its lobbyist in Washington. 
Teamwork – Create integrated response team 
Example: Creation of cross-function investigation team within BP in first 24 hours. 
Codes: team, investigation and cross-functional 
 
Within 24 hours, BP formed an investigation team with participation from 
executives, permanent and hourly workers, and its subcontractors.  As stated in the 
BP’s statement on CSB’s final investigation report, BP produced to CSB over 
6,300,000 pages of documents and made over 300 witnesses available for CSB 
interviews. BP created an Independent Panel, to assess process safety management 
and safety culture (proper operation of equipment and handling of hazardous 
materials) at BP’s US refineries. The Independent Panel undertook investigations, 
and issued their report in January, 2007. According to Panel’s findings, BP gained 
false confidence in its safety culture before the blast as the result of effort put in 
providing personal safety (meaning preventing workers’ falls or slips). This finding 
is stated as opposed to CSB’s conclusion that the safety lapses had been clearly 
linked to the budget costs in the 1999.  
The Chemical Safety Board expanded on this work and provided a much more 
critical external view in its final report 24 months after the event. Because of delays 
by BP in implementing early recommendations, the CSB expanded its investigation 
and later a new committee chaired was formed. This panel review refinery safety 
across five BP sites, and its findings echoed the CSB.  
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Planning – Leverage preparedness by update procedures 
Example: Updated procedures were implemented (Staff did not follow standard 
shutdown or emergency procedures). 
Codes: procedures, training, emergency 
 
As is discussed in the response, both prevention and mitigation procedures were 
not adequately updated or followed in this event. 
Implement Training – Provide training on detection and response 
Example:  
 Provide employee training on leading indicators. 
 Leverage external resources (Trained local fire fighting personnel and 
ambulance services). 
 
BP Texas City implemented and updated training programs on leading indicators to 
detect anomalies as well as training to external parties in the event of major 
disruption. 
7.5.4 Response Time at BP Texas City 
D1 - Detection of the event 
Since the Amoco merger, Texas City plant managers faced strict targets on 
maintenance investment. Targets were set on improving capital performance, to the 
extent that local management fought to reverse some of the scheduled cuts.  
The reduction in maintenance was visible at a technical level, with faulty alarm 
systems, reduced training, even simple visible liquid level indicators on key 
equipment being ‘blackened’ and unreadable already for years. BP debated the 
inadequate level of investment; the fact remains that equipment was faulty and 
process status difficult to verify. Investment in physical plant has a parallel 
requirement for human capital and equivalent shortfall; though the operating team 
was fully staffed at the time of the accident, key-operating personnel had minimal 
training or experience. 
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D2 – Design of a Solution 
All the disaster, in the words of one BP executive, ‘was years in the making’, the 
process failure took hours and the explosion occurred literally in seconds. Without 
adequate warning, little could be done at the moment to avoid full scale destruction 
of much of the unit. To find a longer-term solution to avoid impact of the same 
underlying causes, intensive investigation was warranted. It was one of the worst 
industry accidents in the country; the risk of repeating such an event in a critical 
energy supply chain had to be reduced. 
D3 – Deployment of the Solution 
Speaking to a conference on process safety, BP Senior VP John Mogford related 
what they saw as key causes and lessons from the event:  
“Firstly, over the years the working environment had eroded to one characterized 
by resistance to change and lack of trust, motivation and purpose. Expectations 
around supervisory and management behaviour were unclear. Rules were not 
followed consistently. Individuals felt disempowered from suggesting or initiating 
improvements. 
Secondly, process safety, operations performance and systematic risk reduction 
priorities had not been set nor consistently reinforced by management. Safety 
lessons from other parts of BP were not acted on.  
The changes in site layout were made permanent, increasing the safety margin 
through greater work area.  ‘Hot’ work – where high temperatures are involved, 
such as from welding, were also separated and controlled during critical periods. 
In summary, BP found critical importance in the following recommendations: 
 Real-time management awareness of activities taking place. 
 Capturing the right metrics on process safety. 
 Up-to-date and implemented procedures. 
 Two-way communications.  
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 Investigating process incidents and loss of containment incidents and 
documenting all incidents thoroughly.  
 Sharing what is learned. 
 Training programs. 
 Keeping non-essential personnel out of process areas.  
 
BP was investigated by OSHA a number of times after 2005, and due to continued 
violation was fined a record USD 87M in 2009: “The U.S. Department of Labor's 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) today announced it is 
issuing USD 87 Million in proposed penalties to BP Products North America Inc. 
for the company's failure to correct potential hazards faced by employees. The fine 
is the largest in OSHA's history. The prior largest total penalty, USD 21 Million, 
was issued in 2005, also against BP.”   (OSHA) 
BP also reached an agreement with OSHA. Under terms of the settlement BP 
agreed to fulfil six requirements (among them: paying USD 21 Million in penalties, 
complete a review of the ISOM unit, retain a firm with expertise in PSM, hire an 
expert to assess and report on communication within and between management, 
supervisors, and authorized employee representatives and non-management 
employees and the impact of the communication on implementation of safety 
practices and procedures, submit to OSHA and BP Products' authorized employee 
representative, every six months for three years, logs of occupational injuries and 
illnesses, notify the OSHA area office of any incident or injury at the Texas City 
facility that results in an employee losing one or more workdays during the same 
three-year period46).  
 
In the June 2007 BP, prompted by the Panel, appointed an independent monitor 
whose task is to oversee safety improvements. For this position, Duane Wilson, a 
retired vice president of refining, marketing, supply and transportation for 
ConocoPhillips was chosen. 
                                                 
 
46  OSHA (2005) 
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A Summary of the findings in related to the 3-D framework from Texas City case in 
shown in Table 32. 
Table 32: A Summary of the Findings from BP Texas City Case 
Tailored approaches Examples from BP Texas Refinery Explosion D1 D2 D3 
Develop advanced 
warning system 
 Failed alarm systems, e.g. high-level alarm sounded two 
minutes late when much higher liquid level was 
received. 
 Broken physical sight equipment for visual inspection. 
 No general alarm sounded, instead radio reports and 
shouting to notify workers in the area. 
 Alarms not tested prior as required by standard 
operating procedures. 

 

 
 
 
  
Conduct stress testing  No approval of  facilities layout (dangerous positioning 
of  trailers). 
 Lack of  process review during sensitive shut down / 
start up phases. 
 
 
  
 
Develop scenario plan 
and modelling 
capability  
 Gas flow modelling. 
 Major Accident Risk analysis performed in 2003, 
however using limited scope and generic industry data. 
 

 
 
 
 
Leverage 
preparedness plan  
 Standard shutdown procedures. 
 Standard emergency procedures. 
  
 
 
 
Implement training  Employee training on leading indicators to sense 
possible disruptions. 
 Local trained emergency response services from Texas 
City fire and ambulance services. 
 
 
  
 
 
Establish frequent 
communications with 
supply chain partners 
 Participation in congressional hearings. 
 Baker panel on BP refinery safety to review 
implementation of  recommended changes. 
 CSB investigations on root-cause and management 
background to the event. 
 EPA investigations on adherence to regulation and 
environmental impact. 
 OSHA investigations on root-cause and employees 
safety. 
 

 

 


 

 
 
Create integrated 
response team 
 Creation of  cross-functional investigation team within 
BP in first 24 hours. 
   
Shorten lines of 
communications 
within the 
organisation 
 BP created a new communication structure for safety 
related issues. 
 

Establish learning 
from past events and 
during the events 
 Independent panel to determine critical factors. 
 Updated physical site layout recommendations. 
 Numerous recommendations on engineering, process, 
management, training. 

 
 
 
 
 


 
Assure management 
and employee capacity 
 Improved safety procedures for employees. 
 Improved control over dangerous (‘hot’) work areas and 
general operations during sensitive start-up and 
shutdown sequence. 
   

 
 
Increase capacity  Improved staffing to reduce employee fatigue and 
improve alertness and response speed. 
 Reduce distractions in control room. 
 Allocate time to complete testing.  
 Geographic reserve – greater spacing of  activities for 
improved Simultaneous Operations, e.g. trailer siting. 
 

 
 
 



 
Develop product or 
solution extensions 
 Changes in system design (e.g. removing out-of-date 
blowout preventor). 
   
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Chapter 8 
The Emergent Theory 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter addresses the findings of the study after all data have been coded, 
categories identified, the properties and the links between categories established and 
the emerging theory has been delimited. A detailed explanation of the core concepts 
and related categories is provided here. 
8.2 Integrating Categories and Their Properties 
During the open, axial and selective coding of data from interviews and data other 
sources in three cases, properties of and links between the categories and sub-
categories became explicit. At this stage of analysis, the focus is on integrating the 
core categories with their sub-categories and creating suitable definition to be 
applicable beyond the current data sources. 
Based on this approach, four major factors can be shown to have an impact on the 
time in which organizations can respond to catastrophic risk in the supply chain are: 
Preparation, Partnership, Organization, and Reserve (Figure 29). The findings show 
that the presence  – or lack of – these factors can have a major influence on the 
response speed for the effective management of disruption.  
These factors can require significant investments and trade-offs in resource 
allocation, and have – as discussed – varying impact during the typical phases of 
response.. An evaluation of return on investment before, during and after a 
catastrophic event is evident in the approach taken by each firm. Some tailored 
approaches used by the firms showed interaction between multiple factors: reserve 
capacity can be both internal to the organization, as in the mothballed Nicole 
production lines at PHARMA, or externally with partners, as in the oil recovery 
ships from Shell, a traditional competitor to BP. Such external partnerships, for 
example, reduce the cost of holding or internally pooling reserve capacity. 
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Figure 29: An Overview of the Core Categories and Sub-Categories Following Completion of the Analysis of Three Cases
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8.3 Factors Underlying Response Time 
As the primary outcome of the study, sub-categories derived and confirmed from 
the cases are depicted in Figure 30 illustrating the tailored approach each 
organization took to contribute to the four factors (Preparation, Partnership, 
Organization, Reserve), which underlie response time.   
Preparation includes approaches implemented prior to the event such as creating 
advance-warning systems; stress testing, scenario planning and modelling and 
training. Partnership includes management of the external relationships to improve 
response time, such as suppliers and customers, but also other influences and even 
competitors. Organization covers the steps taken in coordination, communication, 
roles and responsibilities, and learning within the border of the firm.  Reserve covers 
the full complement of resources, attributes of supply chain resources, and 
techniques to improve capacity in a timely fashion, such as flexibility, inventory, 
management and employee capacity and product or production line extensions. 
Each factor has a positive effect on the firm’s ability to reduce response time; this in 
turn reduces the negative impact of catastrophic disruption on the supply chain. 
The characteristics and relationships of the core categories are explored in detail 
below (see also Figure 30): 
1. Preparation 
2. Partnership 
3. Organisation 
4. Reserve 
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Figure 30: Factors Underlying Companies' Response to Supply Chain Disruption 
 
8.4 Preparation 
Preparation can be considered to consist of the tailored approaches made prior to 
detection of an event that contribute positively to the organization’s speed of 
response. Preparation can be mandated by industry or government regulation, grow 
out of experience with previous events, or come from fortuitous alignment with 
supply chain optimization for normal operations.  
Preparedness is defined here as the degree to which the organization has executed 
activities and investments are identified during the cases to prepare an organization 
to handle disruption.   
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From the data, there is a clear focus in preparation on information access and 
interpretation within the organization and also extending to information gathering 
partners along the supply chain.  Viewed along a time dimension, this preparation 
takes the form of response review and post-event learning (‘lessons learned’).  
Assessment of organizational preparedness is linked to improved avoidance and 
rapid response. Having plans such as contingency (recovery) plans, business 
continuity plans, and preparedness plans in place and ready to use will shorten the 
response time to different types of disruption. This can have a positive impact on 
design lead-time as well as reducing deployment lead-time. 
8.4.1 Develop Advanced Warning System 
Early detection of impending events or anticipation of the impact of disruption is 
implemented through one or more advanced warning systems. These systems must 
help distinguish routine operational events and those that indicate elevated risk of 
disruption. Event correlation is a key capability – advanced warning of disrupted 
production and sudden influx of orders, for example, would elevate priority of the 
coincident data.  Failure to detect deteriorating safety culture and increasing 
frequency of accidents is another example of the need for event correlation. 
Advanced warning systems can take a range of forms and inputs, from automated 
systems and through processes of observation and notification, using data from 
monitoring internally and externally along the supply chain. 
Early warning of potential or impending events relies, on information access and 
interpretation. At a most mechanical level, this is illustrated by failure of the 
Deepwater Horizon to correctly monitor on the rig – or offshore in real-time – the 
ominous increase in well pressure, foreshadowing an imminent blowout. Had the 
crew been alert, and taken the right action to redirect the erupting mix of mud and gas 
overboard, the resulting explosion could have been delayed or mitigated. Failed 
monitoring processes and equipment contributed directly to the disaster at Texas City. 
PHARMA stated that much information was first visible in the public press, both at 
the outside and at later stages of the pandemic. 
 
8.4.2 Conduct Stress Testing 
Stress testing is an exercise that helps managers identify and prioritize potentially 
vulnerability of the supply. 
Creating different scenarios and rehearse simulations runs/drills is seen to enhance 
the company’s ability to respond more quickly. Sodhi and Tang (2009, P.36) 
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addressed that “the deployment time accounts for the preparation time to launch 
the selected recovery plan, scenario planning and stress tests are effect mechanisms 
for reduce deploy lead time.” 
Targeted testing of components, systems and processes in the supply chain can 
reveal vulnerability before risks escalates.  Where this is not feasible, live testing can 
be replaced or supplemented with modelling, and this is found in each of the cases. 
While PHARMA runs successful preparedness exercises each year, investigation of 
BP Texas City revealed that pressure to reduce cost had reduced frequency of fire 
drills from bi-weekly to monthly. This division of BP was also noted for its ‘run to 
failure’ use of infrastructure, rather than implement rigorous testing of technical 
systems and processes. Likewise, prior to the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster, BP 
Upstream failed to assure that its partner Transocean had met recommended 
procedures for periodic testing of the Blowout Preventer (BOP).  Transocean had a 
‘condition based’ approach, e.g. testing was done based on experience of equipment 
use and failure, in some way corresponding to the ‘run to failure’ approach of BP. 
Failure to accurately predict increasing risk of failure of such components led to 
elevated risk exposure. 
 
That said, stress testing itself could elevate systemic risks, as in the case of the 
Chernobyl nuclear disaster, which failed during a test procedure. Pressure testing of 
the oil well prior to production triggered the immediate failure, which caused the 
well blow-out on BP Deepwater Horizon: 
Stress testing of concrete formulation by Halliburton was not communicated in full to 
the BP Horizon drill team – only a final successful test was confirmed; previous 
failures that revealed instability were not disclosed until after the accident. Further, 
misinterpreted ‘negative pressure’ test results at BP Deepwater Horizon, which the 
drill team erroneously interpreted to indicate successful securing of the well, exposed 
the rig to disaster during subsequent steps. This is reminiscent of the nuclear 
meltdown on 26 April 1986 at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant in the Ukrainian 
SSR which was caused by poorly designed recovery procedures during stress testing of 
the reactor control systems. 
 
8.4.3 Develop Scenario Plan and Modelling Capability 
 
Modelling of potential risks was used in each of the companies, both before and 
after the event. As a technique for encapsulating experience and reducing the skill 
burden during operations, modelling and simulation provide a useful avenue for 
both disaster avoidance and optimizing deployment of scarce human resources and 
other assets.  
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This tailored approach can also include development of a risk map – identification 
of potential risks and assessment of impact. This was implemented, in the case of 
PHARMA, as a two-dimensional matrix, estimating event frequency and severity. In 
an engineering scenario, the risk map is expressed as a fault tree – where failure of 
an element could trigger certain symptoms, and therefore such symptoms or 
warnings, when present, could be traced back to potential faults.  However, these 
risk map representations may not accurately express heightened risk conditions, e.g. 
coincident events can elevate total risk. This is the case when safety systems fail at 
the same time as production systems, as seen in the BP Deepwater Horizon case.  
It is important to point out as well modelling, just as with stress testing – can also 
increase risk or create false confidence if a false sense of security if this testing no 
longer corresponds to actual conditions and system behaviour.  
Given the very complex response to the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill, in which 
dozens of ships and thousands of staff were working in unprecedented proximity of 
each other and thousands of barrels of explosive hydrocarbons, each operation 
required close coordination and control. A simulation facility for ‘Simultaneous 
Operations’ was developed where the design of possible solutions could be tested and 
each stage of deployment could be carefully modelled to avoid further disaster or 
delay. 
 
8.4.4 Leverage Preparedness Plan 
Advanced planning, including up-to-date roles and responsibilities (an approach 
recorded as part of the Organization factor), are identified as being key to rapid 
response.  From the cases under study, this includes response procedures for each 
geographic, organizational or functional business unit. The currency – how up-to-
date- these plans and structures are – was shown to the effectiveness of such plans 
in the response process. 
PHARMA observed that while its emergency plans were correctly in place for lines of 
business and physical plant locations, reorganization through a corporate efficiency 
program resulted in many staff identified in the plans as having taken new roles. 
Further, some newly assigned staff who were responsible for site-level deployment 
were unaware that they had been assigned such a task.  At BP Texas City, after 
frequent management reorganization and the speed of possible events made it policy 
to allow for any staff person to initiate the emergency response. In contrast, on the 
BP Deepwater Horizon, the captain of the Deepwater Horizon scolded its young, 
inexperienced ship-positioning operator for taking the liberty to officially make the 
Mayday distress call, despite the fact that the rig was very close to total destruction. 
 
At BP Texas City, the first response by management was to call its government Public 
Relations staff, secondly to inform the Business Unit Leader by phone – an issue in 
corporate priorities that was highly critical of BP during litigation against the firm.  
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8.4.5 Implement Training 
Training of organization staff, suppliers and customers is identified as a key element 
of rapid event detection and solution implementation. Skills are shown to be 
essentially for early detection of impending events, as well of course as avoiding the 
underlying root cause, for example, where a trigger is found in misjudged or 
erroneously executed procedures. Adequate training internally and externally, 
beyond typical operational requirements, allows rapid redeployment of skills for 
greater capacity reserve and flexibility.  Training of staff across multiple roles and 
skills could assure continuity in the event that some staff were unavailable and also 
create increased capacity where resources needed to be shifted, for example as 
production was reallocated in the PHARMA case. 
After the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster, an important learning point was made 
retrospectively for the otherwise experienced operators on the rig. The team 
erroneously believed that ill-fitting data from a ‘successful negative pressure test’ was 
caused by a ‘bladder effect’ (higher pressure due to configuration of the drilling fluid). 
No such effect exists – this was a propagated myth among some field engineers – and 
ultimately cost the life of the veteran drilling engineer who erroneously believed that 
explanation. Sadly, he died the day before he was scheduled to leave active work and 
to begin teaching at the company’s well control school. Recommendations by various 
panels after the BP Texas City also focussed on training to help staff identify the ‘early 
indicators’ of increasing risk. 
 
8.5 Partnership 
Management of external relationships is shown to be an important dimension in the 
response to disruption. They can further trace the impact of each disruption along 
the supply chain from upstream partners to downstream customers. This requires 
productive relationships and communication between supply chain partners. This 
requires productive relationships and communication between supply chain 
partners.  Creating a common awareness of different types of disruptions and the 
impact on both parties could decrease the risk for all parties; “Companies must 
identify ways to share the information with their supply-chain partners and to get 
similar information from them” (Sodhi & Tang, 2009 p: 36). 
Due to the nature of complex and global supply chains, large investment in 
specialized skills and capital, the firms studied here operate with extensive 
partnerships. Only seven of 126 employees on the Deepwater Horizon were actual 
employees of the ‘responsible party’, BP Upstream. All of the dead in the Texas City 
disaster were from companies contracting to BP.  Indeed the disruption to supply 
chains, or in the case of PHARMA’s response to swine flu, had an impact far beyond 
each organization. Accordingly, Partnership is identified as an important category of 
capabilities related to risk response. Many companies identify potential disruptions to 
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business according to their impact and likelihood as part of their Business Continuity 
Plans. 
 
8.5.1 Establish Frequent Communication with Supply Chain 
Partners 
 
Communication between supply chain partners is identified as a critical element of 
response. As events evolve, control of communication to external parties is 
prioritized, in particular where the catastrophic impact of the disruption is visible in 
the public sphere. First information about events, in fact, is itself in public media. 
PHARMA was asked to comment in press interviews on public perception of  ‘price 
gouging’ of scarce medicines and made forced to make public statements on its 
distribution policy. BP Texas City issued a number of press releases and enlisted its 
mid-tier international executives in communications. Learning from previous failures 
to communicate effectively with government, the public and its partners, BP 
Upstream deployed real-time video feeds to show the actual, live flow of oil into the 
Gulf from 5,000 feet below the surface. Direct disclosure of frequent information is 
driven today by new forms of media and a need to retain trust and brand confidence 
in an increasingly online world. Legal restrictions and litigation, however, can make 
sharing of information difficult if not impossible. Facing huge fines, each party in the 
Deepwater Horizon case was reluctant to provide unfettered access to staff or 
engineering data. The failed equipment, recovered from the sea floor, remained as of 
this writing under close guard on US Federal government property. It is expected to 
remain there to support litigation for several decades. 
8.5.2 Establish Relationship with Governments and Agencies 
 
Governments, local and federal, along with a plethora of government and 
regulatory agencies play an increasingly important role in the allocation of resources, 
protection of employees and environment, parameters of trade and license to 
operate complex supply chains. In the case studied, the government plays a key 
influencing role and direct role as supplier (of right to drill, for example) or 
customer (for purchase of medicines on behalf of the population). It is natural that 
the relationship between the firm and various government agencies is a focal point 
for response. 
In a global supply chain, a number of activities including sourcing, manufacturing, 
distribution and marketing will fall under the control or influence of various local and 
international governments and agencies. These external bodies have considerable 
influence on the regulatory environment and can have a dramatic affect on the 
operating environment of a supply chain before and after a major disruption. The 
policy and operating relationship with such agencies is an explicit element of risk 
response. For downstream partners, close coordination and information exchange was 
important – PHARMA proactively contacted relevant organisations such as the 
WHO, the CDC, the Department of Health and Human Service in the US, The 
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control and different governments 
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around the world. Being in direct contact with these parties helped PHARMA 
understand their needs and develop estimates for manufacturing capability and the 
timing of possible production as well as determine the benefit of developing 
additional technology for the production of a pandemic vaccine. PHARMA worked 
with its government customers to allocate scarce capacity (‘proportional response’).  
The first phone call made from BP Texas City was to its lobbyist in Washington.  
Lack of participation of the US President and the CEO of BP in the early stages of 
the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster was equally vocally critised. 
 
8.5.3 Establish Relationship with Business Partners 
 
The relationship with upstream and downstream business partners is by definition a 
key control point in the supply chain. Management of such external relationships 
during the response to a catastrophic event takes on new priority and new 
mechanisms maybe established in the context of these relationships.  In one of the 
most studied supply chain cases, that of the fire at a Philips Electronics chip factory 
in Arizona, Nokia has quickly moved to capitalize and extend a closer working 
relationship that its rival Ericsson, enabling Nokia to secure scare inventory and 
remaining production capacity. This led Ericsson Mobile to tremendous financial 
and market share losses and eventual merger with Sony. 
PHARMA has defined certain risk management processes for external suppliers. 
PHARMA had a team looking at external suppliers, because a significant portion of 
the supply chain is outside PHARMA and it must be ensured that those sites are 
considered in the BCP. For example, PHARMA assessed if it had any outsourcing or 
external contractors in Mexico in addition to its own site. Medically critical products 
or revenue-critical products could be affected by production or transport shutdown. 
Accordingly, on 29 April 2009 PHARMA gave antiviral drugs to its employees in 
Mexico to assure their safety as well as manufacturing and supply continuity. 
8.5.4 Establish Relationship with Competitors 
 
Competitors who may play an adversarial role during routine business can play a 
very different role in the risk response, in particular where the event affects multiple 
supply chains and can put either the entire industry or downstream customers under 
stress. The nature of the relationship with competitors has both tactical (event 
response) and strategic (market-shaping) aspects in the events under study. Parallel 
to the shift from normal organizational design to crisis response within the 
organization, each case shows the unique competitive and supply chain 
configuration required to accelerate response in crisis. 
BP Refining and Marketing shared findings with industrial competitors. BP Upstream, 
while protective of proprietary data on geologic information and drilling techniques (it 
refused to provide information to medical staff that was treating injured workers, so 
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as not to disclose formulation of drilling fluid), later joined a consortium of 
competitors to form a dedicated, not-for-profit disaster recovery organization – with 
investment of more than GBP 600 Million.  
 
BP Upstream also leveraged support from erstwhile competitor Chevron to model 
and stress test cement composition, in an effort to identify root-cause of the 
Deepwater Horizon Disaster. BP drew on partners that it harmed – local fisherman – 
through a special program, ‘Vessels of Opportunity’ which gave financial reward to 
affected fisherman for assisting in oil spill recovery. This novel approach of 
supporting such a widely affected group of downstream partners – tens of thousands 
of individuals participated – created logistic demands and administrative burden, 
however capped exposure to litigation, reduced public brand damage, and provided 
some capability in oil spill control. The technical mechanism, such as a purpose built 
radio-relay system, as well as lessons learned for both effective and ineffective spill 
control, are a key contribution of BP to the industry initiative on protecting the Gulf 
from subsequent disaster. 
 
 
8.6 Organisation 
Organization refers to investments and strategies that are directed to the structure 
and internal management capabilities of the organization. In all three cases, the 
companies refer extensively to their organizational structures and work culture. 
Communication and decision-making are a key component of these factors. Clarity 
and speed of communication as a consequence of organizational structure are 
highlighted as relevant attributes for fast response. 
The lack of investment in organizational capabilities is traced to increased likelihood 
and impact of disruption. 
BP was known to have a culture of austerity, acquiring many older firms with aging 
equipment and under investing, as stated by its own site management. PHARMA had 
designed a new line of communications and assigned a communications manager after 
it became aware of the ‘noise’ during the few weeks of the outbreak.  Following Van 
Wassenhove (2006), effective coordination has three forms: (1) centralized 
coordination by command (2) coordination by consensus and information sharing and 
(3) coordination by default, e.g. through routine communication. PHARMA applied 
coordination by command during the design and deployment phases. According to 
Sodhi and Tang (2009), these two phases need to take central command for collecting 
and analysing information to design a recovery plan and disseminating information 
regarding the deployment of the selected recovery plan. In PHARMA's case, the 
central command was the MSC pandemic team. 
 
8.6.1 Create Integrated Response Team 
After detection of the events, each organization assigned an integrated team to 
investigate and respond to the event, indicating that internal structures for routine 
supply chain operation may not be adequate for rapid response. This integrated 
response team was supplemented by external expertise and capacity. 
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PHARMA assigned working groups at each level of the organization. After initial 
failures by BP Upstream to stem flow of oil into the Gulf, growing frustration with 
the company prompted the US federal government to extend the mission of the Coast 
Guard’s Incident Management team under a “Unified Command”.  BP Texas City 
managed an integrated investigation team with representation from executive, 
‘salaried’ and ‘hourly’ workers to get a complete picture on possible changes in 
responding to the event. 
 
8.6.2 Shorten Lines of Communications within the Organisation 
 
Fast and direct communication was mentioned as a critical capability in developing 
and deploying possible solutions.  In the case of PHARMA, this was evident where 
information would be cascaded through different layers of the organization through 
multiple functional groups, e.g. production, HR, etc.  The delay and potential 
miscommunication inherent in relayed communication forced a rapid restructuring 
of communications to reduce confusion. Electronic means, such as a shared online 
team room, were employed to shorten lines of communication. 
PHARMA mentioned the importance of collaborative techniques such as online team 
rooms to support deployment. BP claimed to significantly change its internal 
communications culture to encourage faster risk response. 
 
8.6.3 Establish Learning from Past Events and During the 
Events 
 
While major disruption is by definition rare, explicit learning from such events 
becomes even more a priority.  Study of events faced competitors, historical events, 
comparable scenarios are all part of a learning process to understand best practices. 
PHARMA implemented an After event executive review; BP Texas City and BP 
Deepwater Horizon triggered ongoing highly technical and broad organizational 
investigation that continue to influence preparation by all industry participants. 
PHARMA could leverage experience with previous types of Influenza, in processes as 
well as possible supply chain solutions. Incentives and rewards have a strong influence 
on internal communication and learning, according to executives at PHARMA.   In 
contrast, BP Deepwater Horizon’s owner, Transocean, failed to keep its engineers 
informed of very similar events in the Northsea drilling, where the same type of well 
design and engineering approach resulted in loss of well control just weeks earlier. 
Investigation in each case by internal and external parties can be seen to have two 
components: root-cause analysis, in part to prepare for litigation, and 
recommendations going forward. In the case of BP Refining and Marketing, failure to 
implement many recommendations made after Texas City was cause for the company 
to be investigated again (Baker Commission) and heavily fined (more than GBP 50 
Million).  
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8.6.4 Clarify Roles and Responsibilities 
Well-defined roles and responsibilities may be explicitly defined for each of phase 
of handling disruption. The authority to manage the crisis, for example, at 
PHARMA rested politically with plant and site managers, however the expertise was 
with specialists. Names mentioned in some plans were out-of-date; this is an issue 
of maintaining Preparation (see above). 
PHARMA observed that while its emergency plans were correctly in place for lines of 
business and physical plant locations, reorganization through a corporate efficiency 
program resulted in the prior year left many staff identified in the plans as having 
taken new roles. Further, some newly assigned staffs that were responsible for site-
level deployment were unaware that they had been assigned such a task 
 
 
8.7 Reserve 
The category of Reserves covers the affordable additional resource beyond those 
required for routine operations, which are immediately available for the firm to 
mount an effective response, in detection (e.g. redundant alarm systems), in design 
(e.g. scientific staff on board) or deployment.  
Chopra and Sodhi (2009) discuss a range of techniques for tailoring reserves to 
mitigate risk. Companies can extend their reserves by increasing capacity, acquiring 
redundant suppliers, improving responsiveness, increasing inventory, increasing 
flexibility, pooling or aggregating demand and increasing production capability. 
However, the cost of building up a reserve must be balanced against the level of 
risk. According to Chopra and Sodhi (2009), when the cost of building a reserve is 
low, the reserves can be decentralized. Where costs are high, the reserves should be 
centrally pooled. Similarly, they state that when the level of risk is low, the strategy 
should focus on cost reduction. When the risk is high, the focus should be on 
mitigation to reduce the likelihood of occurrence. 
They also proposed ‘three time-tested approaches’ (Figure 31) which can be used to 
help managers and companies mitigate inventory risk, are: (1) pooling inventory, (2) 
creating common component across product lines and (2) postponing or delaying 
the last stage of production. 
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Figure 31: Rule of Thumb for Tailored Risk Management 
Source: Chopra & Sodhi (2004) 
Internal capacity, above and beyond the mechanisms for routine supply chain 
management, is shown as an important factor in risk response in the cases studied 
here.   
This is visible in terms of moth-balled production lines (PHARMA) that were quickly 
activated, also the availability of drilling rigs and support ships from Transocean 
already in the Gulf of Mexico that were not otherwise scheduled. The lack of such 
additional reserve is evident there was well: specialized fuel-burning equipment was 
weeks in transit from France, needed to safely burn-off the recovered oil where 
dozens of other ships were active in close proximity. 
 
8.7.1 Assure Management Capacity and Employee Capacity 
Protection of employee and management capacity was one of the first and most 
rapidly implemented steps in each case under study.  Both management skill and 
employee resources are seen as critical to response speed. The threat to employees 
from the event could trigger a delay or reduction in ability to respond, for example 
through illness, as well as increase in actual demand for intermediate or end 
product. Rapid isolation of key skills was implemented, for example by restricting 
out-of-country travel for country and site management at PHARMA.  Immediate 
abandonment of the BP Deepwater Horizon rig served to limit casualties. 
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PHARMA required its mangers to remain in country. BP Refining and Drilling has 
focussed on employee safety before and during the event, however mistakenly 
neglecting to cover process safety in the same fashion – and non-employees were 
obviously at full risk. BP Deepwater Horizon management chose to immediately 
abandon the rig; no further deaths occurred after the initial explosions.  Able rig 
workers who survived were immediately pressed into service to fight the explosion 
from arriving support craft, and all were heavily involved in the investigation – legal 
and technical – after the event. 
 
8.7.2 Increase (Production) Capacity 
Ramping up production capacity along the supply chain is an explicit goal in the 
crisis response. This can take on both physical dimension of goods and equipment, 
but is also implemented in the greater concentration and availability of human 
capital, in terms of better structuring management, expertise and skills to improve 
capacity. 
Geographically diverse supply chains, such as commodity oil and gas, by their nature 
require distributed investment in capacity. Spare drilling rigs can be moved, albeit 
slowly; fixed production equipment cannot. However, higher-value intermediate 
products, as well as critical skills and knowledge, can be accumulated centrally to 
support faster response.  PHARMA, for example, stockpiled active ingredients and 
had implement procurement contracts in place for rapid acceleration of production. 
In the engineering- and science-intensive field of hydrocarbon exploration, BP 
Upstream maintains an offshore centre in Houston that has a myriad of engineers and 
facilities working in frequent, often real-time, cooperation with offshore teams.  This 
centralized capability is a key design for reducing expensive offshore deployment, but 
was also critical to rapid design, evaluation and control of the various attempts to 
resolve the oil spill. 
8.7.3 Develop Product or Solution Extension 
Each organization studied maintained a portfolio of possible response solutions, 
which were extended to address requirements for flexibility, speed of response, and 
more rapid increase in capacity growth.  These measures could be implemented for 
example in simplification of production steps (PHARMA), increased flexibility of 
technology or techniques (BP), changing design parameters and regulations (BP 
Texas City). 
Following the natural reassortment of viruses to form new pathogens, PHARMA can 
recombine existing active ingredients, vaccines, and delivery mechanisms to scale-out 
and scale-up production. BP Upstream had minimal experience with possible 
solutions to well blow-out, and other than the relief well, and struggled to find or 
develop a workable solution to the Deepwater conditions of the disaster at Macondo. 
In fact, many weeks and hundreds of millions of pounds was spent on adapting, 
modelling, and deploying solutions that failed – while million gallons (equating to tens 
of millions of dollars in environmental damage fines) of oil flowed unhindered into 
the Gulf.  It became evident that nothing in oil spill recovery had evolved since the 
Exxon Valdez disaster some twenty years earlier; the same techniques were tried and 
failed on a grand scale.  BP Refining and Marketing identified hundreds of 
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recommendations at Texas City, however had failed to implement previous lessons 
and recommendations on plant design and layout which could have reduced the scale 
of impact – more explicitly, the number of deaths and serious injuries. 
 
8.7.4 Acquire Additional Suppliers 
Capacity constraints on components, supplies, labour and distribution, to name a 
few restrictions, can hinder rapid expansion or recovery of supply chain capacity. 
Despite growing fluidity in faster, typically on-line sourcing procurement, 
protection of intellectual property (PHARMA) and regulatory control make it 
essential that firms ‘prepare’ to rapidly acquire additional suppliers. 
PHARMA was fortunate, in responding to the demand from China and LDCs, that it 
had explored a voluntary licensing arrangement two years prior. Governments, under 
the same stress of rapid growth in demand, correspondingly had ‘Advanced Purchase 
Agreements’ in place on pre-negotiated terms to acquire Influenza medicines. 
 
8.7.5 Increase Flexibility 
An additional reserve of supply chain capacity is found through flexibility. This can 
be the redeployment of production equipment or staff resources in the supply 
chain, adaptable tooling (such as undersea equipment for deepwater operations, 
reducing the need to resurface equipment), but also in policy such as the scarce-
product allocation in PHARMA. 
PHARMA could shift production – labour resources – from two different lines to 
increase Influenza medicine availability while retaining a robust production capability 
for unrelated lines. BP Upstream used a multi-purpose rig, the Deepwater Horizon, 
for both exploration and establishing production readiness.  This flexibility can come 
at a cost: such a rig, for example, is at the top-end of daily rates (USD 1 Million per 
day for certain operations).  The recovery operation also created new modes of 
flexibility for its remotely operated vehicles (ROVs), which could rapidly exchange 
tooling without resurfacing from the seafloor – saving many hours on every step. 
 
8.7.6 Increase Inventory 
Traditional supply chain optimization often seeks an ‘optimal’ stock of inventory to 
reduce working capital or increase design flexibility. Sudden spikes in demand or 
disruption of supply to inventory can obviously diminish the firm’s ability to 
respond. As the evolution of a disruption may be unpredictable, the firms studied 
here sought to increase inventory to cover variance in the supply chain. 
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Sharp increase in demand or sudden disruption in the supply chain will have an 
immediate shift in the optimal availability of inventory. Increasing inventory is an 
explicit goal in this data, as part of the solving disruption remedy itself  - e.g. 
emergency equipment - and as part of meeting existing or increased demand. Where 
competitors are affected in the same disruption, increase in inventory on scarce inputs 
becomes a competitive priority. While a carrying cost can be significant, ‘strategic’ 
inventory – as PHARMA refers to stock of key materials – is shown in these cases to 
support faster recovery. PHARMA, for example, reduces the dependency on shared 
machinery with limited capacity by over-producing secondary products in the supply 
chain. BP Upstream could assemble a remarkable fleet of support ships for oil 
recovery through its partnerships, though often operated at the extreme edge of 
internal capacity in many of its operations. Similarly, BP Refining and Marketing had 
driven its production capacity to the limit – employee exhaustion, reduced testing, 
reduced training, reduced supervision, reduced operating maximum pressure of aging 
equipment, etc. all pointed to a lack of ‘inventory’ in a broad sense that made incident 
detection and management far more difficult. 
 
8.8 Core Categories in Related to the 3-D Framework 
This research has used diverse examples of catastrophic events to argue that firms 
can use a time-based risk management concept to reduce the response lead-time 
(detection time  (D1) + design lead-time (D2) + deploy lead-time (D3)), which will 
in turn reduce the impact of a disruption.  
Through an iterative process of coding and categorisation, each tailored approach is 
identified which is expressed in observations of relevant actions performed by the 
firm or related parties.  Some approaches are seen as lacking, but suggested in the 
subsequent root cause analysis or after-the-fact recommendations made by the firm. 
The four factors are explained earlier in the previous section.  These factors may 
have significance across one or more phases of the response lifecycle.  The use of 
each tailored approach in the cases is shown in the following (Table 33) across the 
lifecycle of detection-, design- and deployment lead-time.   Moreover, while some 
approaches may be uniquely effective in the context of catastrophic risk 
management – for example cooperation in recovery with direct competitors – the 
most effective approaches may have a positive effect on operational performance, 
prior to an event.  
Table 33 summarizes the observed actions in each case, indicated as follows: 
 
 Actions were explicitly identified and taken by the firm to improve response 
time. 
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 Actions were identified after the event, and are considered by the firm as 
potential improvements in response for comparable events in the future. 
 Actions were not taken nor identified by the firm or its partners, but might have 
had a positive impact on response speed. 
 Actions were not taken nor identified by the firm or its partners, and would be 
unlikely to have had a relevant or positive effect on response speed. 
 
The first two are indicated by a diamond symbol [], the second by a dash [-]. As 
this study is in the early stages of building the framework, only positive 
observations can be confirmed. Investigation on the effectiveness of each approach, 
impact of withholding the tailored approach or possible risks for each would be 
appropriate in further study of the same or new cases in management of disruption 
risk.  
Table 34 shows a summary of examples from three cases by grouping the actions 
and initiatives taken by each company in detection and response to the disruption. 
Data display was used in an organised, compressed way according to Miles and 
Huberman (1994) for the purpose of data reduction. The table suggest tailored 
approached activities that would enable the firms to reduce the respond lead-time, 
which affect the impact of supply chain disruptions. Correspondingly, as evidenced 
by investigation and retrospective recommendations, lacks of such capabilities 
hinder companies in detecting and responding in a timely fashion to severe 
disruption. 
 
 267 
Time Factors Tailored approaches PHARMA 
BP 
Deepwater 
BP 
Texas 
D
e
te
c
ti
o
n
 T
im
e
 (
D
1)
 
Preparation 
Develop advanced warning system    
Conduct stress testing    
Develop scenario plan and modelling 
capability  
-   
Leverage preparedness plan  - - - 
Implement training -   
Partnership 
Establish frequent communications with 
supply chain partners 
  - 
Establish relationship with local and 
international agencies, business partners 
and competitors 
  - 
Organisation 
Create integrated response team - - - 
Shorten lines of  communications within 
the organisation 
- -  
Clarify roles and responsibilities - - - 
Establish learning from past events and 
during the events 
- -  
Reserve 
Assure management and employee 
capacity 
- - - 
Increase capacity - -  
Develop product or solution extensions - - - 
Acquire additional suppliers - - - 
Increase flexibility - - - 
Increase inventory - - - 
D
e
si
g
n
 L
e
a
d
-T
im
e
 (
D
2
) 
Preparation 
Develop advanced warning system - - - 
Conduct stress testing - - - 
Develop scenario plan and modelling 
capability  
  - 
Leverage preparedness plan     
Implement training - - - 
Partnership 
Establish frequent communications with 
supply chain partners 
   
Establish relationship with local and 
international agencies, business partners 
and competitors 
- - - 
Organisation 
Create integrated response team    
Shorten lines of  communications within 
the organisation 
 -  
Clarify roles and responsibilities  - - 
Establish learning from past events and 
during the events 
   
Reserve 
Assure management and employee 
capacity 
- - - 
Increase capacity - - - 
Develop product or solution extensions   - 
Acquire additional suppliers  - - 
Increase flexibility   - 
Increase inventory - - - 
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Table 33: A Summary of Findings from Three Settings in Related to 3-D Framework 
 
      
Time Factors Tailored approaches PHARMA 
BP 
Deepwater 
BP 
Texas 
D
e
p
lo
y
 L
e
a
d
-T
im
e
 (
D
3
) 
Preparation 
Develop advanced warning system - -  
Conduct stress testing   - 
Develop scenario plan and modelling 
capability  
-   
Leverage preparedness plan     
Implement training    
Partnership 
Establish frequent communications with 
supply chain partners 
   
Establish relationship with local and 
international agencies, business partners 
and competitors 
  - 
Organisation 
Create integrated response team   - 
Shorten lines of  communications within 
the organisation 
 - - 
Clarify roles and responsibilities - - - 
Establish learning from past events and 
during the events 
-   
Reserve 
Assure management and employee 
capacity 
   
Increase capacity    
Develop product or solution extensions    
Acquire additional suppliers -  - 
Increase flexibility   - 
Increase inventory   - 
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Factors 
underlying 
response 
lead time 
Tailored approaches Examples from PHARMA  H1N1 2009 Influenza 
Pandemic 
Examples from BP Response to Deepwater 
Horizon Oil Spill 
Examples from BP Texas Refinery 
Explosion 
Preparation 
(PR) 
Develop advanced 
warning system 
 Assigned staff  to monitor the information and process 
flow. 
 Well pressure monitoring: distractions while 
working prevented early detection.  
 Gas detection systems for early warning 
(example: drill floor level was alarm was 
turned off) 
 Lack of  shift change information from night 
to day shift. 
 Driller’s display screen (Sperry-Sun) difficult 
to interpret, e.g. (pressure anomaly unnoticed) 
 No on-shore real-time monitoring facility. 
 Failed alarm systems, e.g. high-level alarm 
sounded two minutes late when much 
higher liquid level was received. 
 Broken physical sight equipment for 
visual inspection. 
 No general alarm sounded, instead radio 
reports and shouting to notify workers in 
the area. 
 Alarms not tested prior as required by 
standard operating procedures. 
Conduct stress testing  Pandemic stress testing each year (July).  Engineering tests prior to deployment of  
equipment (example: BOP was not tested). 
 Positive-pressure tests of  well integrity. 
 Negative-pressure test of  well integrity. 
 Cement testing during formulation by 
Halliburton. 
 No approval of  facilities layout 
(dangerous positioning of  trailers). 
 Lack of  process review during sensitive 
shut down / start up phases. 
Develop scenario plan 
and modelling 
capability  
 Modelling the second wave of pandemic to estimate 
demand of medicines. 
 Model of gas flow and explosion on the rig. 
 Cement model software at Halliburton 
 Independent testing of cement formulation by 
Chevron and CSI. 
 OLGA software well-flow modelling. 
 Simultaneous Operations using storyboarding 
to coordinate operations after the event. 
 Oil spill modelling after the event. 
 Forensic study of BOP after it was retrieved 
from the sea floor (flow modelling, finite 
element modelling). 
 Gas flow modelling. 
 Major Accident Risk analysis performed 
in 2003, however using limited scope and 
generic industry data. 
Leverage preparedness 
plan  
 Assessment and update site pandemic preparedness 
plan. 
 Blow-out procedures during well completion. 
 Rig abandonment procedures. 
 Standard shutdown procedures. 
 Standard emergency procedures. 
Implement training  Assure skill availability for managing risk.  Blow out prevention school for key engineers 
 Online electronic bulletins and document 
databases. 
 Employee training on leading indicators 
to sense possible disruptions. 
 Local trained emergency response 
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Factors 
underlying 
response 
lead time 
Tailored approaches Examples from PHARMA  H1N1 2009 Influenza 
Pandemic 
Examples from BP Response to Deepwater 
Horizon Oil Spill 
Examples from BP Texas Refinery 
Explosion 
services from Texas City fire and 
ambulance services. 
Partnership 
(PA) 
Establish frequent 
communications with 
supply chain partners 
 Proactive contact with governments to anticipate 
orders and allocate stock proportional to need. 
 Increase frequency of press and public 
communications. 
 Establish direct line of communication with external 
suppliers. 
 Improve communication with key suppliers: 
e.g. Halliburton communication of cement test 
results was incomplete. 
 Increased frequency of press and public 
communications-daily press briefings. 
 Real-time video camera feed (‘spillcam)’. 
 Congressional hearings after the event. 
 Radio relay network for thousands of ships 
and team to coordinate response. 
 Participation in congressional hearings. 
 Baker panel on BP refinery safety to 
review implementation of recommended 
changes. 
 CSB investigations on root-cause and 
management background to the event. 
 EPA investigations on adherence to 
regulation and environmental impact. 
 OSHA investigations on root-cause and 
employees safety. 
Establish relationship 
with government, 
agencies, press, 
business partners and 
expertise 
 Coordination with international agencies e.g. CDC and 
WHO. 
 Establish relationship with experts in the industry. 
 Invite external experts (academic, industry) to 
assist in design. 
  
Establish relationship 
with competitors 
 N/A  Outsourcing key tasks (Halliburton, Chevron, 
etc.) before and after event. 
 Shell help BP adding capacity by provides 
ships for clean up. 
 Marine Well company formed after event to 
facilitate recovery and reduce cost of reserve. 
 N/A 
Organisation 
(O) 
Create integrated 
response team 
 Create pandemic management organisation chart. 
 Established integrated response team called “Crisis 
Management Team”. 
 Create frequent communication with site directors. 
 Set up a War room at headquarters. 
 Established online team room for document sharing. 
 BP internal investigation team. 
 Established integrated response team called 
“Unified Command”. 
 Creation of cross-functional investigation 
team within BP in first 24 hours. 
Shorten lines of  
communications within 
the organisation 
 Modify organisation hierarchy to shorten lines of 
communication. 
 N/A  BP created a new communication 
structure for safety related issues. 
Clarify roles and 
responsibilities 
 Revised logistics pandemic BCP and site pandemic  N/A  N/A 
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Factors 
underlying 
response 
lead time 
Tailored approaches Examples from PHARMA  H1N1 2009 Influenza 
Pandemic 
Examples from BP Response to Deepwater 
Horizon Oil Spill 
Examples from BP Texas Refinery 
Explosion 
preparedness plan. 
 Revised and updated roles and responsibilities as 
formally documented in RACI diagram. 
 
Establish learning from 
past events and during 
the events 
 Learning from past epidemics (e.g. H5N1 Avian Flu).  BP investigation team on root-cause and 
possible mitigation. 
 National Commission on BP Deepwater 
Horizon Oil Spill Offshore Drilling 
 Chief Counsel’s Report 
 Coast Guard ISPR and BOEMRE Joint 
Investigation 
 DNV BPO Report on key equipment. 
 Department of Justice Investigation on 
potential criminal liability. 
 Independent panel to determine critical 
factors. 
 Updated physical site layout 
recommendations. 
 Numerous recommendations on 
engineering, process, management, 
training. 
Reserves (R) Assure management 
and employee capacity 
 Distribute H1N1 antiviral medicines to employees. 
 Lockdown managers in-country and restrict travel to at-
risk areas (Mexico). 
 Recruiting contingency workers to cover peak period 
and move to 24/7 shifts for greater production capacity 
in existing sites (Nicole). 
 Rig was abandoned relatively quickly to avoid 
further casualty. 
 Leverage rig personnel in immediate fire-
fighting operations. 
 Extensively staffed 27 hours search for 
survivors. 
 Improved safety procedures for 
employees. 
 Improved control over dangerous (‘hot’) 
work areas and general operations during 
sensitive start-up and shutdown sequence. 
Increase capacity  Reallocate labour resources to increase capacity of 
Nicole. 
 Leverage production load balancing by reducing load of 
production on some sites while increase production on 
main sites. 
 Oil recovery and burning facilities put in place 
to reduce impact of spill. 
 Hire wide group of existing fishing vessels to 
assist in recovery (‘Vessels of Opportunity’) 
 Improved staffing to reduce employee 
fatigue and improve alertness and 
response speed. 
 Reduce distractions in control room. 
 Allocate time to complete testing.  
 Geographic reserve – greater spacing of 
activities for improved Simultaneous 
Operations, e.g. trailer siting. 
Develop product or 
solution extensions 
 Having easier-to-manufacture Nicole capsule inhaler 
product design in place and ready to produce. 
 Accelerate approval process for new products e.g. 
Nicole capsule inhaler and antiviral masks. 
 Initiate Relief Well drilling immediately. 
 Develop new design solutions in place (Top 
Hat, Oil Boom, Artificial Barrier, Top Kill, 
Skimmers, Junk Shot, BOP activation) 
 Changes in system design (e.g. removing 
out-of-date blowout preventor). 
Acquire additional 
suppliers 
 Granting a production licence to a Chinese 
manufacturer. 
 Relief well drilling using capacity from 
Transocean. 
 N/A 
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Factors 
underlying 
response 
lead time 
Tailored approaches Examples from PHARMA  H1N1 2009 Influenza 
Pandemic 
Examples from BP Response to Deepwater 
Horizon Oil Spill 
Examples from BP Texas Refinery 
Explosion 
 Leasing of clean-up equipment from across 
the industry. 
Increase flexibility  Using generic pack (vanilla pack) instead of market 
specific packaging. 
 Shift shared Hematol manufacturing capacity to Nicole. 
Shared same machine, labour, resources, warehouse, 
quality insurance etc. 
 Design of rigs for multiple operations 
(exploration, drilling, production on both gas 
and oil) 
 N/A 
Increase inventory  Increase raw material by securing all available active 
pharmaceutical ingredients (API) from the suppliers. 
 Increase strategic stock of micronised ingredients. 
 Deploy remotely operated vehicle (ROV) with 
more flexible tooling 
 N/A 
Table 34: A Summary of Examples from Three Settings
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Chapter 9 
Conclusion 
9.1 Research conclusion 
This empirical study of three cases of major supply chain disruption set out to 
contribute to the further development of a framework of time-based supply chain 
risk management and formulate propositions for further study and validation. Three 
additional objectives were stated, to examine how three global corporations 
perceive and manage risk, look at how companies incorporate techniques to reduce 
time, and finally identify, analyse and categorize the possible factors that underlying 
time of response. 
The investigation of three major supply chain disruptions demonstrates that there 
are identifiable patterns to how global organizations attempt to manage time in 
responding to supply chain disruption, through action and structure in detection, 
design and deployment of solutions. 
Grounded Theory methodology proved effective, where a Straussian approach was 
taken, using the time-based risk management framework as a lens to construct 
interview questions and case-based qualitative data collection.  An adaptive 
approach is used to formulate core categories of tailored approaches that can 
reduce time of detection, design and deployment of solutions. The emerging 
framework was further developed using data from the second two cases.  
Four propositions emerge, expressed below, stating that Preparation, Partnership, 
Organization and Reserve are key factors in reducing response time. The theoretical 
and management implications, and recommendations for further research are 
presented as follows. 
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9.2 Implications of the research 
9.2.1 Theoretical implications 
This research provides a first empirical examination of a time based risk 
management framework using Grounded Theory method.  
Based on our empirical research and review of the literature, I propose the 
following relationship between response time and each of four constructs. 
Proposition 1: Firm seeks to reduce response time to supply chain disruption 
through preparation by training, preparedness plans, stress testing, modelling or 
advance warning systems. 
Proposition 2: Firm seeks to reduce response time to supply chain disruptions 
through organisational development on lines of communication, roles and 
responsibilities, learning or empowerment. 
Proposition 3: Firm seeks to reduce response time to supply chain disruptions 
through partnerships among others suppliers, customers, technical and scientific 
experts, government agencies or public media. 
Proposition 4: Firm seeks to reduce response time to supply chain disruptions with 
appropriate reserves such as increased capacity or increased inventory. 
These propositions can augment existing knowledge related to time-based risk 
management but also support hypothesis testing for future research in the field of 
supply chain risk management. 
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9.2.2 Managerial implications 
The study is based on a set of real-world cases of supply chain disruption that had 
broad impact within and external to the firms. As a direct benefit from using a 
Grounded Theory methodology, the concepts derived remain close to the real-
world managerial perspective of the participants in each case.   Managers can 
benefit from adapting risk-mitigation and risk-response measures through 
improving existing or new business continuity efforts. Investors and stakeholders 
such as lenders, investors, government and industry bodies have a keen interest in 
understanding risk management readiness. Improved agility and responsiveness is a 
direct outcome of a time-based risk management, benefitting overall supply chain 
performance through greater awareness of primary and secondary processes and 
improved communication. 
Organizational factors internal and external to the organization are often 
mentioned. These are directly accessible for strategic management.  The identified 
tailored approaches are qualitative in nature, and should prove to be complementary 
to traditional quantitative supply chain modelling and management.  
The approach and framework of solutions may have benefits in general supply 
chain operational performance as well as improving speed of response during 
disruption.  For example, lines of manufacturing in PHARMA that can handle 
multiple products provide supply chain scale, flexibility and reserve capacity. The 
flexibility added to equipment used at vast depths beneath the sea was essential to 
develop and trial possible solutions to the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster. The 
same techniques now greatly reduce the time and expense in handling routine 
operations on the sea floor.  
This classification of factors can form the basis of a useful tool for supply chain 
managers to assess and balance investment in management of disruption risk in the 
supply chain.  
This study used pharmaceutical industry and energy industry as examples, but the 
findings can be applied in other industries, which can be useful to practitioners. 
There are recent cases of disruption both natural and man-made from supply-chains 
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in the electronic, computer and automobile industries where this could apply, to 
name a few. 
For instance, in mobile phone industry, one of the most referenced cases in supply 
chain disruption is the fire at the Philips microchip plant in Albuquerque, New 
Mexico in March 200, which simultaneously affected both Nokia and Ericsson. As 
the two major customers of the Philips plant, both firms were notified on the same 
Monday following the accident. Their very different reactions to this seemingly 
minor event have highlighted the importance of managing supply chain risk to 
other companies. While Ericsson took weeks to absorb the information and react, 
Nokia moved swiftly at all levels in its relationship with Philips and with alternate 
component suppliers, assuring continuity of product delivery towards its own 
customers. The impact was far-reaching – allowing Nokia to extend its market 
leadership (to 27% by 2002) and contributing to Ericsson’s merger of its handset 
business with rival Sony with loss of USD 400 million in 2000.  
The key lessons learned from this case can be structured using the proposed 
framework as follows: 
1. The cost of reaction grows disproportionately with time. The company, 
which can shorten respond time can effective, reduce impact of supply 
chain disruption (detection). 
2. By swiftly taking control of the supply of a critical component, Nokia 
secured its manufacturing its manufacturing capacity but also effectively 
blocked Ericsson from recovering in the same time-frame – this shows that 
Nokia had a superior reserve in term of production capacity and supplier 
capacity. 
3. Learning and organization are important. Nokia had previously faced a similar 
event and had subsequently put in place the mechanisms to support a faster 
and more flexible response. 
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4. A strong partnership with other suppliers helped Nokia secure reserve capacity 
at other Philips plants and every other supplier that Nokia could find. 
While, Ericsson had no other component source. This costly disruption 
generate new learning to Ericsson – as they company defined new concepts, 
put in place new methods and plans, and modelled reaction time in dealing 
with the inevitable disruption event in the future. 
During the primary cases were analysed, several comparable events underscored the 
need for a coherent time-based risk-management framework.  In March 2011, an 
earthquake of the coast of Japan was quickly followed by a devastating tsunami. At 
least 15,000 people died and more than one million buildings were destroyed or 
damaged. This virtually shut down industry for months in the region, having a 
significant impact on export-oriented industries.  
Just four months later, while Japan was still wrestling with near nuclear disaster at 
the damaged Fukushima power station and beginning the massive clean-up effort, 
catastrophic flooding hit Thailand, the worst for more than a century. Low-cost 
industrial production areas just north of Bangkok were among the areas worst hit, 
damaging production facilities in components and finished products such as 
automotive components, cameras, analog and semiconductors, and hard disks.  
Two of the largest disk makers, Western Digital and Seagate, had a large portion of 
their global manufacturing in the area and had to stop production, as did Toshiba 
whose motor supplier Nidec was unable to continue manufacturing.  Shipment of 
disks dropped by 25% in the third quarter of 2011, causing price increase and 
supply shortage in the laptop and consumer market. The Thailand flooding was the 
second major natural disaster to affect Japan that year.  Some 1,800 Japanese 
manufacturers operate in the country and 450 Japanese businesses are located in the 
flood-hit industrial parks. All major car manufacturers, for example,  have 
significant supply chain operations in Thailand serving the domestic and regional 
markets,  “HIS Automotive downgraded Thailand’s light-vehicle forecast to 1.64 
million units in the fourth quarter, down from 1.77 million units…these have 
affected vehicles to be exported to core market in the ASEAN region, Australia, 
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Japan and the Mille East where Thailand’s exports account for 56 percent of total 
production.47” 
These dramatic events, which affected millions of citizens as well as supply chain 
partners across the globe, provide a clear test of how quickly a global firm can 
respond and recover from disruption.   
 A less visible but equally far reaching event was triggered by a small fire in the Marl 
Chemical factory in Germany, part of Evonik Industries global manufacturing 
capabilities.  Sadly, although the fire was quickly extinguished, two employees died, 
and there was some concern over environmental impact to the nearby town; luckily 
no major health risk faced the broader public.  The plant produced a specialized 
resin used in the automotive industry to make brake and fuel lines.  This relatively 
small event pushed US OEMs and suppliers to meet as an industry to discuss the 
global impact:  “The shortage of the resin may impact the production of these 
components in the next few week. The shortage is real and immediate…the 
possibility of production interruptions at some of your facilities in the next few 
weeks is high48” said William Kozyra, chairman of Auburn Hills, Michigan-based TI 
Automotive. 
This latest supply chain disruptions should further companies interest in evaluating 
and managing their supply chain risks. It is also urged the companies, for example, 
to look at a greater geographical (location) spread of their supply chain for new 
factories and in terms of suppliers or relocating production.  The factors proposed 
in this paper can be used to evaluate response and improve response speed. Using 
this viewpoint, lessons learned from Tsunami and Thai floods include: 
1. Risk factors were overlooked when businesses sought areas with low labour 
costs such as the industrial zones north of Bangkok. 
2. Business should know their supply chain inside out – which includes 
knowing the business partners and understanding the risks they face and 
responses they might take. 
                                                 
 
47Zhang, F. (2008) 
48 Trudell et al., (2012) 
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3. Executives need to be aware of risks – this should be built into the  culture 
of the organisation. Every level in the company must know about the risks 
to the supply chain and any contingency and mitigation plans in place.  
4. Suppliers are a critical part of the supply chain and product development 
process, the relationship and frequent communications are critical to rapid 
response.  
5. Visibility into key supplier performance and the ability to evaluate and 
simulate disruption (preparation: scenario planning and modelling) and 
constraints are as important as the internal operation planning process. 
6. Risk mitigation and response management in the supply chain occurs at 
every level in the organization. 
7. Where products are highly specialized, as in the Marl fire example, the 
supply chain requires specific reserve capacity in the form of stock, 
manufacturing, or alternatives. 
8. Partnership with competitors or from exceptional relationships, such as in 
the nuclear response at Fukushima, which involved worldwide resources, 
can accelerate response. 
9.3 Limitations of the Study and Future Work 
While the methodology proved effective for the nature of event under study, the 
research has several limitations. 
Only two industries are used and two cases are from derived from the same firm, 
albeit quite different divisions and business models. Applicability to other industries 
could be explored through further study. 
A small set of cases was used, due to the intensity of study and duration.  Ideally, 
this could be expanded to a larger set, where statistical and other quantitative 
methods can enhance the qualitative approach used here. As mentioned, new cases 
could be added, such as the 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami in Japan, or 
flooding in recently developed industrial areas north of Bangkok. 
Firms are global and of societal importance, putting great scrutiny on external 
communications and analysis. These cases are particularly well studied and 
scrutinized in the public eye and firms faced potential and real litigation. Legislation 
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and litigation were important factor, which may bias some response in first hand 
interview and availability of data outside formal testimony. 
On a practical note, the use of software could facilitate the coding process for this 
or a following study. 
This study provides a foundation for further research. 
From a theoretical point of view, evaluation of the propositions can be used to 
validate or explore applicability of theories that address the cause, frequency and 
avoidance of disruption, in particular Normal Accident Theory versus High 
Availability Theory. From this study, it is apparent that several factors underlie early 
detection – line of communication as well as training, for example, as well as rapid 
response in total.  
The second avenue for further research could empirically study the perception and 
use of factors as stated above in broader set of firms including those firms who 
have experienced major disruption as well as a test group who perceive their supply 
chain to have maintained planned supply chain operations.   
A different perspective in empirical validation would be to explore the perceived 
trade-off between factors, for example effectiveness of training and fixed 
preparedness plans prior to an event versus the rapid solution development during 
an event response (e.g. new or modified solutions). In the case of the BP 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill, for example, established oil spill containment 
techniques were in some cases useless (e.g. artificial berms) and even potentially 
harmful (chemical dispersants). Under certain circumstances, it could be postulated 
that inappropriate plans may in fact delay the rapid development of more effective, 
new solutions, given the complex and infrequent nature of catastrophic disruption. 
Lastly, further research is warranted to assess the cost / benefit aspects where the 
identified factors can imply a significant investment or create additional risk. It can 
be again postulated, for example, that close cooperation with competitors to 
leverage solutions or increase deployment capacity may reduce the imperative for a 
firm to invest sufficiently in internal reserve.   
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Data from a larger sample size of firms could be used to evaluate managerial 
decision-making, interdependence, and perceived cost / benefit for specific factors 
of response to low frequency and high-impact events. 
This research examine events in two major corporations using a Grounded Theory 
approach to identify and characterize factors driving response lead-time in the face 
of significant supply chain disruption. Building on an emerging framework in time-
based response, in the context of existing literature on supply chain complexity and 
supply chain management, these factors provide a vehicle for further research.  
It is a starting point to highlight a potentially rich area of empirical research in 
supply chain risk using Grounded Theory. This study adds new concepts on 
improving response to disruption to literature that has been primarily focused on 
prevention of delays and disruptions through various means rather than on 
planning for post-incident recovery as it focuses on response rather than the 
capability to respond. 
The factors are derived directly from observations and recommendations made by 
the firms and their stakeholders and occur in recognizable patterns – both in their 
presence with successful support to risk response and in their absence with 
contribution to delay and exponentially greater impact. Although the cases are 
found in different domains: a leading pharmaceutical response to a pandemic, 
upstream oil exploration under extreme and unfamiliar conditions, downstream 
energy refining in antiquated, profit-oriented industrial site, the commonality of 
factors in Preparation, Partnership, Organisation and Reserve between the cases 
suggest that further investigation can lead to an improved mitigation of catastrophic 
risk in complex supply chains. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Acronyms PHARMA Case 
AAR   After Action Review 
APAs  Advanced Purchased Agreements 
API  Active Pharmaceutical Ingredient 
BCP  Business Continuity Plan 
CCMT  The Corporate Crisis Management Team 
CDC  Centres for Disease Control and Prevention 
CET  Corporate Executive Team 
CMT  Crisis Management Team 
COE  Centre of Excellence 
Defra  Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
DH  Department of Health. 
DOD  U.S. Department of Defence  
ECDC  European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control 
EH+P  Employee Health and Performance 
EHM  Employee Health Management 
EHS  Environment, Health and Safety 
EMEA  European Medicines Evaluation 
FAO  Food and Agriculture Organisation 
FDA  The Food and Drug Administration 
FPP  Flu Pandemic Plan 
GQMP  Global Quality management Process in QMS 
HHS  U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
HPA  The Health Protection Agency 
IMT  Incident Management Team 
ITCP  IT Continuity Plan 
LDCs  Least Developing Countries 
MSC  The Manufacture and Supply Chain 
OIE  The World Organisation for Animal Health 
PAHO  Pan American Health Organisation 
PMT  Pandemic Management Team 
ROCC  Risk Oversight and Compliance Council 
SAGE  Scientific Advisory Group for Emergency 
SARS  Severe Acute Respiratory Sydrome 
SVP  Senior Vice President 
USAID  U.S. Agency for International Development 
WHO  World Health Organisation 
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Appendix 2: Acronyms BP Deepwater Horizon 
AFE   Approval for Expenditure 
AMF   Automatic mode function 
APB   Annular pressure buildup 
APD   Application for permit to drill 
API   American Petroleum Institute 
APM   Application for permit to modify 
bbl  Barrels 
BOEMRE Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement 
BOP   Blowout preventer 
bpm  Barrels per minute 
BSR   Blind shear ram 
CMMS   Computerized Maintenance Management System 
DP   Dynamically positioned 
DPO  Dynamic positioning officers 
ECD   Equivalent circulating density 
EDS   Emergency disconnect system 
ERA   Efficient Reservoir Access 
ESD   Equivalent static density 
ETP   Engineering Technical Practice 
FIT  Formation integrity test 
gal/sack   Gallons per sack 
gpm   Gallons per minute 
HSSE   Health, safety, security, and the environment 
LDS   Lockdown sleeve 
LMRP  Lower marine riser package 
LOT   Leak off test 
MC 252   Mississippi Canyon Block 252 
MD   Measured depth 
MMS   Minerals Management Service 
MOC   Management of change 
MODU  Mobile offshore drilling unit 
MUX   Multiplex 
OIM   Offshore installation manager 
OMS   Operating management system 
PINC   Potential incidents and non-compliance 
ppg  Pounds per gallon 
PRV  Pressure relief valve 
psi   Pounds per square inch 
RCRA   Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
RMS   Rig Management System 
ROV   Remotely operated vehicle 
SG   Specific gravity 
TD   Total depth 
TIGER   Totally Integrated Geological and Engineering Resource 
TOC   Top of cement 
TVD   Total vertical depth 
UWILD  Underwater Inspection in Lieu of Dry-docking 
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Appendix 3: Timeline of BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill 
 
Date Time Events Source 
18 March 2008  BP pays USD 34 million for an exclusive lease to drill in Mississippi 
Canyon Block 252. 
Oil Spill 
Commission 
6 October 2009 
 
 Spudded Macondo well with Transocean’s Marianas OpenWells® 
 Transocean's Marianas arrives on location and begins the drilling of  
the Macondo well. 
Oil Spill 
Commission 
8 November 2009  The Marianas drills for 34 days, reaching a depth of  9,090 feet. It 
then stops drilling and moves off-site to avoid Hurricane Ida. 
Hurricane Ida nevertheless damages the rig badly enough that it can 
no longer drill the well. 
Oil Spill 
Commission 
8-27 November 
2009 
 Pull riser and evacuated Marianas for Hurricane Ida. Marianas 
subsequently damaged and moved to safe harbour for repairs. 
OpenWells® 
 Transocean’s Deepwater Horizon on location to replace Marianas  
31 January -  
6 February 2010 
 Six days of  pre-job maintenance and testing of  blowout preventer 
(BOP) followed 
OpenWells® 
 Drilling activities recommenced on 6 February.  
31 January 2010  Transocean's Deepwater Horizon arrives on location. 
Its first task is to lower its giant blowout preventer (BOP) onto the 
wellhead that the Marianas had left behind. The BOP is a stack of  
enormous valves that rig crews use both as a drilling tool and as an 
emergency safety device. Once it is put in place, everything needed in 
the well—drilling pipe, bits, casing, and mud—passes through the 
BOP. 
Oil Spill 
Commission 
10 February 2010  The Deepwater Horizon resumes the drilling of  the Macondo well. 
Drilling Terminology: Drilling through the seafloor does not differ 
fundamentally from drilling on land. The crews on any drilling rig use 
rotary drill bits that they lubricate and cool with drilling mud—an 
ordinary name for what is today a sophisticated blend of  synthetic 
fluids, polymers, and weighting agents that often costs over USD 100 
per barrel. The rig crews pump the mud down through a drill pipe 
that connects with and turns the bit. The mud flows out holes in the 
bit and then circulates back to the rig through the space between the 
drill pipe and the sides of  the well (the annulus), carrying to the 
surface bits of  rock called cuttings that the drill bit has removed from 
the bottom of  the well. When the mud returns to the rig at the 
surface, the cuttings are sieved out and the mud is sent back down 
the drill string. The mud thus travels in a closed loop 
Oil Spill 
Commission 
23 February - 13 
March 2010 
 Pilot valve leak of  1 gpm noticed on yellow pod of  BOP, leak 
reduced after switching to blue pod 
OpenWells® 
8 March 2010 
 
 Well control event at 13,305 ft. Pipe stuck; severed pipe at 12,146ft. OpenWells® 
 Halliburton personnel send BP the results of  a foam stability test it 
ran in February on the cement blend it plans to use at Macondo. To 
the trained eye, the data showed that the cement slurry design was 
unstable. Halliburton personnel did not comment on the evidence of  
the cement slurry's instability, and there is no evidence that BP 
examined the foam stability data in the report at all. 
Oil Spill 
Commission 
12-22 March 2010  Contingency liner utilized, a new drilling liner was added and 
production casing changed to 9 7/8 in x 7 in. long string 
Macondo well 
plan 
 Minerals Management Service (MMS) approved changes MMS 
applications 
5-6 April 2010  Stripped drill pipe through upper annular preventer from 17,146 ft. to 
14, 937 ft. while addressing wellbore losses 
OpenWells® 
9-14 April 2010  Total depth of  18,360ft. reached and data collected for five days. 
Reservoir sands contained hydrocarbons at pressures of  
approximately 11,850 psi. 
OpenWells® 
9 April 2010  After numerous instances indicating fractures in the formation over 
the past few weeks, BP elects to call total depth at 18,360 feet, short 
of  the 20,200 feet initially planned. BP informs its lease partners 
Anadarko and MOEX that "well integrity and safety" issues require 
the rig to stop drilling further. 
 
Drilling Terminology: The weight of  the column of  mud in a well 
exerts pressure that counterbalances the pressure in the hydrocarbon 
formation. If  the mud weight is too low, fluids such as oil and gas 
can enter the well, causing what is known as a "kick." But if  the mud 
weight is too high, it can fracture the surrounding rock, potentially 
leading to “lost returns”—leakage of  the mud into the formation. 
The rig crew therefore monitors and adjusts the weight (density) of  
the drilling mud as the well is being drilled—one of  many sensitive, 
technical tasks requiring special equipment and the interpretation of  
data from difficult drilling environments. 
Oil Spill 
Commission 
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Date Time Events Source 
11-15 April 2010  BP and its contractors spend five days logging the open hole with 
sophisticated instruments. Based on the logging data, BP concludes 
that it has drilled into a hydrocarbon reservoir of  sufficient size (at 
least 50 million barrels) and pressure that it is economically worthwile 
to install a final production casing string that BP will eventually use to 
recover the oil and gas 
Oil Spill 
Commission 
13 April 2010  Halliburton personnel run a second set of  tests on the now-slightly-
altered cement blend they plan to use at Macondo. The foam stability 
test showed that the cement slurry would be unstable. 
Oil Spill 
Commission 
14-15 April 2010  After going back and forth, BP engineers choose a "long string" 
production casing—for a single continuous wall of  steel between the 
wellhead, on the seafloor, and the oil and gas zone at the bottom of  
the well. The other option considered, a "liner," would result in a 
more complex—and theoretically more leak-prone—system over the 
life of  the well. But it would be easier to cement into place at 
Macondo. 
Oil Spill 
Commission 
14 April2010  Halliburton Opticem cement model review concluded zonal isolation 
objectives could be met using 9 7/8 in x 7 in. long string as 
production casing 
Halliburton 9 
7/8 in. x 7 in. 
Production 
Casing Design 
Report 
15 April2010  OptiCem model updated with open hole calliper and survey data. 
Input included 21 centralizers and 70% standoff  above the top 
centralizer 
Company 
emails 
 Decision made to order 15 additional centralizer order placed Company 
emails 
 A Halliburton engineer informs BP engineers that computer 
simulations suggest that the Macondo production casing would need 
more than six centralizers (used to keep the casing string centered) to 
avoid channeling in the cement job. BP engineers order 15 additional 
centralizers—the most BP could transport immediately in a 
helicopter. 
Oil Spill 
Commission 
16 April 2010 
 
11:51 AM Fifteen slip-on bow spring centralizers delivered to rig by helicopter OpenWells® 
12:48-12:53 
PM 
Mechanical integrity concerns regarding the bow spring centralizers. 
Decision made not to run bow spring centralizers. 
Company 
emails 
Interview 
 A helicopter delivers 15 additional centralizers to the rig. BP 
engineers decide the centralizers are the wrong kind and do not run 
them. 
Oil Spill 
Commission 
18 April 2010 
 
20:58 PM Partial lab test results, a new OptiCem model report (using seven 
inline centralizers) and Halliburton’s cementing recommended 
procedure for the Macondo well cement job were provided to BP 
and Halliburton staff 
Email from 
Halliburton 
in-house 
cementing 
engineer to 
BP and 
Halliburton 
staff 
 Halliburton personnel run yet another set of  tests on the cement 
slurry they plan to use at Macondo. The test would normally take 48 
hours to complete. It is unclear whether Halliburton had results from 
the test in hand before it pumped the job. Halliburton did not send 
the results of  the final test to BP until six days after the blowout. 
Oil Spill 
Commission 
18-19 April 2010  The Deepwater Horizon crew installs the long string production 
casing. The leading end of  the casing, the "shoe track," began with a 
"reamer shoe"—a bullet-shaped piece of  metal with three holes 
designed to help guide the casing down the hole. The reamer shoe 
was followed by 180 feet of  seven-inch-diameter steel casing. Then 
came a Weatherford-manufactured "float collar," a simple 
arrangement of  two flapper (float) valves, spaced one after the other, 
held open by a short "auto-fill tube" through which the mud in the 
well could flow. As the long string was lowered down the wellbore, 
the mud passed through the holes in the reamer shoe and auto-fill 
tube that propped open the float valves, giving it a clear flow path 
upward 
Oil Spill 
Commission 
Final Casing Run 
Date Time Events Source 
19 April 2010 13:30 PM Completed final (production) casing run to 18,304ft. (Job took 37 
hours). The shoe track included a Weatherford float collar installed at 
the top and a reamer shoe at the bottom. 
OpenWells® 
14:30-
16:20 PM 
Nine attempts made to establish circulation. Circulation established 
with 3,412 psi 
OpenWells® 
Real-time data 
16:20-
19:30 PM 
Circulation pressure of  340 psi did not match modeling results of  
570psi. 
OpenWells® 
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Date Time Events Source 
19 April 2010  An explosion aboard the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig in the Gulf  
of  Mexico, 52 miles (84km) south-east of  Venice, Louisiana, kills 11 
workers. Operator Transocean, under contract for BP, says it had no 
warning of  trouble ahead of  the blast. 
BBC 
Cement Job 
Date Time Events Source 
19 April 2010  In preparation for cementing, the crew attempts to convert the float 
valves by pushing the tube downward. After nine attempts, the crew 
establishes circulation. Circulation pressure is lower than predicted, 
but the crew decides the pressure gauge is broken. 
Oil Spill 
Commission 
  The first compromise in BP's plan was to limit the circulation of  
drilling mud through the wellbore before cementing. Optimally, mud 
in the wellbore would have been circulated “bottoms up”—meaning 
the rig crew would have pumped enough mud down the wellbore to 
bring mud originally at the bottom of  the well all the way back up to 
the rig. There are at least two benefits to bottoms up circulation. Such 
extensive circulation cleans the wellbore and reduces the likelihood 
of  channeling. And circulating bottoms up allows technicians on the 
rig to examine mud from the bottom of  the well for hydrocarbon 
content before cementing. But the BP engineers feared that the 
longer the rig crew circulated mud through the casing before 
cementing, the greater the risk of  another lost-returns event. 
Accordingly, BP circulated approximately 350 barrels of  mud before 
cementing, rather than the 2,760 barrels needed to do a full bottoms 
up circulation. 
Oil Spill 
Commission 
20 April 2010 
 
 The crew pumps cement into the well for the shoe track cement job. 
BP decides to pump the cement down at the relatively low rate of  4 
barrels or less per minute. BP also decides to limit the volume of  
cement pumped to approximately 60 barrels—a volume that its own 
engineers recognized would provide little margin for error. 
Oil Spill 
Commission 
19:30-
00:36 PM 
Cement job pumped as planned with full fluid returns observed. 
Bottom plug burst disk ruptured at higher-tan-planned pressure, 
2,900 psi 
OpenWells® 
Real-time data 
 Cement job completed bumped top wiper plug at 00:3 hours. Real-time data 
20 April 2010 
 
00:30 – 
03:00 AM 
BP and Halliburton personnel perform a check to see whether the 
float valves are closed and holding the cement in. While it is not clear 
how long the personnel watched for flow, they eventually concluded 
the float valves were holding. 
Oil Spill 
Commission 
0:40 AM Bled off  5 bbls of  fluid to reduce drill pipe pressure from 1,150 psi 
to 0 psi. No flow observed after bleeding 5bbls. 
Real-time data 
OpenWells® 
00:40-
07:00 AM 
Dril-Quip seal assembly installed in subsea wellhead. Two pressure 
tests successfully completed. Drill pipe pulled out of  riser. 
Real-time data 
OpenWells® 
Interview 
05:45 – 
7:30 AM 
BP and Halliburton personnel declare the cement job a success. BP 
decides to send home a team of  Schlumberger technicians who had 
been standing by on the rig to perform a suite of  cement evaluation 
tests. 
Oil Spill 
Commission 
~ 07:30 BP and service providers discussed running cement bond log (CBL) 
during morning operations call. 
Interviews 
 Decision made, in accordance with pre-established BP Macondo well 
team decision tree, not to run CBL. 
 
Positive-pressure and Negative-pressure Tests 
Date Time Events Source 
20 April 2010 10:43 AM BP moves on to prepare the well for temporary abandonment. A BP 
engineer sends out an "Ops Note" to the rest of  the Macondo team 
listing the temporary abandonment procedure for the well. The 
temporary abandonment procedure had undergone numerous 
Oil Spill 
Commission 
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Date Time Events Source 
modifications over a short period, none of  which appear to have 
been subject to any formal risk assessment. The morning of  April 20 
was the first time rig personnel had seen the procedure they would 
use that day. 
 
The basic sequence for the procedure is as follows: 
1. Perform a positive-pressure test to test the integrity of  the 
production casing; 
2. Run the drill pipe into the well to 8,367 feet (3,300 feet below the 
mud line); 
3. Displace 3,300 feet of  mud in the well with seawater, lifting the 
mud above the BOP and into the riser; 
4. Perform a negative-pressure test to assess the integrity of  the well 
and bottom-hole cement job to ensure outside fluids (such as 
hydrocarbons) are not leaking into the well; 
5. Displace the mud in the riser with seawater; 
6. Set the surface cement plug at 8,367 feet; and 
7. Set the lockdown sleeve. 
10:55 AM-
12:00 PM 
Successful positive-pressure test of  the production casing Real-time data 
Interviews 
 Drill pipe run in hole to 8,367 ft. Displacement procedure reviewed 
in preparation for mud displacement and negative-pressure test. 
 
 The crew conducts a positive-pressure test to evaluate, among other 
things, the ability of  the casing in the well to hold in pressure. The 
pressure inside the well remained steady, showing there were no leaks 
in the production casing through which fluids could pass from inside 
the well to the outside. 
Oil Spill 
Commission 
12:00-
15:04 PM 
At 13L28 hours. Deepwater Horizon started offloading mud to M/V 
Damon Bankston. 
Real-time data 
M/V Damon 
Bankston log 
12:00-
15:04 PM 
Mudlogger told assistant driller that pit levels could not be monitored 
during offloading. Assistant driller told mudlogger that notice would 
be provided when offloading to M/V Damon Bankston ceased. 
Interview 
15:00-
16:57 PM 
The crew prepares to conduct a negative-pressure test, and displaces 
mud from a depth of  8,367 feet to above the blowout preventer. The 
negative-pressure test checks not only the integrity of  the casing but 
also the integrity of  the bottomhole cement job. At the Macondo 
well, the negative-pressure test was the only test performed that 
would have checked the integrity of  the bottomhole cement job. 
Oil Spill 
Commission 
15:04-
15:56 PM 
Seawater pumped into boost, choke and lines to displace mud. 1,2000 
psi left trapped in the kill line (i.e., not blend off). 
Real-time data 
15:56-
16:53 PM 
A total of  424 bbls of  16 ppg of  freshwater pumped into well. 
Displacement completed with 352 bbls of  seawater, placing the 
spacer 12 ft. above the BOP. 
Real-time data 
M-I SWACO 
20 April 2010  (From ~ 16:00 hours  - 17:50 hours, trip tank was being cleaned. 
Recorded flow data unreliable during this period). 
Displacement 
procedure 
16:54 PM Upon shutting down pumps, drill pipe pressure was at 2,325 psi. 
Pressure in kill line remained at 1,200 psi. 
Real-time data 
 An annular preventer was closed for the negative pressure test. Interview 
16:54-
16:56 PM 
Drill pipe pressure bled from 2,325 psi down to 1,220 psi in order to 
equalize with the 1,200 psi on the kill line. 
Real-time data 
16:57-
18:40 PM 
The crew conducts a negative-pressure test on the drill pipe. For a 
successful negative-pressure test, the drill-pipe pressure must remain 
at zero psi after the pressure is bled off  and the pipe is closed. The 
crew attempts to bleed drill-pipe pressure down to zero three times, 
but each time drill-pipe pressure builds back up. At the end of  the 
test, drill-pipe pressure is 1,400 psi. BP and Transocean personnel 
discuss the pressure, apparently explaining it as a result of  "the 
bladder effect." BP's Well Site Leader Don Vidrine insists on running 
a second negative-pressure test, this time on the kill line. 
Oil Spill 
Commission 
16:57-
16:59 PM 
Kill line opened and pressure decreased to 645 psi, drill pipe pressure 
increased to 1,350 psi. 
Real-time data 
Interview 
 Attempt made to bleed system down to 0 psi. Drill pipe pressure 
decreased to 273 psi. Kill line pressure decreased to 0 psi. Kill line 
shut in. 
 
16:59-
17:08 PM 
At 16:59 hours, drill pipe pressure increased from 273 psi to 1,250 psi 
in 6 minutes. 
Real-time data 
MBI 
testimony 
 Annular preventer closing pressure was increased from 1,500 psi to 
1,900 psi to create a seal. 
 
 The riser was topped up with approximately 50 bbls of  mud from the 
trip tank to replace the volume blend off  through the drill pipe. 
(Spacer fluid was then across the BOP.) 
 
17:08-
17:27 PM 
Drill pipe pressure decreased from 1,250 psi to 1,205 psi. Real-time data 
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Date Time Events Source 
17:17 PM Mud offloading from Deepwater Horizon mud pits to M/V Damon 
Bankston ceased. Mudlogger not notified. 
M/V Damon 
Bankston log 
Interviews 
17:27-
17:52 PM 
Drill pipe pressure reduced from 1,205 psi to 0 psi by bleeding off  15 
bbls to 23 bbls of  fluid to the cement unit. 
Real-time data 
Interviews 
 Rig crew and well site leader discussed negative pressure test 
procedure. Well site leader stated the negative-pressure test needed to 
be done on the kill line in accordance with the BP plan submitted to 
MMS. 
 
17:52-
18:00 
Kill line opened to the cement unit Real-time data 
Interview 
 Cementer bled off  3 bbls to 15 bbls of  seawater. A witness reported 
continuous flow from the kill line that spurted and was still flowing 
when instructed to shut in the line. 
 
18:00-
18:35 PM 
Drill pipe pressure gradually increased to 1,4000 psi over 25 minutes. 
Build profile showed distinct pressure fluctuations at fairly uniform 
intervals. 
Real-time data 
 Discussion ensurd about pressure anomalies and negative pressure 
test procedure. 
 
18:35-
19:55 
Seawater pumped into the kill line to confirm it was full. Real-time data 
Interviews 
 Opened kill line and bled 0.2 bbl to mini trip tank; flow stopped. Kill 
line opened and monitored for 30 minutes with no flow. 
 
 At 19:55 hours, the negative-pressure test was concluded and 
considered a good test. 
 
Well Monitoring and Simultaneous Operations 
Date Time Events Source 
20 April 2010 20:00 PM Internal blowout preventer (BOP) and annular preventer opened and 
pumping of  seawater commenced down the drill pipe to displace 
mud and spacer from the riser. 
Real-time data 
20:02 PM The crew opens the annular preventer and begins displacing mud and 
spacer from the riser. 
Oil Spill 
Commission 
20:50 PM Pumps slowed for the spacer arriving at surface Real-time data 
~ 20:52 
PM 
Calculated that the well went underbalanced and started to flow] OLGA model 
20:58-
21:08 PM 
Flow out from the well increased Real-time data 
Calculatons 
 Tip tank was emptied into the flow-line at this time.  
 [Taking into account the emptying of  the trip tank calculated a gain 
of  approximately 39 bbls over this period.] 
 
21:01 PM After steadily decreasing for much of  the displacement, drill-pipe 
pressure changes direction and begins increasing. This is an anomaly 
that apparently went unnoticed. 
Oil Spill 
Commission 
21:01-
21:08 PM 
Drill pipe pressure increased from 1,250 psi to 1,350 psi at constant 
pump rate 
Real-time data 
21:09 PM Spacer observed at surface 
Pumps shut down to enable sheen test to be conducted 
Real-time data 
Interviews 
21:08-
21:14 PM 
Pumps off, drill pipe pressure increased from 1,017 psi to 1,263 psi in 
5 ½ minutes. 
Real-time data 
Interviews 
Deepwater 
Horizon 
P&IDs 
OLGA model 
20 April 2010  Overboard dump line opened during sheen test; Sperry-Sun flow 
meter by passed.  
Successful result from visual sheen test indicated that fluids could be 
discharged overboard. [OLGA well flow modelling calculated that in-
flow to the well during this period was approximately 9bbls/min.] 
 
 The crew shuts down the pumps to perform a sheen test. With the 
pumps off, the drill-pipe pressure should have stayed constant or 
gone down. Instead, it went up by approximately 250 psi. Had 
someone noticed it, he would have recognized this as a significant 
anomaly that warranted further investigation before turning the 
pumps back on. 
Oil Spill 
Commission 
21:14 PM The crew turns the pumps back on and continues the displacement. Oil Spill 
Commission 
21:14-
21:31 PM 
Pumps restarted to continue displacement Real-time data 
Interviews 
 Displaced well fluids discharged overboard.  
 Drill pipe pressure on continually increasing trend  
21:17 PM Pump no. 2 started ad pressure spiked to 6,000 psi. [Inferred that the 
pump likely started against a closed valve and the pressure lifted the 
Real-time data 
MBI 
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Date Time Events Source 
relief  valve.] testimony 
21:18 PM Pumps no.2, no.3, no.4 were shut down. Pump no.1 stayed online 
(boost line) 
Real-time data 
 The pressure-relief  valve on Pump No. 2 blows, and the driller 
organizes a group of  crewmembers to go to the pump room to fix 
the valve. 
Oil Spill 
Commission 
~21:18-
21:20 PM 
Toolpusher was called to rig floor Interviews 
~21:20 PM Assistant driller was called to either the pit room or the pumproom Interviews 
MBI 
testimony 
~21:20 PM Senior Toolpusher called toolpusher and ask how the negative-
pressure test had gone. Toolpusher responded that the test result was 
good, and the displacement was “going fine.” 
MBI 
testimony 
 The senior toolpusher calls the rig floor and asks about the 
displacement. The toolpusher responds, "It's going fine. . . . I've got 
this." 
Oil Spill 
Commission 
21:20-
21:27 PM 
Pump no.3, and no.4 restarted. Some pressure started to build on 
pump no.2, reaching 800 psi at 21:27 hours 
Real-time data 
21:26-
21:30 PM 
Drill pipe pressure declined by 400 psi at constant pump rate. Real-time data 
21:30 PM [Calculated that the space was fully displaced from the riser] Real-time data 
OLGA model 
 The driller notices an odd and unexpected pressure difference 
between the drill pipe and the kill line. The crew shuts off  the pumps 
to investigate. 
Oil Spill 
Commission 
Well Control Response 
Date Time Events Source 
20 April 2010 21:30 PM Pumps shut down: first pump no.3 and no.4, then no.1 (boost pump) Real-time 
data 
21:31-
21:34 PM 
Drill pipe pressure increased from 1,210 psi to 1,766 psi. 
~21:33 hours, chief  mate observed Toolpusher and driller discussing 
differential pressure”. Toolpusher told chief  mate that cement job 
may be delayed 
Real-time 
data 
MBI 
testimony 
21:36-
21:37 PM 
The driller orders a floorhand to bleed off  the drill-pipe pressure, in 
an apparent attempt to eliminate the difference. The drill-pipe 
pressure initially dropped off  as expected, but immediately began 
climbing again. Despite the mounting evidence of  a kick, neither the 
driller nor the toolpusher performed a visual flow check or shut in 
the well. 
Oil Spill 
Commission 
21:36-
21:38 PM 
Over a 90 second period, drill pipe pressure decreased from 1,782 psi 
to 714 psi and then increased from 714 psi to 1,353 psi 
Real-time 
data 
 [Inferred to have been caused by opening and closing a 4 in. valve on 
the standpide manifold.] 
OLGA model 
21:38 PM [Calculated that at approximately 21:38, hydrocarbons passed from 
well into riser.] 
OLGA model 
21:38-
21:42 PM 
Drill pipe pressure held briefly, then decreased steadily from 1,400 
psi to 338 psi. 
Real-time 
data 
21.40 -
21.43 PM 
Drilling mud begins spewing from the rotary onto the rig floor. The 
crew closes one of  the annular preventers to shut in the well and 
routes the flow to the mud-gas separator (rather than overboard into 
the sea). The flow continues and quickly overwhelms the mud-gas 
separator system. 
Oil Spill 
Commission 
~21:40-
21:48 PM 
Chief  electrician observed four personnel (including the assistant 
driller) completing repair of  the pressure relief  valve on pump no.2 
at the time he left the area (~21:48 hours) 
MBI 
testimony 
 ~21:40 hours – Mud overflowed the flow line and onto rig floor  
 ~21:41 hours – Mud shot up through derrick.  
 ~21:41 hours – Diverter closed and flow routed to mud gas 
separator (MGS); NOP activated (believed to be lower annular 
preventer). 
 
 ~21:41 hours – M/V Damon Bankston was advised by Deepwater 
Horizon bridge to stand off  500 m because of  a problem with the 
well. The ship began to move away. 
 
 ~21:42 hours – Drill pipe pressure increased steadily from 338 psi to 
1,200 psi over 5 minute period 
 
 ~21:44 hours – Mud and water exited MGS vents; mud rained down 
on rig and M/V Damon Bankston as it pulled away from rig. 
 
20 April 2010 21:40-
21:48 PM 
~21:44 hours – Toolpusher called well site leader and stated they 
were “getting mud back” and that they had “diverted to the mud gas 
separator” and had either closed or were closing the annular 
Real-time 
data 
Interviews 
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preventer. MBI 
testimony 
 ~21:45 hours – Assistant driller called the senior Toolpusher to 
report that “The well is blowing out…[the Toolpusher] is shutting it 
in now. 
 
 ~21:46 hours - Gas hissing noise heard and high-pressure gas 
discharged from MGS vents towards deck. 
 
 ~21:47 hours – First gas alarm sounded. Gas rapidly dispersed, 
setting off  other gas alarms. 
 
 ~21:47 hours – Roaring noise heard and vibration felt.  
 ~21:47 hours – Drill pipe pressure started rapidly increasing from 
1,200 psi to 5,730 psi. 
 
 [This is thought to have been the BOP sealing around pipe. Possible 
activation of  variable bore rams [VBRs] at 21:46 hours.] 
 
 ~21:48 hours – Main power generation engines started going into 
overspeed (no.3 and no.6 were online) 
 
 Rig power lost. Sperry-Sun real-time data transmission lost.  
21.45 PM The assistant driller calls the senior toolpusher and tells him the well 
is "blowing out." 
Oil Spill 
Commission 
21.46 PM The crew activates a variable bore ram to shut in the well. Oil Spill 
Commission 
21:49 PM First explosion occurred an estimated 5 seconds after power loss. Real-time 
data 
Interviews 
MBI 
testimony 
 Second explosion occurred an estimated 10 seconds after first 
explosion 
 
 The first explosion occurs. On the drilling floor, the Macondo 
disaster claims its first victims. A short time later, a second explosion 
occurs. 
Oil Spill 
Commission 
21:52 PM Mayday call made by Deepwater Horizon M/V Damon 
Bankston log 
~21:52-
21:57 PM 
Subsea supervisor attempted to activate emergency disconnect 
sequence (EDS) for the BOP at the panel on the bridge. Lights 
changed on panel, but no flow was observed on the flow meter. 
MBI 
testimony 
Interviews 
 Lower marine riser package did not unlatch.  
 Deepwater Horizon master announced the activation of  the EDS at 
21:56 
 
~22:00-
23:22 PM 
Transfer of  115 personnel including 17 injured, to M/V Damon 
Bankston 
MBI 
testimony 
 11 people were determined to be missing, and search and rescue 
activities ensued. 
 
 US. Coast Guard arrived on-site at 23:22 hours.  
 Sometime after the first explosion, Transocean personnel on the 
bridge attempt to activate the Emergency Disconnect System. 
Although the panel indicators lit up, the rig never disconnected. 
Oil Spill 
Commission 
22 April 2010 10:22 PM Deepwater Horizon Sank Unified 
Command 
23 April 2010 17:00 PM The search for the 11 missing people was suspended  
22 April 2011  The Deepwater Horizon sinks to the bottom of  the Gulf  after 
burning for 36 hours, raising concerns of  a catastrophic oil spill. 
A Coast Guard official says the Macondo well, which the rig had 
been drilling, could be releasing up to 8,000 barrels of  oil per day. 
BBC 
BOP Emergency Operation 
Date Time Events Source 
21-22 April 2010 18:00-
01:15 PM 
Remotely operated vehicle (ROV) operations were initiated. IMT reports 
22 April 2010 ~02:45 
AM 
ROV attempted hot stab interventions to close VBRs and blind shear 
rams (BSRs); ROV attempts were ineffective. 
IMT reports 
~07:40 
AM 
On the third attempt, ROV activated autoshear function. (BSR 
thought to have closed) Well continued to flow. 
IMT reports 
25 April – 5 May 
2010 
 Seventeen further attempts by ROVs using subsea accumulators to 
close various BOP rams and annular preventers. Well continued to 
flow 
IMT reports 
23 April 2010  The Coast Guard says it had no indication that oil was leaking from 
the well 5,000ft below the surface of  the Gulf. 
BBC 
26 April2010  In a reverse, officials reveal the well is leaking an estimated 1,000 
barrels of  oil per day and warn of  environmental disaster.  
Meanwhile, BP sends undersea robots to the wellhead in an 
BBC 
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unsuccessful effort to activate the blowout preventer, a piece of  
heavy kit mounted on top of  the well to stem the flow of  oil. 
28 April2010  The US Coast Guard warns the oil leak could become the worst oil 
spill in US history. 
BBC 
29 April2010  The US Coast Guard sets fire to patches of  spilled oil in an effort to 
prevent the slick from reaching the vulnerable Louisiana coastal 
wetlands. 
President Barack Obama pledges "every single available resource", 
including the military, to help in the response effort. 
BBC 
30 April 2010  Oil from the leaking well begins washing ashore in Louisiana. Soon 
fragile coastal wetlands are inundated with thick, brown mud. 
President Barack Obama's administration bans oil drilling in new 
areas off  the US coast pending investigations into the cause of  the 
BP spill. Before the spill, Mr Obama had said he would allow new 
offshore drilling. 
BBC 
2 May 2010  President Obama makes his first trip to the Gulf  Coast and says BP 
is responsible for the leak and for paying for its clean-up. 
"We're dealing with a massive and potentially unprecedented 
environmental disaster," he says.  
"The oil that is still leaking from the well could seriously damage the 
economy and the environment of  our Gulf  states. And it could 
extend for a long time. It could jeopardise the livelihoods of  
thousands of  Americans who call this place home." 
President Obama said he would 'spare no effort' in responding to the 
crisis 
BBC 
8 May 2010  BP's effort to place a giant metal box atop the leaking well to contain 
the spill fails when ice crystals accumulate inside the box and 
engineers are forced to remove it. 
Meanwhile, officials revise the estimate of  the leak's rate upward to 
5,000 barrels per day. 
BBC 
10 May 2010  BP officials weigh shoving debris, including golf  balls and rubber 
tyres, into the leaking wellhead, a manoeuvre known as the "junk 
shot". They also ready a "top hat" - a metal dome - to be placed over 
the leak.  
Meanwhile, BP reveals the oil spill has cost the company USD 350m 
(GBP 233m) so far. 
BBC 
11 May 2010  At a series of  congressional hearings, BP, Transocean and 
Halliburton, the three companies involved in the Deepwater Horizon 
drilling operations, all blame each other for the disaster. 
BBC 
14 May 2010  Pelicans are among the wildlife harmed by the oil  
Researchers who have analysed underwater video from the leak site 
estimate as many as 70,000 barrels of  oil are leaking into the Gulf  
per day, with a margin of  error of  plus or minus 20%, significantly 
higher than earlier estimates. BP tries to thread a tube into the 
broken wellhead in an effort to collect some of  the leaking oil in 
surface ships. Meanwhile, President Obama condemns the 
"ridiculous spectacle" of  the companies trading blame while oil 
spews from the well. 
BBC 
19 May 2010  Oceanographers say oil from the leak has entered an ocean current - 
the "loop current" - that could carry it towards Florida and 
potentially up the US east coast. 
BBC 
26 May 2010  BP prepares to plug the leaking well with heavy drilling mud, a 
procedure called a "top kill". The attempt is declared a failure three 
days later. 
BBC 
28 May 2010  Obama visits the Gulf  Coast again and declares "the buck stops with 
me". 
BBC 
30 May 2010  Carol Browner, President Barack Obama's adviser on energy policy, 
says the spill is the worst environmental disaster in US history, worse 
even than the 1989 Exxon Valdez spill in Alaska. 
BBC 
2 June 2010  The US announces a criminal inquiry into the BP oil spill. BBC 
4 June 2010  BP places a cap, called the "lower marine riser package", atop the 
leaking wellhead. The cap allows the company to pipe much of  the 
oil and gas leaking from the well to ships on the surface. 
President Obama takes a third trip to the region. 
BBC 
8 June 2010  Skimmers, including the giant "A Whale", are cleaning oil from the 
surface  
Adm Thad Allen, the commander of  the US response, says clean-up 
of  the oil-stricken Gulf  could take years. Meanwhile, President 
Obama says he has been consulting with experts so he can learn 
"whose ass to kick" in the matter. The US government says 
underwater oil plumes have travelled as far as 40 miles from the site 
of  the leaking well. 
BBC 
10 June 2010  The US Geological Survey estimates the oil flow at as many as 40,000 
barrels per day before a cap was put on the well on 3 June. BP 
announces it is collecting 15,800 barrels per day from the well. 
BBC 
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12 June 2010  Responding to complaints in the British media of  an anti-British tone 
to his remarks, President Barack Obama tells UK Prime Minister 
David Cameron that his criticism of  BP has nothing to do with 
national identity. 
BBC 
14 June 2010  President Obama makes a fourth trip to the gulf BBC 
15 June 2010  President Obama addresses the nation from the Oval Office, vowing, 
"We will make BP pay for the damage their company has caused." 
BBC 
17 June 2010  BP announces it will place USD 20bn in a fund to compensate 
victims of  the oil spill and says it will not pay a shareholder dividend 
this year. 
BBC 
18 June 2010  BP chief  executive Tony Hayward receives a tongue-lashing at a 
hearing in the US Congress. 
Henry Waxman, chairman of  the House Committee on Energy and 
Commerce, says BP's "complacency" before the 20 April rig 
explosion was "astonishing". 
BBC 
22 June 2010  Many fishermen put out of  work by the oil spill have taken jobs in 
the clean-up effort  
A federal judge blocks the Obama administration's six-month 
moratorium on Deepwater oil drilling in the Gulf  of  Mexico, saying 
the ban cannot be justified. 
The administration quickly issues another moratorium with revised 
terms. 
Meanwhile, BP hands day-to-day control of  the response to Bob 
Dudley, replacing Chief  Executive Tony Hayward, who had been 
widely criticised for his insensitive remarks on the spill. 
BBC 
5 July 2010  BP says the oil spill response has cost the company USD 3.12bn 
(GBP 2bn), including the cost of  containing the spill and cleaning up 
the oil, and the cost of  drilling relief  wells. The figure also includes 
USD 147m paid out in compensation to some of  those affected by 
the spill. 
BBC 
6 July 2010  Oil from the spill reaches Texas, meaning it has affected all five US 
Gulf  Coast states. 
But officials said it was unclear if  the oil had drifted hundreds of  
kilometres from the leak site to the Texas shore, or had fallen from 
ships taking part in the clean-up operation. 
BBC 
10 July 2010  BP begins a bid to place a tighter-fitting cap atop the leaking 
wellhead. The company warns that oil will flow freely while the caps 
are being exchanged, but says it has brought in 400 oil-skimming 
ships to deal with the increased flow. 
The BBC's Madeleine Morris says it may take days to complete the 
operation 
BBC 
14 July 2010  Adm Thad Allen says a relief  well, which officials and BP have said is 
the only way permanently to plug the well, has come within 5ft 
(1.5m) of  the leaking well bore. 
BBC 
15 July 2010  With the new cap in place, BP says it has temporarily shut off  the oil 
flow in order to test the integrity of  the well.  
President Barack Obama hails "a positive sign". 
BBC 
19 July 2010  Adm Allen tells BP he is concerned about a "detected seep" on the 
sea floor near the well and other "undetermined anomalies". He said 
that if  methane was found to be seeping from the sea floor, oil might 
also be leaking. 
BBC 
22 July 2010  The rig drilling a relief  well was ordered to leave the spill site ahead 
of  Tropical Storm Bonnie  
Dozens of  vessels, including the rig drilling a relief  well to 
permanently block the damaged well, are ordered to leave the site as 
Tropical Storm Bonnie approaches. BP warns that the final operation 
to plug the well could be delayed by up to two weeks by the storm. 
The capped well is to remain unmonitored for several days. 
Meanwhile, BP says it has been given permission to prepare for a 
"static kill" - pumping mud into the top of  the well through the new 
cap - a step viewed as an intermediate measure. The firm would need 
final approval from the US to carry it out. 
BBC 
25 July 2010  Ships involved in BP's effort to secure the blown-out oil well prepare 
to resume work after a tropical storm in the Gulf  of  Mexico 
weakened. 
Coast Guard chief  Adm Thad Allen says the storm put back efforts 
to drill a relief  well by seven to 10 days. 
BBC 
 The BBC learns that BP's chief  executive Tony Hayward, who has 
faced widespread criticism over his handling of  the spill, is 
negotiating the terms of  his exit from his post. 
BBC 
26 July 2010  The BBC reveals that 53-year old BP chief  executive Tony Hayward 
will receive a year's salary plus benefits, together worth more than 
GBP 1m, when he steps down. He will also be entitled to draw an 
annual pension of  GBP 600,000 once he reaches the age of  55. 
BBC 
27 July 2010  Mr Hayward will leave his post by October  BBC 
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BP confirms that chief  executive Tony Hayward will leave his post by 
mutual agreement in October, but he is likely to retain a position in 
the company. BP plans to nominate him as a non-executive director 
of  its Russian joint venture, TNK-BP.  
Mr Hayward's American colleague, Bob Dudley, who has taken 
charge of  the clean-up operation, will replace him. 
Meanwhile, the oil giant's second quarter earnings are published, 
showing losses of  USD 17bn for the three months between April 
and June - a UK record. 
The company says it has set aside USD 32.2bn (GBP 20.8bn) to 
cover the costs linked to the Gulf  of  Mexico spill. 
28 July 2010  US scientists say the oil from the well has cleared from the sea 
surface faster than expected, 100 days after the disaster began. 
BBC 
2 August 2010  The US Environmental Protection Agency says in a study the 
dispersant used after the spill is no more toxic than oil alone. There 
had been concerns raised by congressional investigators that 
dispersant may have been more widely used than the government 
ordered. 
BBC 
3 August 2010  The US government says the oil spill is officially the biggest leak ever, 
with 4.9 million barrels of  oil leaked before the well was capped last 
month. Scientists said only a fifth of  the leaking oil - around 800,000 
barrels - was captured during the clean-up operation. 
BBC 
4 August 2010  The US government says three-quarters of  the oil spilled in the Gulf  
has been cleaned up or broken down by natural forces. 
Meanwhile, BP reports "encouraging" progress with the "static kill" 
operation to plug the well with mud and seal it with cement. 
BBC 
9 August 2010  BP announces that the total cost to it of  the oil spill so far has 
reached USD 6.1bn (GBP 3.8bn). The total includes the cost of  the 
spill response, containment, relief  well drilling, and cementing up of  
the damaged well. 
It also includes grants to the Gulf  states hit by the spill and USD 
319m paid out in compensation to some of  those affected by the 
spill. 
BBC 
16 August 2010  The US announces that future applications for Deepwater offshore 
drilling will require an environmental assessment, ending a practice 
that allowed BP's Deepwater Horizon rig to drill with little scrutiny. 
The White House said decision-making must be "fully informed" by 
knowledge of  any potential environmental consequences. 
BBC 
19 August 2010  A study published in a leading scientific journal confirms the 
presence of  a toxic chemical residue one kilometre below the surface 
of  the Gulf  of  Mexico, but says it amounts to just 0.1% of  the total 
amount spilled. 
BBC 
3 September 2010  The blowout preventer that failed to stop the explosion on the 
Deepwater Horizon rig is removed from the stricken Gulf  of  Mexico 
oil well by BP. The 300-ton device will be examined as part of  the 
inquiry into the leak of  206m gallons of  oil into the Gulf.  
Meanwhile, the cost of  the oil spill has risen to USD 8bn (GBP 
5.2bn), BP says - a rise of  some USD 2bn in the past month alone. 
BBC 
5 September 2010  Thad Allen, the US coastguard official overseeing the clean-up 
operation, says the BP oil well at the centre of  the leak poses "no 
further risk" to the environment, despite the final stages of  an 
operation to pump concrete into a relief  well remaining unfinished. 
BBC 
8 September 2010  In its own internal report into the Gulf  of  Mexico oil spill - the first 
to be published since the disaster - BP spreads the blame for the 11 
April explosion and resulting leak.  
In a 193-page report BP accepts responsibility in part for the disaster, 
but also blames other companies working on the well. 
BBC 
17 September 2010  BP pumps cement to seal the damaged well after it was intercepted 
by a relief  well. 
BBC 
19 September 2010  The ruptured well is finally sealed and "effectively dead", says the top 
US federal official overseeing the disaster, Coast Guard Adm Thad 
Allen. 
BBC 
Table 35: Timeline of BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill 
Source: BP (2010c), Deepwater horizon accident investigation report 
 
 
 309 
Appendix 4: Acronyms BP Texas Case 
ACC   American Chemistry Council 
AIChE  American Institute of Chemical Engineers 
API   American Petroleum Institute 
ARPD   Amoco Refining Planning Department 
ARU   Aromatics Recovery Unit 
AU2   Aromatics Unit #2 
BOT   Basic Operator Training 
BPSH   BP South Houston 
bpd   barrels per day 
BUL   Business Unit Leader 
CAIB   Columbia Accident Investigation Board 
CDP   Compliance Delivery Process 
CFHU   Cat Feed Hydrotreating Unit 
CCPS   Center for Chemical Process Safety 
CMMS   Computerized Maintenance Management Software 
CSB   U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board 
CVP  Capital Value Process 
DIERS   Design Institute for Emergency Relief Systems 
DIH   Deisohexanizer 
EHS   Environment, Health and Safety 
EPA   Environmental Protection Agency 
ERP  Enterprise Resource Planning 
GHSER  Getting Health, Safety, and Environment Right 
gph  gallons per hour 
HAZOP    Hazard and Operability Study 
HC1   Hydrogen Chloride 
HRO   High Reliability Organization 
HSE   Health, Safety & Environment 
HSSE   Health, Safety, Security, & Environment 
HUF   Heavy Ultraformate Fractionator 
IH   Industrial Hygiene 
IMAS   Industrial Mutual Aid System 
ISBL   Inside Battery Limits 
ISOM   Isomerization unit 
kPa  kilopascal 
KPI   Key Performance Indicators 
L&D   Learning and Development 
MAR   Major Accident Risk 
MAWP   Maximum Allowable Working Pressure 
MDL   Manufacturing Delivery Leader 
MOA   Memorandum of Agreement 
MOC   Management of Change 
mscf  million standard cubic feet 
NDU   Naptha Desulfurization Unit 
NESHAP  National Emissions Standard for Hazardous Air Pollutants 
NPRA   National Petrochemical and Refiners Association 
NPS   Nominal Pipe Size 
NTSB   National Transportation Safety Board 
OSBL   Outside Battery Limits 
OCAM   Operator Competency Assurance Model 
OSHA   Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
P&ID   Piping and Instrumentation Diagram 
PHA   Process Hazard Analysis 
PIP   Piping Integrity Program 
pph  pounds per hour 
PPS   Amoco Petroleum Products Sector 
psi   pounds per square inch 
PSM   Process Safety Management 
PSS   Process Safety Standard 
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PSSR   Pre-Startup Safety Review 
PT   Process Technician 
QA/QC  Quality Assurance/Quality Control 
R&M   Refining and Marketing 
RCFA   Root Cause Failure Analysis 
RHU   ResidHydrotreating Unit 
RIF   Recordable Injury Frequency 
RMP   Risk Management Program 
SAP   Systems Applications and Products 
SEP   Special Emphasis Program 
SHIFT   South Houston Infrastructure for Tomorrow 
SIS   Safety Instrumented System 
SOI   Standard Operating Instructions 
SOPs   Standard Operating Procedures 
TCEQ   Texas Commission on Environmental Quality 
TCR   Texas City Refinery 
TCS   Texas City Site 
TSP   Traffic Safety Policy 
UK   United Kingdom 
ULC   Ultracracker unit 
UOP   Universal Oil Products 
USW   United Steelworkers 
UU3   Ultraformer Unit # 3 
UU4   Ultraformer Unit #4 
VOC   Volatile Organic Compounds 
VPP   Variable Pay Plan 
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